Bump golang.org/x/crypto to 7b82a4e

Resolves: GHSA-8c26-wmh5-6g9v - CVE-2022-27191

Buildah doesn't seem to be directly affected as the logic in question
is not called.

golang.org/x/crypto@1baeb1ce contains the actual CVE fix. Using the
latest upstream commit to also include support for SHA-2.

Signed-off-by: Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@fedoraproject.org>
This commit is contained in:
Lokesh Mandvekar 2022-04-12 14:11:44 -04:00
parent b07f40b7d0
commit 55e2081cc9
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 1C1EDD7CC7C3A0DD
62 changed files with 2173 additions and 4716 deletions

2
go.mod
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ require (
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0
github.com/syndtr/gocapability v0.0.0-20200815063812-42c35b437635
go.etcd.io/bbolt v1.3.6
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210711020723-a769d52b0f97
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220411220226-7b82a4e95df4
golang.org/x/sync v0.0.0-20210220032951-036812b2e83c
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210820121016-41cdb8703e55
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210615171337-6886f2dfbf5b

7
go.sum
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@ -870,8 +870,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPh
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200728195943-123391ffb6de/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20201002170205-7f63de1d35b0/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210322153248-0c34fe9e7dc2/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210711020723-a769d52b0f97 h1:/UOmuWzQfxxo9UtlXMwuQU8CMgg1eZXqTRwkSQJWKOI=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210711020723-a769d52b0f97/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220411220226-7b82a4e95df4 h1:kUhD7nTDoI3fVd9G4ORWrbV5NY0liEs/Jg2pv5f+bBA=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220411220226-7b82a4e95df4/go.mod h1:IxCIyHEi3zRg3s0A5j5BB6A9Jmi73HwBIUl50j+osU4=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190306152737-a1d7652674e8/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190510132918-efd6b22b2522/go.mod h1:ZjyILWgesfNpC6sMxTJOJm9Kp84zZh5NQWvqDGG3Qr8=
@ -956,8 +956,9 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210119194325-5f4716e94777/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210226172049-e18ecbb05110/go.mod h1:m0MpNAwzfU5UDzcl9v0D8zg8gWTRqZa9RBIspLL5mdg=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210316092652-d523dce5a7f4/go.mod h1:RBQZq4jEuRlivfhVLdyRGr576XBO4/greRjx4P4O3yc=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210405180319-a5a99cb37ef4/go.mod h1:p54w0d4576C0XHj96bSt6lcn1PtDYWL6XObtHCRCNQM=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210428140749-89ef3d95e781 h1:DzZ89McO9/gWPsQXS/FVKAlG02ZjaQ6AlZRBimEYOd0=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210428140749-89ef3d95e781/go.mod h1:OJAsFXCWl8Ukc7SiCT/9KSuxbyM7479/AVlXFRxuMCk=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211112202133-69e39bad7dc2 h1:CIJ76btIcR3eFI5EgSo6k1qKw9KJexJuRLI9G7Hp5wE=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211112202133-69e39bad7dc2/go.mod h1:9nx3DQGgdP8bBQD5qxJ1jj9UTztislL4KSBs9R2vV5Y=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20180821212333-d2e6202438be/go.mod h1:N/0e6XlmueqKjAGxoOufVs8QHGRruUQn6yWY3a++T0U=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190226205417-e64efc72b421/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190604053449-0f29369cfe45/go.mod h1:gOpvHmFTYa4IltrdGE7lF6nIHvwfUNPOp7c8zoXwtLw=

View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ const bufSize = 256
// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only
// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s.
//
//go:noescape
func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32)

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@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT.
//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego
// +build amd64,gc,!purego
package field
// feMul sets out = a * b. It works like feMulGeneric.
//
//go:noescape
func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element)
// feSquare sets out = a * a. It works like feSquareGeneric.
//
//go:noescape
func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element)

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@ -1,13 +1,7 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// In Go 1.13, the ed25519 package was promoted to the standard library as
// crypto/ed25519, and this package became a wrapper for the standard library one.
//
//go:build !go1.13
// +build !go1.13
// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
//
@ -16,21 +10,15 @@
// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
//
// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the
// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility
// wrapper.
package ed25519
// This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519
// from SUPERCOP.
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha512"
"errors"
"crypto/ed25519"
"io"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519"
)
const (
@ -45,57 +33,21 @@ const (
)
// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
type PublicKey []byte
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey
// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
type PrivateKey []byte
// Public returns the PublicKey corresponding to priv.
func (priv PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
copy(publicKey, priv[32:])
return PublicKey(publicKey)
}
// Seed returns the private key seed corresponding to priv. It is provided for
// interoperability with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds
// in this package.
func (priv PrivateKey) Seed() []byte {
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
copy(seed, priv[:32])
return seed
}
// Sign signs the given message with priv.
// Ed25519 performs two passes over messages to be signed and therefore cannot
// handle pre-hashed messages. Thus opts.HashFunc() must return zero to
// indicate the message hasn't been hashed. This can be achieved by passing
// crypto.Hash(0) as the value for opts.
func (priv PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, message []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
if opts.HashFunc() != crypto.Hash(0) {
return nil, errors.New("ed25519: cannot sign hashed message")
}
return Sign(priv, message), nil
}
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey
// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
if rand == nil {
rand = cryptorand.Reader
}
seed := make([]byte, SeedSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, seed); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
privateKey := NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
copy(publicKey, privateKey[32:])
return publicKey, privateKey, nil
return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand)
}
// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
@ -103,121 +55,17 @@ func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
// package.
func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
if l := len(seed); l != SeedSize {
panic("ed25519: bad seed length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
digest := sha512.Sum512(seed)
digest[0] &= 248
digest[31] &= 127
digest[31] |= 64
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
var hBytes [32]byte
copy(hBytes[:], digest[:])
edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&A, &hBytes)
var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
A.ToBytes(&publicKeyBytes)
privateKey := make([]byte, PrivateKeySize)
copy(privateKey, seed)
copy(privateKey[32:], publicKeyBytes[:])
return privateKey
return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
}
// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
if l := len(privateKey); l != PrivateKeySize {
panic("ed25519: bad private key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(privateKey[:32])
var digest1, messageDigest, hramDigest [64]byte
var expandedSecretKey [32]byte
h.Sum(digest1[:0])
copy(expandedSecretKey[:], digest1[:])
expandedSecretKey[0] &= 248
expandedSecretKey[31] &= 63
expandedSecretKey[31] |= 64
h.Reset()
h.Write(digest1[32:])
h.Write(message)
h.Sum(messageDigest[:0])
var messageDigestReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&messageDigestReduced, &messageDigest)
var R edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&R, &messageDigestReduced)
var encodedR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&encodedR)
h.Reset()
h.Write(encodedR[:])
h.Write(privateKey[32:])
h.Write(message)
h.Sum(hramDigest[:0])
var hramDigestReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hramDigestReduced, &hramDigest)
var s [32]byte
edwards25519.ScMulAdd(&s, &hramDigestReduced, &expandedSecretKey, &messageDigestReduced)
signature := make([]byte, SignatureSize)
copy(signature[:], encodedR[:])
copy(signature[32:], s[:])
return signature
return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message)
}
// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
if l := len(publicKey); l != PublicKeySize {
panic("ed25519: bad public key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
}
if len(sig) != SignatureSize || sig[63]&224 != 0 {
return false
}
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
copy(publicKeyBytes[:], publicKey)
if !A.FromBytes(&publicKeyBytes) {
return false
}
edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.X, &A.X)
edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.T, &A.T)
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(sig[:32])
h.Write(publicKey[:])
h.Write(message)
var digest [64]byte
h.Sum(digest[:0])
var hReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest)
var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement
var s [32]byte
copy(s[:], sig[32:])
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7 requires that s be in
// the range [0, order) in order to prevent signature malleability.
if !edwards25519.ScMinimal(&s) {
return false
}
edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &s)
var checkR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&checkR)
return bytes.Equal(sig[:32], checkR[:])
return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig)
}

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@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.13
// +build go1.13
// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
//
// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
//
// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the
// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility
// wrapper.
package ed25519
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"io"
)
const (
// PublicKeySize is the size, in bytes, of public keys as used in this package.
PublicKeySize = 32
// PrivateKeySize is the size, in bytes, of private keys as used in this package.
PrivateKeySize = 64
// SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package.
SignatureSize = 64
// SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032.
SeedSize = 32
)
// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey
// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
//
// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type.
// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey
// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand)
}
// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability
// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
// package.
func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
}
// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message)
}
// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig)
}

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
// directly.
package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
package poly1305
import "crypto/subtle"

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@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 {
// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of
// 128 bits of message, it computes
//
// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5
//
// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last
// incomplete chunk is the final one.
@ -278,8 +278,7 @@ const (
// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes
//
// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
//
// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸
func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) {
h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2]

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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
// updateVX is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector
// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is
// available.
//
//go:noescape
func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte)

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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
// value. These limbs are, for the most part, zero extended and
// placed into 64-bit vector register elements. Each vector
// register is 128-bits wide and so holds 2 of these elements.
// Using 26-bit limbs allows us plenty of headroom to accomodate
// Using 26-bit limbs allows us plenty of headroom to accommodate
// accumulations before and after multiplication without
// overflowing either 32-bits (before multiplication) or 64-bits
// (after multiplication).

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@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
// Package armor implements OpenPGP ASCII Armor, see RFC 4880. OpenPGP Armor is
// very similar to PEM except that it has an additional CRC checksum.
//
// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New
// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP
// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP
// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork.
// See https://golang.org/issue/44226.
package armor // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor"
import (
@ -17,12 +23,14 @@ import (
// A Block represents an OpenPGP armored structure.
//
// The encoded form is:
// -----BEGIN Type-----
// Headers
//
// base64-encoded Bytes
// '=' base64 encoded checksum
// -----END Type-----
// -----BEGIN Type-----
// Headers
//
// base64-encoded Bytes
// '=' base64 encoded checksum
// -----END Type-----
//
// where Headers is a possibly empty sequence of Key: Value lines.
//
// Since the armored data can be very large, this package presents a streaming

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@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ func (l *lineBreaker) Close() (err error) {
// trailer.
//
// It's built into a stack of io.Writers:
// encoding -> base64 encoder -> lineBreaker -> out
//
// encoding -> base64 encoder -> lineBreaker -> out
type encoding struct {
out io.Writer
breaker *lineBreaker

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@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
// This form of ElGamal embeds PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, which may make it
// unsuitable for other protocols. RSA should be used in preference in any
// case.
//
// Deprecated: this package was only provided to support ElGamal encryption in
// OpenPGP. The golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is now deprecated (see
// https://golang.org/issue/44226), and ElGamal in the OpenPGP ecosystem has
// compatibility and security issues (see https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/923).
// Moreover, this package doesn't protect against side-channel attacks.
package elgamal // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal"
import (
@ -71,8 +77,8 @@ func Encrypt(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (c1, c2 *big.Int, err
// returns the plaintext of the message. An error can result only if the
// ciphertext is invalid. Users should keep in mind that this is a padding
// oracle and thus, if exposed to an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, can
// be used to break the cryptosystem. See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
// Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel
// be used to break the cryptosystem. See Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
// Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1, Daniel
// Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology (Crypto '98),
func Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, c1, c2 *big.Int) (msg []byte, err error) {
s := new(big.Int).Exp(c1, priv.X, priv.P)

View File

@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package errors contains common error types for the OpenPGP packages.
//
// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New
// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP
// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP
// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork.
// See https://golang.org/issue/44226.
package errors // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
import (

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@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
// Package packet implements parsing and serialization of OpenPGP packets, as
// specified in RFC 4880.
//
// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New
// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP
// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP
// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork.
// See https://golang.org/issue/44226.
package packet // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet"
import (

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@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package openpgp implements high level operations on OpenPGP messages.
//
// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New
// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP
// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP
// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork.
// See https://golang.org/issue/44226.
package openpgp // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp"
import (

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@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
// Package s2k implements the various OpenPGP string-to-key transforms as
// specified in RFC 4800 section 3.7.1.
//
// Deprecated: this package is unmaintained except for security fixes. New
// applications should consider a more focused, modern alternative to OpenPGP
// for their specific task. If you are required to interoperate with OpenPGP
// systems and need a maintained package, consider a community fork.
// See https://golang.org/issue/44226.
package s2k // import "golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k"
import (

View File

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import (
// can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a 32-byte key) by
// doing:
//
// dk := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 4096, 32, sha1.New)
// dk := pbkdf2.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 4096, 32, sha1.New)
//
// Remember to get a good random salt. At least 8 bytes is recommended by the
// RFC.

