Merge b1d75d2df8 into 296f1f6dd8

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28113)

.github/workflows/build_quic_interop_container.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-name: "Build openssl interop container from master"
+name: "Build openssl interop containers"
 
 on:
   schedule:
@@ -24,3 +24,24 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           docker push quay.io/openssl-ci/openssl-quic-interop:latest
 
+  update_msquic_quay_container:
+    if: github.repository == 'openssl/openssl'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          repository: microsoft/msquic
+          ref: main
+          submodules: recursive
+      - name: "log in to quay.io"
+        run: |
+          docker login -u openssl-ci+machine -p ${{ secrets.QUAY_IO_PASSWORD }} quay.io
+      - name: Patch qns.Dockerfile
+        run: |
+          sed 's/RUN     cmake -DQUIC_BUILD_TOOLS=on -DQUIC_ENABLE_LOGGING=on ../RUN     cmake -DQUIC_BUILD_TOOLS=on -DQUIC_ENABLE_LOGGING=on -DQUIC_TLS_LIB=openssl ../' ./scripts/qns.Dockerfile
+      - name: "Build container"
+        run: |
+          docker build -f ./scripts/qns.Dockerfile -t quay.io/openssl-ci/msquic-openssl:latest .
+      - name: "Push to quay"
+        run: |
+          docker push quay.io/openssl-ci/msquic-openssl:latest

.github/workflows/run-checker-ci.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
           no-http,
           no-legacy,
           no-sock,
-          no-ssl-trace,
+          no-sm2,
           no-stdio,
           no-threads,
           no-thread-pool,

.github/workflows/run-checker-daily.yml

@@ -102,13 +102,13 @@ jobs:
           no-shared,
           no-siphash,
           no-siv,
-          no-sm2,
           no-sm2-precomp,
           no-sm3,
           no-sm4,
           no-sock,
           no-sse2,
           no-ssl,
+          no-ssl-trace,
           enable-ssl3,
           enable-ssl3-method,
           enable-sslkeylog,

.github/workflows/run_quic_interop.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: "Run openssl quic interop testing"
 
 on:
   workflow_run:
-    workflows: ["Build openssl interop container from master"]
+    workflows: ["Build openssl interop containers"]
     types: [completed]
   workflow_dispatch:
 
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       matrix:
         tests: [http3, transfer, handshake, retry, chacha20, resumption, multiplexing, ipv6]
-        servers: [quic-go, ngtcp2, mvfst, quiche, nginx, msquic, haproxy]
+        servers: [quic-go, ngtcp2, mvfst, quiche, nginx, msquic, haproxy, msquic-openssl]
         exclude:
           - servers: msquic
             tests: retry
+          - servers: msquic-openssl
+            tests: retry
       fail-fast: false
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
@@ -36,10 +38,15 @@ jobs:
           for i in {1..3}; do sudo apt-get install -y tshark && break; sleep 10; done
       - name: Patch implementations file
         run: |
-          jq '.openssl = { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/openssl-quic-interop"
-                         , url: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl"
-                         , role: "both"
-                         }' ./implementations.json > ./implementations.tmp
+          jq '. + {
+            "openssl": { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/openssl-quic-interop"
+                       , url: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl"
+                       , role: "both"
+                       },
+            "msquic-openssl": { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/msquic-openssl"
+                              , url: "https://github.com/microsoft/msquic"
+                              , role: "both"
+                              }}' ./implementations.json > ./implementations.tmp
           mv ./implementations.tmp implementations.json
       - name: "Update to docker-compose 2.36 and docker engine 28.1.1"
         run: |
@@ -69,7 +76,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       matrix:
         tests: [http3, transfer, handshake, retry, chacha20, resumption, amplificationlimit, ipv6]
-        clients: [quic-go, ngtcp2, mvfst, quiche, msquic, openssl, chrome]
+        clients: [quic-go, ngtcp2, mvfst, quiche, msquic, openssl, chrome, msquic-openssl]
         exclude:
           - clients: mvfst
             tests: amplificationlimit
@@ -94,10 +101,15 @@ jobs:
           for i in {1..3}; do sudo apt-get install -y tshark && break; done
       - name: Patch implementations file
         run: |
-          jq '.openssl = { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/openssl-quic-interop"
-                         , url: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl"
-                         , role: "both"
-                         }' ./implementations.json > ./implementations.tmp
+          jq '. + {
+            "openssl": { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/openssl-quic-interop"
+                       , url: "https://github.com/openssl/openssl"
+                       , role: "both"
+                       },
+            "msquic-openssl": { image: "quay.io/openssl-ci/msquic-openssl"
+                              , url: "https://github.com/microsoft/msquic"
+                              , role: "both"
+                              }}' ./implementations.json > ./implementations.tmp
           mv ./implementations.tmp implementations.json
       - name: "Update to docker-compose 2.36 and docker engine 28.1.1"
         run: |

.gitignore

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ providers/common/der/der_rsa_gen.c
 providers/common/der/der_wrap_gen.c
 providers/common/der/der_sm2_gen.c
 providers/common/der/der_ml_dsa_gen.c
+providers/common/der/der_hkdf_gen.c
 providers/common/include/prov/der_slh_dsa.h
 providers/common/include/prov/der_dsa.h
 providers/common/include/prov/der_ec.h
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ providers/common/include/prov/der_digests.h
 providers/common/include/prov/der_wrap.h
 providers/common/include/prov/der_sm2.h
 providers/common/include/prov/der_ml_dsa.h
+providers/common/include/prov/der_hkdf.h
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/ml_dsa_kmgmt.c
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/ml_kem_kmgmt.c
 providers/implementations/keymgmt/mlx_kmgmt.c

CHANGES.md

@@ -133,6 +133,23 @@ OpenSSL 3.6
 
    *Adrian Stanciu*
 
+ * Added support for TLS 1.3 OCSP multi-stapling for server certs.
+     * new `s_client` options:
+       * `-ocsp_check_leaf`: Checks the status of the leaf (server) certificate.
+       * `-ocsp_check_all`: Checks the status of all certificates in the server chain.
+     * new `s_server` option:
+       * `-status_all` Provides OCSP status information for the entire server certificate chain (multi-stapling) for TLS 1.3 and later.
+
+     * Improved `-status_file` option can now be given multiple times to provide
+       multiple files containing OCSP responses.
+
+   *Michael Krueger, Martin Rauch*
+
+ * Added KEMRecipientInfo (RFC 9629) and ML-KEM (draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kyber)
+   support to CMS.
+
+   *Daniel Van Geest (CryptoNext Security)*
+
 OpenSSL 3.5
 -----------
 

Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl

@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ generate_buildinfo: generate_doc_buildinfo
 
 .PHONY: doc-nits md-nits
 doc-nits: build_generated_pods ## Evaluate OpenSSL documentation
-	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/find-doc-nits -c -n -l -e -i
+	$(PERL) $(SRCDIR)/util/find-doc-nits -c -n -l -e -i -a
 
 # This uses "mdl", the markdownlint application, which is written in ruby.
 # The source is at https://github.com/markdownlint/markdownlint

apps/cms.c

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
 static int verify_err = 0;
 
 typedef struct cms_key_param_st cms_key_param;
+typedef struct cms_recip_opt_st cms_recip_opt;
 
 struct cms_key_param_st {
     int idx;
@@ -60,6 +61,14 @@ struct cms_key_param_st {
     cms_key_param *next;
 };
 
+struct cms_recip_opt_st {
+    int idx;
+    const char *kdf;
+    unsigned char *ukm_data;
+    long ukm_data_length;
+    cms_recip_opt *next;
+};
+
 typedef enum OPTION_choice {
     OPT_COMMON,
     OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ENCRYPT,
@@ -85,7 +94,8 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
     OPT_PROV_ENUM, OPT_CONFIG,
     OPT_V_ENUM,
     OPT_CIPHER, OPT_KEKCIPHER,
-    OPT_ORIGINATOR
+    OPT_ORIGINATOR,
+    OPT_RECIP_UKM, OPT_RECIP_KDF
 } OPTION_CHOICE;
 
 const OPTIONS cms_options[] = {
@@ -167,13 +177,15 @@ const OPTIONS cms_options[] = {
     {"kekcipher", OPT_KEKCIPHER, 's',
      "The key encryption algorithm to use"},
     {"wrap", OPT_WRAP, 's',
-     "Key wrap algorithm to use when encrypting with key agreement"},
+     "Key wrap algorithm to use when encrypting with key agreement or key encapsulation"},
     {"aes128-wrap", OPT_AES128_WRAP, '-', "Use AES128 to wrap key"},
     {"aes192-wrap", OPT_AES192_WRAP, '-', "Use AES192 to wrap key"},
     {"aes256-wrap", OPT_AES256_WRAP, '-', "Use AES256 to wrap key"},
     {"des3-wrap", OPT_3DES_WRAP, '-', "Use 3DES-EDE to wrap key"},
     {"debug_decrypt", OPT_DEBUG_DECRYPT, '-',
      "Disable MMA protection, return error if no recipient found (see doc)"},
+    {"recip_kdf", OPT_RECIP_KDF, 's', "Set KEMRecipientInfo KDF for current recipient"},
+    {"recip_ukm", OPT_RECIP_UKM, 's', "KEMRecipientInfo user keying material for current recipient, in hex notation"},
 
     OPT_SECTION("Signing"),
     {"md", OPT_MD, 's', "Digest algorithm to use"},
@@ -281,6 +293,19 @@ static CMS_ContentInfo *load_content_info(int informat, BIO *in, int flags,
     return NULL;
 }
 
