mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
Start to overhaul RAND API
Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection
Make rand_pseudo same as rand.
Cleanup formatting and ifdef control
Rename some things:
- rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global
- source file
- lock/init functions, start per-thread state
- ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init
Put state into RAND_STATE structure
And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h
Use "randomness" instead of "entropy"
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)
This commit is contained in:
Rich Salz
parent
71d57be52e
commit
da8fc25a98
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
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md_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
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ossl_rand.c randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
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rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c
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@ -23,35 +23,40 @@
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/async.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <internal/thread_once.h>
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#include "rand_lcl.h"
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <internal/thread_once.h>
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#if defined(BN_DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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# define PREDICT
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# define PREDICT 1
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#endif
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/* #define PREDICT 1 */
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#define STATE_SIZE 1023
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static size_t state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
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static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
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static double entropy = 0;
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typedef struct ossl_rand_state_st OSSL_RAND_STATE;
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struct ossl_rand_state_st {
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size_t num;
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size_t index;
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unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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long md_count[2];
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};
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static OSSL_RAND_STATE global_state;
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static double randomness = 0;
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static int initialized = 0;
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static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_lock = NULL;
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static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_tmp_lock = NULL;
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static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
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/* May be set only when a thread holds rand_lock (to prevent double locking) */
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static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0;
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/* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock */
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/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
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/*
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* access to locking_threadid is synchronized by rand_tmp_lock;
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* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set
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*/
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static CRYPTO_THREAD_ID locking_threadid;
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#ifdef PREDICT
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@ -60,51 +65,35 @@ int rand_predictable = 0;
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static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
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static void rand_cleanup(void);
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static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
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static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
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static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
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static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
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static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
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#endif
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static int rand_status(void);
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static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
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rand_seed,
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rand_nopseudo_bytes,
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rand_cleanup,
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rand_add,
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#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
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rand_pseudo_bytes,
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#else
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NULL,
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#endif
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rand_status
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};
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DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
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static void rand_thread_cleanup(void *arg)
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{
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OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = arg;
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OPENSSL_clear_free(sp, sizeof(*sp));
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}
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DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_ossl_rand_init)
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{
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int ret = 1;
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OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
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rand_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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ret &= rand_lock != NULL;
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rand_tmp_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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return rand_lock != NULL && rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
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ret &= rand_tmp_lock != NULL;
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ret &= CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&key, rand_thread_cleanup) == 1;
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return ret;
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}
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RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
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{
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return (&rand_meth);
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return &openssl_rand_meth;
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}
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static void rand_cleanup(void)
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{
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OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
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state_num = 0;
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state_index = 0;
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OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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md_count[0] = 0;
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md_count[1] = 0;
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entropy = 0;
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OPENSSL_cleanse(&global_state, sizeof(global_state));
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randomness = 0;
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initialized = 0;
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_lock);
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CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_tmp_lock);
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@ -114,10 +103,11 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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{
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int i, j, k, st_idx;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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EVP_MD_CTX *m;
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int do_not_lock;
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int rv = 0;
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OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
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if (!num)
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return 1;
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@ -146,7 +136,7 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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if (m == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
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if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
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goto err;
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/* check if we already have the lock */
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@ -160,58 +150,58 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
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st_idx = state_index;
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st_idx = sp->index;
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/*
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* use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
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* seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
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* _some_ difference
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*/
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md_c[0] = md_count[0];
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md_c[1] = md_count[1];
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md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
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md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
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memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md));
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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state_index += num;
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if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
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state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
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state_num = STATE_SIZE;
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} else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
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if (state_index > state_num)
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state_num = state_index;
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/* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
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sp->index += num;
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if (sp->index >= STATE_SIZE) {
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sp->index %= STATE_SIZE;
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sp->num = STATE_SIZE;
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} else if (sp->num < STATE_SIZE) {
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if (sp->index > sp->num)
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sp->num = sp->index;
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}
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/* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
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/* sp->index <= sp->num <= STATE_SIZE */
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/*
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* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
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* will use now, but other threads may use them as well
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*/
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md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
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sp->md_count[1] += (num / RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
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for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
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for (i = 0; i < num; i += RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
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j = (num - i);
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j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
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j = (j > RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
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if (!MD_Init(m))
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
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goto err;
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k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
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if (k > 0) {
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if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j - k))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
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goto err;
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} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
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} else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], j))
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goto err;
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/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
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if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
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/* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO EVP_DigestUpdate()! */
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, buf, j))
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goto err;
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/*
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* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
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@ -221,9 +211,9 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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* insecure keys.
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*/
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if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
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goto err;
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if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
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goto err;
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md_c[1]++;
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* conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
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* random state.
