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Implement functionality for direct use of composite signature algorithms 

The following API groups are extended with a new init function, as well
as an update and final function, to allow the use of explicitly fetched
signature implementations for any composite signature algorithm, like
"sha1WithRSAEncryption":

- EVP_PKEY_sign
- EVP_PKEY_verify
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover

To support this, providers are required to add a few new functions, not
the least one that declares what key types an signature implementation
supports.

While at this, the validity check in evp_signature_from_algorithm() is
also refactored; the SIGNATURE provider functionality is too complex for
counters.  It's better, or at least more readable, to check function
combinations.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
This commit is contained in:
Richard Levitte 2024-01-18 15:27:34 +01:00
parent 1985ba60bb
commit e675aabb87
12 changed files with 1138 additions and 204 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
crypto/err/openssl.txt
View File

@ -779,6 +779,8 @@ EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED:177:only oneshot supported
EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operation not initialized EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED:151:operation not initialized
EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE:150:\
operation not supported for this keytype operation not supported for this keytype
EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_SIGNATURE_TYPE:226:\
operation not supported for this signature type
EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW:202:output would overflow EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW:202:output would overflow
EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE:187:parameter too large EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE:187:parameter too large
EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING:162:partially overlapping buffers
@ -790,6 +792,8 @@ EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR:146:private key encode error
EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA:106:public key not rsa EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA:106:public key not rsa
EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED:227:setting xof failed EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED:227:setting xof failed
EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE:209:set default property failure EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE:209:set default property failure
EVP_R_SIGNATURE_TYPE_AND_KEY_TYPE_INCOMPATIBLE:228:\
signature type and key type incompatible
EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS:183:too many records EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS:183:too many records
EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING:212:unable to enable locking EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING:212:unable to enable locking
EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE:215:unable to get maximum request size EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE:215:unable to get maximum request size

6
crypto/evp/evp_err.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* /*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* *
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
"operation not initialized"}, "operation not initialized"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE), {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
"operation not supported for this keytype"}, "operation not supported for this keytype"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
"operation not supported for this signature type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW), {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW),
"output would overflow"}, "output would overflow"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE), {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE),
@ -149,6 +151,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED), "setting xof failed"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED), "setting xof failed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE), {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE),
"set default property failure"}, "set default property failure"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_SIGNATURE_TYPE_AND_KEY_TYPE_INCOMPATIBLE),
"signature type and key type incompatible"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS), "too many records"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS), "too many records"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING), {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING),
"unable to enable locking"}, "unable to enable locking"},

9
crypto/evp/evp_local.h
View File

@ -167,8 +167,14 @@ struct evp_signature_st {
OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn *newctx; OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn *newctx;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn *sign_init; OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn *sign_init;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn *sign; OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn *sign;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_init_fn *sign_message_init;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_update_fn *sign_message_update;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_final_fn *sign_message_final;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn *verify_init; OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn *verify_init;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn *verify; OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn *verify;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_init_fn *verify_message_init;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_update_fn *verify_message_update;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_final_fn *verify_message_final;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn *verify_recover_init; OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn *verify_recover_init;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn *verify_recover; OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn *verify_recover;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn *digest_sign_init; OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn *digest_sign_init;
@ -189,6 +195,9 @@ struct evp_signature_st {
OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn *gettable_ctx_md_params; OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn *gettable_ctx_md_params;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn *set_ctx_md_params; OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn *set_ctx_md_params;
OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn *settable_ctx_md_params; OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn *settable_ctx_md_params;
/* Signature object checking */
OSSL_FUNC_signature_query_key_types_fn *query_key_types;
} /* EVP_SIGNATURE */; } /* EVP_SIGNATURE */;
struct evp_asym_cipher_st { struct evp_asym_cipher_st {

652
crypto/evp/signature.c
View File

@ -7,8 +7,10 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/ */
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h> #include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/numbers.h" /* includes SIZE_MAX */ #include "internal/numbers.h" /* includes SIZE_MAX */
@ -42,9 +44,15 @@ static void *evp_signature_from_algorithm(int name_id,
{ {
const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns = algodef->implementation; const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns = algodef->implementation;
EVP_SIGNATURE *signature = NULL; EVP_SIGNATURE *signature = NULL;
int ctxfncnt = 0, signfncnt = 0, verifyfncnt = 0, verifyrecfncnt = 0; /* Counts newctx / freectx */
int digsignfncnt = 0, digverifyfncnt = 0; int ctxfncnt = 0;
/* Counts all init functions */
int initfncnt = 0;
/* Counts all performance functions (oneshot / update / final) */
int fncnt = 0;
/* Counts all parameter functions */
int gparamfncnt = 0, sparamfncnt = 0, gmdparamfncnt = 0, smdparamfncnt = 0; int gparamfncnt = 0, sparamfncnt = 0, gmdparamfncnt = 0, smdparamfncnt = 0;
int valid = 0;
if ((signature = evp_signature_new(prov)) == NULL) { if ((signature = evp_signature_new(prov)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
@ -68,91 +76,137 @@ static void *evp_signature_from_algorithm(int name_id,
if (signature->sign_init != NULL) if (signature->sign_init != NULL)
break; break;
signature->sign_init = OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init(fns); signature->sign_init = OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init(fns);
signfncnt++; initfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN:
if (signature->sign != NULL) if (signature->sign != NULL)
break; break;
signature->sign = OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign(fns); signature->sign = OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign(fns);
signfncnt++; fncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_INIT:
if (signature->sign_message_init != NULL)
break;
signature->sign_message_init
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_init(fns);
initfncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_UPDATE:
if (signature->sign_message_update != NULL)
break;
signature->sign_message_update
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_update(fns);
fncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_FINAL:
if (signature->sign_message_final != NULL)
break;
signature->sign_message_final
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_message_final(fns);
fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT:
if (signature->verify_init != NULL) if (signature->verify_init != NULL)
break; break;
signature->verify_init = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init(fns); signature->verify_init = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init(fns);
verifyfncnt++; initfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY:
if (signature->verify != NULL) if (signature->verify != NULL)
break; break;
signature->verify = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify(fns); signature->verify = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify(fns);
verifyfncnt++; fncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_INIT:
if (signature->verify_message_init != NULL)
break;
signature->verify_message_init
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_init(fns);
initfncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_UPDATE:
if (signature->verify_message_update != NULL)
break;
signature->verify_message_update
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_update(fns);
fncnt++;
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_FINAL:
if (signature->verify_message_final != NULL)
break;
signature->verify_message_final
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_message_final(fns);
fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT:
if (signature->verify_recover_init != NULL) if (signature->verify_recover_init != NULL)
break; break;
signature->verify_recover_init signature->verify_recover_init
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init(fns);
verifyrecfncnt++; initfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER:
if (signature->verify_recover != NULL) if (signature->verify_recover != NULL)
break; break;
signature->verify_recover signature->verify_recover
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover(fns);
verifyrecfncnt++; fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT:
if (signature->digest_sign_init != NULL) if (signature->digest_sign_init != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_sign_init signature->digest_sign_init
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init(fns);
initfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE:
if (signature->digest_sign_update != NULL) if (signature->digest_sign_update != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_sign_update signature->digest_sign_update
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update(fns);
digsignfncnt++; fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL:
if (signature->digest_sign_final != NULL) if (signature->digest_sign_final != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_sign_final signature->digest_sign_final
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final(fns);
digsignfncnt++; fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN:
if (signature->digest_sign != NULL) if (signature->digest_sign != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_sign signature->digest_sign
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign(fns);
fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT:
if (signature->digest_verify_init != NULL) if (signature->digest_verify_init != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_verify_init signature->digest_verify_init
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init(fns);
initfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE:
if (signature->digest_verify_update != NULL) if (signature->digest_verify_update != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_verify_update signature->digest_verify_update
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update(fns);
digverifyfncnt++; fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL:
if (signature->digest_verify_final != NULL) if (signature->digest_verify_final != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_verify_final signature->digest_verify_final
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final(fns);
digverifyfncnt++; fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY:
if (signature->digest_verify != NULL) if (signature->digest_verify != NULL)
break; break;
signature->digest_verify signature->digest_verify
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify(fns);
fncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX: case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX:
if (signature->freectx != NULL) if (signature->freectx != NULL)
@ -221,48 +275,109 @@ static void *evp_signature_from_algorithm(int name_id,
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params(fns); = OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params(fns);
smdparamfncnt++; smdparamfncnt++;
break; break;
case OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_QUERY_KEY_TYPES:
if (signature->query_key_types != NULL)
break;
signature->query_key_types
= OSSL_FUNC_signature_query_key_types(fns);
break;
} }
} }
if (ctxfncnt != 2 /*
|| (signfncnt == 0 * In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least
&& verifyfncnt == 0 * a set of context functions (newctx and freectx) as well as a set of
&& verifyrecfncnt == 0 * "signature" functions. Because there's an overlap between some sets
&& digsignfncnt == 0 * of functions, counters don't always cut it, we must test known
&& digverifyfncnt == 0 * combinations.
&& signature->digest_sign == NULL * We start by assuming the implementation is valid, and then look for
&& signature->digest_verify == NULL) * reasons it's not.
|| (signfncnt != 0 && signfncnt != 2) */
|| (verifyfncnt != 0 && verifyfncnt != 2) valid = 1;
|| (verifyrecfncnt != 0 && verifyrecfncnt != 2) /* Start with the ones where counters say enough */
|| (digsignfncnt != 0 && digsignfncnt != 2) if (ctxfncnt != 2)
|| (digsignfncnt == 2 && signature->digest_sign_init == NULL) /* newctx or freectx missing */
|| (digverifyfncnt != 0 && digverifyfncnt != 2) valid = 0;
|| (digverifyfncnt == 2 && signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) if (valid
|| (signature->digest_sign != NULL && ((gparamfncnt != 0 && gparamfncnt != 2)
&& signature->digest_sign_init == NULL) || (sparamfncnt != 0 && sparamfncnt != 2)
|| (signature->digest_verify != NULL || (gmdparamfncnt != 0 && gmdparamfncnt != 2)
&& signature->digest_verify_init == NULL) || (smdparamfncnt != 0 && smdparamfncnt != 2)))
|| (gparamfncnt != 0 && gparamfncnt != 2)
|| (sparamfncnt != 0 && sparamfncnt != 2)
|| (gmdparamfncnt != 0 && gmdparamfncnt != 2)
|| (smdparamfncnt != 0 && smdparamfncnt != 2)) {
/* /*
* In order to be a consistent set of functions we must have at least * Params functions are optional, but if defined, they must
* a set of context functions (newctx and freectx) as well as a set of * be pairwise complete sets, i.e. a getter must have an
* "signature" functions: * associated gettable, etc
* (sign_init, sign) or
* (verify_init verify) or
* (verify_recover_init, verify_recover) or
* (digest_sign_init, digest_sign_update, digest_sign_final) or
* (digest_verify_init, digest_verify_update, digest_verify_final) or
* (digest_sign_init, digest_sign) or
* (digest_verify_init, digest_verify).
*
* set_ctx_params and settable_ctx_params are optional, but if one of
* them is present then the other one must also be present. The same
* applies to get_ctx_params and gettable_ctx_params. The same rules
* apply to the "md_params" functions. The dupctx function is optional.
*/ */
valid = 0;
if (valid && (initfncnt == 0 || fncnt < initfncnt))
/*
* No init functions, or fewer execution functions than init functions
*/
valid = 0;
/* Now we check for function combinations */
if (valid
&& ((signature->sign_init != NULL
&& signature->sign == NULL)
|| (signature->sign_message_init != NULL
&& signature->sign == NULL
&& (signature->sign_message_update == NULL
|| signature->sign_message_final == NULL))))
/* sign_init functions with no signing function? That's weird */
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& (signature->sign != NULL
|| signature->sign_message_update != NULL
|| signature->sign_message_final != NULL)
&& signature->sign_init == NULL
&& signature->sign_message_init == NULL)
/* signing functions with no sign_init? That's odd */
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& ((signature->verify_init != NULL
&& signature->verify == NULL)
|| (signature->verify_message_init != NULL
&& signature->verify == NULL
&& (signature->verify_message_update == NULL
|| signature->verify_message_final == NULL))))
/* verify_init functions with no verification function? That's weird */
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& (signature->verify != NULL
|| signature->verify_message_update != NULL
|| signature->verify_message_final != NULL)
&& signature->verify_init == NULL
&& signature->verify_message_init == NULL)
/* verification functions with no verify_init? That's odd */
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& (signature->verify_recover_init != NULL)
&& (signature->verify_recover == NULL))
/* verify_recover_init functions with no verify_recover? How quaint */
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& (signature->digest_sign_init != NULL
&& signature->digest_sign == NULL
&& (signature->digest_sign_update == NULL
|| signature->digest_sign_final == NULL)))
/*
* You can't have a digest_sign_init without *some* performing functions
*/
valid = 0;
if (valid
&& ((signature->digest_verify_init != NULL
&& signature->digest_verify == NULL
&& (signature->digest_verify_update == NULL
|| signature->digest_verify_final == NULL))))
/*
* You can't have a digest_verify_init without *some* performing functions
*/
valid = 0;
if (!valid) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PROVIDER_FUNCTIONS);
goto err; goto err;
} }
@ -387,12 +502,11 @@ const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_SIGNATURE_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_SIGNATURE *sig)
return sig->settable_ctx_params(NULL, provctx); return sig->settable_ctx_params(NULL, provctx);
} }
static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation, static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *signature,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]) int operation, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{ {
int ret = 0; int ret = 0;
void *provkey = NULL; void *provkey = NULL;
EVP_SIGNATURE *signature = NULL;
EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL; EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
const OSSL_PROVIDER *tmp_prov = NULL; const OSSL_PROVIDER *tmp_prov = NULL;
const char *supported_sig = NULL; const char *supported_sig = NULL;
@ -406,91 +520,30 @@ static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation,
evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops(ctx); evp_pkey_ctx_free_old_ops(ctx);
ctx->operation = operation; ctx->operation = operation;
ERR_set_mark(); if (signature != NULL) {
/*
* It's important to figure out what the key type should be, and if
* that is what we have in ctx.
*/
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx))
goto legacy;
if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET);
goto err;
}
/*
* Try to derive the supported signature from |ctx->keymgmt|.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(ctx->pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|| ctx->pkey->keymgmt == ctx->keymgmt)) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
supported_sig = evp_keymgmt_util_query_operation_name(ctx->keymgmt,
OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE);
if (supported_sig == NULL) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* We perform two iterations:
*
* 1. Do the normal signature fetch, using the fetching data given by
* the EVP_PKEY_CTX.
* 2. Do the provider specific signature fetch, from the same provider
* as |ctx->keymgmt|
*
* We then try to fetch the keymgmt from the same provider as the
* signature, and try to export |ctx->pkey| to that keymgmt (when
* this keymgmt happens to be the same as |ctx->keymgmt|, the export
* is a no-op, but we call it anyway to not complicate the code even
* more).
* If the export call succeeds (returns a non-NULL provider key pointer),
* we're done and can perform the operation itself. If not, we perform
* the second iteration, or jump to legacy.
*/
for (iter = 1; iter < 3 && provkey == NULL; iter++) {
EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt_tofree = NULL; EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt_tofree = NULL;
/* if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
* If we're on the second iteration, free the results from the first. ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET);
* They are NULL on the first iteration, so no need to check what goto err;
* iteration we're on.
*/
EVP_SIGNATURE_free(signature);
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
switch (iter) {
case 1:
signature =
EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, supported_sig, ctx->propquery);
if (signature != NULL)
tmp_prov = EVP_SIGNATURE_get0_provider(signature);
break;
case 2:
tmp_prov = EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(ctx->keymgmt);
signature =
evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
supported_sig, ctx->propquery);
if (signature == NULL)
goto legacy;
break;
} }
if (signature == NULL)
continue;
/* /*
* Ensure that the key is provided, either natively, or as a cached * Ensure that the key is provided, either natively, or as a
* export. We start by fetching the keymgmt with the same name as * cached export. We start by fetching the keymgmt with the same
* |ctx->pkey|, but from the provider of the signature method, using * name as |ctx->pkey|, but from the provider of the signature
* the same property query as when fetching the signature method. * method, using the same property query as when fetching the
* With the keymgmt we found (if we did), we try to export |ctx->pkey| * signature method. With the keymgmt we found (if we did), we
* to it (evp_pkey_export_to_provider() is smart enough to only actually * try to export |ctx->pkey| to it (evp_pkey_export_to_provider()
* is smart enough to only actually export it if |tmp_keymgmt|
* export it if |tmp_keymgmt| is different from |ctx->pkey|'s keymgmt) * is different from |ctx->pkey|'s keymgmt)
*/ */
tmp_prov = EVP_SIGNATURE_get0_provider(signature);
tmp_keymgmt_tofree = tmp_keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt_tofree = tmp_keymgmt =
evp_keymgmt_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov, evp_keymgmt_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(ctx->keymgmt), EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(ctx->keymgmt),
@ -500,14 +553,163 @@ static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation,
&tmp_keymgmt, ctx->propquery); &tmp_keymgmt, ctx->propquery);
if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL)
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt_tofree); EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt_tofree);
}
if (provkey == NULL) { if (provkey == NULL)
EVP_SIGNATURE_free(signature); goto end;
goto legacy;
}
ERR_pop_to_mark(); /*
* Check that the signature matches the given key. This is not
* designed to work with legacy keys, so has to be done after we've
* ensured that the key is at least exported to a provider (above).
*/
if (signature->query_key_types != NULL) {
/* This is expect to be a NULL terminated array */
const char **keytypes;
keytypes = signature->query_key_types();
for (; *keytypes != NULL; keytypes++)
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_is_a(ctx, *keytypes))
break;
if (*keytypes == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SIGNATURE_TYPE_AND_KEY_TYPE_INCOMPATIBLE);
return -2;
}
} else {
/*
* Fallback 1:
* check if the keytype is the same as the signature algorithm name
*/
const char *keytype = EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(ctx->keymgmt);
int ok = EVP_SIGNATURE_is_a(signature, keytype);
/*
* Fallback 2:
* query the pkey for a default signature algorithm name, and check
* if it matches the signature implementation
*/
if (!ok) {
const char *signame
= evp_keymgmt_util_query_operation_name(ctx->keymgmt,
OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE);
ok = EVP_SIGNATURE_is_a(signature, signame);
}
/* If none of the fallbacks helped, we're lost */
if (!ok) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_SIGNATURE_TYPE_AND_KEY_TYPE_INCOMPATIBLE);
return -2;
}
}
if (!EVP_SIGNATURE_up_ref(signature))
return 0;
} else {
/* Without a pre-fetched signature, it must be figured out somehow */
ERR_set_mark();
if (evp_pkey_ctx_is_legacy(ctx))
goto legacy;
if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NO_KEY_SET);
goto err;
}
/*
* Try to derive the supported signature from |ctx->keymgmt|.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(ctx->pkey->keymgmt == NULL
|| ctx->pkey->keymgmt == ctx->keymgmt)) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
supported_sig
= evp_keymgmt_util_query_operation_name(ctx->keymgmt,
OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE);
if (supported_sig == NULL) {
ERR_clear_last_mark();
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* We perform two iterations:
*
* 1. Do the normal signature fetch, using the fetching data given by
* the EVP_PKEY_CTX.
* 2. Do the provider specific signature fetch, from the same provider
* as |ctx->keymgmt|
*
* We then try to fetch the keymgmt from the same provider as the
* signature, and try to export |ctx->pkey| to that keymgmt (when
* this keymgmt happens to be the same as |ctx->keymgmt|, the export
* is a no-op, but we call it anyway to not complicate the code even
* more).
* If the export call succeeds (returns a non-NULL provider key pointer),
* we're done and can perform the operation itself. If not, we perform
* the second iteration, or jump to legacy.
*/
for (iter = 1; iter < 3 && provkey == NULL; iter++) {
EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt_tofree = NULL;
/*
* If we're on the second iteration, free the results from the first.
* They are NULL on the first iteration, so no need to check what
* iteration we're on.
*/
EVP_SIGNATURE_free(signature);
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt);
switch (iter) {
case 1:
signature =
EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, supported_sig, ctx->propquery);
if (signature != NULL)
tmp_prov = EVP_SIGNATURE_get0_provider(signature);
break;
case 2:
tmp_prov = EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(ctx->keymgmt);
signature =
evp_signature_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
supported_sig, ctx->propquery);
if (signature == NULL)
goto legacy;
break;
}
if (signature == NULL)
continue;
/*
* Ensure that the key is provided, either natively, or as a
* cached export. We start by fetching the keymgmt with the same
* name as |ctx->pkey|, but from the provider of the signature
* method, using the same property query as when fetching the
* signature method. With the keymgmt we found (if we did), we
* try to export |ctx->pkey| to it (evp_pkey_export_to_provider()
* is smart enough to only actually export it if |tmp_keymgmt|
* is different from |ctx->pkey|'s keymgmt)
*/
tmp_keymgmt_tofree = tmp_keymgmt =
evp_keymgmt_fetch_from_prov((OSSL_PROVIDER *)tmp_prov,
EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(ctx->keymgmt),
ctx->propquery);
if (tmp_keymgmt != NULL)
provkey = evp_pkey_export_to_provider(ctx->pkey, ctx->libctx,
&tmp_keymgmt, ctx->propquery);
if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL)
EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt_tofree);
}
if (provkey == NULL) {
EVP_SIGNATURE_free(signature);
goto legacy;
}
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
/* No more legacy from here down to legacy: */ /* No more legacy from here down to legacy: */
@ -529,6 +731,14 @@ static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation,
} }
ret = signature->sign_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params); ret = signature->sign_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params);
break; break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG:
if (signature->sign_message_init == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
ret = signature->sign_message_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY: case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY:
if (signature->verify_init == NULL) { if (signature->verify_init == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
@ -537,14 +747,21 @@ static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation,
} }
ret = signature->verify_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params); ret = signature->verify_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params);
break; break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG:
if (signature->verify_message_init == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
ret = signature->verify_message_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER: case EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER:
if (signature->verify_recover_init == NULL) { if (signature->verify_recover_init == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
ret = -2; ret = -2;
goto err; goto err;
} }
ret = signature->verify_recover_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, ret = signature->verify_recover_init(ctx->op.sig.algctx, provkey, params);
params);
break; break;
default: default:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
@ -615,12 +832,69 @@ static int evp_pkey_signature_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int operation,
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, NULL); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, NULL);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, params); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, algo, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, algo, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->op.sig.signature->sign_message_update == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
return -2;
}
return ctx->op.sig.signature->sign_message_update(ctx->op.sig.algctx,
in, inlen);
}
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->op.sig.signature->sign_message_final == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
return -2;
}
return ctx->op.sig.signature->sign_message_final(ctx->op.sig.algctx,
sig, siglen,
(sig == NULL) ? 0 : *siglen);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
@ -634,7 +908,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
return -1; return -1;
} }
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) { if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN
&& ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1; return -1;
} }
@ -664,12 +939,88 @@ int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, NULL); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, NULL);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, params); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, algo, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, algo, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
{
OSSL_PARAM sig_params[2], *p = sig_params;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_SIGNATURE,
/*
* Cast away the const. This is
* read only so should be safe
*/
(char *)sig, siglen);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, sig_params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->op.sig.signature->verify_message_update == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
return -2;
}
return ctx->op.sig.signature->verify_message_update(ctx->op.sig.algctx,
in, inlen);
}
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1;
}
if (ctx->op.sig.signature->verify_message_final == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
return -2;
}
/* The signature must have been set with EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature() */
return ctx->op.sig.signature->verify_message_final(ctx->op.sig.algctx);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
@ -683,7 +1034,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
return -1; return -1;
} }
if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { if (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
&& ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED); ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED);
return -1; return -1;
} }
@ -711,13 +1063,19 @@ int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER, NULL); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER, NULL);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]) const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{ {
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER, params); return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, NULL, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER, params);
}
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
return evp_pkey_signature_init(ctx, algo, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER, params);
} }
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,

290
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_sign.pod
View File

@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
=head1 NAME =head1 NAME
EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_sign EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2,
- sign using a public key algorithm EVP_PKEY_sign, EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init, EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update,
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final - sign using a public key algorithm
=head1 SYNOPSIS =head1 SYNOPSIS
@ -11,6 +12,14 @@ EVP_PKEY_sign_init, EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_sign
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]); int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize);
int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
@ -26,37 +35,120 @@ for more information about implicit fetches.
EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex() is the same as EVP_PKEY_sign_init() but additionally EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex() is the same as EVP_PKEY_sign_init() but additionally
sets the passed parameters I<params> on the context before returning. sets the passed parameters I<params> on the context before returning.
The EVP_PKEY_sign() function performs a public key signing operation EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2() initializes a public key algorithm context I<ctx> for
using I<ctx>. The data to be signed is specified using the I<tbs> and signing a pre-computed message digest using the algorithm given by I<algo> and
I<tbslen> parameters. If I<sig> is NULL then the maximum size of the output the key given through L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)> or L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(3)>.
buffer is written to the I<siglen> parameter. If I<sig> is not NULL then A context I<ctx> without a pre-loaded key cannot be used with this function.
before the call the I<siglen> parameter should contain the length of the This function provides almost the same functionality as EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(),
I<sig> buffer, if the call is successful the signature is written to but is uniquely intended to be used with a pre-computed messsage digest, and
I<sig> and the amount of data written to I<siglen>. allows pre-determining the exact conditions for that message digest, if a
composite signature algorithm (such as RSA-SHA256) was fetched.
Following a call to this function, setting parameters that modifies the digest
implementation or padding is not normally supported.
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init() initializes a public key algorithm context I<ctx>
for signing an unlimited size message using the algorithm given by I<algo> and
the key given through L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)> or L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(3)>.
Passing the message is supported both in a one-shot fashion using
EVP_PKEY_sign(), and through the combination of EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update()
and EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final().
This function enables using algorithms that can process input of arbitrary
length, such as ED25519, RSA-SHA256 and similar.
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update() adds I<inlen> bytes from I<in> to the data to be
processed for signature. The signature algorithm specification and
implementation determine how the input bytes are processed and if there's a
limit on the total size of the input. See L</NOTES> below for a deeper
explanation.
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final() signs the processed data and places the data in
I<sig>, and the number of signature bytes in I<*siglen>, if the number of
bytes doesn't surpass the size given by I<sigsize>.
I<sig> may be NULL, and in that case, only I<*siglen> is updated with the
number of signature bytes.
EVP_PKEY_sign() is a one-shot function that can be used with all the init
functions above.
When initialization was done with EVP_PKEY_sign_init(), EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex()
or EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(), the data specified by I<tbs> and I<tbslen> is
signed after appropriate padding.
When initialization was done with EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(), the data
specified by I<tbs> and I<tbslen> is digested by the implied message digest
algorithm, and the result is signed after appropriate padding.
If I<sig> is NULL then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the
I<siglen> parameter.
If I<sig> is not NULL, then before the call the I<siglen> parameter should
contain the length of the I<sig> buffer, and if the call is successful the
signature is written to I<sig> and the amount of data written to I<siglen>.
=head1 NOTES =head1 NOTES
EVP_PKEY_sign() does not hash the data to be signed, and therefore is =begin comment
normally used to sign digests. For signing arbitrary messages, see the
L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and
L<EVP_SignInit(3)> signing interfaces instead.
After the call to EVP_PKEY_sign_init() algorithm specific control These notes are largely replicated in EVP_PKEY_verify.pod, please keep them
operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the in sync.
operation (see L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(3)>).
The function EVP_PKEY_sign() can be called more than once on the same =end comment
context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.
=head2 General
Some signature implementations only accumulate the input data and do no
further processing before signing it (they expect the input to be a digest),
while others compress the data, typically by internally producing a digest,
and signing the result.
Some of them support both modes of operation at the same time.
The caller is expected to know how the chosen algorithm is supposed to behave
and under what conditions.
For example, an RSA implementation can be expected to only expect a message
digest as input, while ED25519 can be expected to process the input with a hash,
i.e. to produce the message digest internally, and while RSA-SHA256 can be
expected to handle either mode of operation, depending on if the operation was
initialized with EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2() or with EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init().
Similarly, an RSA implementation usually expects additional details to be set,
like the message digest algorithm that the input is supposed to be digested
with, as well as the padding mode (see L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(3)> and
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(3)> and similar others), while an RSA-SHA256
implementation usually has these details pre-set and immutable.
The functions described here can't be used to combine separate algorithms. In
particular, neither L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(3)> nor the B<OSSL_PARAM>
parameter "digest" (B<OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST>) can be used to combine a
signature algorithm with a hash algorithm to process the input. In other
words, it's not possible to specify a I<ctx> pre-loaded with an RSA pkey, or
an I<algo> that fetched C<RSA> and try to specify SHA256 separately to get the
functionality of RSA-SHA256. If combining algorithms in that manner is
desired, please use L<EVP_DigestSignInit(3)> and associated functions.
=head2 Performing multiple signatures
When initialized using EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex() or EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(),
EVP_PKEY_sign() can be called more than once on the same context to have
several one-shot operations performed using the same parameters.
When initialized using EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(), it's not possible to
call EVP_PKEY_sign() multiple times.
=head1 RETURN VALUES =head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_PKEY_sign_init() and EVP_PKEY_sign() return 1 for success and 0 All functions return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
or a negative value for failure. In particular a return value of -2
indicates the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm. In particular, EVP_PKEY_sign_init() and its other variants may return -2 to
indicate that the operation is not supported by the public key algorithm.
=head1 EXAMPLES =head1 EXAMPLES
Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest: =begin comment
These examples are largely replicated in EVP_PKEY_verify.pod, please keep them
in sync.
=end comment
=head2 RSA with PKCS#1 padding for SHA256
Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and a SHA256 digest as input:
#include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h> #include <openssl/rsa.h>
@ -73,7 +165,7 @@ Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
* point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed. * point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed.
*/ */
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */); ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
if (!ctx) if (ctx == NULL)
/* Error occurred */ /* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0) if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) <= 0)
/* Error */ /* Error */
@ -88,7 +180,7 @@ Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (!sig) if (sig == NULL)
/* malloc failure */ /* malloc failure */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0) if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
@ -96,6 +188,152 @@ Sign data using RSA with PKCS#1 padding and SHA256 digest:
/* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */ /* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */
=head2 RSA-SHA256 with a pre-computed digest
Sign a digest with RSA-SHA256 using one-shot functions. To be noted is that
RSA-SHA256 is assumed to be an implementation of C<sha256WithRSAEncryption>,
for which the padding is pre-determined to be B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING>, and the
input digest is assumed to have been computed using SHA256.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* md is a SHA-256 digest in this example. */
unsigned char *md, *sig;
size_t mdlen = 32, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
/*
* NB: assumes signing_key and md are set up before the next
* step. signing_key must be an RSA private key and md must
* point to the SHA-256 digest to be signed.
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Determine buffer length */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (sig == NULL)
/* malloc failure */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */
=head2 RSA-SHA256, one-shot
Sign a document with RSA-SHA256 using one-shot functions.
To be noted is that RSA-SHA256 is assumed to be an implementation of
C<sha256WithRSAEncryption>, for which the padding is pre-determined to be
B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING>.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* in is the input in this example. */
unsigned char *in, *sig;
/* inlen is the length of the input in this example. */
size_t inlen, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
EVP_SIGNATURE *alg;
/*
* NB: assumes signing_key, in and inlen are set up before
* the next step. signing_key must be an RSA private key,
* in must point to data to be digested and signed, and
* inlen must be the size of the data in bytes.
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL || alg == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Determine sig buffer length */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, NULL, &siglen, in, inlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (sig == NULL)
/* malloc failure */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx, sig, &siglen, in, inlen) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */
=head2 RSA-SHA256, using update and final
This is the same as the previous example, but allowing stream-like
functionality.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* in is the input in this example. */
unsigned char *in, *sig;
/* inlen is the length of the input in this example. */
size_t inlen, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
EVP_SIGNATURE *alg;
/*
* NB: assumes signing_key, in and inlen are set up before
* the next step. signing_key must be an RSA private key,
* in must point to data to be digested and signed, and
* inlen must be the size of the data in bytes.
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL || alg == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
while (inlen > 0) {
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update(ctx, in, inlen)) <= 0)
/* Error */
if (inlen > 256) {
inlen -= 256;
in += 256;
} else {
inlen = 0;
}
}
/* Determine sig buffer length */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(ctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0)
/* Error */
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
if (sig == NULL)
/* malloc failure */
if (EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(ctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Signature is siglen bytes written to buffer sig */
=head1 SEE ALSO =head1 SEE ALSO
@ -114,6 +352,10 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.0.
The EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0. The EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
The EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(), EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(),
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update() and EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final() functions
where added in OpenSSL 3.4.
=head1 COPYRIGHT =head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

280
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify.pod
View File

@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
=head1 NAME =head1 NAME
EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_verify EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2,
- signature verification using a public key algorithm EVP_PKEY_verify, EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update,
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature - signature
verification using a public key algorithm
=head1 SYNOPSIS =head1 SYNOPSIS
@ -11,6 +13,15 @@ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_verify
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]); int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
@ -18,7 +29,7 @@ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_verify
=head1 DESCRIPTION =head1 DESCRIPTION
EVP_PKEY_verify_init() initializes a public key algorithm context I<ctx> for EVP_PKEY_verify_init() initializes a public key algorithm context I<ctx> for
signing using the algorithm given when the context was created verification using the algorithm given when the context was created
using L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)> or variants thereof. The algorithm is used to using L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)> or variants thereof. The algorithm is used to
fetch a B<EVP_SIGNATURE> method implicitly, see L<provider(7)/Implicit fetch> fetch a B<EVP_SIGNATURE> method implicitly, see L<provider(7)/Implicit fetch>
for more information about implicit fetches. for more information about implicit fetches.
@ -26,27 +37,113 @@ for more information about implicit fetches.
EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex() is the same as EVP_PKEY_verify_init() but additionally EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex() is the same as EVP_PKEY_verify_init() but additionally
sets the passed parameters I<params> on the context before returning. sets the passed parameters I<params> on the context before returning.
The EVP_PKEY_verify() function performs a public key verification operation EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2() is the same as EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(), but works
using I<ctx>. The signature is specified using the I<sig> and with an explicitly fetched B<EVP_SIGNATURE> I<algo>.
I<siglen> parameters. The verified data (i.e. the data believed originally A context I<ctx> without a pre-loaded key cannot be used with this function.
signed) is specified using the I<tbs> and I<tbslen> parameters. Depending on what algorithm was fetched, certain details revolving around the
treatment of the input to EVP_PKEY_verify() may be pre-determined, and in that
case, those details may normally not be changed.
See L</NOTES> below for a deeper explanation.
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init() initializes a public key algorithm context
I<ctx> for verifying an unlimited size message using the algorithm given by
I<algo> and the key given through L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)> or
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(3)>.
Passing the message is supported both in a one-shot fashion using
EVP_PKEY_verify(), and through the combination of EVP_PKEY_verify_update() and
EVP_PKEY_verify_final().
This function enables using algorithms that can process input of arbitrary
length, such as ED25519, RSA-SHA256 and similar.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature() specifies the I<siglen> bytes long signature
I<sig> to be verified against by EVP_PKEY_verify_final().
It I<must> be used together with EVP_PKEY_verify_update() and
EVP_PKEY_verify_final().
See L</NOTES> below for a deeper explanation.
EVP_PKEY_verify_update() adds I<inlen> bytes from I<in> to the data to be
processed for verification. The signature algorithm specification and
implementation determine how the input bytes are processed and if there's a
limit on the total size of the input. See L</NOTES> below for a deeper
explanation.
EVP_PKEY_verify_final() verifies the processed data, given only I<ctx>.
The signature to verify against must have been given with
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature().
EVP_PKEY_verify() is a one-shot function that performs the same thing as
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature() call with I<sig> and I<siglen> as parameters,
followed by a single EVP_PKEY_verify_update() call with I<tbs> and I<tbslen>,
followed by EVP_PKEY_verify_final() call.
=head1 NOTES =head1 NOTES
After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_init() algorithm specific control =begin comment
operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
operation.
The function EVP_PKEY_verify() can be called more than once on the same These notes are largely replicated in EVP_PKEY_sign.pod, please keep them
context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. in sync.
=end comment
=head2 General
Some signature implementations only accumulate the input data and do no
further processing before verifying it (they expect the input to be a digest),
while others compress the data, typically by internally producing a digest,
and signing the result, which is then verified against a given signature.
Some of them support both modes of operation at the same time.
The caller is expected to know how the chosen algorithm is supposed to behave
and under what conditions.
For example, an RSA implementation can be expected to only expect a digest as
input, while ED25519 can be expected to process the input with a hash, i.e.
to produce the digest internally, and while RSA-SHA256 can be expected to
handle either mode of operation, depending on if the operation was initialized
with EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2() or with EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init().
Similarly, an RSA implementation usually expects additional details to be set,
like the message digest algorithm that the input is supposed to be digested
with, as well as the padding mode (see L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(3)> and
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(3)> and similar others), while an RSA-SHA256
implementation usually has these details pre-set and immutable.
The functions described here can't be used to combine separate algorithms. In
particular, neither L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(3)> nor the B<OSSL_PARAM>
parameter "digest" (B<OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST>) can be used to combine a
signature algorithm with a hash algorithm to process the input. In other
words, it's not possible to specify a I<ctx> pre-loaded with an RSA pkey, or
an I<algo> that fetched C<RSA> and try to specify SHA256 separately to get the
functionality of RSA-SHA256. If combining algorithms in that manner is
desired, please use L<EVP_DigestVerifyInit(3)> and associated functions, or
L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)> and associated functions.
=head2 Performing multiple verifications
When initialized using EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex() or EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(),
EVP_PKEY_verify() can be called more than once on the same context to have
several one-shot operations performed using the same parameters.
When initialized using EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(), it's not possible to
call EVP_PKEY_verify() multiple times.
=head2 On EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature()
Some signature algorithms (such as LMS) require the signature verification
data be specified before verifying the message.
Other algorithms allow the signature to be specified late.
To allow either way (which may depend on the application's flow of input), the
signature to be verified against I<must> be specified using this function when
using EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update() and EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final() to
perform the verification.
=head1 RETURN VALUES =head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_PKEY_verify_init() and EVP_PKEY_verify() return 1 if the verification was All functions return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure.
successful and 0 if it failed. Unlike other functions the return value 0 from However, unlike other functions, the return value 0 from EVP_PKEY_verify(),
EVP_PKEY_verify() only indicates that the signature did not verify EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() and EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final() only indicates
successfully (that is tbs did not match the original data or the signature was that the signature did not verify successfully (that is tbs did not match the
of invalid form) it is not an indication of a more serious error. original data or the signature was of invalid form) it is not an indication of
a more serious error.
A negative value indicates an error other that signature verification failure. A negative value indicates an error other that signature verification failure.
In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by In particular a return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by
@ -54,7 +151,16 @@ the public key algorithm.
=head1 EXAMPLES =head1 EXAMPLES
Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest: =begin comment
These examples are largely replicated in EVP_PKEY_sign.pod, please keep them
in sync.
=end comment
=head2 RSA with PKCS#1 padding for SHA256
Verify signature using PKCS#1 padding and a SHA256 digest as input:
#include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h> #include <openssl/rsa.h>
@ -69,7 +175,7 @@ Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
* and that verify_key is an RSA public key * and that verify_key is an RSA public key
*/ */
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key, NULL /* no engine */); ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(verify_key, NULL /* no engine */);
if (!ctx) if (ctx == NULL)
/* Error occurred */ /* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0) if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0)
/* Error */ /* Error */
@ -86,6 +192,138 @@ Verify signature using PKCS#1 and SHA256 digest:
* other error. * other error.
*/ */
=head2 RSA-SHA256 with a pre-computed digest
Verify a digest with RSA-SHA256 using one-shot functions. To be noted is that
RSA-SHA256 is assumed to be an implementation of C<sha256WithRSAEncryption>,
for which the padding is pre-determined to be B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING>, and the
input digest is assumed to have been computed using SHA256.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* md is a SHA-256 digest in this example. */
unsigned char *md, *sig;
size_t mdlen = 32, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
/*
* NB: assumes verify_key, sig, siglen, md and mdlen are already set up
* and that verify_key is an RSA public key
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Determine buffer length */
if (EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen) <= 0)
/* Error or signature doesn't verify */
/* Perform operation */
ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, md, mdlen);
/*
* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some
* other error.
*/
=head2 RSA-SHA256, one-shot
Verify a document with RSA-SHA256 using one-shot functions.
To be noted is that RSA-SHA256 is assumed to be an implementation of
C<sha256WithRSAEncryption>, for which the padding is pre-determined to be
B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING>.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* in the input in this example. */
unsigned char *in, *sig;
/* inlen is the length of the input in this example. */
size_t inlen, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
EVP_SIGNATURE *alg;
/*
* NB: assumes signing_key, in and inlen are set up before
* the next step. signing_key must be an RSA private key,
* in must point to data to be digested and signed, and
* inlen must be the size of the data in bytes.
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL || alg == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* Perform operation */
ret = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, in, inlen);
/*
* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some
* other error.
*/
=head2 RSA-SHA256, using update and final
This is the same as the previous example, but allowing stream-like
functionality.
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx;
/* in is the input in this example. */
unsigned char *in, *sig;
/* inlen is the length of the input in this example. */
size_t inlen, siglen;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key;
EVP_SIGNATURE *alg;
/*
* NB: assumes signing_key, in and inlen are set up before
* the next step. signing_key must be an RSA private key,
* in must point to data to be digested and signed, and
* inlen must be the size of the data in bytes.
*/
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(signing_key, NULL /* no engine */);
alg = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(NULL, "RSA-SHA256", NULL);
if (ctx == NULL || alg == NULL)
/* Error occurred */
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(ctx, alg, NULL) <= 0)
/* Error */
/* We have the signature, specify it early */
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature(ctx, sig, siglen);
/* Perform operation */
while (inlen > 0) {
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(ctx, in, inlen)) <= 0)
/* Error */
if (inlen > 256) {
inlen -= 256;
in += 256;
} else {
inlen = 0;
}
}
ret = EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final(ctx);
/*
* ret == 1 indicates success, 0 verify failure and < 0 for some
* other error.
*/
=head1 SEE ALSO =head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(3)>,
@ -102,6 +340,10 @@ OpenSSL 1.0.0.
The EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0. The EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
The EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(), EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(),
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(), EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final() and
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature() functions where added in OpenSSL 3.4.
=head1 COPYRIGHT =head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

16
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_verify_recover.pod
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
=head1 NAME =head1 NAME
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex,
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
- recover signature using a public key algorithm - recover signature using a public key algorithm
=head1 SYNOPSIS =head1 SYNOPSIS
@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]); const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
@ -29,6 +31,14 @@ EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex() is the same as
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() but additionally sets the passed parameters EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() but additionally sets the passed parameters
I<params> on the context before returning. I<params> on the context before returning.
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2() is the same as EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(),
but works with an explicitly fetched B<EVP_SIGNATURE> I<algo>.
A context I<ctx> without a pre-loaded key cannot be used with this function.
Depending on what algorithm was fetched, certain details revolving around the
treatment of the input to EVP_PKEY_verify() may be pre-determined, and in that
case, those details may normally not be changed.
See L</NOTES> below for a deeper explanation.
The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data The EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() function recovers signed data
using I<ctx>. The signature is specified using the I<sig> and using I<ctx>. The signature is specified using the I<sig> and
I<siglen> parameters. If I<rout> is NULL then the maximum size of the output I<siglen> parameters. If I<rout> is NULL then the maximum size of the output
@ -51,6 +61,10 @@ After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init() algorithm specific control
operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the operations can be performed to set any appropriate parameters for the
operation. operation.
After the call to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2(), algorithm specific control
operations may not be needed if the chosen algorithm implies that those controls
pre-set (and immutable).
The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same The function EVP_PKEY_verify_recover() can be called more than once on the same
context if several operations are performed using the same parameters. context if several operations are performed using the same parameters.

41
include/openssl/core_dispatch.h
View File

@ -741,22 +741,45 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(const OSSL_PARAM *, keyexch_gettable_ctx_params,
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS 23 # define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS 23
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS 24 # define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS 24
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS 25 # define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS 25
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_QUERY_KEY_TYPES 26
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_INIT 27
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_UPDATE 28
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_FINAL 29
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_INIT 30
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_UPDATE 31
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_FINAL 32
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void *, signature_newctx, (void *provctx, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void *, signature_newctx, (void *provctx,
const char *propq)) const char *propq))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_init, (void *ctx, void *provkey, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_init, (void *ctx, void *provkey,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])) const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign, (void *ctx, unsigned char *sig, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign, (void *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize, size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize,
const unsigned char *tbs, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)) size_t tbslen))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_init,
(void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_update,
(void *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_final,
(void *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_init, (void *ctx, void *provkey, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_init, (void *ctx, void *provkey,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])) const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify, (void *ctx, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify, (void *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)) size_t tbslen))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_init,
(void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_update,
(void *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen))
/*
* signature_verify_final requires that the signature to be verified against
* is specified via an OSSL_PARAM.
*/
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_final, (void *ctx))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_recover_init, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_recover_init,
(void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[])) (void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_recover, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_recover,
@ -801,7 +824,7 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_set_ctx_md_params,
(void *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])) (void *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(const OSSL_PARAM *, signature_settable_ctx_md_params, OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(const OSSL_PARAM *, signature_settable_ctx_md_params,
(void *ctx)) (void *ctx))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(const char **, signature_query_key_types, (void))
/* Asymmetric Ciphers */ /* Asymmetric Ciphers */

29
include/openssl/evp.h
View File

@ -1703,11 +1703,15 @@ const char *EVP_PKEY_get0_type_name(const EVP_PKEY *key);
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE (1 << 11) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE (1 << 11)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE (1 << 12) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCAPSULATE (1 << 12)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE (1 << 13) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_DECAPSULATE (1 << 13)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG (1 << 14)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG (1 << 15)
/* Update the following when adding new EVP_PKEY_OPs */ /* Update the following when adding new EVP_PKEY_OPs */
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_ALL ((1 << 14) - 1) # define EVP_PKEY_OP_ALL ((1 << 16) - 1)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG \ # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG \
(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER \ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNMSG \
| EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYMSG \
| EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER \
| EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX) | EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGNCTX | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYCTX)
# define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT \ # define EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT \
@ -1857,6 +1861,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data); void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *data);
void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_app_data(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);
void EVP_SIGNATURE_free(EVP_SIGNATURE *signature); void EVP_SIGNATURE_free(EVP_SIGNATURE *signature);
int EVP_SIGNATURE_up_ref(EVP_SIGNATURE *signature); int EVP_SIGNATURE_up_ref(EVP_SIGNATURE *signature);
OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_SIGNATURE_get0_provider(const EVP_SIGNATURE *signature); OSSL_PROVIDER *EVP_SIGNATURE_get0_provider(const EVP_SIGNATURE *signature);
@ -1910,17 +1917,35 @@ const OSSL_PARAM *EVP_KEM_settable_ctx_params(const EVP_KEM *kem);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]); int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]); int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]); const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen); const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen);

4
include/openssl/evperr.h
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* /*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* *
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
# define EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED 177 # define EVP_R_ONLY_ONESHOT_SUPPORTED 177
# define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 151 # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 151
# define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150 # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 150
# define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_SIGNATURE_TYPE 226
# define EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW 202 # define EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW 202
# define EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE 187 # define EVP_R_PARAMETER_TOO_LARGE 187
# define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING 162 # define EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING 162
@ -104,6 +105,7 @@
# define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 106 # define EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 106
# define EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED 227 # define EVP_R_SETTING_XOF_FAILED 227
# define EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE 209 # define EVP_R_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTY_FAILURE 209
# define EVP_R_SIGNATURE_TYPE_AND_KEY_TYPE_INCOMPATIBLE 228
# define EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS 183 # define EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS 183
# define EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING 212 # define EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING 212
# define EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE 215 # define EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_MAXIMUM_REQUEST_SIZE 215

10
util/libcrypto.num
View File

@ -5716,3 +5716,13 @@ OSSL_BASIC_ATTR_CONSTRAINTS_free ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_BASIC_ATTR_CONSTRAINTS_new ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION: OSSL_BASIC_ATTR_CONSTRAINTS_new ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OSSL_BASIC_ATTR_CONSTRAINTS_it ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION: OSSL_BASIC_ATTR_CONSTRAINTS_it ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_KEYMGMT_gen_gettable_params ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_KEYMGMT_gen_gettable_params ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2 ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2 ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2 ? 3_4_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:

1
util/perl/OpenSSL/paramnames.pm
View File

@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ my %params = (
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_CHECK' => "rsa-pss-saltlen-check", 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_CHECK' => "rsa-pss-saltlen-check",
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_X931_PAD_CHECK' => "sign-x931-pad-check", 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_X931_PAD_CHECK' => "sign-x931-pad-check",
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR' => '*ALG_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR', 'SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR' => '*ALG_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR',
'SIGNATURE_PARAM_SIGNATURE' => "signature",
# Asym cipher parameters # Asym cipher parameters
'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST', 'ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST',