Added a python script to convert the json files into evp_test data.
Added a EVP_TEST_METHOD "KeyFromData" that can test failures when
loading raw keys. (The existing "PrivateKeyRaw" and "PublicKeyRaw"
were not fit for this purpose).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26885)
This is like Verify-Message but accepts a public key instead of a private one.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26750)
These tests are not run by default, instead they run when the EVP_TEST_EXTENDED environment variable
has an integer value other than zero.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26750)
There are general input and output controls that are used instead.
Also fix a memory leak in keygen.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26791)
- On import, if a seed is provided, the keys are regenerated.
- The seed is exported as a separate "seed" parameter, when available.
The "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter is also exported, when false.
- The seed is optionally dropped after key generation.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is set to zero.
* When the "ml-kem.retain_seed" keygen parameter is not set to 1,
and the "ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set
explictly false.
- The exported private key parameter "priv" is always the FIPS 203 |dk|.
- Private key decoding from PKCS#8 produces a transient "seed-only" form
of the key, in which "retain_seed" is set to false when the
"ml-kem.retain_seed" provider config property is set explictly false.
The full key is generated during "load" and the seed is retained
or not as specified.
- Import honours the "ml-kem.retain_seed" parameter when specified, or
otherwise honours the provider's "ml-kem.retain_seed" property.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26512)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26341)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26339)
This introduces support for ML-KEM-512 and ML-KEM-1024 using the same
underlying implementation parameterised by a few macros for the
associated types and constants.
KAT tests are added for ML-KEM 512 and 1024, to complement the previous
tests for ML-KEM-768.
MLKEM{512,768,1024} TLS "group" codepoints are updated to match the
final IANA assigments and to make the additional KEMs known to the TLS
layer.
The pure-QC MLKEMs are not in the default list of supported groups, and
need to be explicitly enabled by the application. Future work will
introduce support for hybrids, and for more fine-grained policy of
which keyshares a client should send by default, and when a server
should request (HRR) a new mutually-supported group that was not
sent.
Tests for ML-KEM key exchange added to sslapitest to make sure that our
TLS client MLKEM{512,768,1024} implementations interoperate with our TLS
server, and that MLKEM* are not negotiated in TLS 1.2.
Tests also added to excercise non-derandomised ML-KEM APIs, both
directly (bypassing the provider layer), and through the generic EVP KEM
API (exercising the provider). These make sure that RNG input is used
correctly (KAT tests bypass the RNG by specifying seeds).
The API interface to the provider takes an "const ML_KEM_VINFO" pointer,
(obtained from ossl_ml_kem_get_vinfo()). This checks input and output
buffer sizes before passing control to internal code that assumes
correctly sized (for each variant) buffers.
The original BoringSSL API was refactored to eliminate the opaque
public/private key structure wrappers, since these structures are an
internal detail between libcrypto and the provider, they are not part of
the public (EVP) API.
New "clangover" counter-measures added, refined with much appreciated
input from David Benjamin (Chromium).
The internal steps of "encrypt_cpa" were reordered to reduce the
working-set size of the algorithm, now needs space for just two
temporary "vectors" rather than three. The "decap" function now process
the decrypted message in one call, rather than three separate calls to
scalar_decode_1, scalar_decompress and scalar_add.
Some loops were unrolled, improving performance of en/decapsulate
(pre-expanded vectors and matrix) by around 5%.
To handle, however unlikely, the SHA3 primitives not behaving like
"pure" functions and failing, the implementation of `decap` was modifed:
- To use the KDF to compute the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) failure secret
first thing, and if that fails, bail out returning an error, a shared
secret is still returned at random from the RNG, but it is OK for the
caller to not use it.
- If any of the subsequently used hash primitives fail, use the computed
FO failure secret (OK, despite no longer constant-time) and return
success (otherwise the RNG would replace the result).
- We quite reasonably assume that chosen-ciphertext attacks (of the
correct length) cannot cause hash functions to fail in a manner the
depends on the private key content.
Support for ML-KEM-512 required adding a centered binomial distribution
helper function to deal with η_1 == 3 in just that variant.
Some additional comments were added to highlight how the code relates to
the ML-KEM specification in FIPS 203.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26172)
Add KATs for ML-KEM-768 under CCLA from https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/
These KATs test key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation for the
ML-KEM-768 algorithm.
Relevant notes:
- Added functionality to the ML-KEM key management to export/import. These may not
be fully implemented yet (see openssl/openssl#25885)
- Exposed some more low-level ML-KEM API's to the provider implementation to
allow for deterministic encapsulation/key generation
- Actually run 'mlkem_internal_test' with `make test`
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25938)
The evp_test line buffer was increased to 32K to deal with the large
lines required for PQ messages and signatures.
The test data files were generated by parsing AVCP test files using
a python script.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26451)
(in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms,
which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used
for composite algorithms)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24992)
X25519 and X448 are unapproved in FIPS 140-3
So always trigger the indicator callback if these Keys are used,
and add "fips-indicator" getters that return 0.
This has been added to keygen and key exchange.
