This fixes the RSA-SM3 signatures to conform to the standard.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28415)
This reverts commit dc5cd6f70a "rsa: expose pairwise consistency test API",
that has introduced ossl_rsa_key_pairwise_test() function, as the only user
has been removed in 7f7f75816f "import pct: remove import PCTs for most
algorithms".
Complements: 7f7f75816f "import pct: remove import PCTs for most algorithms"
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28557)
Some are only checking for a value < 0, some for <= 0, some for == 0, etc.
The documentation tells us that -1 is returned on error, so at least the
== 0 ones are wrong. In general, the return values are checked
inconsistently. This patch makes the return value checks consistent to
the form that seems to occur most.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28306)
This is only used by the FIPS provider as part of importing keys. At least
at the moment.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28122)
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Issue https://github.com/openssl/project/issues/1245 has identified that
we encounter a significant amount of time waiting to acquire the
BN_BLINDING_lock when running our handshake perf test with 10 threads
using an rsa key. Specifically, with 10 threads we spend about 19327731
usecs just waiting. So it would be great if we could eliminate the need
to get the write lock here.
Currently, the need for the lock is based off the fact that each rsa key
has only a single blinding pointer, for which exclusive access is
needed, with an attempt to use a fallback mt_blinding pointer in the
shared case. If a key is shared by many threads, then we find ourselves
needing to maniuplate this lock quite frequently if we are doing lots of
ssl connections.
To address this, I've come up with this approach. It replaces the
blinding pointer with a pointer to a sparse array. The sparse array is
then indexed by thread id. This allows us to do two things:
When getting the blinding, we only need to take the read lock in the
common case when looking up this threads blinding structure. Only in
the first lookup for any thread do we need to take the write side lock
when updating the table, and only then for a very brief critical section
(i.e. we don't need to hold the lock when allocating/setting the
blinding up via RSA_setup_blinding
This trades off some extra memory usage for the above significant
reduction in execution time.
it also allows us to simplify the blinding code quite a bit by
eliminating the need to handle shared blindings because blindings are
never shared anymore
Fixesopenssl/project#1245
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27913)
There are several cases where new BIGNUM instances are created, not
using the context, but not freed when an error occurs.
Fix this by adding the necessary calls to BN_free().
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26515)
We use REF_PRINT_COUNT to dump out the value of various reference
counters in our code
However, we commonly use this macro after an increment or decrement. On
increment its fine, but on decrement its not, because the macro
dereferences the object holding the counter value, which may be freed by
another thread, as we've given up our ref count to it prior to using the
macro.
The rule is that we can't reference memory for an object once we've
released our reference, so lets fix this by altering REF_PRINT_COUNT to
accept the value returned by CRYPTO_[UP|DOWN]_REF instead. The
eliminates the need to dereference the memory the object points to an
allows us to use the call after we release our reference count
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25664)
For SHAKE algorithms we now return 0 from EVP_MD_size().
So all the places that check for < 0 needed to change to <= 0
(Otherwise the behaviour will be to digest nothing in most cases).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25285)
This issue has been discovered by osss-fuzzer [1]. The test function decodes
RSA key created by fuzzer and calls EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check() which
proceeds to ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime() check which takes too long
exceeding timeout (45secs).
The idea is to fix OSSL_DECODER_from_data() code path so invalid
RSA keys will be refused.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=69134
Test case generated by the fuzzer is added.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25190)
After December 31, 2023, SP 800-131Ar2 [0] no longer allows PKCS#1 v1.5
padding for RSA "key-transport" (aka encryption and decryption).
There's a few good options to replace this usage in the RSA PCT, but
the simplest is verifying m = (m^e)^d mod n, (where 1 < m < (n − 1)).
This is specified in SP 800-56Br2 (Section 6.4.1.1) [1] and allowed by
FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A. In OpenSSL, this corresponds to RSA_NO_PADDING.
[0]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
[1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23832)
After December 31, 2023, SP 800-131Ar2 [0] no longer allows PKCS#1 v1.5
padding for RSA "key-transport" (aka encryption and decryption).
There's a few good options to replace this usage in the RSA PCT, but
signature generation and verification using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (which
remains approved) is the simplest.
[0]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23832)
It turns out that we didn't allow the combination RSA + SM3 anywhere.
This is perfectly reasonable in the FIPS module, but less so in the default
provider. This change enables it in the default provider, and adds a simple
evp_test stanza for the RSA-SM3 signature scheme.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.
A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).
Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22097)
Coverity recently flaged an error in which the return value for
EVP_MD_get_size wasn't checked for negative values prior to use, which
can cause underflow later in the function.
Just add the check and error out if get_size returns an error.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24896)
NIST SP 800-56 rev2 only allows using approved hash algorithms in
OAEP. Unlike FIPS 186-5 it doesn't have text allowing to use XOF SHAKE
functions. Maybe future revisions of SP 800-56 will adopt similar text
to FIPS 186-5 and allow XOF as MD and MGF (not MGF1).
RFC documents do not specify if SHAKE is allowed or blocked for usage
(i.e. there is no equivalent of RFC 8692 or RFC 8702 for OAEP). Status
quo allows their usage.
Add test cases for SHAKE in RSA-OAEP as allowed in default provider,
and blocked in fips.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24387)
this is rquired by fipd-186-5 section A.1.6, step 7:
Zeroize the internally generated values that are not returned
In OpenSSL code we need to zero p, q members of rsa structure. The rsa
structure is provided by ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes() caller.
The remaining values (variables) mentioned by standard are zeroed
already in functions we call from ossl_rsa_fips186_4_gen_prob_primes().
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24358)
ISO 19790:2012/Cor.1:2015 7.9 requires cryptographic module to provide
methods to zeroise all unproctected security sensitive parameters
(which inclues both Critical/Private **and** Public security
parameters). And those that are temprorarly stored are required to be
zeroised after they are no longer needed at security levels 2 and
higher.
Comply with the above requirements by always zeroising public security
parameters whenever they are freed.
This is currently done under the FIPS feature, however the requirement
comes from the ISO 19790:2012 which may also be needed in other
jurisdictions. If not always. Note FIPS 140-3 includes ISO 19790:2012
by reference.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24355)
Fixes#24051
RSA with 'no padding' corresponds to RSAEP/RSADP.
The code was not checking the lower bounds.
The bounds are specified in SP800-56Br2, section 7.1.1.1 and 7.1.2.1
Note that RFC8017 expresses the range in a sentence using the word
between, and there is some ambiguity in this.
The upper bounds have change to match the definition in SP800.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24061)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(cherry picked from commit 0ce7d1f355)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24034)
Add the checks for the return value of EVP_MD_CTX_get_size() before explicitly
cast them to size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
Fixes: 75d44c0452 ("Store digests as EVP_MD instead of a NID.")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23953)
Add the check for the EVP_MD_get_size() to avoid invalid negative numbers.
Fixes: 17c63d1cca ("RSA PSS ASN1 signing method")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23973)
Fixes CVE-2023-6237
If a large and incorrect RSA public key is checked with
EVP_PKEY_public_check() the computation could take very long time
due to no limit being applied to the RSA public key size and
unnecessarily high number of Miller-Rabin algorithm rounds
used for non-primality check of the modulus.
Now the keys larger than 16384 bits (OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
will fail the check with RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE error reason.
Also the number of Miller-Rabin rounds was set to 5.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23243)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23253)
It would be helpful to be able to generate RSA's dmp1/dmq1/iqmp values
when not provided in the param list to EVP_PKEY_fromdata. Augment the
provider in ossl_rsa_fromdata to preform this generation iff:
a) At least p q n e and e are provided
b) the new parameter OSSL_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_PQ is set to 1
Fixes#21826
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21875)
Make EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md() and
EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name() only work for RSA keys.
Since these calls use "digest" as a OSSL_PARAM, they should not
work for other key types.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20319)
The code did not yet check that the length of the RSA key is positive
and even.
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22403)
Its not required that crt params be available in an RSA key, so don't
perform an error check on them
Fixes#29135
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22334)
Theres no reason we should gate ossl_rsa_todata on there being a minimum
set of parameters. EVP_PKEY_todata makes no guarantees about the
validity of a key, it only returns the parameters that are set in the
requested key, whatever they may be. Remove the check.
Fixes#21935
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22334)
According to the manual page, EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label()
should accept NULL as the label argument, though the function
currently rejects it while setting the corresponding octet string
parameter with OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string, which expects
non-NULL input. This adds a workaround to the caller for backward
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22397)
That seems to be only an issue for RSA-PSS with parameters.
Spotted by code review, so it looks like there is no test coverage for this.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22032)
Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21468)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21401)
Typos in doc/man* will be fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20910)
Fixes regression of RSA signatures for legacy keys caused
by quering the provider for the algorithm id with parameters.
Legacy keys do not have a method that would create the
algorithm id. So we revert to what was done in 3.0.7 and
earlier versions for these keys.
Fixes#21008
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21019)
We optimise locking in rsa_get_blinding() so that we normally take a
read lock, and only fallback to a write lock if we need to. This will
be very slightly slower in the case of single use RSA objects, but should
be significantly better when an RSA object is reused in a multi-threaded
environment. It's probably worth the trade off.
Partially fixes#20286
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20953)
xiaoloudongfeng
Eugene Syromiatnikov
two-heart
openssl-machine
Pauli
Niels Dossche
Neil Horman
Tomas Mraz
slontis
sashan
Joachim Vandersmissen
Richard Levitte
pohsingwu
Dimitri Papadopoulos
Gopal Sharma
Dimitri John Ledkov
Alexandr Nedvedicky
Jiasheng Jiang
sharad3001
Clemens Lang
Daiki Ueno
Bernd Edlinger
Matt Caswell
ljuzwiuk
Pauli