Using this option disables the OpenSSL FIPS provider
self tests.
This is intended for debugging purposes only,
as it breaks FIPS compliance.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25063)
Since FIPS provider performs lower bound check by default from v3.0, the
default value for new configurable item will be one.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24120)
In FIPS 140-3, RSA Signing with X9.31 padding is not approved,
but verification is allowed for legacy purposes. An indicator has been added
for RSA signing with X9.31 padding.
A strict restriction on the size of the RSA modulus has been added
i.e. It must be 1024 + 256 * s (which is part of the ANSI X9.31 spec).
Added implementation comments to the X9.31 padding code
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24021)
This leaves 3DES with the FIPS query "FIPS=yes", which allows
Triple-DES to be used for Decryption by default.
Disallow CMAC using Triple-DES in FIPS.
This does not use a FIPS indicator.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24960)
This is a FIPS 140-3 requirement.
This uses a FIP indicator if either the FIPS configurable "dsa_sign_disabled" is set to 0,
OR OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_SIGN_CHECK is set to 0 in the dsa signing context.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24799)
Add a FIPS indicator callback that can be set via
OSSL_INDICATOR_set_callback(). This callback is intended to be run
whenever a non approved algorithm check has occurred and strict checking
has been disabled.The callback may be used to
log non approved algorithms. The callback is passed a type and
description string as well as the cbarg specified in OSSL_INDICATOR_set_callback.
The return value can be either 0 or 1.
A value of 0 can be used for testing purposes to force an error to occur from the algorithm
that called the callback.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24623)
Fixes: #23979
Previously fips module relied on OPENSSL_cpuid_setup
being used as constructor by the linker to correctly
setup the capability vector, either via .section .init
(for x86_64) or via __attribute__((constructor)).
This would make ld.so call OPENSSL_cpuid_setup before
the init function for fips module. However, this early
constructing behavior has several disadvantages:
1. Not all platform/toolchain supports such behavior
2. Initialisation sequence is not well defined, and
some function might not be initialized when cpuid_setup
is called
3. Implicit path is hard to maintain and debug
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24419)
We were neglecting to register the main thread to receive thread stop
notifications. This is important if the thread that starts the FIPS
provider is not the same one that is used when OPENSSL_cleanup() is
called.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21964)
This can effectively reduce the binary size for platforms
that don't need ECX feature(~100KB).
Signed-off-by: Yi Li <yi1.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20781)
Fixes#20710
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20745)
Add option for restricting digests available to DRBGs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20521)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20386)
This reverts commit 09627a8ceb.
NIST isn't allowing EdDSA at this stage after all, so flag it as not
FIPS approved in the FIPS provider. Guidance for FIPS 140-3 is expected
later this month:
The use of EdDSA still remains non-approved.
Before the FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-186 algorithms / curves can be
used in the approved mode, the CMVP will need to do (at least)
the following:
* Incorporate FIPS 186-5 and SP 800-186 into SP 800-140C/D;
* Update IG 10.3.A to incorporate self-test requirements for the
new algorithms/curves.
* Write a new IG on this transition to clarify the issues raised in
this thread and elsewhere and provide a clear transition schedule.
The CMVP is working on all three of these items and hope to have
drafts public by the end of March.
Since security relevant changes are not permitted for new 140-2
submissions, and under the assumption that this transition away
from FIPS 186-4 algorithms will be 'soft' and not move modules to
the historical list, we do not plan on writing 140-2 guidance for
this transition.
It seems unlikely that all of these requirements will be completed before
we submit.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20343)
CMVP's answer when questioned about this being:
X448 and X25519 uses Curve448 and Curve25519, respectfully, within an
ECDH scheme. Therefore, it is possible for a key agreement scheme
that uses Curve448 and Curve25519 to be used in the approved mode
and be viewed as an allowed algorithm if requirements of Scenario
X2 of IG D.8 and IG A.2 are met (or Scenario 3 of D.F and IG C.A for
FIPS 140-3). The use of EdDSA in the approved mode is not permitted
until FIPS 186-5 is published and part of CMVP guidance.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20079)
Likewise for the related ECX key exchanges.
NIST is mandating this until FIPS 186-5 is finalised.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20020)
And so clean a few useless includes
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19721)
This reverts commit fc0bb3411b and changes
how 3DES is advertised.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19631)
Co-authored-by: Randall Steck <rsteck@thinqsoft.com>
Co-authored-by: Mark J. Minnoch <mark@keypair.us>
Co-authored-by: Steve Weymann <steve@keypair.us>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19510)
Rather than relying on the locale code working, instead implement these
functions directly.
Fixes#18322
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18344)
It also allows for passing -DOPENSSL_NO_LOCALE as a workaround
to ./Configure command.
Fixes#18233
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18282)
This refactors OSSL_LIB_CTX to avoid using CRYPTO_EX_DATA. The assorted
objects to be managed by OSSL_LIB_CTX are hardcoded and are initialized
eagerly rather than lazily, which avoids the need for locking on access
in most cases.
Fixes#17116.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17881)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16203)
Ensure we free the OSSL_LIB_CTX on the error path.
Fixes#16163
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16168)
They need to be set once the provider will definitely be loading. If they
are set earlier, a double free results on a failure.
Fixes#15452
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15492)
provider/fips/fipsprov.c contains a number of symbols that get used by
anything that's included in libfips.a, at least on Unix.
Unfortunately, there are platforms that do not support resolving
symbols to things that are already included in the end product (module
in this case) being built; they only support resolving symbols with
what comes next in the linking process.
The offending symbols in this case are FIPS_security_check_enabled,
c_thread_start and ossl_fips_intern_provider_init.
We resolve this by placing provider/fips/fipsprov.c in libfips.a along
with everything else there. That takes care of the offending symbols.
What remains is to ensure that there is an entry point in an object
file used directly when linking the module, providers/fips/fips_entry.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15370)
Where an object has multiple ex_data associated with it, then we free that
ex_data in order of priority (high priority first).
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14991)
The OIDs were extracted with the help of libcrypto's ASN1 OID database.
While doing this, we move all the names strings to macro definitions,
to avoid duplication and conflicting names declarations. Those macros
are all in providers/implementations/include/prov/names.h
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14498)
When we store references to up-calls for future reference we run a sanity
check to make sure we either previously haven't set these values or they
are the same as last time. We don't support the scenario where an
application is linked against multiple versions of libcrypto but using a
shared fips.so file. This would result in different up-calls for different
calls to OSSL_provider_init(), which we currently can't handle.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14814)
We had some FIPS global variables that were based on values from the
config file. In theory if two instances of the fips module are loaded
they could be based on different config files which would cause this to
fail. Instead we store them in the FIPS_GLOBAL structure.
Fixes#14364
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14814)
With new provided algorithms added, we'd rather rely on the names and
descriptions that we get from the providers.
Specifically with the 'openssl list' command, we now display the
description of all algorithms. For '-public-key-algorithms', we
additionally print key type information a bit more like we do for
legacy methods.
We also add descriptions to all our keymgmt functions, because the
built in EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHODs had them.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14656)
Pauli
slontis
pohsingwu
Hongren Zheng
Tomas Mraz
Matt Caswell
Pauli
Yi Li
Irak Rigia
FdaSilvaYY
Dmitry Belyavskiy
Hugo Landau
Richard Levitte
Daniel Bevenius