openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kemri.c

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/*
* Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "cms_local.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
/* KEM Recipient Info (KEMRI) routines */
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
uint32_t **pkekLength,
X509_ALGOR **pwrap)
{
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return 0;
}
if (pkekLength)
*pkekLength = &ri->d.ori->d.kemri->kekLength;
if (pwrap)
*pwrap = ri->d.ori->d.kemri->wrap;
return 1;
}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
{
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return -2;
}
return ossl_cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(ri->d.ori->d.kemri->rid, cert);
}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return 0;
}
kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kemri->pctx);
kemri->pctx = NULL;
if (pk != NULL) {
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kemri->cms_ctx), pk,
ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kemri->cms_ctx));
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(pctx, NULL) <= 0)
goto err;
kemri->pctx = pctx;
}
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
/* Initialise a kemri based on passed certificate and key */
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, unsigned int flags,
const CMS_CTX *ctx)
{
CMS_OtherRecipientInfo *ori;
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
int idtype;
X509_PUBKEY *x_pubkey;
X509_ALGOR *x_alg;
ri->d.ori = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo);
if (ri->d.ori == NULL)
return 0;
ri->encoded_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER;
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM;
ori = ri->d.ori;
ori->oriType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ori_kem);
if (ori->oriType == NULL)
return 0;
ori->d.kemri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo);
if (ori->d.kemri == NULL)
return 0;
kemri = ori->d.kemri;
kemri->version = 0;
kemri->cms_ctx = ctx;
/*
* Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the same
* structure.
*/
idtype = (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) ? CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER : CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
if (!ossl_cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(kemri->rid, recip, idtype, ctx))
return 0;
x_pubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(recip);
if (x_pubkey == NULL)
return 0;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, NULL, NULL, &x_alg, x_pubkey))
return 0;
if (!X509_ALGOR_copy(kemri->kem, x_alg))
return 0;
kemri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx),
recipPubKey,
ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx));
if (kemri->pctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(kemri->pctx, NULL) <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
return ri->d.ori->d.kemri->ctx;
return NULL;
}
X509_ALGOR *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
return ri->d.ori->d.kemri->kdf;
return NULL;
}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
const unsigned char *ukm,
int ukmLength)
{
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return 0;
}
if (ukm == NULL && ukmLength != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(kemri->ukm);
kemri->ukm = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (kemri->ukm == NULL)
return 0;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(kemri->ukm, ukm, ukmLength);
return 1;
}
static EVP_KDF_CTX *create_kdf_ctx(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri)
{
const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid;
int ptype;
char kdf_alg[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
EVP_KDF *kdf = NULL;
EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
/*
* KDFs with algorithm identifier parameters are not supported yet. To
* support this, EVP_KDF_CTX_set_algor_params from
* `doc/designs/passing-algorithmidentifier-parameters.md` needs to be
* implemented.
*/
X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_oid, &ptype, NULL, kemri->kdf);
if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && ptype != V_ASN1_NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KDF_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (OBJ_obj2txt(kdf_alg, sizeof(kdf_alg), kdf_oid, 1) < 0)
goto err;
kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kemri->cms_ctx), kdf_alg,
ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kemri->cms_ctx));
if (kdf == NULL)
goto err;
kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
err:
EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
return kctx;
}
static int kdf_derive(unsigned char *kek, size_t keklen,
const unsigned char *ss, size_t sslen,
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri)
{
EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[3];
unsigned char *infoder = NULL;
int infolen = 0;
int rv = 0;
infolen = CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo_encode(&infoder, kemri->wrap, kemri->ukm,
kemri->kekLength);
if (infolen <= 0)
goto err;
kctx = create_kdf_ctx(kemri);
if (kctx == NULL)
goto err;
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
(unsigned char *)ss, sslen);
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
(char *)infoder, infolen);
params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, kek, keklen, params) <= 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(infoder);
EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
return rv;
}
/*
* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
* or the encrypted CEK.
*/
static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
const unsigned char *ss, size_t sslen,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri, int enc)
{
/* Key encryption key */
unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
size_t keklen = kemri->kekLength;
unsigned char *out = NULL;
int outlen = 0;
int rv = 0;
if (keklen > sizeof(kek)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!kdf_derive(kek, keklen, ss, sslen, kemri))
goto err;
/* Set KEK in context */
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kemri->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
goto err;
/* obtain output length of ciphered key */
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kemri->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, (int)inlen))
goto err;
out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
if (out == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kemri->ctx, out, &outlen, in, (int)inlen))
goto err;
*pout = out;
out = NULL;
*poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(out);
OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kemri->ctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kemri->pctx);
kemri->pctx = NULL;
return rv;
}
/* Encrypt content key in KEM recipient info */
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
unsigned char *kem_ct = NULL;
size_t kem_ct_len;
unsigned char *kem_secret = NULL;
size_t kem_secret_len = 0;
unsigned char *enckey;
size_t enckeylen;
int rv = 0;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return 0;
}
kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
/* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_wrap_init(ri, ec->cipher))
return 0;
/* Initialise KDF algorithm */
if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
return 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(kemri->pctx, NULL, &kem_ct_len, NULL, &kem_secret_len) <= 0)
return 0;
kem_ct = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_ct_len);
kem_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_secret_len);
if (kem_ct == NULL || kem_secret == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(kemri->pctx, kem_ct, &kem_ct_len, kem_secret, &kem_secret_len) <= 0)
goto err;
ASN1_STRING_set0(kemri->kemct, kem_ct, (int)kem_ct_len);
kem_ct = NULL;
if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, kem_secret, kem_secret_len, ec->key, ec->keylen,
kemri, 1))
goto err;
ASN1_STRING_set0(kemri->encryptedKey, enckey, (int)enckeylen);
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(kem_ct);
OPENSSL_clear_free(kem_secret, kem_secret_len);
return rv;
}
int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_decrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
const unsigned char *kem_ct = NULL;
size_t kem_ct_len;
unsigned char *kem_secret = NULL;
size_t kem_secret_len = 0;
unsigned char *enckey = NULL;
size_t enckeylen;
unsigned char *cek = NULL;
size_t ceklen;
int ret = 0;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
return 0;
}
kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
if (kemri->pctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
return 0;
}
/* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
goto err;
kem_ct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(kemri->kemct);
kem_ct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(kemri->kemct);
if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(kemri->pctx, NULL, &kem_secret_len, kem_ct, kem_ct_len) <= 0)
return 0;
kem_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_secret_len);
if (kem_secret == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(kemri->pctx, kem_secret, &kem_secret_len, kem_ct, kem_ct_len) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
enckeylen = kemri->encryptedKey->length;
enckey = kemri->encryptedKey->data;
if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, kem_secret, kem_secret_len, enckey, enckeylen, kemri, 0))
goto err;
ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
ec->key = cek;
ec->keylen = ceklen;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(kem_secret, kem_secret_len);
return ret;
}