As per the new licensing change for Elasticsearch and Kibana this commit
moves existing Apache 2.0 licensed source code to the new dual license
SSPL+Elastic license 2.0. In addition, existing x-pack code now uses
the new version 2.0 of the Elastic license. Full changes include:
- Updating LICENSE and NOTICE files throughout the code base, as well
as those packaged in our published artifacts
- Update IDE integration to now use the new license header on newly
created source files
- Remove references to the "OSS" distribution from our documentation
- Update build time verification checks to no longer allow Apache 2.0
license header in Elasticsearch source code
- Replace all existing Apache 2.0 license headers for non-xpack code
with updated header (vendored code with Apache 2.0 headers obviously
remains the same).
- Replace all Elastic license 1.0 headers with new 2.0 header in xpack.
For all OSS plugins (except repository-* and discovery-*) integTest
task is now a no-op and all of the tests are now executed via a test,
yamlRestTest, javaRestTest, or internalClusterTest.
This commit does NOT convert the discovery-* and repository-* since they
are bit more complex then the rest of tests and this PR is large enough.
Those plugins will be addressed in a future PR(s).
This commit also fixes a minor issue that did not copy the rest api
for projects that only had YAML TEST tests.
related: #56841
This is a simple naming change PR, to fix the fact that "metadata" is a
single English word, and for too long we have not followed general
naming conventions for it. We are also not consistent about it, for
example, METADATA instead of META_DATA if we were trying to be
consistent with MetaData (although METADATA is correct when considered
in the context of "metadata"). This was a simple find and replace across
the code base, only taking a few minutes to fix this naming issue
forever.
In order to prepare the `AliasOrIndex` abstraction for the introduction of data streams,
the abstraction needs to be made more flexible, because currently it really can be only
an alias or an index.
* Renamed `AliasOrIndex` to `IndexAbstraction`.
* Introduced a `IndexAbstraction.Type` enum to indicate what a `IndexAbstraction` instance is.
* Replaced the `isAlias()` method that returns a boolean with the `getType()` method that returns the new Type enum.
* Moved `getWriteIndex()` up from the `IndexAbstraction.Alias` to the `IndexAbstraction` interface.
* Moved `getAliasName()` up from the `IndexAbstraction.Alias` to the `IndexAbstraction` interface and renamed it to `getName()`.
* Removed unnecessary casting to `IndexAbstraction.Alias` by just checking the `getType()` method.
Relates to #53100
The current implementations make it difficult for
adding new privileges (example: a cluster privilege which is
more than cluster action-based and not exposed to the security
administrator). On the high level, we would like our cluster privilege
either:
- a named cluster privilege
This corresponds to `cluster` field from the role descriptor
- or a configurable cluster privilege
This corresponds to the `global` field from the role-descriptor and
allows a security administrator to configure them.
Some of the responsibilities like the merging of action based cluster privileges
are now pushed at cluster permission level. How to implement the predicate
(using Automaton) is being now enforced by cluster permission.
`ClusterPermission` helps in enforcing the cluster level access either by
performing checks against cluster action and optionally against a request.
It is a collection of one or more permission checks where if any of the checks
allow access then the permission allows access to a cluster action.
Implementations of cluster privilege must be able to provide information
regarding the predicates to the cluster permission so that can be enforced.
This is enforced by making implementations of cluster privilege aware of
cluster permission builder and provide a way to specify how the permission is
to be built for a given privilege.
This commit renames `ConditionalClusterPrivilege` to `ConfigurableClusterPrivilege`.
`ConfigurableClusterPrivilege` is a renderable cluster privilege exposed
as a `global` field in role descriptor.
Other than this there is a requirement where we would want to know if a cluster
permission is implied by another cluster-permission (`has-privileges`).
This is helpful in addressing queries related to privileges for a user.
This is not just simply checking of cluster permissions since we do not
have access to runtime information (like request object).
This refactoring does not try to address those scenarios.
Relates #44048
For some users, the built in authorization mechanism does not fit their
needs and no feature that we offer would allow them to control the
authorization process to meet their needs. In order to support this,
a concept of an AuthorizationEngine is being introduced, which can be
provided using the security extension mechanism.
An AuthorizationEngine is responsible for making the authorization
decisions about a request. The engine is responsible for knowing how to
authorize and can be backed by whatever mechanism a user wants. The
default mechanism is one backed by roles to provide the authorization
decisions. The AuthorizationEngine will be called by the
AuthorizationService, which handles more of the internal workings that
apply in general to authorization within Elasticsearch.
In order to support external authorization services that would back an
authorization engine, the entire authorization process has become
asynchronous, which also includes all calls to the AuthorizationEngine.
The use of roles also leaked out of the AuthorizationService in our
existing code that is not specifically related to roles so this also
needed to be addressed. RequestInterceptor instances sometimes used a
role to ensure a user was not attempting to escalate their privileges.
Addressing this leakage of roles meant that the RequestInterceptor
execution needed to move within the AuthorizationService and that
AuthorizationEngines needed to support detection of whether a user has
more privileges on a name than another. The second area where roles
leaked to the user is in the handling of a few privilege APIs that
could be used to retrieve the user's privileges or ask if a user has
privileges to perform an action. To remove the leakage of roles from
these actions, the AuthorizationService and AuthorizationEngine gained
methods that enabled an AuthorizationEngine to return the response for
these APIs.
Ultimately this feature is the work included in:
#37785#37495#37328#36245#38137#38219Closes#32435
Mark Vieira
Jake Landis
Jason Tedor
Martijn van Groningen
Yogesh Gaikwad
Ryan Ernst
Jay Modi