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@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
// ssh-agent process using the sample server.
//
// References:
// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00
//
// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00
package agent // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent"
import (
@ -25,7 +26,6 @@ import (
"math/big"
"sync"
"crypto"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
@ -771,19 +771,26 @@ func (s *agentKeyringSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature,
return s.agent.Sign(s.pub, data)
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) SignWithOpts(rand io.Reader, data []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
var flags SignatureFlags
if opts != nil {
switch opts.HashFunc() {
case crypto.SHA256:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha256
case crypto.SHA512:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha512
}
func (s *agentKeyringSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
if algorithm == "" || algorithm == s.pub.Type() {
return s.Sign(rand, data)
}
var flags SignatureFlags
switch algorithm {
case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha256
case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512:
flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported algorithm %q", algorithm)
}
return s.agent.SignWithFlags(s.pub, data, flags)
}
var _ ssh.AlgorithmSigner = &agentKeyringSigner{}
// Calls an extension method. It is up to the agent implementation as to whether or not
// any particular extension is supported and may always return an error. Because the
// type of the response is up to the implementation, this returns the bytes of the

View File

@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (r *keyring) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error {
// expireKeysLocked removes expired keys from the keyring. If a key was added
// with a lifetimesecs contraint and seconds >= lifetimesecs seconds have
// ellapsed, it is removed. The caller *must* be holding the keyring mutex.
// elapsed, it is removed. The caller *must* be holding the keyring mutex.
func (r *keyring) expireKeysLocked() {
for _, k := range r.keys {
if k.expire != nil && time.Now().After(*k.expire) {
@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ func (r *keyring) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureF
var algorithm string
switch flags {
case SignatureFlagRsaSha256:
algorithm = ssh.SigAlgoRSASHA2256
algorithm = ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256
case SignatureFlagRsaSha512:
algorithm = ssh.SigAlgoRSASHA2512
algorithm = ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported signature flags: %d", flags)
}

View File

@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ import (
"time"
)
// These constants from [PROTOCOL.certkeys] represent the algorithm names
// for certificate types supported by this package.
// Certificate algorithm names from [PROTOCOL.certkeys]. These values can appear
// in Certificate.Type, PublicKey.Type, and ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms.
// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner and don't
// appear in the Signature.Format field.
const (
CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
@ -25,6 +27,21 @@ const (
CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoSKED25519v01 = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
// CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 and CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 can't appear as a
// Certificate.Type (or PublicKey.Type), but only in
// ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms.
CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 = "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 = "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"
)
const (
// Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSAv01.
CertSigAlgoRSAv01 = CertAlgoRSAv01
// Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA256v01.
CertSigAlgoRSASHA2256v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA256v01
// Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA512v01.
CertSigAlgoRSASHA2512v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA512v01
)
// Certificate types distinguish between host and user
@ -423,6 +440,16 @@ func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
}
c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey()
// Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers.
if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA {
sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), KeyAlgoRSASHA512)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.Signature = sig
return nil
}
sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning())
if err != nil {
return err
@ -431,26 +458,40 @@ func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
return nil
}
var certAlgoNames = map[string]string{
KeyAlgoRSA: CertAlgoRSAv01,
KeyAlgoDSA: CertAlgoDSAv01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoED25519: CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoSKED25519: CertAlgoSKED25519v01,
// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the
// corresponding public key signature algorithm.
var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{
CertAlgoRSAv01: KeyAlgoRSA,
CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA512,
CertAlgoDSAv01: KeyAlgoDSA,
CertAlgoECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoECDSA256,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01: KeyAlgoECDSA384,
CertAlgoECDSA521v01: KeyAlgoECDSA521,
CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256,
CertAlgoED25519v01: KeyAlgoED25519,
CertAlgoSKED25519v01: KeyAlgoSKED25519,
}
// certToPrivAlgo returns the underlying algorithm for a certificate algorithm.
// Panics if a non-certificate algorithm is passed.
func certToPrivAlgo(algo string) string {
for privAlgo, pubAlgo := range certAlgoNames {
if pubAlgo == algo {
return privAlgo
// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is
// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are
// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms.
func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string {
if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok {
return a
}
return algo
}
// certificateAlgo returns the certificate algorithms that uses the provided
// underlying signature algorithm.
func certificateAlgo(algo string) (certAlgo string, ok bool) {
for certName, algoName := range certKeyAlgoNames {
if algoName == algo {
return certName, true
}
}
panic("unknown cert algorithm")
return "", false
}
func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte {
@ -494,13 +535,13 @@ func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte {
return result
}
// Type returns the key name. It is part of the PublicKey interface.
// Type returns the certificate algorithm name. It is part of the PublicKey interface.
func (c *Certificate) Type() string {
algo, ok := certAlgoNames[c.Key.Type()]
certName, ok := certificateAlgo(c.Key.Type())
if !ok {
panic("unknown cert key type " + c.Key.Type())
panic("unknown certificate type for key type " + c.Key.Type())
}
return algo
return certName
}
// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public

View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import (
"io/ioutil"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20"
"golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
"golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305"
)
const (
@ -394,6 +394,10 @@ func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
}
c.incIV()
if len(plain) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet")
}
padding := plain[0]
if padding < 4 {
// padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies
@ -636,7 +640,7 @@ const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
// AEAD, which is described here:
//
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00
//
// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6
// also requires of stream ciphers.
@ -710,6 +714,10 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([
plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd]
s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain)
if len(plain) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet")
}
padding := plain[0]
if padding < 4 {
// padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies

View File

@ -113,14 +113,18 @@ func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) e
return c.clientAuthenticate(config)
}
// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key
// exchange.
func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, result *kexResult) error {
// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key exchange.
// algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may be a certificate type.
func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, algo string, result *kexResult) error {
sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature)
if len(rest) > 0 || !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error")
}
if a := underlyingAlgo(algo); sig.Format != a {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid signature algorithm %q, expected %q", sig.Format, a)
}
return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig)
}
@ -224,11 +228,11 @@ type ClientConfig struct {
// be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used.
ClientVersion string
// HostKeyAlgorithms lists the key types that the client will
// accept from the server as host key, in order of
// HostKeyAlgorithms lists the public key algorithms that the client will
// accept from the server for host key authentication, in order of
// preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any
// string returned from PublicKey.Type method may be used, or
// any of the CertAlgoXxxx and KeyAlgoXxxx constants.
// string returned from a PublicKey.Type method may be used, or
// any of the CertAlgo and KeyAlgo constants.
HostKeyAlgorithms []string
// Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish.

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
)
type authResult int
@ -29,6 +30,33 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
// The server may choose to send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at this point (if we
// advertised willingness to receive one, which we always do) or not. See
// RFC 8308, Section 2.4.
extensions := make(map[string][]byte)
if len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgExtInfo {
var extInfo extInfoMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &extInfo); err != nil {
return err
}
payload := extInfo.Payload
for i := uint32(0); i < extInfo.NumExtensions; i++ {
name, rest, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok {
return parseError(msgExtInfo)
}
value, rest, ok := parseString(rest)
if !ok {
return parseError(msgExtInfo)
}
extensions[string(name)] = value
payload = rest
}
packet, err = c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil {
return err
@ -41,7 +69,7 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID()
for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; {
ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand)
ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@ -93,7 +121,7 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative
// method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored
// and the previous set of possible methods will be reused.
auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error)
auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error)
// method returns the RFC 4252 method name.
method() string
@ -102,7 +130,7 @@ type AuthMethod interface {
// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2.
type noneAuth int
func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
@ -122,7 +150,7 @@ func (n *noneAuth) method() string {
// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user.
type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error)
func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
type passwordAuthMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@ -189,7 +217,46 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string {
return "publickey"
}
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (as AlgorithmSigner, algo string) {
keyFormat := signer.PublicKey().Type()
// Like in sendKexInit, if the public key implements AlgorithmSigner we
// assume it supports all algorithms, otherwise only the key format one.
as, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
return algorithmSignerWrapper{signer}, keyFormat
}
extPayload, ok := extensions["server-sig-algs"]
if !ok {
// If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension, fall back to the key
// format algorithm.
return as, keyFormat
}
// The server-sig-algs extension only carries underlying signature
// algorithm, but we are trying to select a protocol-level public key
// algorithm, which might be a certificate type. Extend the list of server
// supported algorithms to include the corresponding certificate algorithms.
serverAlgos := strings.Split(string(extPayload), ",")
for _, algo := range serverAlgos {
if certAlgo, ok := certificateAlgo(algo); ok {
serverAlgos = append(serverAlgos, certAlgo)
}
}
keyAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)
algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos)
if err != nil {
// If there is no overlap, try the key anyway with the key format
// algorithm, to support servers that fail to list all supported
// algorithms.
return as, keyFormat
}
return as, algo
}
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
// Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is
// acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will
// attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat
@ -201,7 +268,10 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
}
var methods []string
for _, signer := range signers {
ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c)
pub := signer.PublicKey()
as, algo := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions)
ok, err := validateKey(pub, algo, user, c)
if err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
@ -209,13 +279,13 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
continue
}
pub := signer.PublicKey()
pubKey := pub.Marshal()
sign, err := signer.Sign(rand, buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{
data := buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: cb.method(),
}, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey))
}, algo, pubKey)
sign, err := as.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo))
if err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
@ -229,7 +299,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: cb.method(),
HasSig: true,
Algoname: pub.Type(),
Algoname: algo,
PubKey: pubKey,
Sig: sig,
}
@ -266,26 +336,25 @@ func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool {
}
// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server.
func validateKey(key PublicKey, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
msg := publickeyAuthMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "publickey",
HasSig: false,
Algoname: key.Type(),
Algoname: algo,
PubKey: pubKey,
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil {
return false, err
}
return confirmKeyAck(key, c)
return confirmKeyAck(key, algo, c)
}
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
algoname := key.Type()
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
@ -302,14 +371,14 @@ func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if msg.Algo != algoname || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
if msg.Algo != algo || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
case msgUserAuthFailure:
return false, nil
default:
return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthPubKeyOk, packet[0])
}
}
}
@ -330,6 +399,7 @@ func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMet
// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and
// an error if an unexpected response was received.
func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) {
gotMsgExtInfo := false
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
@ -341,6 +411,12 @@ func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) {
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
case msgExtInfo:
// Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once.
if gotMsgExtInfo {
return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
}
gotMsgExtInfo = true
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
@ -380,10 +456,10 @@ func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error {
// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers.
// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After
// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no
// questions, for which the user and instruction messages should be
// questions, for which the name and instruction messages should be
// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for
// both CLI and GUI environments.
type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error)
type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error)
// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response
// sequence controlled by the server.
@ -395,7 +471,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string {
return "keyboard-interactive"
}
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
type initiateMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
@ -412,6 +488,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
return authFailure, nil, err
}
gotMsgExtInfo := false
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
@ -425,6 +502,13 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
return authFailure, nil, err
}
continue
case msgExtInfo:
// Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once.
if gotMsgExtInfo {
return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
}
gotMsgExtInfo = true
continue
case msgUserAuthInfoRequest:
// OK
case msgUserAuthFailure:
@ -465,7 +549,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe
return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
}
answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos)
answers, err := cb(msg.Name, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos)
if err != nil {
return authFailure, nil, err
}
@ -497,9 +581,9 @@ type retryableAuthMethod struct {
maxTries int
}
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) {
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) {
for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ {
ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand)
ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand, extensions)
if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate
return ok, methods, err
}
@ -542,7 +626,7 @@ type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct {
target string
}
func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) {
m := &userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,

View File

@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ var preferredCiphers = []string{
// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in
// preference order.
var supportedKexAlgos = []string{
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256,
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH,
// P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't
// reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK.
kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
}
// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden
@ -61,18 +61,20 @@ var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{
// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange algorithms
// in preference order.
var preferredKexAlgos = []string{
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256,
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH,
kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
kexAlgoDH14SHA1,
kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1,
}
// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods
// of authenticating servers) in preference order.
var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSASHA256v01,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521,
KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSASHA256,
KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA,
KeyAlgoED25519,
@ -87,19 +89,33 @@ var supportedMACs = []string{
var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone}
// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported algorithms to their respective
// hashes needed for signature verification.
// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported signature algorithms to their
// respective hashes needed for signing and verification.
var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{
KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512,
CertAlgoRSAv01: crypto.SHA1,
CertAlgoDSAv01: crypto.SHA1,
CertAlgoECDSA256v01: crypto.SHA256,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01: crypto.SHA384,
CertAlgoECDSA521v01: crypto.SHA512,
KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoRSASHA256: crypto.SHA256,
KeyAlgoRSASHA512: crypto.SHA512,
KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512,
// KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash.
KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: crypto.SHA256,
KeyAlgoSKED25519: crypto.SHA256,
}
// algorithmsForKeyFormat returns the supported signature algorithms for a given
// public key format (PublicKey.Type), in order of preference. See RFC 8332,
// Section 2. See also the note in sendKexInit on backwards compatibility.
func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string {
switch keyFormat {
case KeyAlgoRSA:
return []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA}
case CertAlgoRSAv01:
return []string{CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSAv01}
default:
return []string{keyFormat}
}
}
// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't
@ -146,6 +162,11 @@ func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
return 1 << 30
}
var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{
gcmCipherID: true,
chacha20Poly1305ID: true,
}
type algorithms struct {
kex string
hostKey string
@ -181,14 +202,18 @@ func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMs
return
}
ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
if !aeadCiphers[ctos.Cipher] {
ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
if !aeadCiphers[stoc.Cipher] {
stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer)
@ -272,8 +297,9 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
}
// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove
// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7.
func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7. algo is the advertised
// algorithm, and may be a certificate type.
func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo string, pubKey []byte) []byte {
data := struct {
Session []byte
Type byte
@ -281,7 +307,7 @@ func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubK
Service string
Method string
Sign bool
Algo []byte
Algo string
PubKey []byte
}{
sessionID,

View File

@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support
others.
References:
[PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD
[SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1
[PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD
[SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1
This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself,
so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise.

View File

@ -455,14 +455,38 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
}
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:])
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0
if isServer {
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, k.PublicKey().Type())
// If k is an AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all signature algorithms
// associated with the key format. (Ideally AlgorithmSigner would have a
// method to advertise supported algorithms, but it doesn't. This means that
// adding support for a new algorithm is a breaking change, as we will
// immediately negotiate it even if existing implementations don't support
// it. If that ever happens, we'll have to figure something out.)
// If k is not an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the
// algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign can't pick
// a different default.)
keyFormat := k.PublicKey().Type()
if _, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner); ok {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)...)
} else {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat)
}
}
} else {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms
// As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what
// algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC
// 8308, Section 2.1.
if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange {
msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+1)
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...)
msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c")
}
}
packet := Marshal(msg)
// writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy.
@ -582,9 +606,9 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
var result *kexResult
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
result, err = t.server(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
result, err = t.server(kex, &magics)
} else {
result, err = t.client(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
result, err = t.client(kex, &magics)
}
if err != nil {
@ -611,19 +635,52 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
var hostKey Signer
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
if algs.hostKey == k.PublicKey().Type() {
hostKey = k
// algorithmSignerWrapper is an AlgorithmSigner that only supports the default
// key format algorithm.
//
// This is technically a violation of the AlgorithmSigner interface, but it
// should be unreachable given where we use this. Anyway, at least it returns an
// error instead of panicing or producing an incorrect signature.
type algorithmSignerWrapper struct {
Signer
}
func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
if algorithm != underlyingAlgo(a.PublicKey().Type()) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: algorithmSignerWrapper invoked with non-default algorithm")
}
return a.Sign(rand, data)
}
func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner {
for _, k := range hostKeys {
if algo == k.PublicKey().Type() {
return algorithmSignerWrapper{k}
}
k, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner)
if !ok {
continue
}
for _, a := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(k.PublicKey().Type()) {
if algo == a {
return k
}
}
}
return nil
}
r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey)
func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.hostKey)
if hostKey == nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: negotiated unsupported signature type")
}
r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey)
return r, err
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -634,7 +691,7 @@ func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *
return nil, err
}
if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, result); err != nil {
if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey, result); err != nil {
return nil, err
}

186
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go generated vendored
View File

@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ import (
)
const (
kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256"
// For the following kex only the client half contains a production
// ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal
@ -75,8 +77,9 @@ func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) {
// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms.
type kexAlgorithm interface {
// Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result
// with a hostkey.
Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s Signer) (*kexResult, error)
// with a hostkey. algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may
// be a certificate type.
Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (*kexResult, error)
// Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is
// responsible for verifying the host key signature.
@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ type kexAlgorithm interface {
// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
type dhGroup struct {
g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int
hashFunc crypto.Hash
}
func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) {
@ -96,8 +100,6 @@ func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int,
}
func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
var x *big.Int
for {
var err error
@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
return nil, err
}
h := hashFunc.New()
h := group.hashFunc.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey)
writeInt(h, X)
@ -146,12 +148,11 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
K: K,
HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey,
Signature: kexDHReply.Signature,
Hash: crypto.SHA1,
Hash: group.hashFunc,
}, nil
}
func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return
@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
h := hashFunc.New()
h := group.hashFunc.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X)
@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha
K: K,
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Signature: sig,
Hash: crypto.SHA1,
Hash: group.hashFunc,
}, err
}
@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool {
return true
}
func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -359,7 +360,7 @@ func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, p
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -384,39 +385,62 @@ func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, p
}, nil
}
// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC
// 5656, section 6.2.1
func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash {
bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize
switch {
case bitSize <= 256:
return crypto.SHA256
case bitSize <= 384:
return crypto.SHA384
}
return crypto.SHA512
}
var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{}
func init() {
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC
// 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in
// RFC 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
hashFunc: crypto.SHA1,
}
// This are the groups called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and
// diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 in RFC 4253 and RFC 8268,
// and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
group14 := &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
}
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1,
hashFunc: crypto.SHA1,
}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{
g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1,
hashFunc: crypto.SHA256,
}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256}
}
// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key
// agreement protocol, as described in
// https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/tree/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt
// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256 (formerly known as
// curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) key exchange method, as described in RFC 8731.
type curve25519sha256 struct{}
type curve25519KeyPair struct {
@ -486,7 +510,7 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
}, nil
}
func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return
@ -527,7 +551,7 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
H := h.Sum(nil)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -553,7 +577,6 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols,
// as described in RFC 4419
type dhGEXSHA struct {
g, p *big.Int
hashFunc crypto.Hash
}
@ -563,14 +586,7 @@ const (
dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192
)
func (gex *dhGEXSHA) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) {
if theirPublic.Sign() <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(gex.p) >= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
}
return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, gex.p), nil
}
func (gex dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
// Send GexRequest
kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{
MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits,
@ -587,35 +603,29 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
return nil, err
}
var kexDHGexGroup kexDHGexGroupMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexGroup); err != nil {
var msg kexDHGexGroupMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits
if kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen())
if msg.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || msg.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", msg.P.BitLen())
}
gex.p = kexDHGexGroup.P
gex.g = kexDHGexGroup.G
// Check if g is safe by verifing that g > 1 and g < p - 1
one := big.NewInt(1)
var pMinusOne = &big.Int{}
pMinusOne.Sub(gex.p, one)
if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 && gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
// Check if g is safe by verifying that 1 < g < p-1
pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(msg.P, bigOne)
if msg.G.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || msg.G.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe")
}
// Send GexInit
var pHalf = &big.Int{}
pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1)
pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(msg.P, 1)
x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
X := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, x, gex.p)
X := new(big.Int).Exp(msg.G, x, msg.P)
kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{
X: X,
}
@ -634,13 +644,13 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
return nil, err
}
kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexReply.Y, x)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
if kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
}
kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexReply.Y, x, msg.P)
// Check if k is safe by verifing that k > 1 and k < p - 1
if kInt.Cmp(one) != 1 && kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
// Check if k is safe by verifying that k > 1 and k < p - 1
if kInt.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe")
}
@ -650,8 +660,8 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits))
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits))
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits))
writeInt(h, gex.p)
writeInt(h, gex.g)
writeInt(h, msg.P)
writeInt(h, msg.G)
writeInt(h, X)
writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y)
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
@ -670,7 +680,7 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256.
//
// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests.
func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) {
// Receive GexRequest
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
@ -681,35 +691,17 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
return
}
// smoosh the user's preferred size into our own limits
if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits {
kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits
}
if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits {
kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits
}
// fix min/max if they're inconsistent. technically, we could just pout
// and hang up, but there's no harm in giving them the benefit of the
// doubt and just picking a bitsize for them.
if kexDHGexRequest.MinBits > kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits {
kexDHGexRequest.MinBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits
}
if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits {
kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits
}
// Send GexGroup
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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
gex.p = p
gex.g = big.NewInt(2)
g := big.NewInt(2)
kexDHGexGroup := kexDHGexGroupMsg{
P: gex.p,
G: gex.g,
msg := &kexDHGexGroupMsg{
P: p,
G: g,
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexGroup)); err != nil {
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(msg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -723,19 +715,19 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
return
}
var pHalf = &big.Int{}
pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1)
pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(p, 1)
y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf)
if err != nil {
return
}
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(g, y, p)
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, y, gex.p)
kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexInit.X, y)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne)
if kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
}
kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexInit.X, y, p)
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
@ -745,8 +737,8 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits))
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits))
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits))
writeInt(h, gex.p)
writeInt(h, gex.g)
writeInt(h, p)
writeInt(h, g)
writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X)
writeInt(h, Y)
@ -758,7 +750,7 @@ func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshake
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf"
)
// These constants represent the algorithm names for key types supported by this
// package.
// Public key algorithms names. These values can appear in PublicKey.Type,
// ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms, Signature.Format, or as AlgorithmSigner
// arguments.
const (
KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss"
@ -41,16 +42,21 @@ const (
KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519"
KeyAlgoSKED25519 = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
// KeyAlgoRSASHA256 and KeyAlgoRSASHA512 are only public key algorithms, not
// public key formats, so they can't appear as a PublicKey.Type. The
// corresponding PublicKey.Type is KeyAlgoRSA. See RFC 8332, Section 2.
KeyAlgoRSASHA256 = "rsa-sha2-256"
KeyAlgoRSASHA512 = "rsa-sha2-512"
)
// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported
// as algorithm parameters to AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm methods. See
// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1 and
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10
const (
SigAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa"
SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = "rsa-sha2-256"
SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = "rsa-sha2-512"
// Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSA.
SigAlgoRSA = KeyAlgoRSA
// Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA256.
SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = KeyAlgoRSASHA256
// Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA512.
SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = KeyAlgoRSASHA512
)
// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm.
@ -70,7 +76,7 @@ func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err err
case KeyAlgoSKED25519:
return parseSKEd25519(in)
case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
cert, err := parseCert(in, certToPrivAlgo(algo))
cert, err := parseCert(in, certKeyAlgoNames[algo])
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
@ -289,18 +295,21 @@ func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte {
return b.Bytes()
}
// PublicKey is an abstraction of different types of public keys.
// PublicKey represents a public key using an unspecified algorithm.
//
// Some PublicKeys provided by this package also implement CryptoPublicKey.
type PublicKey interface {
// Type returns the key's type, e.g. "ssh-rsa".
// Type returns the key format name, e.g. "ssh-rsa".
Type() string
// Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format,
// with the name prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use
// the ParsePublicKey function.
// Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format, with the name
// prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use the ParsePublicKey function.
Marshal() []byte
// Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this
// key. This function will hash the data appropriately first.
// Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this key. This
// method will hash the data appropriately first. sig.Format is allowed to
// be any signature algorithm compatible with the key type, the caller
// should check if it has more stringent requirements.
Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error
}
@ -311,25 +320,32 @@ type CryptoPublicKey interface {
}
// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key.
//
// Some Signers provided by this package also implement AlgorithmSigner.
type Signer interface {
// PublicKey returns an associated PublicKey instance.
// PublicKey returns the associated PublicKey.
PublicKey() PublicKey
// Sign returns raw signature for the given data. This method
// will apply the hash specified for the keytype to the data.
// Sign returns a signature for the given data. This method will hash the
// data appropriately first. The signature algorithm is expected to match
// the key format returned by the PublicKey.Type method (and not to be any
// alternative algorithm supported by the key format).
Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error)
}
// A AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying a specific
// algorithm to use for signing.
// An AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying an algorithm to
// use for signing.
//
// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, so it should
// be prepared to be invoked with every algorithm supported by the public key
// format.
type AlgorithmSigner interface {
Signer
// SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specification of a
// non-default signing algorithm. See the SigAlgo* constants in this
// package for signature algorithms supported by this package. Callers may
// pass an empty string for the algorithm in which case the AlgorithmSigner
// will use its default algorithm.
// SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specifying a desired
// signing algorithm. Callers may pass an empty string for the algorithm in
// which case the AlgorithmSigner will use a default algorithm. This default
// doesn't currently control any behavior in this package.
SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error)
}
@ -381,17 +397,11 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte {
}
func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
var hash crypto.Hash
switch sig.Format {
case SigAlgoRSA:
hash = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hash = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hash = crypto.SHA512
default:
supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(r.Type())
if !contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type())
}
hash := hashFuncs[sig.Format]
h := hash.New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -466,7 +476,7 @@ func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
if sig.Format != k.Type() {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -499,7 +509,7 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, k.PublicKey().Type())
}
func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
@ -507,7 +517,7 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
h := crypto.SHA1.New()
h := hashFuncs[k.PublicKey().Type()].New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest)
@ -603,19 +613,6 @@ func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool {
return curve == elliptic.P256() || curve == elliptic.P384() || curve == elliptic.P521()
}
// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC
// 5656, section 6.2.1
func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash {
bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize
switch {
case bitSize <= 256:
return crypto.SHA256
case bitSize <= 384:
return crypto.SHA384
}
return crypto.SHA512
}
// parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1.
func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) {
var w struct {
@ -671,7 +668,7 @@ func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := ecHash(k.Curve).New()
h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
h.Write(data)
digest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -775,7 +772,7 @@ func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type())
}
h := ecHash(k.Curve).New()
h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
h.Write([]byte(k.application))
appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -874,7 +871,7 @@ func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l)
}
h := sha256.New()
h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New()
h.Write([]byte(k.application))
appDigest := h.Sum(nil)
@ -961,44 +958,20 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "")
return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, s.pubKey.Type())
}
func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) {
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
if _, ok := s.pubKey.(*rsaPublicKey); ok {
// RSA keys support a few hash functions determined by the requested signature algorithm
switch algorithm {
case "", SigAlgoRSA:
algorithm = SigAlgoRSA
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case SigAlgoRSASHA2256:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
case SigAlgoRSASHA2512:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
} else {
// The only supported algorithm for all other key types is the same as the type of the key
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
} else if algorithm != s.pubKey.Type() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm)
}
switch key := s.pubKey.(type) {
case *dsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = crypto.SHA1
case *ecdsaPublicKey:
hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve)
case ed25519PublicKey:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key)
}
if algorithm == "" {
algorithm = s.pubKey.Type()
}
supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type())
if !contains(supportedAlgos, algorithm) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type())
}
hashFunc := hashFuncs[algorithm]
var digest []byte
if hashFunc != 0 {
h := hashFunc.New()

