When TLS-1.3 is used and the server does not send any CA names
the ca_dn will be NULL. sk_X509_NAME_num() returns -1 on null
argument.
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17986)
(cherry picked from commit 89dd854307)
Prior to the crash there is an out of memory error
in X509_verify_cert which makes the chain NULL or
empty. The error is ignored by ssl_add_cert_chain,
and ssl_security_cert_chain crashes due to the
unchecked null pointer.
This is reproducible with my error injection patch.
The test vector has been validated on the 1.1.1 branch
but the issue is of course identical in all branches.
$ ERROR_INJECT=1652848273 ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./server-test ./corpora/server/47c8e933c4ec66fa3c309422283dfe0f31aafae8# ./corpora/server/47c8e933c4ec66fa3c309422283dfe0f31aafae8
#0 0x7f3a8f766eba in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace ../../../../gcc-trunk/libsanitizer/asan/asan_stack.cpp:87
#1 0x403ba4 in my_malloc fuzz/test-corpus.c:114
#2 0x7f3a8f39a430 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:230
#3 0x7f3a8f46bd3b in sk_reserve crypto/stack/stack.c:180
#4 0x7f3a8f46bd3b in OPENSSL_sk_insert crypto/stack/stack.c:242
#5 0x7f3a8f4a4fd8 in sk_X509_push include/openssl/x509.h:99
#6 0x7f3a8f4a4fd8 in X509_verify_cert crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c:286
#7 0x7f3a8fed726e in ssl_add_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:959
#8 0x7f3a8fed726e in ssl3_output_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:1015
#9 0x7f3a8fee1c50 in tls_construct_server_certificate ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:3812
#10 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in write_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:843
#11 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:443
#12 0x7f3a8fe84b3f in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#13 0x403202 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:740
#14 0x40371b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#15 0x402856 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#16 0x7f3a8e859f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#17 0x402936 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/server-test+0x402936)
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==8400==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000158 (pc 0x7f3a8f4d822f bp 0x7ffc39b76190 sp 0x7ffc39b760a0 T0)
==8400==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==8400==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7f3a8f4d822f in x509v3_cache_extensions crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:386
#1 0x7f3a8f4d9d3a in X509_check_purpose crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:84
#2 0x7f3a8f4da02a in X509_get_extension_flags crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:921
#3 0x7f3a8feff7d2 in ssl_security_cert_sig ssl/t1_lib.c:2518
#4 0x7f3a8feff7d2 in ssl_security_cert ssl/t1_lib.c:2542
#5 0x7f3a8feffa03 in ssl_security_cert_chain ssl/t1_lib.c:2562
#6 0x7f3a8fed728d in ssl_add_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:963
#7 0x7f3a8fed728d in ssl3_output_cert_chain ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:1015
#8 0x7f3a8fee1c50 in tls_construct_server_certificate ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:3812
#9 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in write_state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:843
#10 0x7f3a8feb8b0a in state_machine ssl/statem/statem.c:443
#11 0x7f3a8fe84b3f in SSL_do_handshake ssl/ssl_lib.c:3718
#12 0x403202 in FuzzerTestOneInput fuzz/server.c:740
#13 0x40371b in testfile fuzz/test-corpus.c:182
#14 0x402856 in main fuzz/test-corpus.c:226
#15 0x7f3a8e859f44 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21f44)
#16 0x402936 (/home/ed/OPC/openssl/fuzz/server-test+0x402936)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c:386 in x509v3_cache_extensions
==8400==ABORTING
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18376)
(cherry picked from commit dc0ef292f7)
DH_get_1024_160() and DH_get_2048_224() return parameters from
RFC5114. Those parameters include primes with known small subgroups,
making them unsafe. Change the code to use parameters from
RFC 2409 and RFC 3526 instead (group 2 and 14 respectively).
This patch also adds automatic selection of 4096 bit params for 4096 bit
RSA keys
backport of 7646610
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12160)
In the tls1_check_sig_alg() helper function, we loop through the list of
"signature_algorithms_cert" values received from the client and attempt
to look up each one in turn in our internal table that maps wire
codepoint to string-form name, digest and/or signature NID, etc., in
order to compare the signature scheme from the peer's list against what
is used to sign the certificates in the certificate chain we're
checking. Unfortunately, when the peer sends a value that we don't
support, the lookup returns NULL, but we unconditionally dereference the
lookup result for the comparison, leading to an application crash
triggerable by an unauthenticated client.