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*/
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state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
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sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
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if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
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st_idx = 0;
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}
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@ -249,14 +239,14 @@ static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
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/*
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* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
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* thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
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* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
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* counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much randomness as fits into
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* md.
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*/
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for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
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md[k] ^= local_md[k];
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for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(sp->md); k++) {
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sp->md[k] ^= local_md[k];
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}
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if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
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entropy += add;
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if (randomness < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
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randomness += add;
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if (!do_not_lock)
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CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
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@ -271,15 +261,16 @@ static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
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return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
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}
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static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
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{
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static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
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int i, j, k;
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size_t num_ceil, st_idx, st_num;
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int ok;
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long md_c[2];
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unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char local_md[RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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EVP_MD_CTX *m;
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OSSL_RAND_STATE *sp = &global_state;
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#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
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pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
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#endif
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@ -323,9 +314,9 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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if (m == NULL)
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goto err_mem;
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/* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
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/* round upwards to multiple of RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
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num_ceil =
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(1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
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(1 + (num - 1) / (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
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/*
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* (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
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@ -345,7 +336,7 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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* global 'md'.
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*/
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if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
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if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
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goto err_mem;
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CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
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@ -369,28 +360,28 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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if (!stirred_pool)
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do_stir_pool = 1;
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ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
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ok = (randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
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if (!ok) {
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/*
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* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
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* output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
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* to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
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* seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
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* to decrease the randomness estimate. Once we've had enough initial
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* seeding we don't bother to adjust the randomness count, though,
|
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* because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
|
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* randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
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* we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
|
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* input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
|
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* entropy limit has been reached.
|
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* we have enough randomness. Randomness should be collected in a
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* separate input pool and be transferred to the output pool only
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* when the randomness limit has been reached.
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*/
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entropy -= num;
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if (entropy < 0)
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entropy = 0;
|
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randomness -= num;
|
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if (randomness < 0)
|
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randomness = 0;
|
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}
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|
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if (do_stir_pool) {
|
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/*
|
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* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
|
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* better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
|
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* better make sure that the required randomness gets 'evenly
|
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* distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
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* function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
|
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* suitable for this purpose.
|
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|
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@ -398,37 +389,37 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
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|
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int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
|
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while (n > 0) {
|
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#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
|
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#if RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
|
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# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
|
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#endif
|
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#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
|
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#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH */
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/*
|
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* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
|
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* rand_add expects to have something to hash.
|
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*/
|
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rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
|
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n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
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rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
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n -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
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}
|
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if (ok)
|
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stirred_pool = 1;
|
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}
|
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|
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st_idx = state_index;
|
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st_num = state_num;
|
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md_c[0] = md_count[0];
|
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md_c[1] = md_count[1];
|
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memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
|
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st_idx = sp->index;
|
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st_num = sp->num;
|
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md_c[0] = sp->md_count[0];
|
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md_c[1] = sp->md_count[1];
|
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memcpy(local_md, sp->md, sizeof sp->md);
|
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|
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state_index += num_ceil;
|
||||
if (state_index > state_num)
|
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state_index %= state_num;
|
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sp->index += num_ceil;
|
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if (sp->index > sp->num)
|
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sp->index %= sp->num;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
|
||||
* ours (but other threads may use them too)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
md_count[0] += 1;
|
||||
sp->md_count[0] += 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
|
||||
crypto_lock_rand = 0;
|
||||
|
|
@ -436,63 +427,64 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
|
|||
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
|
||||
|
||||
while (num > 0) {
|
||||
/* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
|
||||
j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
|
||||
/* num_ceil -= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 */
|
||||
j = (num >= RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
|
||||
num -= j;
|
||||
if (!MD_Init(m))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
|
||||
if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
curr_pid = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
curr_time = 0;
|
||||
if (!rand_hw_seed(m))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
|
||||
k = (st_idx + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
|
||||
if (k > 0) {
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[0], k))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
|
||||
} else if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, &sp->state[st_idx], RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, local_md, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
|
||||
/* may compete with other threads */
|
||||
state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
|
||||
sp->state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
|
||||
if (st_idx >= st_num)
|
||||
st_idx = 0;
|
||||
if (i < j)
|
||||
*(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
|
||||
*(buf++) = local_md[i + RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!MD_Init(m)
|
||||
|| !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
|
||||
|| !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(m, RAND_DIGEST, NULL)
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, (unsigned char *)md_c, sizeof(md_c))
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(m, local_md, RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_lock);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ASYNC_block_pause();
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(m, sp->md, sizeof(sp->md))
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(m, sp->md, NULL)) {
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_lock);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -502,14 +494,10 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
|
|||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
|
||||
if (ok)
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
else if (pseudo)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
|
||||
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
|
||||
"https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
|
||||
|
|
@ -521,28 +509,13 @@ static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
|
|||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static int rand_status(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID cur;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
int do_not_lock;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&ossl_rand_init, do_ossl_rand_init))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
cur = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
|
||||
|
|
@ -578,7 +551,7 @@ static int rand_status(void)
|
|||
initialized = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
|
||||
ret = randomness >= RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!do_not_lock) {
|
||||
/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
|
||||
|
|
@ -595,9 +568,6 @@ static int rand_status(void)
|
|||
* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
|
||||
* currently supports rdrand.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
|
||||
|
||||
#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
|
||||
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
|
||||
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
|
||||
|
|
@ -618,40 +588,12 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
|
|||
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
||||
if (rnd == 0)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (!MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
|
||||
|
||||
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t rnd;
|
||||
if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
|
||||
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
||||
if (rnd == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
*((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
|
||||
buf += sizeof(size_t);
|
||||
num -= sizeof(size_t);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (num) {
|
||||
rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
|
||||
if (rnd == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
while (num) {
|
||||
*buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
|
||||
rnd >>= 8;
|
||||
buf++;
|
||||
num--;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#else
|
||||
|
||||
static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
|
|
@ -659,9 +601,14 @@ static int rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
|
|||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth = {
|
||||
rand_seed,
|
||||
rand_bytes,
|
||||
rand_cleanup,
|
||||
rand_add,
|
||||
rand_bytes,
|
||||
rand_status
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
|
@ -10,37 +10,15 @@
|
|||
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
|
||||
# define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
|
||||
|
||||
# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
|
||||
|
||||
# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
|
||||
# define USE_SHA1_RAND
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
/* we require 256 bits of randomness */
|
||||
# define RANDOMNESS_NEEDED (256 / 8)
|
||||
|
||||
# include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
# define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
|
||||
# define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
|
||||
# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
|
||||
# include <openssl/md5.h>
|
||||
# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
||||
# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
|
||||
# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
|
||||
# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
|
||||
# include <openssl/sha.h>
|
||||
# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
||||
# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|
||||
# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|
||||
# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
|
||||
# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
|
||||
# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
||||
# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
|
||||
# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
|
||||
# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
|
||||
# include <openssl/md2.h>
|
||||
# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
||||
# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
|
||||
# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
|
||||
# define RAND_DIGEST EVP_sha1()
|
||||
# define RAND_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
|
||||
|
||||
extern RAND_METHOD openssl_rand_meth;
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,17 +14,19 @@
|
|||
#include "internal/rand.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
|
||||
#include "rand_lcl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
|
||||
static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock = NULL;
|
||||
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock = NULL;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
|
||||
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
|
||||
|
||||
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 1;
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
|
|
@ -36,9 +38,22 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_lock_init)
|
|||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
|
||||
meth->cleanup();
|
||||
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,25 +70,26 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
|
|||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
|
||||
if (!default_RAND_meth) {
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
|
||||
if (e) {
|
||||
default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
|
||||
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
|
||||
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
||||
e = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (e)
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
ENGINE *e;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
|
||||
if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
|
||||
&& (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
|
||||
funct_ref = e;
|
||||
else
|
||||
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ENGINE_finish(e);
|
||||
default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
default_RAND_meth = &openssl_rand_meth;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
default_RAND_meth = RAND_OpenSSL();
|
||||
}
|
||||
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
|
||||
|
|
@ -85,10 +101,10 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
|
|||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_lock_init, do_rand_lock_init))
|
||||
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (engine) {
|
||||
if (engine != NULL) {
|
||||
if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
|
||||
|
|
@ -106,55 +122,48 @@ int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
|
|||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
||||
if (meth && meth->cleanup)
|
||||
meth->cleanup();
|
||||
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
||||
if (meth && meth->seed)
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth->seed != NULL)
|
||||
meth->seed(buf, num);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
|
||||
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
||||
if (meth && meth->add)
|
||||
meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth->add != NULL)
|
||||
meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
||||
if (meth && meth->bytes)
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
|
||||
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
|
||||
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
|
||||
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
||||
if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
|
||||
return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
int RAND_status(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
|
||||
if (meth && meth->status)
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth->status != NULL)
|
||||
return meth->status();
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
|
||||
curr_uid = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < (RANDOMNESS_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
|
||||
* interference, etc.
|
||||
|
|
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
unsigned long l;
|
||||
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
|
||||
# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || (!defined(OPENSS_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
|
||||
unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
|
||||
unsigned char tmpbuf[RANDOMNESS_NEEDED];
|
||||
int n = 0;
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
# ifdef DEVRANDOM
|
||||
|
|
@ -144,12 +144,12 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
# ifdef DEVRANDOM
|
||||
memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats));
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
|
||||
* Use a randomness device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
|
||||
* this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs
|
||||
* out of random entries.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; (i < OSSL_NELEM(randomfiles)) && (n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED); i++) {
|
||||
if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
|
||||
# ifdef O_NONBLOCK
|
||||
| O_NONBLOCK
|
||||
|
|
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
|
||||
if (try_read) {
|
||||
r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
|
||||
ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
|
||||
RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
|
||||
if (r > 0)
|
||||
n += r;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
|
|
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
while ((r > 0 ||
|
||||
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0
|
||||
&& n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
|
||||
&& n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
|
||||
|
||||
close(fd);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -255,16 +255,15 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
|
||||
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) && defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
|
||||
* collecting daemon.
|
||||
* Use an EGD socket to read randomness from the daemon.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED;
|
||||
for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
|
||||
egdsocket++) {
|
||||
int r;
|
||||
|
||||
r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
|
||||
ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
|
||||
RANDOMNESS_NEEDED - n);
|
||||
if (r > 0)
|
||||
n += r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,16 +7,11 @@
|
|||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Modified by VMS Software, Inc (2016)
|
||||
* Eliminate looping through all processes (performance)
|
||||
* Add additional randomizations using rand() function
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
||||
#include "rand_lcl.h"
|
||||
#include "e_os.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
|
||||
# include <openssl/rand.h>
|
||||
# include "rand_lcl.h"
|
||||
# include <descrip.h>
|
||||
# include <jpidef.h>
|
||||
# include <ssdef.h>
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,9 +29,9 @@
|
|||
# define PTR_T __void_ptr64
|
||||
# pragma pointer_size save
|
||||
# pragma pointer_size 32
|
||||
# else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# define PTR_T void *
|
||||
# endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
static struct items_data_st {
|
||||
short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,27 +47,22 @@ static struct items_data_st {
|
|||
{4, JPI$_PPGCNT},
|
||||
{4, JPI$_WSPEAK},
|
||||
{4, JPI$_FINALEXC},
|
||||
{0, 0} /* zero terminated */
|
||||
{0, 0}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
int RAND_poll(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
/* determine the number of items in the JPI array */
|
||||
|
||||
struct items_data_st item_entry;
|
||||
int item_entry_count = sizeof(items_data)/sizeof(item_entry);
|
||||
|
||||
int item_entry_count = OSSL_NELEM(items_data);
|
||||
/* Create the JPI itemlist array to hold item_data content */
|
||||
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
short length, code;
|
||||
int *buffer;
|
||||
int *retlen;
|
||||
} item[item_entry_count], *pitem; /* number of entries in items_data */
|
||||
|
||||
} item[item_entry_count], *pitem;
|
||||
struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
|
||||
int data_buffer[(item_entry_count*2)+4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
|
||||
int data_buffer[(item_entry_count * 2) + 4]; /* 8 bytes per entry max */
|
||||
int iosb[2];
|
||||
int sys_time[2];
|
||||
int *ptr;
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,27 +70,24 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
int tmp_length = 0;
|
||||
int total_length = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
pitems_data = items_data;
|
||||
pitem = item;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Setup itemlist for GETJPI */
|
||||
while (pitems_data->length) {
|
||||
pitems_data = items_data;
|
||||
for (pitem = item; pitems_data->length != 0; pitem++) {
|
||||
pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
|
||||
pitem->code = pitems_data->code;
|
||||
pitem->buffer = &data_buffer[total_length];
|
||||
pitem->retlen = 0;
|
||||
/* total_length is in longwords */
|
||||
total_length += pitems_data->length/4;
|
||||
total_length += pitems_data->length / 4;
|
||||
pitems_data++;
|
||||
pitem ++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fill data_buffer with various info bits from this process */
|
||||
/* and twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */
|
||||
if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) != SS$_NORMAL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, NULL, NULL, item, &iosb, 0, 0) == SS$_NORMAL) {
|
||||
/* Now twist that data to seed the SSL random number init */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < total_length; i++) {
|
||||
sys$gettim((struct _generic_64 *)&sys_time[0]);
|
||||
srand(sys_time[0] * data_buffer[0] * data_buffer[1] + i);
|
||||
|
|
@ -122,11 +109,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
|
|||
total_length += (tmp_length - 1);
|
||||
|
||||
/* size of seed is total_length*4 bytes (64bytes) */
|
||||
RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length*4, total_length * 2);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RAND_add((PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length * 4, total_length * 2);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue