SSLv3 (specifically with client auth) cannot use one shot APIs: the digested
data and the master secret are handled in separate update operations. So
in the special case of SSLv3 use the streaming API.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3527)
We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these
alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances:
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message
SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically
correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and
semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us
(e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters)
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure)
The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above
represents the best interpretation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3480)
We already did this on an ad-hoc per extension basis (for some extensions).
This centralises it and makes sure we do it for all extensions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3418)
- Mostly missing fall thru comments
- And uninitialized value used in sslapitest.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3440)
Add "single part" digest sign and verify functions. These sign and verify
a message in one function. This simplifies some operations and it will later
be used as the API for algorithms which do not support the update/final
mechanism (e.g. PureEdDSA).
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3409)
The TLSv1.3 spec says that a server SHOULD send supported_groups in the
EE message if there is a group that it prefers to the one used in the
key_share. Clients MAY act on that. At the moment we don't do anything
with it on the client side, but that may change in the future.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3395)
Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we will accept in a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)
There was code existing which attempted to handle the case where application
data is received after a reneg handshake has started in SCTP. In normal DTLS
we just fail the connection if this occurs, so there doesn't seem any reason
to try and work around it for SCTP. In practice it didn't work properly
anyway and is probably a bad idea to start with.
Fixes#3251
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3286)
This move prepares for the later addition of the new custom extensions
API. The context codes have an additional "SSL_" added to their name to
ensure we don't have name clashes with other applications.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)
Add functions to add/retrieve the certificate_authorities. The older
client_CA functions mainly just call the new versions now.
Rename fields sice new extension can be generated by client and server.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3015)
Variable 'pktype' was set but not used under OPENSSL_NO_GOST. This change
will fix the build warning under [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2961)
A similar change that probably should have been wrapped into
commit e0926ef49d.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3010)
Draft-19 changes the HRR transcript hash so that the initial ClientHello
is replaced in the transcript with a special synthetic message_hash message
that just contains a hash of ClientHello1 as its message body.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
The end of early data is now indicated by a new handshake message rather
than an alert.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)
In TLSv1.3 the above messages signal a key change. The spec requires that
the end of these messages must align with a record boundary. We can detect
this by checking for decrypted but as yet unread record data sitting in
OpenSSL buffers at the point where we process the messages.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2875)
This removes the fips configure option. This option is broken as the
required FIPS code is not available.
FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set() are retained for compatibility, but
FIPS_mode() always returns 0, and FIPS_mode_set() can only be used to
turn FIPS mode off.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Too many KeyUpdate message could be inicative of a problem (e.g. an
infinite KeyUpdate loop if the peer always responds to a KeyUpdate message
with an "update_requested" KeyUpdate response), or (conceivably) an attack.
Either way we limit the number of KeyUpdate messages we are prepared to
handle.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2609)
For client auth call tls_choose_sigalg to select the certificate
and signature algorithm. Use the selected algorithm in
tls_construct_cert_verify.
Remove obsolete tls12_get_sigandhash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2643)
Now the certificate and signature algorithm is set in one place we
can use it directly insetad of recalculating it. The old functions
ssl_get_server_send_pkey() and ssl_get_server_cert_index() are no
longer required.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
The original intent of SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN and SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC was to
support two different keys for RSA signing and decrypt. However this
was never implemented and we only ever set one key and the other was
always NULL. Replace with single SSL_PKEY_RSA type.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2587)
Fixed a memory leak in ASN1_digest and ASN1_item_digest.
Reworked error handling in asn1_item_embed_new.
Fixed error handling in int_ctx_new and EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup.
Fixed a memory leak in CRYPTO_free_ex_data.
Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i, x509_name_encode and x509_name_canon.
Check for null pointer in tls_process_cert_verify.
Fixes#2103#2104#2105#2109#2111#2115
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2342)
We now set the server certificate in tls_choose_sigalg() so there is
no need for a special case for TLS 1.3 any more.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2339)
Store peer signature type in s->s3->tmp.peer_sigtype and check it
to see if the peer used PSS.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2301)
The record layer was making decisions that should really be left to the
state machine around unexpected handshake messages that are received after
the initial handshake (i.e. renegotiation related messages). This commit
removes that code from the record layer and updates the state machine
accordingly. This simplifies the state machine and paves the way for
handling other messages post-handshake such as the NewSessionTicket in
TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
TLSv1.3 introduces PSS based sigalgs. Offering these in a TLSv1.3 client
implies that the client is prepared to accept these sigalgs even in
TLSv1.2.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
We had an extra layer of indirection in looking up hashes and sigs based
on sigalgs which is now no longer necessary. This removes it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
In TLSv1.2 an individual sig alg is represented by 1 byte for the hash
and 1 byte for the signature. In TLSv1.3 each sig alg is represented by
two bytes, where the two bytes together represent a single hash and
signature combination. This converts the internal representation of sigalgs
to use a single int for the pair, rather than a pair of bytes.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
We remove the separate CertificateStatus message for TLSv1.3, and instead
send back the response in the appropriate Certificate message extension.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
Also updates TLSProxy to be able to understand the format and parse the
contained extensions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
Because extensions were keyed by type which is sparse, we were continually
scanning the list to find the one we wanted. The way we stored them also
had the side effect that we were running initialisers/finalisers in a
different oder to the parsers. In this commit we change things so that we
instead key on an index value for each extension.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This builds on the work started in 1ab3836b3 and extends is so that
each extension has its own identified parsing functions, as well as an
allowed context identifying which messages and protocols it is relevant for.
Subsequent commits will do a similar job for the ServerHello extensions.
This will enable us to have common functions for processing extension blocks
no matter which of the multiple messages they are received from. In TLSv1.3
a number of different messages have extension blocks, and some extensions
have moved from one message to another when compared to TLSv1.2.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Subsequent commits will pull other extensions code into this file.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There is a set of miscellaneous processing for OCSP, CT etc at the end of
the ServerDone processing. In TLS1.3 we don't have a ServerDone, so this
needs to move elsewhere.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This is a major overhaul of the TLSv1.3 state machine. Currently it still
looks like TLSv1.2. This commit changes things around so that it starts
to look a bit less like TLSv1.2 and bit more like TLSv1.3.
After this commit we have:
ClientHello
+ key_share ---->
ServerHello
+key_share
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateStatus*}
<---- {Finished}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} ---->
[ApplicationData] <---> [Application Data]
Key differences between this intermediate position and the final TLSv1.3
position are:
- No EncryptedExtensions message yet
- No server side CertificateVerify message yet
- CertificateStatus still exists as a separate message
- A number of the messages are still in the TLSv1.2 format
- Still running on the TLSv1.2 record layer
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We can end up with a NULL SSL_METHOD function if a method has been
disabled. If that happens then we shouldn't call vent->smeth().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We read it later in grow_init_buf(). If CCS is the first thing received in
a flight, then it will use the init_msg from the last flight we received. If
the init_buf has been grown in the meantime then it will point to some
arbitrary other memory location. This is likely to result in grow_init_buf()
attempting to grow to some excessively large amount which is likely to
fail. In practice this should never happen because the only time we receive
a CCS as the first thing in a flight is in an abbreviated handshake. None
of the preceding messages from the server flight would be large enough to
trigger this.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Travis is reporting one file at a time shadowed variable warnings where
"read" has been used. This attempts to go through all of libssl and replace
"read" with "readbytes" to fix all the problems in one go.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Includes addition of the various options to s_server/s_client. Also adds
one of the new TLS1.3 ciphersuites.
This isn't "real" TLS1.3!! It's identical to TLS1.2 apart from the protocol
and the ciphersuite...and the ciphersuite is just a renamed TLS1.2 one (not
a "real" TLS1.3 ciphersuite).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
tls_construct_finished() used to have different arguments to all of the
other construction functions. It doesn't anymore, so there is no neeed to
treat it as a special case.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Ensure all message types work the same way including CCS so that the state
machine doesn't need to know about special cases. Put all the special logic
into ssl_set_handshake_header() and ssl_close_construct_packet().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Instead of initialising, finishing and cleaning up the WPACKET in every
message construction function, we should do it once in
write_state_machine().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
ssl_set_handshake_header2() was only ever a temporary name while we had
to have ssl_set_handshake_header() for code that hadn't been converted to
WPACKET yet. No code remains that needed that so we can rename it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
A TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message.
This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length
are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending
reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed
to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that
memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive
message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could
mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a
connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory
exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place,
and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the
application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner
then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again.
Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature.
This then means that there is only a security impact if:
1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the
event that the connection fails
or
2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there
is very little free memory
or
3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there
are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for
the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is
insufficient memory to service the multiple requests.
Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to
be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack
of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.
This issue does not affect DTLS users.
Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.).
CVE-2016-6307
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
All the other functions that take an argument for the number of bytes
use convenience macros for this purpose. We should do the same with
WPACKET_put_bytes().
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.
The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.
However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.
Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.
So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.
An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.
I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.
A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.
The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.
Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.
As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.
Issue reported by Quan Luo.
CVE-2016-2179
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/
Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up
manually by disabling auto-formatting.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
DTLSv1_client_method() is deprecated, but it was the only way to obtain
DTLS1_BAD_VER support. The SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT hack doesn't work with
DTLS_client_method(), and it's relatively non-trivial to make it work without
expanding the hack into lots of places.
So deprecate SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT with DTLSv1_client_method(), and make
it work with SSL_CTX_set_{min,max}_proto_version(DTLS1_BAD_VER) instead.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix some indentation at the same time
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1292)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
ChangeCipherSpec messages have a defined value. They also may not occur
in the middle of a handshake message. The current logic will accept a
ChangeCipherSpec with value 2. It also would accept up to three bytes of
handshake data before the ChangeCipherSpec which it would discard
(because s->init_num gets reset).
Instead, require that s->init_num is 0 when a ChangeCipherSpec comes in.
RT#4391
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot
continue due to malloc failure. Also, when X509_verify_cert()
returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain
X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED,
just in case some code path returns an error without setting an
appropriate value of ctx->error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
We now send the highest supported version by the client, even if the session
uses an older version.
This fixes 2 problems:
- When you try to reuse a session but the other side doesn't reuse it and
uses a different protocol version the connection will fail.
- When you're trying to reuse a session with an old version you might be
stuck trying to reuse the old version while both sides support a newer
version
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
GH: #852, MR: #2452
Adjust ssl_set_client_hello_version to get both the minimum and maximum and then
make ssl_set_client_hello_version use the maximum version.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
MR: #1595
This was done by the following
find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.
And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Some users want to disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0/TLS 1.1, and enable just
TLS 1.2. In the future they might want to disable TLS 1.2 and
enable just TLS 1.3, ...
This commit makes it possible to disable any or all of the TLS or
DTLS protocols. It also considerably simplifies the SSL/TLS tests,
by auto-generating the min/max version tests based on the set of
supported protocols (425 explicitly written out tests got replaced
by two loops that generate all 425 tests if all protocols are
enabled, fewer otherwise).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
short functions in a single file and is table driven. Protocol-specific
constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
field of the method structure. The same protocol version constraints
are now applied in all code paths. It is now much easier to add
new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
logic.
In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
security level, ...). Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
This patch contains the necessary changes to provide GOST 2012
ciphersuites in TLS. It requires the use of an external GOST 2012 engine.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
We were setting |s->renegotiate| and |s->new_session| to 0 twice in
tls_finish_handshake. This is redundant so now we just do it once!
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
We finish the handshake when we move into the TLS_ST_OK state. At various
points we were also unnecessarily finishing it when we were reading/writing
the Finished message. It's much simpler just to do it in TLS_ST_OK, so
remove the other calls.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
|tls_process_finished| was checking that |peer_finish_md_len| was
non-negative. However neither |tls1_final_finish_mac| or
|ssl3_final_finish_mac| can ever return a negative value, so the check is
superfluous.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Various enums were introduced as part of the state machine rewrite. As a
matter of style it is preferred for these to be typedefs.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Change various state machine functions to use the prefix ossl_statem
instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Move some function definitions around within the state machine to make sure
they are in the correct files. Also create a statem_locl.h header for stuff
entirely local to the state machine code and move various definitions into
it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Pull out the state machine into a separate sub directory. Also moved some
functions which were nothing to do with the state machine but were in state
machine files. Pulled all the SSL_METHOD definitions into one place...most
of those files had very little left in them any more.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Todd Short
Dr. Stephen Henson
Matt Caswell
Bernd Edlinger
Qin Long
Benjamin Kaduk
FdaSilvaYY
Emilia Kasper
Cory Benfield
David Woodhouse
David Benjamin
Viktor Dukhovni
Rich Salz
Fedor Indutny
Kurt Roeckx
Rich Salz
Dmitry Belyavsky