Since we will not be able to say anything about algorithms we don't
recognize, treat NULL return from lookup as "does not match".
We currently only apply the "signature_algorithm_cert" checks on TLS 1.3
connections, so previous TLS versions are unaffected. SSL_check_chain()
is not called directly from libssl, but may be used by the application
inside a callback (e.g., client_hello or cert callback) to verify that a
candidate certificate chain will be acceptable to the client.
CVE-2020-1967
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're
allowed by the security level.
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
GH: #11062
TLS < 1.2 has fixed signature algorithms: MD5+SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for the
others. TLS 1.2 sends a list of supported ciphers, but allows not sending
it in which case SHA1 is used. TLS 1.3 makes sending the list mandatory.
When we didn't receive a list from the client, we always used the
defaults without checking that they are allowed by the configuration.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #10784
(cherry picked from commit b0031e5dc2)
Many Windows-based GOST TLS implementations are unable to extend the
list of supported SignatureAlgorithms because of lack of the necessary
callback in Windows. So for TLS 1.2 it makes sense to imply the support
of GOST algorithms in case when the GOST ciphersuites are present.
This is a backport of #10377 to 1.1.1 branch
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10378)
Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like
'*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'
This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)
In commit 6aca8d1a5 ("Honour mandatory digest on private key in
has_usable_cert()") I added two checks for the capabilities of the
EVP_PKEY being used. One of them was wrong, as it should only be
checking the signature of the X.509 cert (by its issuer) against the
sigalgs given in a TLS v1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension.
Remove it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9705)
The function SSL_check_chain() can be used by applications to check that
a cert and chain is compatible with the negotiated parameters. This could
be useful (for example) from the certificate callback. Unfortunately this
function was applying TLSv1.2 sig algs rules and did not work correctly if
TLSv1.3 was negotiated.
We refactor tls_choose_sigalg to split it up and create a new function
find_sig_alg which can (optionally) take a certificate and key as
parameters and find an appropriate sig alg if one exists. If the cert and
key are not supplied then we try to find a cert and key from the ones we
have available that matches the shared sig algs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9443)
It was only ever in cert_st because ssl_st was a public structure
and could not be modified without breaking the API. However, both
structures are now opaque, and thus we can freely change their layout
without breaking applications. In this case, keeping the shared
sigalgs in the SSL object prevents complications wherein they would
inadvertently get cleared during SSL_set_SSL_CTX() (e.g., as run
during a cert_cb).
Fixes#9099
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9157)
(cherry picked from commit 29948ac80c)
The previous 2 commits moved supported groups and ciphers out of the
session object to avoid race conditions. We now also move ecpointformats
for consistency. There does not seem to be a race condition with access
to this data since it is only ever set in a non-resumption handshake.
However, there is no reason for it to be in the session.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9176)
If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then
don't ask it to perform a different one.
Fixes: #7348
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a73)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7609)
SSL_get_signature_nid() -- local signature algorithm
SSL_get_signature_type_nid() -- local signature algorithm key type
SSL_get_peer_tmp_key() -- Peer key-exchange public key
SSL_get_tmp_key -- local key exchange public key
Aliased pre-existing SSL_get_server_tmp_key(), which was formerly
just for clients, to SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(). Changed internal
calls to use the new name.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
TLSv1.3 is more restrictive about the curve used. There must be a matching
sig alg defined for that curve. Therefore if we are using some other curve
in our certificate then we should not negotiate TLSv1.3.
Fixes#7435
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7442)
(cherry picked from commit de4dc59802)
If we have selected a ciphersuite using RSA key exchange then we must
not attempt to use an RSA-PSS cert for that.
Fixes#7059
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7099)
We need to ensure that the min-max version range we use when constructing
the ClientHello is the same range we use when we validate the version
selected by the ServerHello. Otherwise this may appear as a fallback or
downgrade.
Fixes#6964
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7013)
Using the rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 sig alg should imply that the key OID is
rsaEncryption. Similarly rsa_pss_pss_sha256 implies the key OID is
rsassaPss. However we did not check this and incorrectly tolerated a key
OID that did not match the sig alg sent by the peer.
Fixes#6611
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6732)
Don't call the decrypt ticket callback if we've already encountered a
fatal error. Do call it if we have an empty ticket present.
Change the return code to have 5 distinct returns codes and separate it
from the input status value.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The return value from the ticket_key callback was not properly handled in
TLSv1.3, so that a ticket was *always* renewed even if the callback
requested that it should not be.
Also the ticket decrypt callback was not being called at all in TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6198)
The MAX_CURVELIST macro defines the total number of in-built SSL/TLS curves
that we support. However it has not been updated as new curves are added.
Fixes#5232
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6065)
The spec does not prohib certs form using compressed points. It only
requires that points in a key share are uncompressed. It says nothing
about point compression for certs, so we should not fail if a cert uses a
compressed point.
Fixes#5743
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6055)
If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should
allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list
includes the certificate's group.
Fixes#2033
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5601)
Place the session ticket AES and HMAC keys into secure memory.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2351)
Conceptually in TLSv1.3 there can be multiple sessions associated with a
single connection. Each NewSessionTicket issued can be considered a
separate session. We can end up issuing multiple NewSessionTickets on a
single connection at the moment (e.g. in a post-handshake auth scenario).
Each of those issued tickets should have the new_session_cb called, it
should go into the session cache separately and it should have a unique
id associated with it (so that they can be found individually in the
cache).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5644)
Adds application data into the encrypted session ticket
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3802)
This could in theory result in an overread - but due to the over allocation
of the underlying buffer does not represent a security issue.
Thanks to Fedor Indutny for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5414)
The check for a duplicate value was reading one entry past
where it was supposed to, getting an uninitialized value.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5172)
The new extension is like signature_algorithms, but only for the
signature *on* the certificate we will present to the peer (the
old signature_algorithms extension is still used for signatures that
we *generate*, i.e., those over TLS data structures).
We do not need to generate this extension, since we are the same
implementation as our X.509 stack and can handle the same types
of signatures, but we need to be prepared to receive it, and use the received
information when selecting what certificate to present.
There is a lot of interplay between signature_algorithms_cert and
signature_algorithms, since both affect what certificate we can
use, and thus the resulting signature algorithm used for TLS messages.
So, apply signature_algorithms_cert (if present) as a filter on what
certificates we can consider when choosing a certificate+sigalg
pair.
As part of this addition, we also remove the fallback code that let
keys of type EVP_PKEY_RSA be used to generate RSA-PSS signatures -- the
new rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* signature schemes have pulled
the key type into what is covered by the signature algorithm, so
we should not apply this sort of compatibility workaround.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Our historical SSL{,_CTX}_set_sigalgs() APIs take an array of
NID pairs (hash and signature), and our parser for manually
specifying unified sigalgs (that do not necessarily correspond
to an actual signature+hash pair) was transiting via (the implementation
of) this historical API. The TLS 1.3 draft-23 has introduced
signature schemes that have identical signature type and hash type,
differing only in the (RSA) public key OID, which prevents
the rsa_pss_pss_* schemes from being properly identified and
sent on the wire.
To fix the issue, parse sigalg strings directly into SIGALG_LOOKUP
objects, and pass around an array of uint16 wire protocol values
instead of NID pairs. The old interface is retained for API
compatibility but will become less and less useful with time.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
We now have a split in the signature algorithms codepoint space for
whether the certificate's key is for rsaEncryption or a PSS-specific
key, which should let us get rid of some special-casing that we
previously needed to try to coax rsaEncryption keys into performing PSS.
(This will be done in a subsequent commit.)
Send the new PSS-with-PSS-specific key first in our list, so that
we prefer the new technology to the old one.
We need to update the expected certificate type in one test,
since the "RSA-PSS+SHA256" form now corresponds to a public key
of type rsaEncryption, so we should expect the server certificate
type to be just "RSA". If we want to get a server certificate
type of "RSA-PSS", we need to use a new signature algorithm
that cannot be represented as signature+hash, so add a test for that
as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5068)
Extract the RSA key using EVP_PKEY_get0. Type is checked externally to be either EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS or EVP_PKEY_RSA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4389)
Matt Caswell
Tomas Mraz
Bernd Edlinger
Pauli
Hubert Kario
Benjamin Kaduk
Kurt Roeckx
Dmitry Belyavskiy
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
David Woodhouse
Benjamin Kaduk
Viktor Dukhovni
Pauli
Rich Salz
Todd Short
Richard Levitte
Noah Robbin