Fix an assertion failure which happens when a DTLS 1.3 client receives a HelloVerifyRequest.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24509)
This commit is contained in:
Frederik Wedel-Heinen 2024-05-27 21:58:13 +02:00 committed by Tomas Mraz
parent 9d8617854b
commit c6de777d09
7 changed files with 47 additions and 31 deletions

View File

@ -72,12 +72,7 @@ int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
if (client == NULL)
goto end;
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_min_proto_version(client, 0) == 1);
/**
* TODO(DTLSv1.3): Fuzzing fails with
* ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c:624: OpenSSL internal error:
* Assertion failed: s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
*/
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_max_proto_version(client, DTLS1_2_VERSION) == 1);
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_max_proto_version(client, 0) == 1);
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_cipher_list(client, "ALL:eNULL:@SECLEVEL=0") == 1);
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client, "localhost");
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());

View File

@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *ssl)
d1->link_mtu = 0;
d1->mtu = 0;
d1->hello_verify_request = SSL_HVR_NONE;
if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);

View File

@ -2014,6 +2014,8 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st {
pqueue *buffered_messages;
/* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
pqueue *sent_messages;
/* Flag to indicate current HelloVerifyRequest status */
enum {SSL_HVR_NONE = 0, SSL_HVR_RECEIVED} hello_verify_request;
size_t link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */
size_t mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */
struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;

View File

@ -654,13 +654,15 @@ static int add_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int group_id,
size_t encodedlen;
if (loop_num < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey) {
if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
|| s->d1->hello_verify_request == SSL_HVR_RECEIVED)
|| !ossl_assert(s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num] != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
* Could happen if we got a HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
* or if we got a HelloVerifyRequest
*/
key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num];
} else {

View File

@ -1357,6 +1357,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
size_t cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
int min_version;
SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
@ -1376,6 +1378,25 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
if (ssl == NULL) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
min_version = SSL_get_min_proto_version(ssl);
/*
* Server responds with a HelloVerify which means we cannot negotiate a
* higher version than DTLSv1.2.
*/
if (min_version != 0
&& ssl_version_cmp(s, min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION) > 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
s->d1->hello_verify_request = SSL_HVR_RECEIVED;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}

View File

@ -2562,6 +2562,7 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version,
int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
const int version1_2 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION;
/*
* In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
@ -2577,21 +2578,19 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
s->version = ver_max;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
* because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
* anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
* we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
* about this immediately.
*/
if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
return 0;
}
} else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) {
/* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* Even though this is technically before version negotiation,
* because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate
* anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when
* we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer
* about this immediately.
*/
if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max))
return 0;
} else if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, version1_2) > 0) {
/* (D)TLS1.3 always uses (D)TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
ver_max = version1_2;
}
s->client_version = ver_max;

View File

@ -207,8 +207,9 @@ static int test_dtls_drop_records(int idx)
/**
* TODO(DTLSv1.3): Tests fails with
* ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c:624: OpenSSL internal error:
* Assertion failed: s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
* dtls1_read_bytes:ssl/tls alert unexpected message:
* ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c:454:SSL alert number 10
* And "no progress made"
*/
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(NULL, DTLS_server_method(),
DTLS_client_method(),
@ -711,14 +712,9 @@ static int test_listen(void)
SSL *serverssl = NULL, *clientssl = NULL;
int testresult = 0;
/**
* TODO(DTLSv1.3): Tests fails with
* ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c:624: OpenSSL internal error:
* Assertion failed: s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
*/
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(NULL, DTLS_server_method(),
DTLS_client_method(),
DTLS1_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLS1_VERSION, 0,
&sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey)))
return 0;