Check that using the nonce-type sigopt via the dgst app works correctly
Based on the reproducer from #25012
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25057)
(cherry picked from commit c9e36a8221)
- Converted password declaration from `char*` to `const char[]`.
- Updated `memcpy` and `return` statements accordingly to use `sizeof` instead of predefined lengths.
- Renamed `key_password` into `weak_password` to match test name.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25330)
(cherry picked from commit d52e92f835)
Refactor the callback test code to replace global variables with local structures, enhancing memory management and reducing reliance on redundant cleanup logic.
Using a local struct containing a magic number and result flag to ensure the correct handling of user data and to verify that the callback function is invoked at least once during the test.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25330)
(cherry picked from commit 9808ccc53f)
Related to #8441
This commit introduces a test suite for the password callback mechanism used when reading or writing encrypted and PEM or DER encoded keys via a BIO in OpenSSL. The test is designed to cover various edge cases, particularly focusing on scenarios where the password callback might return unexpected or malformed data from user code.
By simulating different callback behaviors, including negative returns, zero-length passwords, passwords that exactly fill the buffer and wrongly reported lengths. Also testing for the correct behaviour of binary passwords that contain a null byte in the middle.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25330)
(cherry picked from commit fa6ae88a47)
On the first squeeze call, when finishing the absorb process, also set
the NIP flag, if we are still in XOF_STATE_INIT state. When MSA 12 is
available, the state buffer A has not been zeroed during initialization,
thus we must also pass the NIP flag here. This situation can happen
when a squeeze is performed without a preceding absorb (i.e. a SHAKE
of the empty message).
Add a test that performs a squeeze without a preceding absorb and check
if the result is correct.
Fixes: 25f5d7b85f
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25388)
(cherry picked from commit dc5afb7e87)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25341)
(cherry picked from commit 8439337036)
The incorrectly typed data is read only, used in a compare operation, so
neither remote code execution, nor memory content disclosure were possible.
However, applications performing certificate name checks were vulnerable to
denial of service.
The GENERAL_TYPE data type is a union, and we must take care to access the
correct member, based on `gen->type`, not all the member fields have the same
structure, and a segfault is possible if the wrong member field is read.
The code in question was lightly refactored with the intent to make it more
obviously correct.
Fixes CVE-2024-6119
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Also improve related documentation.
- The BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL flag did not behave as advertised, only
leading and trailing, but not internal, whitespace was supported:
$ echo 'AA AA' | openssl base64 -A -d | wc -c
0
- Switching from ignored leading input to valid base64 input misbehaved
when the length of the skipped input was one more than the length of
the second and subsequent valid base64 lines in the internal 1k
buffer:
$ printf '#foo\n#bar\nA\nAAA\nAAAA\n' | openssl base64 -d | wc -c
0
- When the underlying BIO is retriable, and a read returns less than
1k of data, some of the already buffered input lines that could have
been decoded and returned were retained internally for a retry by the
caller. This is somewhat surprising, and the new code decodes as many
of the buffered lines as possible. Issue reported by Michał Trojnara.
- After all valid data has been read, the next BIO_read(3) should
return 0 when the input was all valid or -1 if an error was detected.
This now occurs in more consistently, but further tests and code
refactoring may be needed to ensure this always happens.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25253)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24992)
(in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms,
which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used
for composite algorithms)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24992)
The fips_provider_version_* functions return true if the FIPS provider isn't
loaded. This is somewhat counterintuitive and the fix in #25327 neglected
this nuance resulting in not running the SM2 tests when the FIPS provider
wasn't being loaded.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25331)
Fixes#7940: Enhances the existing test for compression methods in the ClientHello message, aligning with RFC 8446 specifications.
Refactored the test code to improve modularity and maintainability, making it easier to extend and modify in the future.
Added checks for the appropriate alerts, ensuring that `SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER` or `SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR` are correctly triggered as per the RFC 8446 guidelines.
Expanded Test Coverage: Introduced additional test cases to cover scenarios involving:
- Lists of unknown compression methods
- Absence of any compression method
- Validation of a single null compression method, which should always succeed.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25255)
In this mode, only the ph instances are supported, and must be set
explicitly through a parameter. The caller is assumed to pass a
prehash to EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify}().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24975)
Add EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify}_message support for our Ed25519 and Ed448
implementations, including ph and ctx variants.
Tests are added with test_evp stanzas.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24975)
Added sm2 testcases to endecode_test.c.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25266)
Added the function EVP_MD_CTX_get_size_ex() which checks for XOF and
does a ctx get rather than just returning EVP_MD_size().
SHAKE did not have a get_ctx_params() so that had to be added to return the xoflen.
Added a helper function EVP_MD_xof()
EVP_MD_CTX_size() was just an aliased macro for EVP_MD_size(), so to
keep it the same I added an extra function.
EVP_MD_size() always returns 0 for SHAKE now, since it caches the value
of md_size at the time of an EVP_MD_fetch(). This is probably better
than returning the incorrect initial value it was before e.g (16 for
SHAKE128) and returning tht always instead of the set xoflen.
Note BLAKE2B uses "size" instead of "xoflen" to do a similar thing.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25285)
This issue has been discovered by osss-fuzzer [1]. The test function decodes
RSA key created by fuzzer and calls EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check() which
proceeds to ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime() check which takes too long
exceeding timeout (45secs).
The idea is to fix OSSL_DECODER_from_data() code path so invalid
RSA keys will be refused.
[1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=69134
Test case generated by the fuzzer is added.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25190)
The options in fipsprov.c are now generated using macros with fips_indicator_params.inc.
This should keep the naming consistent.
Some FIPS related headers have moved to providers/fips/include so that
they can use fips_indicator_params.inc.
securitycheck.h now includes fipsindicator.h, and fipsindicator.h includes
fipscommon.h.
fipsinstall.c uses OSSL_PROV_PARAM_ for the configurable FIPS options rather than
using OSSL_PROV_FIPS_PARAM_* as this was confusing as to which one should be used.
fips_names.h just uses aliases now for existing public names.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25162)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24754)
X25519 and X448 are unapproved in FIPS 140-3
So always trigger the indicator callback if these Keys are used,
and add "fips-indicator" getters that return 0.
This has been added to keygen and key exchange.
(KEM will also require it if ever becomes a FIPS algorithm).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25246)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25267)
Fixes#25199
This should be done using "Availablein" if required.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25267)
Fixes cross testing with OpenSSL 3.4 with removed SHA1 from the self
tests.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25262)
This fixes the possible memory leak in OBJ_add_object
when a pre-existing object is replaced by a new one,
with identical NID, OID, and/or short/long name.
We do not try to delete any orphans, but only mark
them as type == -1, because the previously returned
pointers from OBJ_nid2obj/OBJ_nid2sn/OBJ_nid2ln
may be cached by applications and can thus not
be cleaned up before the application terminates.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22534)
Add OSSL_PROVIDER_unload() when OSSL_PROVIDER_add_builtin() fails to avoid memory leak.
Fixes: 5442611dff ("Add a test for OSSL_LIB_CTX_new_child()")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25109)
Add OSSL_PROVIDER_unload() when test_provider() fails to avoid memory leak.
Fixes: f995e5bdcd ("TEST: Add provider_fallback_test, to test aspects of
fallback providers")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25108)
SSKDF KMAC tests added.
Added FIPS indicator tests for SSKDF Hash, HMAC, and KMAC cases.
Added short salt length tests for SSKDF HMAC and KMAC.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
This adds a FIPS indicator for KMAC key size.
Note that 112 bits keys are still smaller than the
sizes required to reach 128 bits for KMAC128 and
256 bits for KMAC256
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check.
HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC,
so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC.
A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider
for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore
the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the
check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches
HMAC directly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
Instead of just using the neighborhood, fill
subsequent neighborhoods with colliding entries.
If the hashtable is properly sized, it won't degrade
performance too much.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
This replaces LHASH in core_namemap with the new hashtable and adds
a reverse mapping in form of stack of stacks instead of iterating
the existing hash table members.
The new hashtable is used in lockless-read mode.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
Also build it in the FIPS provider too and properly
report error on insert when hashtable cannot be grown.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
Add full key matching to hashtable
the idea is that on a hash value match we do a full memory comparison of
the unhashed key to validate that its actually the key we're looking for
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
It turns out that we didn't allow the combination RSA + SM3 anywhere.
This is perfectly reasonable in the FIPS module, but less so in the default
provider. This change enables it in the default provider, and adds a simple
evp_test stanza for the RSA-SM3 signature scheme.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
With these tests, we get to test:
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex()
- EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2()
- EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2()
- EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init() and friends
- EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init() and friends
A few test cases for RSA-{hash} are added, in
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_rsa_sigalg.txt
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
Validate that the relevant options are on when -pedantic is specified,
off when it isn't and can be given to enable the setting.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25194)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25161)
internally.
This is not using a strict check since there may be applications that
require the IV to be generated externally (e.g. java).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25178)
The passed in reference of a ref-counted object
is free'd by d2i functions in the error handling.
However if it is not the last reference, the
in/out reference variable is not set to null here.
This makes it impossible for the caller to handle
the error correctly, because there are numerous
cases where the passed in reference is free'd
and set to null, while in other cases, where the
passed in reference is not free'd, the reference
is left untouched.
Therefore the passed in reference must be set
to NULL even when it was not the last reference.
Fixes#23713
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22809)
This is related to #22780, simply add test cases
for the different failure modes of PEM_ASN1_read_bio.
Depending on whether the PEM or the DER format is valid or not,
the passed in CRL may be deleted ot not, therefore a statement
like this:
reused_crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(b, &reused_crl, NULL, NULL);
must be avoided, because it can create memory leaks.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22809)
Matt Caswell
erbsland-dev
Ingo Franzki
Viktor Dukhovni
Tomas Mraz
Viktor Dukhovni
Richard Levitte
Pauli
Jamie Cui
slontis
sashan
Jonathan M. Wilbur
Bernd Edlinger
Jiasheng Jiang
Neil Horman