This adds evp_keymgmt_util_copy() and affects EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters()
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11158)
This adds evp_keymgmt_util_match() and affects EVP_PKEY_cmp() and
EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters().
The word 'match' was used for the new routines because many associate
'cmp' with comparison functions that allows sorting, i.e. return -1, 0
or 1 depending on the order in which the two compared elements should
be sorted. EVP_PKEY_cmp() and EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters() don't quite
do that.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11158)
It turns out that GNU as and Solaris as don't have compatible ideas on
the .section syntax, so we need to check if we're using GNU as or
another assembler and adapt this .section syntax accordingly.
Fixes#11132
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11191)
This function "upgrades" a key from a legacy key container to a
provider side key container.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11148)
The role of this cache was two-fold:
1. It was a cache of key copies exported to providers with which an
operation was initiated.
2. If the EVP_PKEY didn't have a legacy key, item 0 of the cache was
the corresponding provider side origin, while the rest was the
actual cache.
This dual role for item 0 made the code a bit confusing, so we now
make a separate keymgmt / keydata pair outside of that cache, which is
the provider side "origin" key.
A hard rule is that an EVP_PKEY cannot hold a legacy "origin" and a
provider side "origin" at the same time.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11148)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11175)
These are old functions that fell out of use with OpenSL 0.9.7.
It's more than time to deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11161)
If the user specifies a minimum allocation size that is smaller than
the free list structure (or zero), calculate the minimum possible size rather
than failing.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11149)
Conditional code readability improvement.
Remove unused macro
Commit #11042 has introduced a new, unused, CRYPTO_EX_INDEX macro.
Remove before version release.
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11103)
Previously, the initialization was done immediately in RAND_DRBG_set(),
which is also called in RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate().
This made it difficult for the FIPS DRBG self test to verify that the
internal state had been zeroized, because it had the side effect that
the drbg->data structure was reinitialized immediately.
To solve the problem, RAND_DRBG_set() has been split in two parts
static int rand_drbg_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags);
static int rand_drbg_init_method(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
and only the first part is called from RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11111)
Previously, evp-keymgmt_util_export_to_provider() took care of all
kinds of exports of EVP_PKEYs to provider side keys, be it from its
legacy key or from another provider side key. This works most of the
times, but there may be cases where the caller wants to be a bit more
in control of what sort of export happens when.
Also, when it's time to remove all legacy stuff, that job will be much
easier if we have a better separation between legacy support and
support of provided stuff, as far as we can take it.
This changes moves the support of legacy key to provider side key
export from evp-keymgmt_util_export_to_provider() to
evp_pkey_make_provided(), and makes sure the latter is called from all
EVP_PKEY functions that handle legacy stuff.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11074)
Made macro names that refer to a known base OID, an commented accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10557)
This includes legacy PSS controls to params conversion, and an attempt
to generalise the parameter names when they are suitable for more than
one operation.
Also added crypto/rsa/rsa_aid.c, containing proper AlgorithmIdentifiers
for known RSA+hash function combinations.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10557)
We were excluding more code than we needed to in the OCSP/HTTP code in
the event of no-sock. We should also not assume that a BIO passed to our
API is socket based.
This fixes the no-sock build
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11134)
Replace the properties default, fips and legacy with a single property
called "provider". So, for example, instead of writing "default=yes" to
get algorithms from the default provider you would instead write
"provider=default". We also have a new "fips" property to indicate that
an algorithm is compatible with FIPS mode. This applies to all the
algorithms in the FIPS provider, as well as any non-cryptographic
algorithms (currently only serializers).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11097)
When converting legacy controls to OSSL_PARAMs, return the unsupported -2
value correctly.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11049)
Use of the low level DH functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11024)
Use of the low level RSA functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11063)
`BN_copy()` (and indirectly `BN_dup()`) do not propagate the
`BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag: the propagation has been turned on and off a
few times in the past years, because in some conditions it has shown
unintended consequences in some code paths.
Without turning the propagation on once more, we can still improve
`BN_copy()` by avoiding to leak `src->top` in case `src` is flagged with
`BN_FLG_CONSTTIME`.
In this case we can instead use `src->dmax` as the number of words
allocated for `dst` and for the `memcpy` operation.
Barring compiler or runtime optimizations, if the caller provides `src`
flagged as const time and preallocated to a public size, no leak should
happen due to the copy operation.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
holding the secret scalar.
This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
the called specifically set it.
The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
Setting the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag alone is never enough, we also have
to preallocate the `BIGNUM` internal buffer to a fixed public size big
enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
accesses.
Fixed Length
------------
The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
secret scalars.
For preallocating the `BIGNUM` storage we look at the number of "words"
required for the internal representation of the order, and we
preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
might temporarily overflow the order length.
Future work
-----------
A separate commit addresses further hardening of `BN_copy()` (and
indirectly `BN_dup()`).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length
of the secret scalar.
Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
scalar in the key.
For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length,
using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`.
When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
constant time implementations in the backend.
Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough
that operations performed during the processing never trigger a
realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
accesses.
Fixed length
------------
The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
secret scalars.
For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
converted to bytes (rounding up).
For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
required for the internal representation of the order, and we
preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
might temporarily overflow the order length.
Future work
-----------
To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon
`EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden
`EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`.
This is done in separate commits.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
A pair of internal functions related to EC_KEY handling could benefit
from declaring `EC_KEY *` variables as `const`, providing clarity for
callers and readers of the code, in addition to enlisting the compiler
in preventing some mistakes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
Since pointer in x32 is 4 bytes, add x86_64-support.pl to define
pointer_size and pointer_register based on flavour to support
stuctures like:
struct { void *ptr; int blocks; }
This fixes 90-test_sslapi.t on x32. Verified with
$ ./Configure shared linux-x86_64
$ make
$ make test
and
$ ./Configure shared linux-x32
$ make
$ make test
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10988)
add CMP message validation and related tests; while doing so:
* add ERR_add_error_mem_bio() to crypto/err/err_prn.c
* move ossl_cmp_add_error_txt() as ERR_add_error_txt() to crypto/err/err_prn.c
* add X509_STORE_CTX_print_verify_cb() to crypto/x509/t_x509.c,
adding internally x509_print_ex_brief(), print_certs(), and print_store_certs()
* move {ossl_cmp_,}X509_STORE_get1_certs() to crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10620)
in addition:
correct wording in doc, comments, and parameter names: self-signed -> self-issued where appropriate
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10620)
in particular:
consolidate documentation of CMP logging and error reporting functions
fix compilation problem with clang on some platforms
rename OSSL_CMP_log etc. to ossl_cmp_log etc. since these macros are CMP-internal
move chopping of trailing separator to ossl_cmp_add_error_txt(), also fix handling of leading separator
internalize X509_print_ex_brief() as x509_print_ex_brief()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10620)
In https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883, I'd meant to exclude
the perlasm drivers since they aren't opening pipes and do not
particularly need it, but I only noticed x86_64-xlate.pl, so
arm-xlate.pl and ppc-xlate.pl got the change.
That seems to have been fine, so be consistent and also apply the change
to x86_64-xlate.pl. Checking for errors is generally a good idea.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930)
FIXES#10692#10638
a bug for aarch64 bigendian with instructions 'st1' and 'ld1' on AES-GCM mode.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10751)
Embed libctx in dsa and dh objects and cleanup internal methods to not pass libctx (This makes it consistent with the rsa changes)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10910)
To support Intel CET, all indirect branch targets must start with
endbranch. Here is a patch to add endbranch to function entries
in x86_64 assembly codes which are indirect branch targets as
discovered by running openssl testsuite on Intel CET machine and
visual inspection.
Verified with
$ CC="gcc -Wl,-z,cet-report=error" ./Configure shared linux-x86_64 -fcf-protection
$ make
$ make test
and
$ CC="gcc -mx32 -Wl,-z,cet-report=error" ./Configure shared linux-x32 -fcf-protection
$ make
$ make test # <<< passed with https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10988
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10982)
Adding support for "no-secure-memory" was simple, a one-liner.
Fixing all the "ifdef OPENSSL_SECURE_MEMORY" to be "ifndef NO_xxx"
was a bit more work. My original goof, for not following the OpenSSL
pattern "ifndef NO_" used everywhere else.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11023)
It uses EVP_PKEY serializers to get the desired results.
One might think that ddoing this might make things a bit dicy for
existing serializers, as they should obviously use i2d functions.
However, since our serializers use much more primitive functions
such as i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(), or keytype specific ones such as
i2d_RSAPrivateKey(), there is no clash.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11056)
We should always generate .note.gnu.property section in x86_64 assembly
codes for ELF outputs to mark Intel CET support since all input files
must be marked with Intel CET support in order for linker to mark output
with Intel CET support. Also .note.gnu.property section in x32 should
be aligned to 4 bytes, not 8 bytes and .p2align should be used
consistently.
Verified with
$ CC="gcc -Wl,-z,cet-report=error" ./Configure shared linux-x86_64 -fcf-protection
$ make
$ make test
and
$ CC="gcc -mx32 -Wl,-z,cet-report=error" ./Configure shared linux-x32 -fcf-protection
$ make
$ make test # <<< 90-test_sslapi.t failed because 8-byte pointer size.
Fix#10896
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10985)
Philippe Antoine
Shane Lontis
Richard Levitte
Nikolay Morozov
Scott Arciszewski
Pauli
Davide Galassi
H.J. Lu
Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
Dr. David von Oheimb
Matt Caswell
Dane (4cad@silvertoque)
Nicola Tuveri
David Benjamin
simplelins
Wataru Ashihara
Rich Salz