Fix some typos

Reported-by: misspell-fixer <https://github.com/vlajos/misspell-fixer>

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10544)

(cherry picked from commit 79c44b4e30)

Configurations/10-main.conf

@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ my %targets = (
     # primarily because vendor assembler can't assemble our modules
     # with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even
     # available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel
-    # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays
+    # resistant code, which is incompatible with security by today's
     # standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged
     # option, which we can firmly point at...
     #

INSTALL

@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@
 
  HASHBANGPERL
                 The command string for the Perl executable to insert in the
-                #! line of perl scripts that will be publically installed.
+                #! line of perl scripts that will be publicly installed.
                 Default: /usr/bin/env perl
                 Note: the value of this variable is added to the same scripts
                 on all platforms, but it's only relevant on Unix-like platforms.

apps/passwd.c

@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p,
             (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */
         (*salt_p)[i] = 0;
 # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-        /* The password encryption funtion will convert back to ASCII */
+        /* The password encryption function will convert back to ASCII */
         ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, saltlen);
 # endif
     }

crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 # nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is
 # identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
 # saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
-# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
+# interleaved with CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
 # "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
 # disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
 # limit.

crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4

@@ -106,15 +106,15 @@ changequote({,})
 ! technique.
 !
 ! The macro also loads address sbox 1 to 5 to global 1 to 5, address
-! sbox 6 to local6, and addres sbox 8 to out3.
+! sbox 6 to local6, and address sbox 8 to out3.
 !
-! Rotates the halfs 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions.
+! Rotates the halves 3 left to bring the sbox bits in convenient positions.
 !
 ! Loads key first round from address in parameter 5 to out0, out1.
 !
 ! After the original LibDES initial permutation, the resulting left
 ! is in the variable initially used for right and vice versa. The macro
-! implements the possibility to keep the halfs in the original registers.
+! implements the possibility to keep the halves in the original registers.
 !
 ! parameter 1  left
 ! parameter 2  right
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ DES_encrypt2:
 	add	%o7,global1,global1
 	sub	global1,.PIC.DES_SPtrans-.des_and,out2
 
-	! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halfs 3 left
+	! Set sbox address 1 to 6 and rotate halves 3 left
 	! Errors caught by destest? Yes. Still? *NO*
 
 	!sethi	%hi(DES_SPtrans), global1 ! address sbox 1

crypto/evp/e_aes.c

@@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@ typedef struct {
                 } icv;
                 unsigned char k[32];
             } kmac_param;
-            /* KMAC-AES paramater block - end */
+            /* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */
 
             union {
                 unsigned long long g[2];

crypto/rand/rand_vms.c

@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
     /*
      * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp
      * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that
-     * the nonce is unique whith high probability for different process
+     * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process
      * instances.
      */
     data.pid = getpid();

crypto/rand/rand_win.c

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
 
     /*
      * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique whith high probability for
+     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
      * different process instances.
      */
     data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();

doc/man3/RAND_set_rand_method.pod

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Each pointer may be NULL if the function is not implemented.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
-RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failue.
+RAND_set_rand_method() returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
 RAND_get_rand_method() and RAND_OpenSSL() return pointers to the respective
 methods.
 

ssl/record/ssl3_record.c

@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
  * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise.
  *
  * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
  *       short etc).
  *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
  *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
  * internal errors, but not otherwise.
  *
  * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
  *       short etc).
  *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
  *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
             } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
                 padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
 
-                /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
+                /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
 
                 if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
                     SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
@@ -1669,7 +1669,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
     enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
     /*-
      * enc_err is:
-     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
      *    1: if the padding is valid
      *   -1: if the padding is invalid
      */

ssl/record/ssl3_record_tls13.c

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
  * internal errors, but not otherwise.
  *
  * Returns:
- *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too
  *        short etc).
  *    1: if the record encryption was successful.
  *   -1: if the record's AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,

ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
         unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
         size_t hashlen;
         /*
-         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this wont
+         * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't
          * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same
          * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify)
          */

util/perl/TLSProxy/Proxy.pm

@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ sub clientstart
     } else {
         # It's a bit counter-intuitive spot to make next connection to
         # the s_server. Rationale is that established connection works
-        # as syncronization point, in sense that this way we know that
+        # as synchronization point, in sense that this way we know that
         # s_server is actually done with current session...
         $self->connect_to_server();
     }