Use secure memory allocation for ML-KEM and ML-DSA private key storage areas

Resolves: #27603

Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27625)
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Frink 2025-05-13 15:27:05 -05:00 committed by Tomas Mraz
parent 4dbb537bd1
commit 815dde3e20
6 changed files with 64 additions and 29 deletions

View File

@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_sk_encode(ML_DSA_KEY *key)
size_t enc_len = params->sk_len;
const POLY *t0 = key->t0.poly;
WPACKET pkt;
uint8_t *enc = OPENSSL_malloc(enc_len);
uint8_t *enc = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(enc_len);
if (enc == NULL)
return 0;
@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_sk_encode(ML_DSA_KEY *key)
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &written)
|| written != enc_len)
goto err;
OPENSSL_clear_free(key->priv_encoding, enc_len);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(key->priv_encoding, enc_len);
key->priv_encoding = enc;
ret = 1;
err:
@ -805,9 +805,12 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_sk_decode(ML_DSA_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len)
goto err;
if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0)
goto err;
if (key->priv_encoding == NULL
&& (key->priv_encoding = OPENSSL_memdup(in, in_len)) == NULL)
if (key->priv_encoding == NULL) {
key->priv_encoding = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(in_len);
if (key->priv_encoding == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(key->priv_encoding, in, in_len);
}
/*
* Computing the public key also computes its hash, which must be equal to
* the |tr| value in the private key, else the key was corrupted.

View File

@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_set_prekey(ML_DSA_KEY *key, int flags_set, int flags_clr,
|| key->seed != NULL)
return 0;
if (sk != NULL
&& (key->priv_encoding = OPENSSL_memdup(sk, sk_len)) == NULL)
if (sk != NULL) {
key->priv_encoding = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(sk_len);
if (key->priv_encoding == NULL)
goto end;
memcpy(key->priv_encoding, sk, sk_len);
}
if (seed != NULL
&& (key->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(seed, seed_len)) == NULL)
goto end;
@ -60,7 +64,7 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_set_prekey(ML_DSA_KEY *key, int flags_set, int flags_clr,
end:
if (!ret) {
OPENSSL_free(key->priv_encoding);
OPENSSL_secure_free(key->priv_encoding);
OPENSSL_free(key->seed);
key->priv_encoding = key->seed = NULL;
}
@ -114,7 +118,7 @@ int ossl_ml_dsa_key_priv_alloc(ML_DSA_KEY *key)
if (key->s1.poly != NULL)
return 0;
if (!vector_alloc(&key->s1, l + 2 * k))
if (!vector_secure_alloc(&key->s1, l + 2 * k))
return 0;
poly = key->s1.poly;
@ -151,7 +155,7 @@ void ossl_ml_dsa_key_reset(ML_DSA_KEY *key)
vector_zero(&key->s1);
vector_zero(&key->s2);
vector_zero(&key->t0);
vector_free(&key->s1);
vector_secure_free(&key->s1);
key->s2.poly = NULL;
key->t0.poly = NULL;
}
@ -161,7 +165,7 @@ void ossl_ml_dsa_key_reset(ML_DSA_KEY *key)
OPENSSL_free(key->pub_encoding);
key->pub_encoding = NULL;
if (key->priv_encoding != NULL)
OPENSSL_clear_free(key->priv_encoding, key->params->sk_len);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(key->priv_encoding, key->params->sk_len);
key->priv_encoding = NULL;
if (key->seed != NULL)
OPENSSL_clear_free(key->seed, ML_DSA_SEED_BYTES);
@ -217,10 +221,10 @@ ML_DSA_KEY *ossl_ml_dsa_key_dup(const ML_DSA_KEY *src, int selection)
vector_copy(&ret->s2, &src->s2);
vector_copy(&ret->t0, &src->t0);
}
if ((ret->priv_encoding =
OPENSSL_memdup(src->priv_encoding,
src->params->sk_len)) == NULL)
ret->priv_encoding = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(src->params->sk_len);
if (!ret->priv_encoding)
goto err;
memcpy(ret->priv_encoding, src->priv_encoding, src->params->sk_len);
}
if (src->seed != NULL
&& (ret->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(src->seed,

View File

@ -40,6 +40,16 @@ int vector_alloc(VECTOR *v, size_t num_polys)
return 1;
}
static ossl_inline ossl_unused
int vector_secure_alloc(VECTOR *v, size_t num_polys)
{
v->poly = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(num_polys * sizeof(POLY));
if (v->poly == NULL)
return 0;
v->num_poly = num_polys;
return 1;
}
static ossl_inline ossl_unused
void vector_free(VECTOR *v)
{
@ -48,6 +58,14 @@ void vector_free(VECTOR *v)
v->num_poly = 0;
}
static ossl_inline ossl_unused
void vector_secure_free(VECTOR *v)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(v->poly, v->num_poly * sizeof(POLY));
v->poly = NULL;
v->num_poly = 0;
}
/* @brief zeroize a vectors polynomial coefficients */
static ossl_inline ossl_unused
void vector_zero(VECTOR *va)

View File

@ -1582,11 +1582,18 @@ ossl_ml_kem_key_reset(ML_KEM_KEY *key)
* secret |z|, and seed |d|, we can cleanse all three in one call.
*
* - Otherwise, when key->d is set, cleanse the stashed seed.
*
* If the memory has been allocated with secure memory, it will be cleared
* before being free'd under the OPENSSL_secure_free call.
*/
if (ossl_ml_kem_have_prvkey(key))
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->s,
key->vinfo->rank * sizeof(scalar) + 2 * ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES);
if (ossl_ml_kem_have_prvkey(key)) {
if (!CRYPTO_secure_allocated(key->t))
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->s, key->vinfo->rank * sizeof(scalar) + 2 * ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES);
OPENSSL_secure_free(key->t);
} else {
OPENSSL_free(key->t);
}
key->d = key->z = (uint8_t *)(key->s = key->m = key->t = NULL);
}
@ -1653,6 +1660,7 @@ ML_KEM_KEY *ossl_ml_kem_key_dup(const ML_KEM_KEY *key, int selection)
{
int ok = 0;
ML_KEM_KEY *ret;
void *tmp;
/*
* Partially decoded keys, not yet imported or loaded, should never be
@ -1683,7 +1691,11 @@ ML_KEM_KEY *ossl_ml_kem_key_dup(const ML_KEM_KEY *key, int selection)
ret->pkhash = ret->rho + ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES;
break;
case OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY:
ok = add_storage(OPENSSL_memdup(key->t, key->vinfo->prvalloc), 1, ret);
tmp = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(key->vinfo->prvalloc);
if (tmp == NULL)
break;
memcpy(tmp, key->t, key->vinfo->prvalloc);
ok = add_storage(tmp, 1, ret);
/* Duplicated keys retain |d|, if available */
if (key->d != NULL)
ret->d = ret->z + ML_KEM_RANDOM_BYTES;
@ -1715,10 +1727,8 @@ void ossl_ml_kem_key_free(ML_KEM_KEY *key)
if (ossl_ml_kem_decoded_key(key)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->seedbuf, sizeof(key->seedbuf));
if (ossl_ml_kem_have_dkenc(key)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->encoded_dk, key->vinfo->prvkey_bytes);
OPENSSL_free(key->encoded_dk);
}
if (ossl_ml_kem_have_dkenc(key))
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(key->encoded_dk, key->vinfo->prvkey_bytes);
}
ossl_ml_kem_key_reset(key);
OPENSSL_free(key);
@ -1831,7 +1841,7 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_parse_private_key(const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
|| (mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (add_storage(OPENSSL_malloc(vinfo->prvalloc), 1, key))
if (add_storage(OPENSSL_secure_malloc(vinfo->prvalloc), 1, key))
ret = parse_prvkey(in, mdctx, key);
if (!ret)
@ -1878,7 +1888,7 @@ int ossl_ml_kem_genkey(uint8_t *pubenc, size_t publen, ML_KEM_KEY *key)
*/
CONSTTIME_SECRET(seed, ML_KEM_SEED_BYTES);
if (add_storage(OPENSSL_malloc(vinfo->prvalloc), 1, key))
if (add_storage(OPENSSL_secure_malloc(vinfo->prvalloc), 1, key))
ret = genkey(seed, mdctx, pubenc, key);
OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));

View File

@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ ossl_ml_kem_d2i_PKCS8(const uint8_t *prvenc, int prvlen,
}
}
if (p8fmt->priv_length > 0) {
if ((key->encoded_dk = OPENSSL_malloc(p8fmt->priv_length)) == NULL) {
if ((key->encoded_dk = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(p8fmt->priv_length)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY,
"error parsing %s private key",
v->algorithm_name);

View File

@ -537,12 +537,12 @@ void *ml_kem_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
if (!ml_kem_pairwise_test(key, key->prov_flags))
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(encoded_dk);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(encoded_dk, key->vinfo->prvkey_bytes);
return key;
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(encoded_dk);
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(encoded_dk, key->vinfo->prvkey_bytes);
ossl_ml_kem_key_free(key);
return NULL;
}