(KEM will also require it if ever becomes a FIPS algorithm).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25246)
Fixes#25199
This should be done using "Availablein" if required.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25267)
HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check.
HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC,
so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC.
A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider
for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore
the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the
check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches
HMAC directly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
It turns out that we didn't allow the combination RSA + SM3 anywhere.
This is perfectly reasonable in the FIPS module, but less so in the default
provider. This change enables it in the default provider, and adds a simple
evp_test stanza for the RSA-SM3 signature scheme.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
With these tests, we get to test:
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex()
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2()
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2()
- EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init() and friends
- EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init() and friends
A few test cases for RSA-{hash} are added, in
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_sigalg.txt
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
The EVP_PKEY_CTX is now created in keygen_test_run().
keygen_test_parse() inserts all values into KEYGEN_TEST_DATA.
The 'Ctrl' parameters have been changed to just be settables,
rather than using legacy controls.
Added EC keygen tests
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25008)
FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH.
The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this
MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
Adjust the existing tests to disable DSA keygen in FIPS mode.
Allow evp_test to load DSA 'KeyParams' that can then be used to
perform a DSA KeyGen.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
Fixes#25089
The test to check if the FIPS indicator was correct failed in 3.1.2
since EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params() returns 0 if there is no
gettable/getter.
The code has been modified to return 1 if there is no gettable.
Manually reproduced and tested by copying the 3.1.2 FIPS provider to master.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25093)
In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.
A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).
Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)
This leaves 3DES with the FIPS query "FIPS=yes", which allows
Triple-DES to be used for Decryption by default.
Disallow CMAC using Triple-DES in FIPS.
This does not use a FIPS indicator.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24960)
This is a FIPS 140-3 requirement.
This uses a FIP indicator if either the FIPS configurable "dsa_sign_disabled" is set to 0,
OR OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_CHECK is set to 0 in the dsa signing context.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24799)
coverity noted a recent change made a call to OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t
without checking the return code, as is practice in all other call
sites.
Just add the check.
Fixesopenssl/private#551
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24860)
evp_test code needed to be modified to defer setting algorithm contexts
until the run phase. The parse functions also defer setting into the context
until the run phase, which allows the context to initialize in a controlled order.
This allows params to be passed into the algorithm init function.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24623)
- add test vectors for tls1_3 integrity-only ciphers
- recmethod_local.h: add new member for MAC
- tls13_meth.c: add MAC only to tls 1.3
- tls13_enc.c: extend function to add MAC only
- ssl_local.h: add ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac()
- s3_lib.c: add the new ciphers and add #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_INTEGRITY_ONLY_CIPHERS
- ssl_ciph.c : add ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac() and use it
- tls13secretstest.c: add dummy test function
- Configure: add integrity-only-ciphers option
- document the new ciphers
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22903)
These are newly introduced memory leaks and UAF in evp_test.c
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24339)
Input value is parsed into chunks, which are separately
stored in the buffer stack. When chunk size is set,
"Count" and "Copy" parameters are skipped.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21727)
When cipher does not support variable fragmentation,
the test is skipped.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21727)
For tests in `evp_test`, which support processing in batches.
When not set or set to 0, data are processed with default
sizes (as before).
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21727)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(cherry picked from commit 0ce7d1f355)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24034)
Coverity issue 1453632 noted a missing null check in kdf_test_ctrl
recently. If a malformed value is passed in from the test file that
does not contain a ':' character, the p variable will be NULL, leading
to a NULL derefence prepare_from_text
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23398)
The EVP_CIPHER api currently assumes that calls made into several APIs
have already initalized the cipher in a given context via a call to
EVP_CipherInit[_ex[2]]. If that hasnt been done, instead of an error,
the result is typically a SIGSEGV.
Correct that by adding missing NULL checks in the apropriate apis prior
to using ctx->cipher
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22995)
EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() cannot be called on older
unfixed versions before EVP_MAC_init().
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23006)
Add null check to cmac_size(). This avoids a seg-fault encountered
with cmac when EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() is called before init.
Extend mac testing in evp_test.c to check that the sizes returned by
EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size() before and after init make sense (this also
ensures that we no longer seg-fault).
Fixes#22842
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22858)
In digest_test_run() there are now 3 parameters possible plus
the sentinel value. In reality we will never use all three
at once but Coverity rightfully complains that it is possible
to overflow the params array.
Fixes Coverity 1548054
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22521)
BLAKE2 is not really an extensible output function unlike SHAKE
as the digest size must be set during the context initialization.
Thus it makes no sense to use OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_XOFLEN.
We also need to adjust EVP_DigestFinal_ex() to query the
OSSL_DIGEST_PARAM_SIZE as gettable ctx param for the size.
Fixes#22488
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22491)
Until the cipher dupctx is properly implemented in 3.1 and 3.0 the check is
wrong. This should be reverted once the implemenation has been done.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21964)
If we ignore the faliure to copy on an old fips provider, we need to use
ctx_base, rather than ctx
Fixes#22076
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22102)