View File

@ -141,6 +141,14 @@ type serviceAcceptMsg struct {
Service string `sshtype:"6"`
}
// See RFC 8308, section 2.3
const msgExtInfo = 7
type extInfoMsg struct {
NumExtensions uint32 `sshtype:"7"`
Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4252, section 5.
const msgUserAuthRequest = 50
@ -180,11 +188,11 @@ const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60
const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61
type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"60"`
Instruction string
DeprecatedLanguage string
NumPrompts uint32
Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"`
Name string `sshtype:"60"`
Instruction string
Language string
NumPrompts uint32
Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.1.
@ -782,6 +790,8 @@ func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
msg = new(serviceRequestMsg)
case msgServiceAccept:
msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg)
case msgExtInfo:
msg = new(extInfoMsg)
case msgKexInit:
msg = new(kexInitMsg)
case msgKexDHInit:
@ -843,6 +853,7 @@ var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{
msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg",
msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg",
msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg",
msgExtInfo: "extInfoMsg",
msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg",
msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg",
msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg",

View File

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
}
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
// key exists with the same algorithm, it is overwritten. Each server
// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server
// config must have at least one host key.
func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) {
for i, k := range s.hostKeys {
@ -212,9 +212,10 @@ func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewCha
}
// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm,
// and serializes the result in SSH wire format.
func signAndMarshal(k Signer, rand io.Reader, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := k.Sign(rand, data)
// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate
// algorithm and may be a certificate type.
func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
switch algo {
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, KeyAlgoED25519, KeyAlgoSKED25519,
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, KeyAlgoED25519, KeyAlgoSKED25519,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01:
return true
}
@ -553,6 +554,7 @@ userAuthLoop:
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
// Ensure the public key algo and signature algo
// are supported. Compare the private key
// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
@ -562,7 +564,12 @@ userAuthLoop:
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)
if underlyingAlgo(algo) != sig.Format {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo)
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData)
if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -633,6 +640,30 @@ userAuthLoop:
}
authFailures++
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
// the loop.
//
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
//
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
// failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
// to match that behavior.
continue
}
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if config.PasswordCallback != nil {
@ -670,7 +701,7 @@ type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct {
*connection
}
func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) {
func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) {
if len(questions) != len(echos) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length")
}
@ -682,6 +713,7 @@ func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(user, instruction string, quest
}
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{
Name: name,
Instruction: instruction,
NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)),
Prompts: prompts,

View File

@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ const (
IXANY = 39
IXOFF = 40
IMAXBEL = 41
IUTF8 = 42 // RFC 8160
ISIG = 50
ICANON = 51
XCASE = 52

View File

@ -238,15 +238,19 @@ var (
// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys).
func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) {
cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher]
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
macKey := make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
var macKey []byte
if !aeadCiphers[algs.Cipher] {
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
}
return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs)
}

View File

@ -663,6 +663,24 @@ func inHeadIM(p *parser) bool {
// Ignore the token.
return true
case a.Template:
// TODO: remove this divergence from the HTML5 spec.
//
// We don't handle all of the corner cases when mixing foreign
// content (i.e. <math> or <svg>) with <template>. Without this
// early return, we can get into an infinite loop, possibly because
// of the "TODO... further divergence" a little below.
//
// As a workaround, if we are mixing foreign content and templates,
// just ignore the rest of the HTML. Foreign content is rare and a
// relatively old HTML feature. Templates are also rare and a
// relatively new HTML feature. Their combination is very rare.
for _, e := range p.oe {
if e.Namespace != "" {
p.im = ignoreTheRemainingTokens
return true
}
}
p.addElement()
p.afe = append(p.afe, &scopeMarker)
p.framesetOK = false
@ -683,7 +701,7 @@ func inHeadIM(p *parser) bool {
if !p.oe.contains(a.Template) {
return true
}
// TODO: remove this divergence from the HTML5 spec.
// TODO: remove this further divergence from the HTML5 spec.
//
// See https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=829668
p.generateImpliedEndTags()
@ -2127,6 +2145,10 @@ func afterAfterFramesetIM(p *parser) bool {
return true
}
func ignoreTheRemainingTokens(p *parser) bool {
return true
}
const whitespaceOrNUL = whitespace + "\x00"
// Section 12.2.6.5

20
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/README generated vendored
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
This is a work-in-progress HTTP/2 implementation for Go.
It will eventually live in the Go standard library and won't require
any changes to your code to use. It will just be automatic.
Status:
* The server support is pretty good. A few things are missing
but are being worked on.
* The client work has just started but shares a lot of code
is coming along much quicker.
Docs are at https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/net/http2
Demo test server at https://http2.golang.org/
Help & bug reports welcome!
Contributing: https://golang.org/doc/contribute.html
Bugs: https://golang.org/issue/new?title=x/net/http2:+

53
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/ascii.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package http2
import "strings"
// The HTTP protocols are defined in terms of ASCII, not Unicode. This file
// contains helper functions which may use Unicode-aware functions which would
// otherwise be unsafe and could introduce vulnerabilities if used improperly.
// asciiEqualFold is strings.EqualFold, ASCII only. It reports whether s and t
// are equal, ASCII-case-insensitively.
func asciiEqualFold(s, t string) bool {
if len(s) != len(t) {
return false
}
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if lower(s[i]) != lower(t[i]) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// lower returns the ASCII lowercase version of b.
func lower(b byte) byte {
if 'A' <= b && b <= 'Z' {
return b + ('a' - 'A')
}
return b
}
// isASCIIPrint returns whether s is ASCII and printable according to
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc20#section-4.2.
func isASCIIPrint(s string) bool {
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if s[i] < ' ' || s[i] > '~' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// asciiToLower returns the lowercase version of s if s is ASCII and printable,
// and whether or not it was.
func asciiToLower(s string) (lower string, ok bool) {
if !isASCIIPrint(s) {
return "", false
}
return strings.ToLower(s), true
}

View File

@ -7,13 +7,21 @@
package http2
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"net/http"
"sync"
)
// ClientConnPool manages a pool of HTTP/2 client connections.
type ClientConnPool interface {
// GetClientConn returns a specific HTTP/2 connection (usually
// a TLS-TCP connection) to an HTTP/2 server. On success, the
// returned ClientConn accounts for the upcoming RoundTrip
// call, so the caller should not omit it. If the caller needs
// to, ClientConn.RoundTrip can be called with a bogus
// new(http.Request) to release the stream reservation.
GetClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string) (*ClientConn, error)
MarkDead(*ClientConn)
}
@ -40,7 +48,7 @@ type clientConnPool struct {
conns map[string][]*ClientConn // key is host:port
dialing map[string]*dialCall // currently in-flight dials
keys map[*ClientConn][]string
addConnCalls map[string]*addConnCall // in-flight addConnIfNeede calls
addConnCalls map[string]*addConnCall // in-flight addConnIfNeeded calls
}
func (p *clientConnPool) GetClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string) (*ClientConn, error) {
@ -52,87 +60,85 @@ const (
noDialOnMiss = false
)
// shouldTraceGetConn reports whether getClientConn should call any
// ClientTrace.GetConn hook associated with the http.Request.
//
// This complexity is needed to avoid double calls of the GetConn hook
// during the back-and-forth between net/http and x/net/http2 (when the
// net/http.Transport is upgraded to also speak http2), as well as support
// the case where x/net/http2 is being used directly.
func (p *clientConnPool) shouldTraceGetConn(st clientConnIdleState) bool {
// If our Transport wasn't made via ConfigureTransport, always
// trace the GetConn hook if provided, because that means the
// http2 package is being used directly and it's the one
// dialing, as opposed to net/http.
if _, ok := p.t.ConnPool.(noDialClientConnPool); !ok {
return true
}
// Otherwise, only use the GetConn hook if this connection has
// been used previously for other requests. For fresh
// connections, the net/http package does the dialing.
return !st.freshConn
}
func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMiss bool) (*ClientConn, error) {
// TODO(dneil): Dial a new connection when t.DisableKeepAlives is set?
if isConnectionCloseRequest(req) && dialOnMiss {
// It gets its own connection.
traceGetConn(req, addr)
const singleUse = true
cc, err := p.t.dialClientConn(addr, singleUse)
cc, err := p.t.dialClientConn(req.Context(), addr, singleUse)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cc, nil
}
p.mu.Lock()
for _, cc := range p.conns[addr] {
if st := cc.idleState(); st.canTakeNewRequest {
if p.shouldTraceGetConn(st) {
traceGetConn(req, addr)
for {
p.mu.Lock()
for _, cc := range p.conns[addr] {
if cc.ReserveNewRequest() {
// When a connection is presented to us by the net/http package,
// the GetConn hook has already been called.
// Don't call it a second time here.
if !cc.getConnCalled {
traceGetConn(req, addr)
}
cc.getConnCalled = false
p.mu.Unlock()
return cc, nil
}
}
if !dialOnMiss {
p.mu.Unlock()
return nil, ErrNoCachedConn
}
traceGetConn(req, addr)
call := p.getStartDialLocked(req.Context(), addr)
p.mu.Unlock()
<-call.done
if shouldRetryDial(call, req) {
continue
}
cc, err := call.res, call.err
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if cc.ReserveNewRequest() {
return cc, nil
}
}
if !dialOnMiss {
p.mu.Unlock()
return nil, ErrNoCachedConn
}
traceGetConn(req, addr)
call := p.getStartDialLocked(addr)
p.mu.Unlock()
<-call.done
return call.res, call.err
}
// dialCall is an in-flight Transport dial call to a host.
type dialCall struct {
_ incomparable
p *clientConnPool
_ incomparable
p *clientConnPool
// the context associated with the request
// that created this dialCall
ctx context.Context
done chan struct{} // closed when done
res *ClientConn // valid after done is closed
err error // valid after done is closed
}
// requires p.mu is held.
func (p *clientConnPool) getStartDialLocked(addr string) *dialCall {
func (p *clientConnPool) getStartDialLocked(ctx context.Context, addr string) *dialCall {
if call, ok := p.dialing[addr]; ok {
// A dial is already in-flight. Don't start another.
return call
}
call := &dialCall{p: p, done: make(chan struct{})}
call := &dialCall{p: p, done: make(chan struct{}), ctx: ctx}
if p.dialing == nil {
p.dialing = make(map[string]*dialCall)
}
p.dialing[addr] = call
go call.dial(addr)
go call.dial(call.ctx, addr)
return call
}
// run in its own goroutine.
func (c *dialCall) dial(addr string) {
func (c *dialCall) dial(ctx context.Context, addr string) {
const singleUse = false // shared conn
c.res, c.err = c.p.t.dialClientConn(addr, singleUse)
c.res, c.err = c.p.t.dialClientConn(ctx, addr, singleUse)
close(c.done)
c.p.mu.Lock()
@ -195,6 +201,7 @@ func (c *addConnCall) run(t *Transport, key string, tc *tls.Conn) {
if err != nil {
c.err = err
} else {
cc.getConnCalled = true // already called by the net/http package
p.addConnLocked(key, cc)
}
delete(p.addConnCalls, key)
@ -276,3 +283,28 @@ type noDialClientConnPool struct{ *clientConnPool }
func (p noDialClientConnPool) GetClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string) (*ClientConn, error) {
return p.getClientConn(req, addr, noDialOnMiss)
}
// shouldRetryDial reports whether the current request should
// retry dialing after the call finished unsuccessfully, for example
// if the dial was canceled because of a context cancellation or
// deadline expiry.
func shouldRetryDial(call *dialCall, req *http.Request) bool {
if call.err == nil {
// No error, no need to retry
return false
}
if call.ctx == req.Context() {
// If the call has the same context as the request, the dial
// should not be retried, since any cancellation will have come
// from this request.
return false
}
if !errors.Is(call.err, context.Canceled) && !errors.Is(call.err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
// If the call error is not because of a context cancellation or a deadline expiry,
// the dial should not be retried.
return false
}
// Only retry if the error is a context cancellation error or deadline expiry
// and the context associated with the call was canceled or expired.
return call.ctx.Err() != nil
}

View File

@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ func (e ErrCode) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown error code 0x%x", uint32(e))
}
func (e ErrCode) stringToken() string {
if s, ok := errCodeName[e]; ok {
return s
}
return fmt.Sprintf("ERR_UNKNOWN_%d", uint32(e))
}
// ConnectionError is an error that results in the termination of the
// entire connection.
type ConnectionError ErrCode
@ -67,6 +74,11 @@ type StreamError struct {
Cause error // optional additional detail
}
// errFromPeer is a sentinel error value for StreamError.Cause to
// indicate that the StreamError was sent from the peer over the wire
// and wasn't locally generated in the Transport.
var errFromPeer = errors.New("received from peer")
func streamError(id uint32, code ErrCode) StreamError {
return StreamError{StreamID: id, Code: code}
}

View File

@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ var flagName = map[FrameType]map[Flags]string{
// a frameParser parses a frame given its FrameHeader and payload
// bytes. The length of payload will always equal fh.Length (which
// might be 0).
type frameParser func(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, error)
type frameParser func(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), payload []byte) (Frame, error)
var frameParsers = map[FrameType]frameParser{
FrameData: parseDataFrame,
@ -267,6 +267,11 @@ type Framer struct {
lastFrame Frame
errDetail error
// countError is a non-nil func that's called on a frame parse
// error with some unique error path token. It's initialized
// from Transport.CountError or Server.CountError.
countError func(errToken string)
// lastHeaderStream is non-zero if the last frame was an
// unfinished HEADERS/CONTINUATION.
lastHeaderStream uint32
@ -426,6 +431,7 @@ func NewFramer(w io.Writer, r io.Reader) *Framer {
fr := &Framer{
w: w,
r: r,
countError: func(string) {},
logReads: logFrameReads,
logWrites: logFrameWrites,
debugReadLoggerf: log.Printf,
@ -500,7 +506,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) ReadFrame() (Frame, error) {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(fr.r, payload); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
f, err := typeFrameParser(fh.Type)(fr.frameCache, fh, payload)
f, err := typeFrameParser(fh.Type)(fr.frameCache, fh, fr.countError, payload)
if err != nil {
if ce, ok := err.(connError); ok {
return nil, fr.connError(ce.Code, ce.Reason)
@ -588,13 +594,14 @@ func (f *DataFrame) Data() []byte {
return f.data
}
func parseDataFrame(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseDataFrame(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
if fh.StreamID == 0 {
// DATA frames MUST be associated with a stream. If a
// DATA frame is received whose stream identifier
// field is 0x0, the recipient MUST respond with a
// connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// PROTOCOL_ERROR.
countError("frame_data_stream_0")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeProtocol, "DATA frame with stream ID 0"}
}
f := fc.getDataFrame()
@ -605,6 +612,7 @@ func parseDataFrame(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, erro
var err error
payload, padSize, err = readByte(payload)
if err != nil {
countError("frame_data_pad_byte_short")
return nil, err
}
}
@ -613,6 +621,7 @@ func parseDataFrame(fc *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, erro
// length of the frame payload, the recipient MUST
// treat this as a connection error.
// Filed: https://github.com/http2/http2-spec/issues/610
countError("frame_data_pad_too_big")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeProtocol, "pad size larger than data payload"}
}
f.data = payload[:len(payload)-int(padSize)]
@ -695,7 +704,7 @@ type SettingsFrame struct {
p []byte
}
func parseSettingsFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseSettingsFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
if fh.Flags.Has(FlagSettingsAck) && fh.Length > 0 {
// When this (ACK 0x1) bit is set, the payload of the
// SETTINGS frame MUST be empty. Receipt of a
@ -703,6 +712,7 @@ func parseSettingsFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error)
// field value other than 0 MUST be treated as a
// connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// FRAME_SIZE_ERROR.
countError("frame_settings_ack_with_length")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
if fh.StreamID != 0 {
@ -713,14 +723,17 @@ func parseSettingsFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error)
// field is anything other than 0x0, the endpoint MUST
// respond with a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of
// type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
countError("frame_settings_has_stream")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
if len(p)%6 != 0 {
countError("frame_settings_mod_6")
// Expecting even number of 6 byte settings.
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
f := &SettingsFrame{FrameHeader: fh, p: p}
if v, ok := f.Value(SettingInitialWindowSize); ok && v > (1<<31)-1 {
countError("frame_settings_window_size_too_big")
// Values above the maximum flow control window size of 2^31 - 1 MUST
// be treated as a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR.
@ -832,11 +845,13 @@ type PingFrame struct {
func (f *PingFrame) IsAck() bool { return f.Flags.Has(FlagPingAck) }
func parsePingFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parsePingFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
if len(payload) != 8 {
countError("frame_ping_length")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
if fh.StreamID != 0 {
countError("frame_ping_has_stream")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
f := &PingFrame{FrameHeader: fh}
@ -872,11 +887,13 @@ func (f *GoAwayFrame) DebugData() []byte {
return f.debugData
}
func parseGoAwayFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseGoAwayFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
if fh.StreamID != 0 {
countError("frame_goaway_has_stream")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
if len(p) < 8 {
countError("frame_goaway_short")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
return &GoAwayFrame{
@ -912,7 +929,7 @@ func (f *UnknownFrame) Payload() []byte {
return f.p
}
func parseUnknownFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseUnknownFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
return &UnknownFrame{fh, p}, nil
}
@ -923,8 +940,9 @@ type WindowUpdateFrame struct {
Increment uint32 // never read with high bit set
}
func parseWindowUpdateFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseWindowUpdateFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
if len(p) != 4 {
countError("frame_windowupdate_bad_len")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
inc := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(p[:4]) & 0x7fffffff // mask off high reserved bit
@ -936,8 +954,10 @@ func parseWindowUpdateFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, err
// control window MUST be treated as a connection
// error (Section 5.4.1).
if fh.StreamID == 0 {
countError("frame_windowupdate_zero_inc_conn")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
countError("frame_windowupdate_zero_inc_stream")
return nil, streamError(fh.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
}
return &WindowUpdateFrame{
@ -988,7 +1008,7 @@ func (f *HeadersFrame) HasPriority() bool {
return f.FrameHeader.Flags.Has(FlagHeadersPriority)
}
func parseHeadersFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err error) {
func parseHeadersFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (_ Frame, err error) {
hf := &HeadersFrame{
FrameHeader: fh,
}
@ -997,11 +1017,13 @@ func parseHeadersFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err er
// is received whose stream identifier field is 0x0, the recipient MUST
// respond with a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// PROTOCOL_ERROR.
countError("frame_headers_zero_stream")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeProtocol, "HEADERS frame with stream ID 0"}
}
var padLength uint8
if fh.Flags.Has(FlagHeadersPadded) {
if p, padLength, err = readByte(p); err != nil {
countError("frame_headers_pad_short")
return
}
}
@ -1009,16 +1031,19 @@ func parseHeadersFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err er
var v uint32
p, v, err = readUint32(p)
if err != nil {
countError("frame_headers_prio_short")
return nil, err
}
hf.Priority.StreamDep = v & 0x7fffffff
hf.Priority.Exclusive = (v != hf.Priority.StreamDep) // high bit was set
p, hf.Priority.Weight, err = readByte(p)
if err != nil {
countError("frame_headers_prio_weight_short")
return nil, err
}
}
if len(p)-int(padLength) <= 0 {
if len(p)-int(padLength) < 0 {
countError("frame_headers_pad_too_big")
return nil, streamError(fh.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
}
hf.headerFragBuf = p[:len(p)-int(padLength)]
@ -1125,11 +1150,13 @@ func (p PriorityParam) IsZero() bool {
return p == PriorityParam{}
}
func parsePriorityFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parsePriorityFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), payload []byte) (Frame, error) {
if fh.StreamID == 0 {
countError("frame_priority_zero_stream")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeProtocol, "PRIORITY frame with stream ID 0"}
}
if len(payload) != 5 {
countError("frame_priority_bad_length")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeFrameSize, fmt.Sprintf("PRIORITY frame payload size was %d; want 5", len(payload))}
}
v := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[:4])
@ -1172,11 +1199,13 @@ type RSTStreamFrame struct {
ErrCode ErrCode
}
func parseRSTStreamFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseRSTStreamFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
if len(p) != 4 {
countError("frame_rststream_bad_len")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeFrameSize)
}
if fh.StreamID == 0 {
countError("frame_rststream_zero_stream")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
return &RSTStreamFrame{fh, ErrCode(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(p[:4]))}, nil
@ -1202,8 +1231,9 @@ type ContinuationFrame struct {
headerFragBuf []byte
}
func parseContinuationFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (Frame, error) {
func parseContinuationFrame(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (Frame, error) {
if fh.StreamID == 0 {
countError("frame_continuation_zero_stream")
return nil, connError{ErrCodeProtocol, "CONTINUATION frame with stream ID 0"}
}
return &ContinuationFrame{fh, p}, nil
@ -1252,7 +1282,7 @@ func (f *PushPromiseFrame) HeadersEnded() bool {
return f.FrameHeader.Flags.Has(FlagPushPromiseEndHeaders)
}
func parsePushPromise(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err error) {
func parsePushPromise(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, countError func(string), p []byte) (_ Frame, err error) {
pp := &PushPromiseFrame{
FrameHeader: fh,
}
@ -1263,6 +1293,7 @@ func parsePushPromise(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err err
// with. If the stream identifier field specifies the value
// 0x0, a recipient MUST respond with a connection error
// (Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
countError("frame_pushpromise_zero_stream")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
// The PUSH_PROMISE frame includes optional padding.
@ -1270,18 +1301,21 @@ func parsePushPromise(_ *frameCache, fh FrameHeader, p []byte) (_ Frame, err err
var padLength uint8
if fh.Flags.Has(FlagPushPromisePadded) {
if p, padLength, err = readByte(p); err != nil {
countError("frame_pushpromise_pad_short")
return
}
}
p, pp.PromiseID, err = readUint32(p)
if err != nil {
countError("frame_pushpromise_promiseid_short")
return
}
pp.PromiseID = pp.PromiseID & (1<<31 - 1)
if int(padLength) > len(p) {
// like the DATA frame, error out if padding is longer than the body.
countError("frame_pushpromise_pad_too_big")
return nil, ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
pp.headerFragBuf = p[:len(p)-int(padLength)]

27
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go115.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.15
// +build go1.15
package http2
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
)
// dialTLSWithContext uses tls.Dialer, added in Go 1.15, to open a TLS
// connection.
func (t *Transport) dialTLSWithContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, cfg *tls.Config) (*tls.Conn, error) {
dialer := &tls.Dialer{
Config: cfg,
}
cn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tlsCn := cn.(*tls.Conn) // DialContext comment promises this will always succeed
return tlsCn, nil
}

View File

@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package http2
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
)
@ -79,10 +78,10 @@ func buildCommonHeaderMaps() {
}
}
func lowerHeader(v string) string {
func lowerHeader(v string) (lower string, ascii bool) {
buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce()
if s, ok := commonLowerHeader[v]; ok {
return s
return s, true
}
return strings.ToLower(v)
return asciiToLower(v)
}

View File

@ -140,25 +140,29 @@ func buildRootHuffmanNode() {
panic("unexpected size")
}
lazyRootHuffmanNode = newInternalNode()
for i, code := range huffmanCodes {
addDecoderNode(byte(i), code, huffmanCodeLen[i])
}
}
// allocate a leaf node for each of the 256 symbols
leaves := new([256]node)
func addDecoderNode(sym byte, code uint32, codeLen uint8) {
cur := lazyRootHuffmanNode
for codeLen > 8 {
codeLen -= 8
i := uint8(code >> codeLen)
if cur.children[i] == nil {
cur.children[i] = newInternalNode()
for sym, code := range huffmanCodes {
codeLen := huffmanCodeLen[sym]
cur := lazyRootHuffmanNode
for codeLen > 8 {
codeLen -= 8
i := uint8(code >> codeLen)
if cur.children[i] == nil {
cur.children[i] = newInternalNode()
}
cur = cur.children[i]
}
shift := 8 - codeLen
start, end := int(uint8(code<<shift)), int(1<<shift)
leaves[sym].sym = byte(sym)
leaves[sym].codeLen = codeLen
for i := start; i < start+end; i++ {
cur.children[i] = &leaves[sym]
}
cur = cur.children[i]
}
shift := 8 - codeLen
start, end := int(uint8(code<<shift)), int(1<<shift)
for i := start; i < start+end; i++ {
cur.children[i] = &node{sym: sym, codeLen: codeLen}
}
}

31
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go115.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !go1.15
// +build !go1.15
package http2
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
)
// dialTLSWithContext opens a TLS connection.
func (t *Transport) dialTLSWithContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, cfg *tls.Config) (*tls.Conn, error) {
cn, err := tls.Dial(network, addr, cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := cn.Handshake(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if cfg.InsecureSkipVerify {
return cn, nil
}
if err := cn.VerifyHostname(cfg.ServerName); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cn, nil
}

View File

@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ type pipeBuffer interface {
io.Reader
}
// setBuffer initializes the pipe buffer.
// It has no effect if the pipe is already closed.
func (p *pipe) setBuffer(b pipeBuffer) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.err != nil || p.breakErr != nil {
return
}
p.b = b
}
func (p *pipe) Len() int {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()

View File

@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ type Server struct {
// If nil, a default scheduler is chosen.
NewWriteScheduler func() WriteScheduler
// CountError, if non-nil, is called on HTTP/2 server errors.
// It's intended to increment a metric for monitoring, such
// as an expvar or Prometheus metric.
// The errType consists of only ASCII word characters.
CountError func(errType string)
// Internal state. This is a pointer (rather than embedded directly)
// so that we don't embed a Mutex in this struct, which will make the
// struct non-copyable, which might break some callers.
@ -231,13 +237,12 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
if s.TLSConfig == nil {
s.TLSConfig = new(tls.Config)
} else if s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites != nil {
// If they already provided a CipherSuite list, return
// an error if it has a bad order or is missing
// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
} else if s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites != nil && s.TLSConfig.MinVersion < tls.VersionTLS13 {
// If they already provided a TLS 1.01.2 CipherSuite list, return an
// error if it is missing ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or
// ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
haveRequired := false
sawBad := false
for i, cs := range s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites {
for _, cs := range s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites {
switch cs {
case tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
// Alternative MTI cipher to not discourage ECDSA-only servers.
@ -245,14 +250,9 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
haveRequired = true
}
if isBadCipher(cs) {
sawBad = true
} else if sawBad {
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites index %d contains an HTTP/2-approved cipher suite (%#04x), but it comes after unapproved cipher suites. With this configuration, clients that don't support previous, approved cipher suites may be given an unapproved one and reject the connection.", i, cs)
}
}
if !haveRequired {
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing an HTTP/2-required AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher (need at least one of TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256).")
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing an HTTP/2-required AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher (need at least one of TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)")
}
}
@ -265,16 +265,12 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
s.TLSConfig.PreferServerCipherSuites = true
haveNPN := false
for _, p := range s.TLSConfig.NextProtos {
if p == NextProtoTLS {
haveNPN = true
break
}
}
if !haveNPN {
if !strSliceContains(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, NextProtoTLS) {
s.TLSConfig.NextProtos = append(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, NextProtoTLS)
}
if !strSliceContains(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1") {
s.TLSConfig.NextProtos = append(s.TLSConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1")
}
if s.TLSNextProto == nil {
s.TLSNextProto = map[string]func(*http.Server, *tls.Conn, http.Handler){}
@ -415,6 +411,9 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
sc.hpackEncoder = hpack.NewEncoder(&sc.headerWriteBuf)
fr := NewFramer(sc.bw, c)
if s.CountError != nil {
fr.countError = s.CountError
}
fr.ReadMetaHeaders = hpack.NewDecoder(initialHeaderTableSize, nil)
fr.MaxHeaderListSize = sc.maxHeaderListSize()
fr.SetMaxReadFrameSize(s.maxReadFrameSize())
@ -826,7 +825,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
})
sc.unackedSettings++
// Each connection starts with intialWindowSize inflow tokens.
// Each connection starts with initialWindowSize inflow tokens.
// If a higher value is configured, we add more tokens.
if diff := sc.srv.initialConnRecvWindowSize() - initialWindowSize; diff > 0 {
sc.sendWindowUpdate(nil, int(diff))
@ -866,6 +865,15 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
case res := <-sc.wroteFrameCh:
sc.wroteFrame(res)
case res := <-sc.readFrameCh:
// Process any written frames before reading new frames from the client since a
// written frame could have triggered a new stream to be started.
if sc.writingFrameAsync {
select {
case wroteRes := <-sc.wroteFrameCh:
sc.wroteFrame(wroteRes)
default:
}
}
if !sc.processFrameFromReader(res) {
return
}
@ -1400,7 +1408,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processFrame(f Frame) error {
// First frame received must be SETTINGS.
if !sc.sawFirstSettings {
if _, ok := f.(*SettingsFrame); !ok {
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("first_settings", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
sc.sawFirstSettings = true
}
@ -1425,7 +1433,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processFrame(f Frame) error {
case *PushPromiseFrame:
// A client cannot push. Thus, servers MUST treat the receipt of a PUSH_PROMISE
// frame as a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("push_promise", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
default:
sc.vlogf("http2: server ignoring frame: %v", f.Header())
return nil
@ -1445,7 +1453,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processPing(f *PingFrame) error {
// identifier field value other than 0x0, the recipient MUST
// respond with a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// PROTOCOL_ERROR."
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("ping_on_stream", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if sc.inGoAway && sc.goAwayCode != ErrCodeNo {
return nil
@ -1464,7 +1472,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processWindowUpdate(f *WindowUpdateFrame) error {
// or PRIORITY on a stream in this state MUST be
// treated as a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of
// type PROTOCOL_ERROR."
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("stream_idle", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if st == nil {
// "WINDOW_UPDATE can be sent by a peer that has sent a
@ -1475,7 +1483,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processWindowUpdate(f *WindowUpdateFrame) error {
return nil
}
if !st.flow.add(int32(f.Increment)) {
return streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeFlowControl)
return sc.countError("bad_flow", streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeFlowControl))
}
default: // connection-level flow control
if !sc.flow.add(int32(f.Increment)) {
@ -1496,7 +1504,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processResetStream(f *RSTStreamFrame) error {
// identifying an idle stream is received, the
// recipient MUST treat this as a connection error
// (Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("reset_idle_stream", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if st != nil {
st.cancelCtx()
@ -1548,7 +1556,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processSettings(f *SettingsFrame) error {
// Why is the peer ACKing settings we never sent?
// The spec doesn't mention this case, but
// hang up on them anyway.
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("ack_mystery", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
return nil
}
@ -1556,7 +1564,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processSettings(f *SettingsFrame) error {
// This isn't actually in the spec, but hang up on
// suspiciously large settings frames or those with
// duplicate entries.
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("settings_big_or_dups", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if err := f.ForeachSetting(sc.processSetting); err != nil {
return err
@ -1623,7 +1631,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processSettingInitialWindowSize(val uint32) error {
// control window to exceed the maximum size as a
// connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type
// FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR."
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeFlowControl)
return sc.countError("setting_win_size", ConnectionError(ErrCodeFlowControl))
}
}
return nil
@ -1656,7 +1664,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
// or PRIORITY on a stream in this state MUST be
// treated as a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of
// type PROTOCOL_ERROR."
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("data_on_idle", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
// "If a DATA frame is received whose stream is not in "open"
@ -1673,7 +1681,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
// and return any flow control bytes since we're not going
// to consume them.
if sc.inflow.available() < int32(f.Length) {
return streamError(id, ErrCodeFlowControl)
return sc.countError("data_flow", streamError(id, ErrCodeFlowControl))
}
// Deduct the flow control from inflow, since we're
// going to immediately add it back in
@ -1686,7 +1694,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
// Already have a stream error in flight. Don't send another.
return nil
}
return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
return sc.countError("closed", streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed))
}
if st.body == nil {
panic("internal error: should have a body in this state")
@ -1698,12 +1706,12 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
// RFC 7540, sec 8.1.2.6: A request or response is also malformed if the
// value of a content-length header field does not equal the sum of the
// DATA frame payload lengths that form the body.
return streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("send_too_much", streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if f.Length > 0 {
// Check whether the client has flow control quota.
if st.inflow.available() < int32(f.Length) {
return streamError(id, ErrCodeFlowControl)
return sc.countError("flow_on_data_length", streamError(id, ErrCodeFlowControl))
}
st.inflow.take(int32(f.Length))
@ -1711,7 +1719,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
wrote, err := st.body.Write(data)
if err != nil {
sc.sendWindowUpdate(nil, int(f.Length)-wrote)
return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
return sc.countError("body_write_err", streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed))
}
if wrote != len(data) {
panic("internal error: bad Writer")
@ -1797,7 +1805,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// stream identifier MUST respond with a connection error
// (Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
if id%2 != 1 {
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("headers_even", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
// A HEADERS frame can be used to create a new stream or
// send a trailer for an open one. If we already have a stream
@ -1814,7 +1822,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// this state, it MUST respond with a stream error (Section 5.4.2) of
// type STREAM_CLOSED.
if st.state == stateHalfClosedRemote {
return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
return sc.countError("headers_half_closed", streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed))
}
return st.processTrailerHeaders(f)
}
@ -1825,7 +1833,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// receives an unexpected stream identifier MUST respond with
// a connection error (Section 5.4.1) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
if id <= sc.maxClientStreamID {
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("stream_went_down", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
sc.maxClientStreamID = id
@ -1842,14 +1850,14 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
if sc.curClientStreams+1 > sc.advMaxStreams {
if sc.unackedSettings == 0 {
// They should know better.
return streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("over_max_streams", streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
// Assume it's a network race, where they just haven't
// received our last SETTINGS update. But actually
// this can't happen yet, because we don't yet provide
// a way for users to adjust server parameters at
// runtime.
return streamError(id, ErrCodeRefusedStream)
return sc.countError("over_max_streams_race", streamError(id, ErrCodeRefusedStream))
}
initialState := stateOpen
@ -1859,7 +1867,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
st := sc.newStream(id, 0, initialState)
if f.HasPriority() {
if err := checkPriority(f.StreamID, f.Priority); err != nil {
if err := sc.checkPriority(f.StreamID, f.Priority); err != nil {
return err
}
sc.writeSched.AdjustStream(st.id, f.Priority)
@ -1903,15 +1911,15 @@ func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
sc := st.sc
sc.serveG.check()
if st.gotTrailerHeader {
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("dup_trailers", ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol))
}
st.gotTrailerHeader = true
if !f.StreamEnded() {
return streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("trailers_not_ended", streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if len(f.PseudoFields()) > 0 {
return streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("trailers_pseudo", streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
if st.trailer != nil {
for _, hf := range f.RegularFields() {
@ -1920,7 +1928,7 @@ func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// TODO: send more details to the peer somehow. But http2 has
// no way to send debug data at a stream level. Discuss with
// HTTP folk.
return streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("trailers_bogus", streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
st.trailer[key] = append(st.trailer[key], hf.Value)
}
@ -1929,13 +1937,13 @@ func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
return nil
}
func checkPriority(streamID uint32, p PriorityParam) error {
func (sc *serverConn) checkPriority(streamID uint32, p PriorityParam) error {
if streamID == p.StreamDep {
// Section 5.3.1: "A stream cannot depend on itself. An endpoint MUST treat
// this as a stream error (Section 5.4.2) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR."
// Section 5.3.3 says that a stream can depend on one of its dependencies,
// so it's only self-dependencies that are forbidden.
return streamError(streamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
return sc.countError("priority", streamError(streamID, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
return nil
}
@ -1944,7 +1952,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processPriority(f *PriorityFrame) error {
if sc.inGoAway {
return nil
}
if err := checkPriority(f.StreamID, f.PriorityParam); err != nil {
if err := sc.checkPriority(f.StreamID, f.PriorityParam); err != nil {
return err
}
sc.writeSched.AdjustStream(f.StreamID, f.PriorityParam)
@ -2001,7 +2009,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequest(st *stream, f *MetaHeadersFrame) (*res
isConnect := rp.method == "CONNECT"
if isConnect {
if rp.path != "" || rp.scheme != "" || rp.authority == "" {
return nil, nil, streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
return nil, nil, sc.countError("bad_connect", streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
} else if rp.method == "" || rp.path == "" || (rp.scheme != "https" && rp.scheme != "http") {
// See 8.1.2.6 Malformed Requests and Responses:
@ -2014,13 +2022,13 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequest(st *stream, f *MetaHeadersFrame) (*res
// "All HTTP/2 requests MUST include exactly one valid
// value for the :method, :scheme, and :path
// pseudo-header fields"
return nil, nil, streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
return nil, nil, sc.countError("bad_path_method", streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
bodyOpen := !f.StreamEnded()
if rp.method == "HEAD" && bodyOpen {
// HEAD requests can't have bodies
return nil, nil, streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol)
return nil, nil, sc.countError("head_body", streamError(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
rp.header = make(http.Header)
@ -2103,7 +2111,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequestNoBody(st *stream, rp requestParam) (*r
var err error
url_, err = url.ParseRequestURI(rp.path)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol)
return nil, nil, sc.countError("bad_path", streamError(st.id, ErrCodeProtocol))
}
requestURI = rp.path
}
@ -2789,8 +2797,12 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Push(target string, opts *http.PushOptions) error {
// but PUSH_PROMISE requests cannot have a body.
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-8.2
// Also disallow Host, since the promised URL must be absolute.
switch strings.ToLower(k) {
case "content-length", "content-encoding", "trailer", "te", "expect", "host":
if asciiEqualFold(k, "content-length") ||
asciiEqualFold(k, "content-encoding") ||
asciiEqualFold(k, "trailer") ||
asciiEqualFold(k, "te") ||
asciiEqualFold(k, "expect") ||
asciiEqualFold(k, "host") {
return fmt.Errorf("promised request headers cannot include %q", k)
}
}
@ -2982,3 +2994,31 @@ func h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled(hs *http.Server) bool {
}
return false
}
func (sc *serverConn) countError(name string, err error) error {
if sc == nil || sc.srv == nil {
return err
}
f := sc.srv.CountError
if f == nil {
return err
}
var typ string
var code ErrCode
switch e := err.(type) {
case ConnectionError:
typ = "conn"
code = ErrCode(e)
case StreamError:
typ = "stream"
code = ErrCode(e.Code)
default:
return err
}
codeStr := errCodeName[code]
if codeStr == "" {
codeStr = strconv.Itoa(int(code))
}
f(fmt.Sprintf("%s_%s_%s", typ, codeStr, name))
return err
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -341,7 +341,12 @@ func encodeHeaders(enc *hpack.Encoder, h http.Header, keys []string) {
}
for _, k := range keys {
vv := h[k]
k = lowerHeader(k)
k, ascii := lowerHeader(k)
if !ascii {
// Skip writing invalid headers. Per RFC 7540, Section 8.1.2, header
// field names have to be ASCII characters (just as in HTTP/1.x).
continue
}
if !validWireHeaderFieldName(k) {
// Skip it as backup paranoia. Per
// golang.org/issue/14048, these should

14
vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/go118.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
// Code generated by running "go generate" in golang.org/x/text. DO NOT EDIT.
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build go1.18
// +build go1.18
package idna
// Transitional processing is disabled by default in Go 1.18.
// https://golang.org/issue/47510
const transitionalLookup = false

View File

@ -59,23 +59,22 @@ type Option func(*options)
// Transitional sets a Profile to use the Transitional mapping as defined in UTS
// #46. This will cause, for example, "ß" to be mapped to "ss". Using the
// transitional mapping provides a compromise between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008
// compatibility. It is used by most browsers when resolving domain names. This
// compatibility. It is used by some browsers when resolving domain names. This
// option is only meaningful if combined with MapForLookup.
func Transitional(transitional bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.transitional = true }
return func(o *options) { o.transitional = transitional }
}
// VerifyDNSLength sets whether a Profile should fail if any of the IDN parts
// are longer than allowed by the RFC.
//
// This option corresponds to the VerifyDnsLength flag in UTS #46.
func VerifyDNSLength(verify bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.verifyDNSLength = verify }
}
// RemoveLeadingDots removes leading label separators. Leading runes that map to
// dots, such as U+3002 IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP, are removed as well.
//
// This is the behavior suggested by the UTS #46 and is adopted by some
// browsers.
func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.removeLeadingDots = remove }
}
@ -83,6 +82,8 @@ func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
// ValidateLabels sets whether to check the mandatory label validation criteria
// as defined in Section 5.4 of RFC 5891. This includes testing for correct use
// of hyphens ('-'), normalization, validity of runes, and the context rules.
// In particular, ValidateLabels also sets the CheckHyphens and CheckJoiners flags
// in UTS #46.
func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
// Don't override existing mappings, but set one that at least checks
@ -91,25 +92,48 @@ func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
o.mapping = normalize
}
o.trie = trie
o.validateLabels = enable
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
o.checkJoiners = enable
o.checkHyphens = enable
if enable {
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
} else {
o.fromPuny = nil
}
}
}
// CheckHyphens sets whether to check for correct use of hyphens ('-') in
// labels. Most web browsers do not have this option set, since labels such as
// "r3---sn-apo3qvuoxuxbt-j5pe" are in common use.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckHyphens flag in UTS #46.
func CheckHyphens(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.checkHyphens = enable }
}
// CheckJoiners sets whether to check the ContextJ rules as defined in Appendix
// A of RFC 5892, concerning the use of joiner runes.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckJoiners flag in UTS #46.
func CheckJoiners(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
o.trie = trie
o.checkJoiners = enable
}
}
// StrictDomainName limits the set of permissible ASCII characters to those
// allowed in domain names as defined in RFC 1034 (A-Z, a-z, 0-9 and the
// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration.
// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration,
// but is only useful if ValidateLabels is set.
//
// This option is useful, for instance, for browsers that allow characters
// outside this range, for example a '_' (U+005F LOW LINE). See
// http://www.rfc-editor.org/std/std3.txt for more details This option
// corresponds to the UseSTD3ASCIIRules option in UTS #46.
// http://www.rfc-editor.org/std/std3.txt for more details.
//
// This option corresponds to the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag in UTS #46.
func StrictDomainName(use bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
o.trie = trie
o.useSTD3Rules = use
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
}
return func(o *options) { o.useSTD3Rules = use }
}
// NOTE: the following options pull in tables. The tables should not be linked
@ -117,6 +141,8 @@ func StrictDomainName(use bool) Option {
// BidiRule enables the Bidi rule as defined in RFC 5893. Any application
// that relies on proper validation of labels should include this rule.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckBidi flag in UTS #46.
func BidiRule() Option {
return func(o *options) { o.bidirule = bidirule.ValidString }
}
@ -152,7 +178,8 @@ func MapForLookup() Option {
type options struct {
transitional bool
useSTD3Rules bool
validateLabels bool
checkHyphens bool
checkJoiners bool
verifyDNSLength bool
removeLeadingDots bool
@ -225,8 +252,11 @@ func (p *Profile) String() string {
if p.useSTD3Rules {
s += ":UseSTD3Rules"
}
if p.validateLabels {
s += ":ValidateLabels"
if p.checkHyphens {
s += ":CheckHyphens"
}
if p.checkJoiners {
s += ":CheckJoiners"
}
if p.verifyDNSLength {
s += ":VerifyDNSLength"
@ -254,26 +284,29 @@ var (
punycode = &Profile{}
lookup = &Profile{options{
transitional: true,
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
bidirule: bidirule.ValidString,
transitional: transitionalLookup,
useSTD3Rules: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
bidirule: bidirule.ValidString,
}}
display = &Profile{options{
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
bidirule: bidirule.ValidString,
useSTD3Rules: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
bidirule: bidirule.ValidString,
}}
registration = &Profile{options{
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
verifyDNSLength: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateRegistration,
@ -340,7 +373,7 @@ func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
}
isBidi = isBidi || bidirule.DirectionString(u) != bidi.LeftToRight
labels.set(u)
if err == nil && p.validateLabels {
if err == nil && p.fromPuny != nil {
err = p.fromPuny(p, u)
}
if err == nil {
@ -681,16 +714,18 @@ func (p *Profile) validateLabel(s string) (err error) {
}
return nil
}
if !p.validateLabels {
if p.checkHyphens {
if len(s) > 4 && s[2] == '-' && s[3] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V2"}
}
if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V3"}
}
}
if !p.checkJoiners {
return nil
}
trie := p.trie // p.validateLabels is only set if trie is set.
if len(s) > 4 && s[2] == '-' && s[3] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V2"}
}
if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V3"}
}
trie := p.trie // p.checkJoiners is only set if trie is set.
// TODO: merge the use of this in the trie.
v, sz := trie.lookupString(s)
x := info(v)

View File

@ -58,23 +58,22 @@ type Option func(*options)
// Transitional sets a Profile to use the Transitional mapping as defined in UTS
// #46. This will cause, for example, "ß" to be mapped to "ss". Using the
// transitional mapping provides a compromise between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008
// compatibility. It is used by most browsers when resolving domain names. This
// compatibility. It is used by some browsers when resolving domain names. This
// option is only meaningful if combined with MapForLookup.
func Transitional(transitional bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.transitional = true }
return func(o *options) { o.transitional = transitional }
}
// VerifyDNSLength sets whether a Profile should fail if any of the IDN parts
// are longer than allowed by the RFC.
//
// This option corresponds to the VerifyDnsLength flag in UTS #46.
func VerifyDNSLength(verify bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.verifyDNSLength = verify }
}
// RemoveLeadingDots removes leading label separators. Leading runes that map to
// dots, such as U+3002 IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP, are removed as well.
//
// This is the behavior suggested by the UTS #46 and is adopted by some
// browsers.
func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.removeLeadingDots = remove }
}
@ -82,6 +81,8 @@ func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
// ValidateLabels sets whether to check the mandatory label validation criteria
// as defined in Section 5.4 of RFC 5891. This includes testing for correct use
// of hyphens ('-'), normalization, validity of runes, and the context rules.
// In particular, ValidateLabels also sets the CheckHyphens and CheckJoiners flags
// in UTS #46.
func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
// Don't override existing mappings, but set one that at least checks
@ -90,25 +91,48 @@ func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
o.mapping = normalize
}
o.trie = trie
o.validateLabels = enable
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
o.checkJoiners = enable
o.checkHyphens = enable
if enable {
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
} else {
o.fromPuny = nil
}
}
}
// CheckHyphens sets whether to check for correct use of hyphens ('-') in
// labels. Most web browsers do not have this option set, since labels such as
// "r3---sn-apo3qvuoxuxbt-j5pe" are in common use.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckHyphens flag in UTS #46.
func CheckHyphens(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.checkHyphens = enable }
}
// CheckJoiners sets whether to check the ContextJ rules as defined in Appendix
// A of RFC 5892, concerning the use of joiner runes.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckJoiners flag in UTS #46.
func CheckJoiners(enable bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
o.trie = trie
o.checkJoiners = enable
}
}
// StrictDomainName limits the set of permissable ASCII characters to those
// allowed in domain names as defined in RFC 1034 (A-Z, a-z, 0-9 and the
// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration.
// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration,
// but is only useful if ValidateLabels is set.
//
// This option is useful, for instance, for browsers that allow characters
// outside this range, for example a '_' (U+005F LOW LINE). See
// http://www.rfc-editor.org/std/std3.txt for more details This option
// corresponds to the UseSTD3ASCIIRules option in UTS #46.
// http://www.rfc-editor.org/std/std3.txt for more details.
//
// This option corresponds to the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag in UTS #46.
func StrictDomainName(use bool) Option {
return func(o *options) {
o.trie = trie
o.useSTD3Rules = use
o.fromPuny = validateFromPunycode
}
return func(o *options) { o.useSTD3Rules = use }
}
// NOTE: the following options pull in tables. The tables should not be linked
@ -116,6 +140,8 @@ func StrictDomainName(use bool) Option {
// BidiRule enables the Bidi rule as defined in RFC 5893. Any application
// that relies on proper validation of labels should include this rule.
//
// This option corresponds to the CheckBidi flag in UTS #46.
func BidiRule() Option {
return func(o *options) { o.bidirule = bidirule.ValidString }
}
@ -152,7 +178,8 @@ func MapForLookup() Option {
type options struct {
transitional bool
useSTD3Rules bool
validateLabels bool
checkHyphens bool
checkJoiners bool
verifyDNSLength bool
removeLeadingDots bool
@ -225,8 +252,11 @@ func (p *Profile) String() string {
if p.useSTD3Rules {
s += ":UseSTD3Rules"
}
if p.validateLabels {
s += ":ValidateLabels"
if p.checkHyphens {
s += ":CheckHyphens"
}
if p.checkJoiners {
s += ":CheckJoiners"
}
if p.verifyDNSLength {
s += ":VerifyDNSLength"
@ -255,9 +285,10 @@ var (
punycode = &Profile{}
lookup = &Profile{options{
transitional: true,
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
removeLeadingDots: true,
useSTD3Rules: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
@ -265,8 +296,9 @@ var (
}}
display = &Profile{options{
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
removeLeadingDots: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateAndMap,
@ -274,8 +306,9 @@ var (
}}
registration = &Profile{options{
useSTD3Rules: true,
validateLabels: true,
verifyDNSLength: true,
checkHyphens: true,
checkJoiners: true,
trie: trie,
fromPuny: validateFromPunycode,
mapping: validateRegistration,
@ -339,7 +372,7 @@ func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
continue
}
labels.set(u)
if err == nil && p.validateLabels {
if err == nil && p.fromPuny != nil {
err = p.fromPuny(p, u)
}
if err == nil {
@ -629,16 +662,18 @@ func (p *Profile) validateLabel(s string) error {
if p.bidirule != nil && !p.bidirule(s) {
return &labelError{s, "B"}
}
if !p.validateLabels {
if p.checkHyphens {
if len(s) > 4 && s[2] == '-' && s[3] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V2"}
}
if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V3"}
}
}
if !p.checkJoiners {
return nil
}
trie := p.trie // p.validateLabels is only set if trie is set.
if len(s) > 4 && s[2] == '-' && s[3] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V2"}
}
if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
return &labelError{s, "V3"}
}
trie := p.trie // p.checkJoiners is only set if trie is set.
// TODO: merge the use of this in the trie.
v, sz := trie.lookupString(s)
x := info(v)

12
vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/pre_go118.go generated vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// Code generated by running "go generate" in golang.org/x/text. DO NOT EDIT.
// Copyright 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !go1.18
// +build !go1.18
package idna
const transitionalLookup = true

View File

@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ func decode(encoded string) (string, error) {
}
}
i, n, bias := int32(0), initialN, initialBias
overflow := false
for pos < len(encoded) {
oldI, w := i, int32(1)
for k := base; ; k += base {
@ -60,29 +61,32 @@ func decode(encoded string) (string, error) {
return "", punyError(encoded)
}
pos++
i += digit * w
if i < 0 {
i, overflow = madd(i, digit, w)
if overflow {
return "", punyError(encoded)
}
t := k - bias
if t < tmin {
if k <= bias {
t = tmin
} else if t > tmax {
} else if k >= bias+tmax {
t = tmax
}
if digit < t {
break
}
w *= base - t
if w >= math.MaxInt32/base {
w, overflow = madd(0, w, base-t)
if overflow {
return "", punyError(encoded)
}
}
if len(output) >= 1024 {
return "", punyError(encoded)
}
x := int32(len(output) + 1)
bias = adapt(i-oldI, x, oldI == 0)
n += i / x
i %= x
if n > utf8.MaxRune || len(output) >= 1024 {
if n < 0 || n > utf8.MaxRune {
return "", punyError(encoded)
}
output = append(output, 0)
@ -115,6 +119,7 @@ func encode(prefix, s string) (string, error) {
if b > 0 {
output = append(output, '-')
}
overflow := false
for remaining != 0 {
m := int32(0x7fffffff)
for _, r := range s {
@ -122,8 +127,8 @@ func encode(prefix, s string) (string, error) {
m = r
}
}
delta += (m - n) * (h + 1)
if delta < 0 {
delta, overflow = madd(delta, m-n, h+1)
if overflow {
return "", punyError(s)
}
n = m
@ -141,9 +146,9 @@ func encode(prefix, s string) (string, error) {
q := delta
for k := base; ; k += base {
t := k - bias
if t < tmin {
if k <= bias {
t = tmin
} else if t > tmax {
} else if k >= bias+tmax {
t = tmax
}
if q < t {
@ -164,6 +169,15 @@ func encode(prefix, s string) (string, error) {
return string(output), nil
}
// madd computes a + (b * c), detecting overflow.
func madd(a, b, c int32) (next int32, overflow bool) {
p := int64(b) * int64(c)
if p > math.MaxInt32-int64(a) {
return 0, true
}
return a + int32(p), false
}
func decodeDigit(x byte) (digit int32, ok bool) {
switch {
case '0' <= x && x <= '9':

7
vendor/modules.txt vendored
View File

@ -491,14 +491,14 @@ go.opencensus.io/internal
go.opencensus.io/trace
go.opencensus.io/trace/internal
go.opencensus.io/trace/tracestate
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210711020723-a769d52b0f97
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220411220226-7b82a4e95df4
golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish
golang.org/x/crypto/cast5
golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20
golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519
golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519
golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305
golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor
@ -507,11 +507,10 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k
golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2
golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf
# golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20210428140749-89ef3d95e781
# golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20211112202133-69e39bad7dc2
golang.org/x/net/context
golang.org/x/net/html
golang.org/x/net/html/atom