Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26361)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26361)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26361)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26333)
SSL_new_from_listner() creates QUIC connection object (QCSO)
from listener. Caller can use the object retuned from
SSL_new_from_listener() to connect to remote QUIC server.
The QCSO created here shares engine/port with listener.
the change is covered by `test_ssl_new_from_listener()` in
test/quicapitest.c
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26138)
Store an EVP_CIPHER_CTX context with an ephemeral key set in port
and use it to encrypt/decrypt the validation token.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26165)
I had experimented with starting the ssl handshake during accept, and
forgot to remove it
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26178)
Add data to track how much unvalidated credit we are sending and
receiving until such time as we are validated. Validated conditions
are:
1) A retry token is sent, received, and validated
2) a handshake is completed on the connection
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26178)
Disabling server address validation here only relates to new connections
that arrive without a token. Future connections using tokens provided
by the server via NEW_TOKEN frames will still be validated
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26114)
Now that we have the infrastructure to skip address validation, add a
public flag to SSL_new_listener and SSL_new_listener_from to allow the
skipping of address validation on selected quic listener SSL objects
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26114)
Give us the infrastrucute to skip addr validation on the server
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26114)
If we opt not to do server address validation, we have no odcid
and therefore never reserved a local cid
We need to follow the initial code path to generate one
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26114)
Adds fields to the QUIC RETRY packet validation token:
timestamp, remote_addr, odcid, & rscid.
Also adds functionality to validate the token once returned by the client.
Note that this does not encrypt the token yet.
Also check that the RSCID stored in the RETRY validation
token matches the DCID in the header.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26048)
When doing a retry after a version negotiation, we actually need to drop
packet 1 rather than 0 to get a retransmit of the initial packet
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26000)
RFC says we should only accept datagrams of at least 1200 bytes, so the
check should discard anything under that, not over that
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26000)
@t8m pointed out that versino negotiation packets weren't guaranteeing
network byte ordering in the array of supported versions.
Convert the client to use network byte order on send and receipt.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25968)
On the client side, when we get a version negotiation packet, we need to
interrogate the supported version list from the server, and either:
1) drop the connection if we don't see a version we can work with
2) select a supported version and try the negotiation again
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25968)
If the server receives an Initial packet with a version number we don't
support (currently a fixed check for QUIC_VERSION_1), instead of
dropping it, respond with a version negotiation packet to the peer
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25968)
In preparation for doing version negotiation, expose the ability to have
the packetiser for QUIC set a configured protocol version. We only set
it to QUIC_VERSION_1 for now, but it allows for us to set different
protocols in the future.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25968)
In preparation for supporting the handling of version negotiation, we
need to be able to detect why the decoding of quic header failed.
Specifically, ossl_quic_wire_decode_pkt_hdr fails if the version
provided in the header isn't QUIC_VERSION_1. We want to keep that, as
we don't support anything else, but the server code needs to
differentiate when we fail decode because of a version problem, vs some
other more fatal malforming issue.
So add a uint64_t *fail_cause pointer that gets filled out with a
failure cause. We only use VERSION failures right now, but we can
expand this later if needed
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25968)
This got introduced by #595288251bb (QUIC APL: Ensure APL
functions use correct prologue)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25659)
After sending a retry frame from a server, the subsequent server hello
record must include the RETRY_SCID transport parameter, as per RFC 9000:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-7.3
Implement the encoding of said retry_source_connection_id transport
param, and fix up tests to address the impact of that change. Test
changes amount to:
1) quicapitest needs to have its tparam test augmented such that it
doesn't inject the retry_scid on its own, as the quic stack does it
for the test now
2) quicapitest needs to have the ssl_trace test adjusted so the expected
record values are reflected.
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25890)
When establishing a connection over quic, if the channel is established
in response to a retry request from the server, the ORIG_DCID transport
parameter must reflect the original dcid sent from the client in the
first inital packet that the server sent the retry request in response
to.
As opposed to establishing a connection without the retry request, when
address validation isn't in use, where the ORIG_DCID parameter just
represents the the dcid that the client sent.
Augment the channel creation code to select the 'right' DCID when
encoding server side transport parameters
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25890)
When using retry packets in QUIC to implement address validation, the
2nd inital packet that arrives after the server sends the retry frame
will have its CRYPTO packet encrypted using keys derived from the new
dcid, rather than the dcid in the 1st initial packet. Update the
channel creation code to update those keys on the server so that the
CRYPTO packet is decrypted successfully
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25890)
RFC 9000 describes a method for preforming server address validation on
QUIC using retry packets. Based on:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-17.2.5.2
We do the following:
1) Client sends an Initial packet without a retry token
2) Server abandons the initial packet and responds with a retry frame
which includes a retry token and integrity tag and new SCID
3) Client send the initial packet again, updating the encryption keys
for the connection based on the SCID sent in (2), using it as the new
DCID, including the retry token/tag provided in (2).
4) Server validates the token in (3) and creates a new connection using
the updated DCID from the client to generate its encryption keys
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25890)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25416)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25416)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25416)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25416)
The ossl_quic_get_net_write_desired() and
ossl_quic_reactor_net_read_desired() implementations can be used by
listeners. But in that case there is no ctx.qc object present. Instead we
should use the reactor from ctx.obj which will work also for a listener.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25642)
Just because one connection has not started yet, it does not mean that
we should not tick the QUIC_ENGINE. There may be other connections that do
need ticking.
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25452)
The comment is no longer accurance so it can be removed
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25457)
Centralise the storage of the override in the QUIC_ENGINE rather than in
the QUIC_CONNECTION. We can now set the override on any type of QUIC SSL
object as needed.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25457)
Now that we also QUIC server (listener) handles, we may have a NULL quic
connection (ctx.qc), and so need to either return early or handle the
NULL `qc` gracefully.
Reviewed-by: Sasa Nedvedicky <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25432)
Neil Horman
Andrew Dinh
Alexandr Nedvedicky
sashan
Tomas Mraz
Hugo Landau
Matt Caswell
Viktor Dukhovni