Although this cannot really happen check for 0 block size
to avoid division by 0.
Fixes Coverity 1633936
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25822)
(cherry picked from commit 59f5f6c73c)
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25792)
(cherry picked from commit a3660729e6)
Signature Algorithms are printed in a SIG+HASH format.
In some cases this is ambiguous like brainpool and RSA-PSS.
And the name of ed25519 and ed448 must be spelled in lower case,
so that the output can be used as a -sigalgs parameter value.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25797)
(cherry picked from commit f30d6ba455)
noticed by @sftcd
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25111)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24434)
(cherry picked from commit 0813ffee2f)
Fixes#24892
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25046)
(cherry picked from commit 871c534d39)
Also fixes Coverity 1604639
There is no point in checking ba_ret as it can never be NULL.
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24931)
(cherry picked from commit 4fa9d1f40f)
Coverity issued an error in the opt_uintmax code, detecting a potential
overflow on a cast to ossl_intmax_t
Looks like it was just a typo, casting m from uintmax_t to ossl_intmax_t
Fix it by correcting the cast to be ossl_uintmax_t, as would be expected
Theres also some conditionals that seem like they should be removed, but
I'll save that for later, as there may be some corner cases in which
ossl_uintmax_t isn't equal in size to uintmax_t..maybe.
Fixesopenssl/private#567
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24897)
(cherry picked from commit a753547eef)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24776)
(cherry picked from commit cfe0bbdeca)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24776)
(cherry picked from commit bb90a7861c)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24267)
(cherry picked from commit 5aec3f4a72)
FLOSS is no longer a dependency for NonStop as of the deprecation of the SPT
thread model builds.
Fixes: #24214
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <randall.becker@nexbridge.ca>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24217)
(cherry picked from commit 0339382aba)
Add the OPENSSL_free() in the error handler to release the "*md_value"
allocated by app_malloc(). To make the code clear and avoid possible
future errors, combine the error handler in the "err" tag.
Then, we only need to use "goto err" instead of releasing the memory
separately.
Since the EVP_MD_get_size() may return negative numbers when an error occurs,
create_query() may fail to catch the error since it only considers 0 as an
error code.
Therefore, unifying the error codes of create_digest() from non-positive
numbers to 0 is better, which also benefits future programming.
Fixes: c7235be ("RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification.")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@purdue.edu>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23873)
(cherry picked from commit beb82177dd)
When using CCM, openssl speed uses the loop function EVP_Update_loop_ccm() which
sets a (fake) tag when decrypting. When using -aead (which benchmarks a different
sequence than normal, to be comparable to TLS operation), the loop function
EVP_Update_loop_aead() is used, which also sets a tag when decrypting.
However, when using defaults, the loop function EVP_Update_loop() is used, which
does not set a tag on decryption, leading to "Error finalizing cipher loop".
To fix this, set a fake tag value if we're doing decryption on an AEAD cipher in
EVP_Update_loop(). We don't check the return value: this shouldn't really be able
to fail, and if it does, the following EVP_DecryptUpdate() is almost certain to
fail, so that can catch it.
The decryption is certain to fail (well, almost certain, but with a very low
probability of success), but this is no worse than at present. This minimal
change means that future benchmarking data should be comparable to previous
benchmarking data.
(This is benchmarking code: don't write real apps like this!)
Fixes#23657
Change-Id: Id581cf30503c1eb766464e315b1f33914040dcf7
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23757)
(cherry picked from commit b3be6cc89e)
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24008)
The syntax check of the -addext fails because the
X509V3_CTX is used to lookup the referenced section,
but the wrong configuration file is used, where only
a default section with all passed in -addext lines is available.
Thus it was not possible to use the subjectAltName=dirName:section
as an -addext parameter. Probably other extensions as well.
This change affects only the syntax check, the real extension
was already created with correct parameters.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23669)
(cherry picked from commit 387418893e)
Printing content of an invalid test certificate causes application crash, because of NULL dereference:
user@user:~/openssl$ openssl pkcs12 -in test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/bad2.p12 -passin pass: -info
MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048
MAC length: 32, salt length: 8
PKCS7 Encrypted data: Segmentation fault (core dumped)
Added test cases for pkcs12 bad certificates
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23632)
(cherry picked from commit a4cbffcd89)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21660)
Return value of function 'SSL_CTX_ctrl', that is called from
SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store() and SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(),
is not checked, but it is usually checked for this function.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23647)
(cherry picked from commit 6f794b461c)
strstr() is used to match multiple characters in the haystack,
whereas strchr() is used to matched only single character.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23347)
The EVP_CIPHER api currently assumes that calls made into several APIs
have already initalized the cipher in a given context via a call to
EVP_CipherInit[_ex[2]]. If that hasnt been done, instead of an error,
the result is typically a SIGSEGV.
Correct that by adding missing NULL checks in the apropriate apis prior
to using ctx->cipher
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22995)
if the private key is output to stdout using the HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX,
out is a stack of BIOs and must therefore free'd using BIO_free_all.
Steps to reproduce:
$ HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX=x OPENSSL_CONF=apps/openssl.cnf util/shlib_wrap.sh apps/openssl req -new -keyout - -passout pass: </dev/null
[...]
Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f6f692b89cf in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x7f6f686eda00 in CRYPTO_malloc crypto/mem.c:202
#2 0x7f6f686edba0 in CRYPTO_zalloc crypto/mem.c:222
#3 0x7f6f68471bdf in BIO_new_ex crypto/bio/bio_lib.c:83
#4 0x7f6f68491a8f in BIO_new_fp crypto/bio/bss_file.c:95
#5 0x555c5f58b378 in dup_bio_out apps/lib/apps.c:3014
#6 0x555c5f58f9ac in bio_open_default_ apps/lib/apps.c:3175
#7 0x555c5f58f9ac in bio_open_default apps/lib/apps.c:3203
#8 0x555c5f528537 in req_main apps/req.c:683
#9 0x555c5f50e315 in do_cmd apps/openssl.c:426
#10 0x555c5f4c5575 in main apps/openssl.c:307
#11 0x7f6f680461c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 128 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23365)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19948)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19948)
This changeset adds the counterpart to the '-subj' option to allow overriding
the Issuer. For consistency, the `-subj` option is aliased to `-set_subject`.
The issuer can be specified as following apps/openssl x509 -new -set_issuer
'/CN=example-nro-ta' -subj '/CN=2a7dd1d787d793e4c8af56e197d4eed92af6ba13' ...
This is useful in constructing specific test-cases or rechaining PKI trees
Joint work with George Michaelson (@geeohgeegeeoh)
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23257)
Printing the hostname on bio_out clutters the output and breaks
pipe like forwarding via openssl.
Print the hostname via bio_err.
Fixes#23013
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23056)
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20727)
Tomas Mraz
Bernd Edlinger
Dr. David von Oheimb
XZ-X
FdaSilvaYY
Andreas Treichel
Marc Brooks
Neil Horman
Richard Levitte
naaysayer
Randall S. Becker
Rajeev Ranjan
Jiasheng Jiang
Tom Cosgrove
Matt Caswell
Vladimir Kotal
Viliam Lejčík
olszomal
Dr. David von Oheimb
Martin Oliveira
MrRurikov
Vincent Lefèvre
rilysh
Viktor Dukhovni
Drokov Pavel
Frederik Wedel-Heinen
Job Snijders
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior