Signed-off-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26753)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26753)
Add an initial version of an ML-DSA fuzzer. Exercises various ML-DSA
appropriate APIs. Currently it is able to randomly:
1. Attempt to create raw public private keys of various valid and invalid sizes
2. Generate legitimate keys of various sizes using the keygen api
3. Perform sign/verify operations using real generated keys
4. Perform digest sign/verify operations using real generated keys
5. Do an export and import of a key using todata/fromdata
6. Do a comparison of two equal and unequal keys
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26685)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26715)
- When a PKCS#8 has both seed and key cross check the implicit
rejection value |z|
- When an import (EVP_PKEY_fromdata call) provides both a private
and public key, fail if the redundant public key does not match
the copy in the private key.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26656)
- The main ASN.1 private key syntax is the one from Russ Housley's post
on the LAMPS list, subsequently amended to tag the seed instead of the
key (each of the three parameter sets will have a fixed size for the
`expandedKey`):
ML-DSA-PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
seed [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (64),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (1632 | 2400 | 3168)
both SEQUENCE {
seed OCTET STRING SIZE (64),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (1632 | 2400 | 3168) } }
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26639)
- Moved the codec code out of `ml_kem.c` into its own file in
the provider tree. Will be easier to share some code with
ML-DSA, and possible to use PROV_CTX, to do config lookups
directly in the functions doing the work.
- Update and fixes of the EVP_PKEY-ML-KEM(8) documentation, which
had accumulated some stale/inaccurate material, and needed new
text for the "prefer_seed" parameter.
- Test the "prefer_seed=no" behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26569)
- On import, if a seed is provided, the keys are regenerated.
- The seed is exported as a separate "seed" parameter, when available.
The "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter is also exported, when false.
- The seed is optionally dropped after key generation.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is set to zero.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is not set to 1,
and the "ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set
explictly false.
- The exported private key parameter "priv" is always the FIPS 203 |dk|.
- Private key decoding from PKCS#8 produces a transient "seed-only" form
of the key, in which "retain_seed" is set to false when the
"ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set explictly false.
The full key is generated during "load" and the seed is retained
or not as specified.
- Import honours the "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter when specified, or
otherwise honours the provider's "ml-kem.retain_seed" property.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26512)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26341)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26338)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26338)
- When used as KEMs in TLS the ECDHE algorithms are NOT subjected to
HPKE Extract/Expand key derivation. Instead the TLS HKDF is used
as usual.
- Consequently these KEMs are just the usual ECDHE key exchange
operations, be it with the encap ECDH private key unavoidably
ephemeral.
- A new "MLX" KEM provider is added that supports four hybrids of EC/ECX
DH with ML-KEM:
* ML-KEM-768 + X25519
* ML-KEM-1024 + X448
* P-256 + ML-KEM-768
* P-384 + ML-KEM-1024
- Support listing of implemented TLS groups.
The SSL_CTX_get0_implemented_groups() function and new
`openssl list -tls-groups` and `openssl list -all-tls-groups`
commands make it possible to determine which groups are
implemented by the SSL library for a particular TLS version
or range of versions matching an SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26220)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26217)
With the soon-to-be-merged ML-KEM #26172 as the merge base.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26217)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26637)
- Same UX as ML-KEM. The main ASN.1 private key syntax is the one from
Russ Housley's post on the LAMPS list, subsequently amended to tag the
seed instead of the key (each of the three parameter sets will have a
fixed size for the `expandedKey`):
ML-DSA-PrivateKey ::= CHOICE {
seed [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING SIZE (32),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (2560 | 4032 | 4896)
both SEQUENCE {
seed OCTET STRING SIZE (32),
expandedKey OCTET STRING SIZE (2560 | 4032 | 4896) } }
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26638)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26548)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26548)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26575)
commandline.
In order to support this gettables are required in both the key and
signature.:
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26575)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26400)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26400)
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26542)
This drops OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION - which is a meaningless
name - everywhere apart from still existing (for API stability, in
case someone uses that macro).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26421)
1. Add OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function for EVP_MD, which is used to copy algctx from the old EVP_MD_CTX to the new one.
2. Add implementation of OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function for default providers.
3. Modify EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex: When the fetched digest is the same in in and out contexts, use the copy function to copy the members in EVP_MD_CTX if the OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx_fn function exists. Otherwise, use the previous method to copy.
4. Add documentation for OSSL_FUNC_digest_copyctx function in doc/man7/provider-digest.pod.
5. Add testcase.
Fixes#25703
Signed-off-by: wangcheng <bangwangnj@163.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25726)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25297)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@devever.net>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25297)
Explicitely document what semantic meaning do various EVP_KDF
algorithms produce.
PBKDF2 produces cryptographic keys that are subject to cryptographic
security measures, for example as defined in NIST SP 800-132.
All other algorithms produce keying material, not subject to explicit
output length checks in any known standards.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25610)
Similar to other KDFs, the input key should be 112 bits long.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25529)
The details for RSA and EdDSA have already been documented, albeit the
RSA documentation wasn't conforming properly to the POD format.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25422)
Also improve related documentation.
- The BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL flag did not behave as advertised, only
leading and trailing, but not internal, whitespace was supported:
$ echo 'AA AA' | openssl base64 -A -d | wc -c
0
- Switching from ignored leading input to valid base64 input misbehaved
when the length of the skipped input was one more than the length of
the second and subsequent valid base64 lines in the internal 1k
buffer:
$ printf '#foo\n#bar\nA\nAAA\nAAAA\n' | openssl base64 -d | wc -c
0
- When the underlying BIO is retriable, and a read returns less than
1k of data, some of the already buffered input lines that could have
been decoded and returned were retained internally for a retry by the
caller. This is somewhat surprising, and the new code decodes as many
of the buffered lines as possible. Issue reported by Michał Trojnara.
- After all valid data has been read, the next BIO_read(3) should
return 0 when the input was all valid or -1 if an error was detected.
This now occurs in more consistently, but further tests and code
refactoring may be needed to ensure this always happens.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25253)
Dmitry Belyavskiy
Andrew Dinh
Pauli
Viktor Dukhovni
Michael Baentsch
slontis
Simo Sorce
Richard Levitte
Ramkumar
wangcheng
Neil Horman
Dr. David von Oheimb
Dimitri John Ledkov
Vladimir Kotal
Tomas Mraz