When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.
Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.
PR#3191
(cherry picked from commit b77b58a398)
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1)
If pointer comparison for current certificate fails check
to see if a match using X509_cmp succeeds for the current
certificate: this is useful for cases where the certificate
pointer is not available.
(cherry picked from commit 6856b288a6e66edd23907b7fa264f42e05ac9fc7)
PR#3169
This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:
SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.
SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.
SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.
The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
(cherry picked from commit 2f56c9c015dbca45379c9a725915b3b8e765a119)
PR: 2808
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.
This is a forward-port of commits:
4af793036ff4c93b46ed3da721dac92583270191
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list
prevents its use by default.
If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity
checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.
(cherry picked from commit 77a0f740d00ecf8f6b01c0685a2f858c3f65a3dd)
Make DTLS behave like TLS when negotiating version: record layer has
DTLS 1.0, message version is 1.2.
Tolerate different version numbers if version hasn't been negotiated
yet.
(cherry picked from commit 40088d8b81)
Add DTLS record header parsing, different client hello format and add
HelloVerifyRequest message type.
Add code to d1_pkt.c to send message headers to the message callback.
(cherry picked from commit 890f2f8b92)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Check for Suite B support using method flags instead of version numbers:
anything supporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites will also support Suite B.
Return an error if an attempt to use DTLS 1.0 is made in Suite B mode.
(cherry picked from commit 4544f0a691)
If we successfully match a cookie don't set return value to 2 as this
results in other error conditions returning 2 as well.
Instead set return value to -2 which can be checked later if everything
else is OK.
(cherry picked from commit c56f5b8edf)
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
(cherry picked from commit c6913eeb76)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Add DTLS1.2 support for cached records when computing handshake macs
instead of the MD5+SHA1 case for DTLS < 1.2 (this is a port of the
equivalent TLS 1.2 code to DTLS).
(cherry picked from commit 04fac50045)
Add correct flags for DTLS 1.2, update s_server and s_client to handle
DTLS 1.2 methods.
Currently no support for version negotiation: i.e. if client/server selects
DTLS 1.2 it is that or nothing.
(cherry picked from commit c3b344e36a)
Conflicts:
apps/s_server.c
Since this is always called from DTLS code it is safe to assume the header
length should be the DTLS value. This avoids the need to check the version
number and should work with any version of DTLS (not just 1.0).
(cherry picked from commit 9cf0f18754)
Andy Polyakov
Dr. Stephen Henson
Piotr Sikora
Rob Stradling
Krzysztof Kwiatkowski
Robin Seggelmann
Ben Laurie
Nick Mathewson