Fix only typos in doc/man* for inclusion in 3.* branches.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21211)
EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name() may return 1 with the returned digest
name "UNDEF". This case hasn't been documented, and the meaning has been
left undefined, until now.
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20460)
(cherry picked from commit af99d55078)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20832)
(cherry picked from commit 2d6585986f)
Fix only typos in doc/man* for inclusion in 3.* branches.
Other typos have been fixed in a different commit.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20924)
(cherry picked from commit 9a271795f8)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20848)
(cherry picked from commit 25bab273cc)
The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20562)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20204)
(cherry picked from commit b75d56dee0)
The documentation didn't mention the development where EVP_PKEY_get_id()
returns a negative value for provider-only implementations, and the
migration guide didn't mention how to cope with that.
Fixes#20497
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20501)
(cherry picked from commit a2a543e0e3)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20277)
(cherry picked from commit d5e50bdf87)
remove unneeded const qualifier to keep method declaration
and definition in sync.
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20436)
(cherry picked from commit 6f792f4d27)
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20436)
(cherry picked from commit f42d6b7ae6)
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG became obsolete in 3c33c6f6b1 and
support for SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG was removed by
7a4dadc3a6. The definitions are still listed under "OBSOLETE
OPTIONS retained for compatibility" in ssl.h.in, so this commit adds
them to the list of obsolete options in doc/man3.
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/46954
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20443)
(cherry picked from commit fe52208c56)
In the default setup, using prediction resistance cascades to a reseeding
of all DRBGs. The cost for this will be excessive for highly threaded
applications.
Fixes#20414
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20452)
(cherry picked from commit d90bd3468a)
Clearly document that implicit fetching is slower when using providers,
and explain prefetching. Added to crypto.pod and migration_guide.pod
links to it.
Add a link to EVP_default_properties_enable_fips() in crypto.pod.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20354)
(cherry picked from commit e798248c84)
Also document CMS_decrypt_set1_password() and fix CMS_EnvelopedData_create.pod.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20209)
(cherry picked from commit 26521faae4)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20275)
(cherry picked from commit 9fae775acf)
Document the effect on the internal read buffer when using pipelining.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20208)
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20327)
(cherry picked from commit 7e5505107a)
Also add corresponding tests and to this end update credentials
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20160)
(cherry picked from commit 6b58f498b3)
Add missing `I` to `<b>`
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20169)
(cherry picked from commit 0414899887)
Fixes#20084
In the 3.0 provider implementation the generic code that handles IV's
only allows a 12 byte IV. Older code intentionally added the ability for
the IV to be truncated.
As this truncation is unsafe, the documentation has been updated to
state that this in no longer allowed. The code has been updated to
produce an error when the iv length is set to any value other than 12.
NOTE: It appears that this additional padding may have originated from the code
which uses a 12 byte IV, that is then passed to CHACHA which zero pads it to 16 bytes.
Note that legacy behaviour in e_chacha20_poly1305.c has not been
updated.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20151)
(cherry picked from commit a011523706)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20095)
(cherry picked from commit 61222b95ff)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20052)
(cherry picked from commit ec6cbda0f2)
Clarify behavior of OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option() when given (negative)
values for OSSL_CMP_OPT_MSG_TIMEOUT or OSSL_CMP_OPT_TOTAL_TIMEOUT.
Fix doc of -msg_timeout and -total_timeout in openssl-cmp.pod.in
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19391)
(cherry picked from commit 5acd4007a0)
Current man page indicates the function returns an int while it returns
a long.
Fixes#20096.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20097)
(cherry picked from commit 2bde260ac0)
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20019)
(cherry picked from commit ae61bd34e6)
Fixes#8630
The remaining functions are at least as old as 0.9.8 so it is
not worth documenting this.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19956)
(cherry picked from commit 8d927e55b7)
Fixes#19829
Examples added for setting/getting ECDSA SIG related r and s values
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19936)
(cherry picked from commit c99209264d)
Fixes#19782
Clarify that EVP_Q_MAC() can be used as an alternative that allows
setting of the libctx.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19855)
(cherry picked from commit d1ebd99397)
Do not accept password-based if expected signature-based and no secret is available and
do not accept signature-based if expected password-based and no trust anchors available.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19861)
FIPS 186-4 section 5 "The RSA Digital Signature Algorithm", subsection
5.5 "PKCS #1" says: "For RSASSA-PSS […] the length (in bytes) of the
salt (sLen) shall satisfy 0 <= sLen <= hLen, where hLen is the length of
the hash function output block (in bytes)."
Introduce a new option RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO_DIGEST_MAX and make it the
default. The new value will behave like RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO, but will
not use more than the digest length when signing, so that FIPS 186-4 is
not violated. This value has two advantages when compared with
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST: (1) It will continue to do auto-detection when
verifying signatures for maximum compatibility, where
RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST would fail for other digest sizes. (2) It will
work for combinations where the maximum salt length is smaller than the
digest size, which typically happens with large digest sizes (e.g.,
SHA-512) and small RSA keys.
J.-S. Coron shows in "Optimal Security Proofs for PSS and Other
Signature Schemes. Advances in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2002, volume 2332
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 272 – 287. Springer Verlag,
2002." that longer salts than the output size of modern hash functions
do not increase security: "For example,for an application in which at
most one billion signatures will be generated, k0 = 30 bits of random
salt are actually sufficient to guarantee the same level of security as
RSA, and taking a larger salt does not increase the security level."
Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6c73ca4a2f)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19862)
The types OSSL_DISPATCH, OSSL_ITEM, OSSL_ALGORITHM, OSSL_PARAM,
OSSL_CALLBACK, and OSSL_PASSPHRASE_CALLBACK are described in their own
manual page, so we change every mention of them to links to those pages.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19842)
(cherry picked from commit 318a9dfa5f)
Vladimír Kotal
Dimitri Papadopoulos
Richard Levitte
Pauli
Tomas Mraz
Watson Ladd
Dr. David von Oheimb
Jeeban Sethi
Samuel Lee (ENS/CRYPTO)
Michael Baentsch
FdaSilvaYY
Tobias Nießen
Matt Caswell
slontis
Benno Evers
Andrea Pappacoda
Thib
north-16
Dmitry Belyavskiy
Nobuhiro IMAI
Nikhil Bisht
Hugo Landau
Peiwei Hu
Clemens Lang