+static cms_recip_opt *alloc_recip_opt(int recipidx)
+{
+    cms_recip_opt *opt;
+
+    opt = app_malloc(sizeof(*opt), "recipient options buffer");
+    opt->idx = recipidx;
+    opt->next = NULL;
+    opt->kdf = NULL;
+    opt->ukm_data = NULL;
+    opt->ukm_data_length = 0;
+    return opt;
+}
+
 int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
     CONF *conf = NULL;
@@ -319,6 +344,8 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
     size_t secret_keylen = 0, secret_keyidlen = 0;
     unsigned char *pwri_pass = NULL, *pwri_tmp = NULL;
     unsigned char *secret_key = NULL, *secret_keyid = NULL;
+    cms_recip_opt *recip_first = NULL, *recip_opt = NULL;
+    int recipidx = -1;
     long ltmp;
     const char *mime_eol = "\n";
     OPTION_CHOICE o;
@@ -653,6 +680,46 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
                 recipfile = opt_arg();
             }
             break;
+        case OPT_RECIP_KDF:
+        case OPT_RECIP_UKM:
+            recipidx = -1;
+            if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT) {
+                if (sk_X509_num(encerts) > 0)
+                    recipidx += sk_X509_num(encerts);
+            }
+            if (recipidx < 0) {
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient specified\n");
+                goto opthelp;
+            }
+            if (recip_opt == NULL || recip_opt->idx != recipidx) {
+                cms_recip_opt *nopt;
+
+                nopt = alloc_recip_opt(recipidx);
+                if (recip_first == NULL)
+                    recip_first = nopt;
+                else
+                    recip_opt->next = nopt;
+                recip_opt = nopt;
+            }
+            if (o == OPT_RECIP_KDF) {
+                if (recip_opt->kdf != NULL) {
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal multiple -recip_kdf for one -recip\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                recip_opt->kdf = opt_arg();
+            } else {
+                if (recip_opt->ukm_data != NULL) {
+                    BIO_puts(bio_err, "Illegal multiple -recip_ukm for one -recip\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+                recip_opt->ukm_data = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(opt_arg(),
+                                                         &recip_opt->ukm_data_length);
+                if (recip_opt->ukm_data == NULL) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid hex value after -recip_ukm\n");
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
         case OPT_CIPHER:
             ciphername = opt_unknown();
             break;
@@ -831,6 +898,9 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
     if (operation != SMIME_ENCRYPT && *argv != NULL)
         BIO_printf(bio_err,
                    "Warning: recipient certificate file parameters ignored for operation other than -encrypt\n");
+    if (operation != SMIME_ENCRYPT && recip_first != NULL)
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Warning: -recip_kdf and -recip_ukm parameters ignored for operation other than -encrypt\n");
 
     if ((flags & CMS_BINARY) != 0) {
         if (!(operation & SMIME_OP))
@@ -990,7 +1060,9 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
             goto end;
         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(encerts); i++) {
             CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
+            int ri_type;
             cms_key_param *kparam;
+            cms_recip_opt *ropt;
             int tflags = flags | CMS_KEY_PARAM;
             /* This flag enforces allocating the EVP_PKEY_CTX for the recipient here */
             EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
@@ -998,14 +1070,19 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
             int res;
 
             for (kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next) {
-                if (kparam->idx == i) {
+                if (kparam->idx == i)
+                    break;
+            }
+            for (ropt = recip_first; ropt; ropt = ropt->next) {
+                if (ropt->idx == i)
                     break;
-                }
             }
             ri = CMS_add1_recipient(cms, x, key, originator, tflags);
             if (ri == NULL)
                 goto end;
 
+            ri_type = CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri);
+
             pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
             if (pctx != NULL && kparam != NULL) {
                 if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param))
@@ -1018,12 +1095,39 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
             if (res <= 0 && res != -2)
                 goto end;
 
-            if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE
-                    && wrap_cipher != NULL) {
-                EVP_CIPHER_CTX *wctx;
-                wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
-                if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(wctx, wrap_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
-                    goto end;
+            if (wrap_cipher != NULL) {
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX *wctx = NULL;
+
+                if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+                    wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
+                else if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
+                    wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(ri);
+                if (wctx != NULL) {
+                    if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(wctx, wrap_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
+                        goto end;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (ropt != NULL && ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+                if (ropt->ukm_data != NULL) {
+                    if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(ri, ropt->ukm_data,
+                                                         (int)ropt->ukm_data_length))
+                        goto end;
+                }
+                if (ropt->kdf != NULL) {
+                    X509_ALGOR *kdf_algo;
+                    ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_obj;
+
+                    kdf_algo = CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(ri);
+                    kdf_obj = OBJ_txt2obj(ropt->kdf, 0);
+                    if (kdf_obj == NULL) {
+                        BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown KDF %s\n", ropt->kdf);
+                        goto end;
+                    }
+                    /* Only works for OIDs without params */
+                    if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(kdf_algo, kdf_obj, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL))
+                        goto end;
+                }
             }
         }
 
@@ -1315,6 +1419,14 @@ int cms_main(int argc, char **argv)
         OPENSSL_free(key_param);
         key_param = tparam;
     }
+    for (recip_opt = recip_first; recip_opt != NULL;) {
+        cms_recip_opt *topt;
+
+        OPENSSL_free(recip_opt->ukm_data);
+        topt = recip_opt->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(recip_opt);
+        recip_opt = topt;
+    }
     X509_STORE_free(store);
     X509_free(cert);
     X509_free(recip);

apps/lib/apps.c

@@ -3047,15 +3047,11 @@ BIO *dup_bio_out(int format)
 {
     BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stdout,
                         BIO_NOCLOSE | (FMT_istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0));
-    void *prefix = NULL;
-    BIO *btmp;
-
-    if (b == NULL)
-        return NULL;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-    if (FMT_istext(format)) {
-        btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+    if (b != NULL && FMT_istext(format)) {
+        BIO *btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
+
         if (btmp == NULL) {
             BIO_free(b);
             return NULL;
@@ -3064,17 +3060,6 @@ BIO *dup_bio_out(int format)
     }
 #endif
 
-    if (FMT_istext(format)
-        && (prefix = getenv("HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX")) != NULL) {
-        btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_prefix());
-        if (btmp == NULL) {
-            BIO_free_all(b);
-            return NULL;
-        }
-        b = BIO_push(btmp, b);
-        BIO_set_prefix(b, prefix);
-    }
-
     return b;
 }
 

apps/lib/s_cb.c

@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         if (!verify_args.quiet)
             policies_print(ctx);
         break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE:
+        if (!verify_args.quiet)
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "no OCSP response(s) for certificate(s) found.\n");
+        break;
     }
     if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_args.quiet)
         policies_print(ctx);

apps/progs.pl

@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ EOF
 
     my %cmd_disabler = (
         ciphers  => "sock",
-        genrsa   => "rsa",
         gendsa   => "dsa",
         dsaparam => "dsa",
         gendh    => "dh",
@@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ EOF
 #   [2] = preprocessor conditional for excluding irrespective of deprecation
 #        rsa      => [ "pkey",      "3_0", "rsa" ],
 #        genrsa   => [ "genpkey",   "3_0", "rsa" ],
-        rsautl   => [ "pkeyutl",   "3_0", "rsa" ],
+        rsautl   => [ "pkeyutl",   "3_0", "" ],
 #        dhparam  => [ "pkeyparam", "3_0", "dh"  ],
 #        dsaparam => [ "pkeyparam", "3_0", "dsa" ],
 #        dsa      => [ "pkey",      "3_0", "dsa" ],

apps/rand.c

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ int rand_main(int argc, char **argv)
         int chunk;
 
         chunk = scaled_num > buflen ? (int)buflen : (int)scaled_num;
-        r = RAND_bytes(buf, chunk);
+        r = RAND_bytes_ex(app_get0_libctx(), buf, chunk, 0);
         if (r <= 0)
             goto end;
         if (format != FORMAT_TEXT) {

apps/s_client.c

@@ -110,9 +110,10 @@ static char *sess_out = NULL;
 static SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
 
 static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
 static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
-#endif
+static void print_ocsp_response(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp);
+# endif
 static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem);
 static int is_dNS_name(const char *host);
 
@@ -483,7 +484,10 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
     OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET,
     OPT_BRIEF, OPT_PREXIT, OPT_NO_INTERACTIVE, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_NBIO,
     OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF,
-    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG,
+    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_WDEBUG,
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_LEAF, OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_ALL,
+# endif
     OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG,
     OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE,
     OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK, OPT_PSK_SESS,
@@ -625,6 +629,17 @@ const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
     {"no-interactive", OPT_NO_INTERACTIVE, '-',
      "Don't run the client in the interactive mode"},
 
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    OPT_SECTION("OCSP stapling"),
+    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-',
+     "Sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling) " \
+     "The server response (if any) will be printed out."},
+    {"ocsp_check_leaf", OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_LEAF, '-',
+     "Require checking leaf certificate status, attempting to use OCSP stapling first"},
+    {"ocsp_check_all", OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_ALL, '-',
+     "Require checking status of full chain, attempting to use OCSP stapling first"},
+# endif
+
     OPT_SECTION("Debug"),
     {"showcerts", OPT_SHOWCERTS, '-',
      "Show all certificates sent by the server"},
@@ -659,9 +674,6 @@ const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
      "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"},
     {"ignore_unexpected_eof", OPT_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF, '-',
      "Do not treat lack of close_notify from a peer as an error"},
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
-    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"},
-#endif
     {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's',
      "types  Send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)"},
     {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's',
@@ -1195,11 +1207,23 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
         case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG:
             c_tlsextdebug = 1;
             break;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
         case OPT_STATUS:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             c_status_req = 1;
-#endif
             break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_LEAF:
+            c_status_req = 1;
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK);
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_OCSP_CHECK_ALL:
+            c_status_req = 1;
+            X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm,
+                                        X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK |
+                                        X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL);
+            vpmtouched++;
+            break;
+# endif
         case OPT_WDEBUG:
 #ifdef WATT32
             dbug_init();
@@ -3626,27 +3650,58 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
 static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 {
-    const unsigned char *p;
-    int len;
+    int num, i;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp = NULL;
     OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
-    len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
-    BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: ");
-    if (p == NULL) {
-        BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n");
-        return 1;
+
+    if (SSL_version(s) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        (void)SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, &sk_resp);
+
+        BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP responses: ");
+
+        if (sk_resp == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(arg, "no responses sent\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        num = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp);
+
+        BIO_printf(arg, "number of responses: %d", num);
+        for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+            print_ocsp_response(arg, sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(sk_resp, i));
+    } else {
+        const unsigned char *p;
+        int len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
+
+        BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: ");
+        if (p == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(arg, "no OCSP response received\n");
+            return 1;
+        }
+        rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+        if (rsp == NULL) {
+            BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response parse error\n");
+            BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        print_ocsp_response(arg, rsp);
+        OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
     }
-    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
-    if (rsp == NULL) {
-        BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n");
-        BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n");
-    OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0);
-    BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n");
-    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+
     return 1;
 }
+
+static void print_ocsp_response(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp)
+{
+    if (rsp == NULL) {
+        BIO_puts(bp, "no OCSP response to print\n");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    BIO_puts(bp, "\n======================================\n");
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bp, rsp, 0);
+    BIO_puts(bp, "\n======================================\n");
+}
 # endif
 
 static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem)

apps/s_server.c

@@ -54,9 +54,10 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int;
 #include "s_apps.h"
 #include "timeouts.h"
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-#include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+# include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
 #endif
 #include "internal/sockets.h"
+#include "internal/statem.h"
 
 static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure);
 static int sv_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context);
@@ -454,16 +455,20 @@ static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
 /* Structure passed to cert status callback */
 typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st {
     int timeout;
-    /* File to load OCSP Response from (or NULL if no file) */
-    char *respin;
+    /*
+     * List of filenames, from which we are loading each OCSP Response to
+     * staple during handshake (or NULL if no file)
+     */
+    STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk_resp_in;
     /* Default responder to use */
     char *host, *path, *port;
     char *proxy, *no_proxy;
     int use_ssl;
     int verbose;
+    int status_all;
 } tlsextstatusctx;
 
-static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { -1 };
+static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { -1, NULL };
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
 
@@ -474,14 +479,15 @@ static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { -1 };
  * the OCSP certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching
  * them until they were considered "expired".
  */
-static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
-                                        OCSP_RESPONSE **resp)
+static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder_single(SSL *s, X509 *x,
+                                               tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
+                                               OCSP_RESPONSE **resp)
 {
     char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL;
     char *proxy = NULL, *no_proxy = NULL;
     int use_ssl;
     STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL;
-    X509 *x = NULL, *cert;
+    X509 *cert;
     X509_NAME *iname;
     STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
     SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
@@ -494,7 +500,6 @@ static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
     int i;
 
     /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */
-    x = SSL_get_certificate(s);
     iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
     aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
     if (aia != NULL) {
@@ -559,6 +564,7 @@ static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
     SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts);
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
         X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
+
         if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1))
             goto err;
     }
@@ -591,6 +597,214 @@ static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
     return ret;
 }
 
+static int bring_ocsp_resp_in_correct_order(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
+                                            STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp_unordered,
+                                            STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) **sk_resp)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *server_certs = NULL;
+    X509 *ssl_cert = NULL;
+    X509 *issuer = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cert_id = NULL;
+    int found = -1;
+    int i, j, num = 1;
+
+    if (*sk_resp != NULL)
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(*sk_resp, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+
+    SSL_get0_chain_certs(s, &server_certs);
+    /*
+     * TODO(DTLS-1.3): in future DTLS should also be considered
+     */
+    if (server_certs != NULL && srctx->status_all &&
+        !SSL_is_dtls(s) && SSL_version(s) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        /* certificate chain is available */
+        num = sk_X509_num(server_certs) + 1;
+    }
+
+    /* get OCSP response for server certificate first */
+    ssl_cert = SSL_get_certificate(s);
+
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL servers with TLS < 1.3 can be configured with no certificate
+     */
+    if (ssl_cert == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+    /* reserve enough space so the pushes to the stack would not fail */
+    *sk_resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_reserve(NULL, num);
+
+    if (*sk_resp == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (i != 0) /* for each certificate in chain (except root) get the OCSP response */
+            ssl_cert = sk_X509_value(server_certs, i - 1);
+
+        /* issuer certificate is next in chain */
+        issuer = sk_X509_value(server_certs, i);
+
+        if (issuer == NULL
+            || (cert_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, ssl_cert, issuer)) == NULL) {
+            sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(*sk_resp, NULL);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* find the correct OCSP response for the requested certificate */
+        found = -1;
+        for (j = 0; j < sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp_unordered); j++) {
+            if ((resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(sk_resp_unordered, j)) == NULL)
+                continue;
+            if ((bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)) == NULL)
+                continue;
+            found = OCSP_resp_find(bs, cert_id, -1);
+            OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+            if (found > -1) {
+                /* remove the found OCSP response to prevent freeing it with the remaining list */
+                sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_delete(sk_resp_unordered, j);
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (found < 0)
+            resp = NULL;
+
+        OCSP_CERTID_free(cert_id);
+
+        /* add response to stack; also insert null response */
+        (void)sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(*sk_resp, resp);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to get a list OCSP_RESPONSE from the files specified using
+ * -status_file options for the server certificate and the chain certificates,
+ * in the same order as the list of certs returned by SSL_get0_chain_certs().
+ * In case of a missing entry, the respective list element will be NULL.
+ */
+static int get_ocsp_resp_from_files(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
+                                    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) **sk_resp)
+{
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp_unordered = NULL;
+    char *respfile = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    BIO *derbio;
+    int i;
+    int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(srctx->sk_resp_in);
+    int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+    sk_resp_unordered = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_reserve(NULL, num);
+
+    if (sk_resp_unordered == NULL) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Cannot reserve memory for OCSP responses\n");
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    }
+
+    /* reading as many responses as files given */
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        respfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(srctx->sk_resp_in, i);
+
+        derbio = bio_open_default(respfile, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1);
+
+        if (derbio == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: Cannot open OCSP response file %s\n", respfile);
+            ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL);
+        BIO_free(derbio);
+        if (resp == NULL) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: Error reading OCSP response from file %s\n",
+                       respfile);
+            ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(sk_resp_unordered, resp);
+    }
+
+    ret = bring_ocsp_resp_in_correct_order(s, srctx, sk_resp_unordered, sk_resp);
+
+err:
+    /* free the unordered list, including all remaining OCSP responses */
+    sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(sk_resp_unordered, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to get a list of OCSP_RESPONSE from a responder
+ * for the server certificate and the chain certificates
+ * in the same order as the list of certs returned by SSL_get0_chain_certs().
+ * The function get_ocsp_resp_from_responder_single is called for each
+ * certificate.
+ * In case of a missing response, the respective list element will be NULL.
+ * This is a simplified version. It examines certificates each time and
+ * makes one OCSP responder query for each request. A full version would
+ * store details such as the OCSP certificate IDs and minimise the number of
+ * OCSP queries by caching responses until they were considered "expired".
+ */
+static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx,
+                                        STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) **sk_resp)
+{
+    X509 *ssl_cert = NULL;
+    int i, num = 0;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *server_certs = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+
+    if (*sk_resp != NULL) {
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(*sk_resp, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+        *sk_resp = NULL;
+    }
+
+    SSL_get0_chain_certs(s, &server_certs);
+    /*
+     * TODO(DTLS-1.3): in future DTLS should also be considered
+     */
+    if (server_certs != NULL && srctx->status_all &&
+        !SSL_is_dtls(s) && SSL_version(s) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        /* certificate chain is available */
+        num = sk_X509_num(server_certs) + 1;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * certificate chain is not available,
+         * set num to 1 for server certificate
+         */
+        num = 1;
+    }
+
+    ssl_cert = SSL_get_certificate(s);
+
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL servers with TLS < 1.3 can be configured with no certificate
+     */
+    if (ssl_cert == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+
+    *sk_resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_reserve(NULL, num);
+
+    if (*sk_resp == NULL)
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
+    /* for each certificate in chain (except root) get the OCSP response */
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        if (i != 0) /* get OCSP response for server certificate first */
+            ssl_cert = sk_X509_value(server_certs, i - 1);
+
+        resp = NULL;
+        if (get_ocsp_resp_from_responder_single(s, ssl_cert, srctx, &resp) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+            resp = NULL;
+
+        /* add response to stack; also insert null response */
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(*sk_resp, resp);
+    }
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
 /*
  * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a
  * certificate status request extension. The response is either obtained from a
@@ -600,48 +814,48 @@ static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 {
     tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg;
     OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
-    unsigned char *rspder = NULL;
-    int rspderlen;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp = NULL;
     int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+    int i;
 
     if (srctx->verbose)
         BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: callback called\n");
 
-    if (srctx->respin != NULL) {
-        BIO *derbio = bio_open_default(srctx->respin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1);
-        if (derbio == NULL) {
-            BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Cannot open OCSP response file\n");
-            goto err;
+    SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, &sk_resp);
+
+    if (sk_resp == NULL || sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp) <= 0) {
+        if (srctx->sk_resp_in != NULL) {
+            get_ocsp_resp_from_files(s, srctx, &sk_resp);
+        } else {
+            ret = get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(s, srctx, &sk_resp);
+            if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+                goto err;
         }
-        resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL);
-        BIO_free(derbio);
-        if (resp == NULL) {
-            BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Error reading OCSP response\n");
-            goto err;
-        }
-    } else {
-        ret = get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(s, srctx, &resp);
-        if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
-            goto err;
+
+        (void)SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, sk_resp);
     }
 
-    rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder);
-    if (rspderlen <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen);
     if (srctx->verbose) {
         BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n");
-        OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bio_err, resp, 2);
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: number of responses: %d\n",
+                   sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp));
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp); i++) {
+            resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(sk_resp, i);
+            if (resp != NULL)
+                OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bio_err, resp, 2);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                           "cert_status: no ocsp response for certificate with index %d\n", i);
+        }
     }
 
     ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 
  err:
-    if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
+    if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
         ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-
-    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(sk_resp, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+    }
 
     return ret;
 }
@@ -680,6 +894,7 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
     if (!s_quiet) {
         /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */
         unsigned int i;
+
         BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols advertised by the client: ");
         for (i = 0; i < inlen;) {
             if (i)
@@ -692,9 +907,8 @@ static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
 
     if (SSL_select_next_proto
         ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data,
-         (unsigned int)alpn_ctx->len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) {
+         (unsigned int)alpn_ctx->len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED)
         return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-    }
 
     if (!s_quiet) {
         BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols selected: ");
@@ -725,9 +939,9 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
     OPT_VERIFYCAFILE,
     OPT_CASTORE, OPT_NOCASTORE, OPT_CHAINCASTORE, OPT_VERIFYCASTORE,
     OPT_NBIO, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF,
-    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE,
-    OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, OPT_PROXY, OPT_NO_PROXY, OPT_STATUS_URL,
-    OPT_STATUS_FILE, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE,
+    OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_ALL,
+    OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, OPT_PROXY, OPT_NO_PROXY,
+    OPT_STATUS_URL, OPT_STATUS_FILE, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE,
     OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_STATE,
     OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_NO_DHE,
     OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK_HINT, OPT_PSK,
@@ -876,9 +1090,12 @@ const OPTIONS s_server_options[] = {
     {"cert_comp", OPT_CERT_COMP, '-', "Pre-compress server certificates"},
 #endif
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
     OPT_SECTION("OCSP"),
-    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"},
+    {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-',
+     "Provide certificate status response if requested, for server cert only"},
+    {"status_all", OPT_STATUS_ALL, '-',
+     "Provide certificate status response(s) if requested, for the whole chain"},
     {"status_verbose", OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, '-',
      "Print more output in certificate status callback"},
     {"status_timeout", OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, 'n',
@@ -891,8 +1108,8 @@ const OPTIONS s_server_options[] = {
     {OPT_MORE_STR, 0, 0,
      "Default from environment variable 'no_proxy', else 'NO_PROXY', else none"},
     {"status_file", OPT_STATUS_FILE, '<',
-     "File containing DER encoded OCSP Response"},
-#endif
+     "File containing DER encoded OCSP Response (can be specified multiple times)"},
+# endif
 
     OPT_SECTION("Debug"),
     {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-',
@@ -1076,9 +1293,9 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
     const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL, *s_chain_file = NULL;
     const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL;
     char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL, *s_dchain_file = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
     int s_tlsextstatus = 0;
-#endif
+# endif
     int no_resume_ephemeral = 0;
     unsigned int max_send_fragment = 0;
     unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0;
@@ -1390,33 +1607,40 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
             s_tlsextdebug = 1;
             break;
         case OPT_STATUS:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             s_tlsextstatus = 1;
-#endif
+            tlscstatp.status_all = 0;
+# endif
             break;
+        case OPT_STATUS_ALL:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+            s_tlsextstatus = tlscstatp.status_all = 1;
+# endif
+            break;
+
         case OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             s_tlsextstatus = tlscstatp.verbose = 1;
-#endif
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             s_tlsextstatus = 1;
             tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(opt_arg());
-#endif
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_PROXY:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             tlscstatp.proxy = opt_arg();
-#endif
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_NO_PROXY:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             tlscstatp.no_proxy = opt_arg();
-#endif
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_STATUS_URL:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             s_tlsextstatus = 1;
             if (!OSSL_HTTP_parse_url(opt_arg(), &tlscstatp.use_ssl, NULL,
                                      &tlscstatp.host, &tlscstatp.port, NULL,
@@ -1424,13 +1648,16 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
                 BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -status_url argument\n");
                 goto end;
             }
-#endif
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_STATUS_FILE:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
             s_tlsextstatus = 1;
-            tlscstatp.respin = opt_arg();
-#endif
+            if (tlscstatp.sk_resp_in == NULL
+                && (tlscstatp.sk_resp_in = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
+                goto end;
+            sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(tlscstatp.sk_resp_in, opt_arg());
+# endif
             break;
         case OPT_MSG:
             s_msg = 1;
@@ -2358,6 +2585,7 @@ int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[])
     OPENSSL_free(port);
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
     free_sessions();
+    sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(tlscstatp.sk_resp_in);
     OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
     OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
     OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);

crypto/cms/build.info

@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= \
         cms_lib.c cms_asn1.c cms_att.c cms_io.c cms_smime.c cms_err.c \
         cms_sd.c cms_dd.c cms_cd.c cms_env.c cms_enc.c cms_ess.c \
-        cms_pwri.c cms_kari.c cms_rsa.c cms_dh.c cms_ec.c
+        cms_pwri.c cms_kari.c cms_rsa.c cms_dh.c cms_ec.c cms_kem.c cms_kemri.c

crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c

@@ -201,10 +201,52 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo) = {
         ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo)
 
+static int cms_kemri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                        void *exarg)
+{
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri = (CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *)*pval;
+
+    if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        kemri->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+        if (kemri->ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(kemri->ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
+        kemri->pctx = NULL;
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kemri->pctx);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kemri->ctx);
+        ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(kemri->ukm);
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, cms_kemri_cb) = {
+        ASN1_EMBED(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, version, INT32),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, rid, CMS_SignerIdentifier),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, kem, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, kemct, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, kdf, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_EMBED(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, kekLength, INT32),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, wrap, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo, CMS_KEMRecipientInfo)
+
+ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(ori_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, d.other, ASN1_ANY);
+
+ASN1_ADB(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo) = {
+        ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_smime_ori_kem, ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, d.kemri,
+                  CMS_KEMRecipientInfo))
+} ASN1_ADB_END(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, 0, oriType, 0, &ori_def_tt, NULL);
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
+
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo) = {
   ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriType, ASN1_OBJECT),
-  ASN1_OPT(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, oriValue, ASN1_ANY)
-} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
+  ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
 
 /* Free up RecipientInfo additional data */
 static int cms_ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -224,6 +266,23 @@ static int cms_ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
             CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri = ri->d.pwri;
             OPENSSL_clear_free(pwri->pass, pwri->passlen);
         }
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
+        CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = (CMS_RecipientInfo *)*pval;
+
+        ri->type = ri->encoded_type;
+        if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER) {
+            int nid;
+
+            nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ri->d.ori->oriType);
+            /* For ORI, map NID to specific type */
+            if (nid == NID_id_smime_ori_kem)
+                ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM;
+            /* Otherwise stay with generic CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER type */
+        }
+    } else if (operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) {
+        CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = (CMS_RecipientInfo *)*pval;
+
+        ri->type = ri->encoded_type;
     }
     return 1;
 }
@@ -234,7 +293,7 @@ ASN1_CHOICE_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, cms_ri_cb) = {
         ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.kekri, CMS_KEKRecipientInfo, 2),
         ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.pwri, CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo, 3),
         ASN1_IMP(CMS_RecipientInfo, d.ori, CMS_OtherRecipientInfo, 4)
-} ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, CMS_RecipientInfo, type)
+} ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientInfo, CMS_RecipientInfo, encoded_type)
 
 ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EnvelopedData) = {
         ASN1_EMBED(CMS_EnvelopedData, version, INT32),
@@ -430,3 +489,33 @@ int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg,
     intsi.pecsi = &ecsi;
     return ASN1_item_i2d(intsi.a, pder, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_SharedInfo));
 }
+
+/*
+ * Utilities to encode the CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo structure used during key
+ * derivation.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    X509_ALGOR *wrap;
+    uint32_t kekLength;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+} CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo) = {
+        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo, wrap, X509_ALGOR),
+        ASN1_EMBED(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo, kekLength, INT32),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+} static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo)
+
+int CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *wrap,
+                                     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen)
+{
+    CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo kem_otherinfo;
+
+    kem_otherinfo.wrap = wrap;
+    kem_otherinfo.kekLength = keylen;
+    kem_otherinfo.ukm = ukm;
+
+    return ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)&kem_otherinfo, pder,
+                         ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo));
+}

crypto/cms/cms_env.c

@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
+/*
+ * Low level key APIs (DH etc) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -14,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/sizes.h"
 #include "crypto/asn1.h"
 #include "crypto/evp.h"
@@ -111,9 +118,12 @@ int ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *pkey;
     int i;
-    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
+
+    switch (ri->type) {
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
         pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey;
-    else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        break;
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE: {
         EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ri->d.kari->pctx;
 
         if (pctx == NULL)
@@ -121,8 +131,13 @@ int ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd)
         pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
         if (pkey == NULL)
             return 0;
-    } else
+        break;
+    }
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM:
+        return ossl_cms_kem_envelope(ri, cmd);
+    default:
         return 0;
+    }
 
     if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DHX") || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DH"))
         return ossl_cms_dh_envelope(ri, cmd);
@@ -202,6 +217,9 @@ void ossl_cms_RecipientInfos_set_cmsctx(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
             case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
                 ri->d.pwri->cms_ctx = ctx;
                 break;
+            case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM:
+                ri->d.ori->d.kemri->cms_ctx = ctx;
+                break;
             default:
                 break;
             }
@@ -220,6 +238,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
         return ri->d.ktri->pctx;
     else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
         return ri->d.kari->pctx;
+    else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
+        return ri->d.ori->d.kemri->pctx;
     return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -336,7 +356,7 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
     ri->d.ktri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo);
     if (!ri->d.ktri)
         return 0;
-    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+    ri->encoded_type = ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
 
     ktri = ri->d.ktri;
     ktri->cms_ctx = ctx;
@@ -423,6 +443,11 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip,
             goto err;
         break;
 
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM:
+        if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags, ctx))
+            goto err;
+        break;
+
     default:
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
         goto err;
@@ -750,7 +775,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
-    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK;
+    ri->encoded_type = ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK;
 
     kekri = ri->d.kekri;
 
@@ -1025,6 +1050,9 @@ int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
     case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
         return ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0);
 
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM:
+        return ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_decrypt(cms, ri);
+
     default:
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENTINFO_TYPE);
         return 0;
@@ -1046,6 +1074,9 @@ int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
     case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS:
         return ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 1);
 
+    case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM:
+        return ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_encrypt(cms, ri);
+
     default:
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE);
         return 0;
@@ -1100,7 +1131,8 @@ static void cms_env_set_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env)
 
     for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(env->recipientInfos); i++) {
         ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(env->recipientInfos, i);
-        if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER) {
+        if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER
+            || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
             env->version = 3;
             return;
         } else if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS
@@ -1337,6 +1369,18 @@ err:
  */
 int ossl_cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk)
 {
+    int ri_type;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * First check the provider for RecipientInfo support since a key may support
+     * multiple types, e.g. an RSA key and provider may support RSA key transport
+     * and/or RSA-KEM.
+     */
+    if (evp_pkey_is_provided(pk)
+        && EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pk, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CMS_RI_TYPE, &ri_type))
+        return ri_type;
+
     /* Check types that we know about */
     if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DH"))
         return CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
@@ -1350,7 +1394,7 @@ int ossl_cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk)
         return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
 
     /*
-     * Otherwise this might ben an engine implementation, so see if we can get
+     * Otherwise this might be an engine implementation, so see if we can get
      * the type from the ameth.
      */
     if (pk->ameth && pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl) {
@@ -1359,7 +1403,25 @@ int ossl_cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk)
         if (i > 0)
             return r;
     }
-    return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise try very hard to figure out what RecipientInfo the key supports.
+     */
+    ri_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+    if (ctx != NULL) {
+        ERR_set_mark();
+        if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx) > 0)
+            ri_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
+        else if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) > 0)
+            ri_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+        else if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) > 0)
+            ri_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM;
+        ERR_pop_to_mark();
+    }
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ri_type;
 }
 
 int ossl_cms_pkey_is_ri_type_supported(EVP_PKEY *pk, int ri_type)
@@ -1381,3 +1443,79 @@ int ossl_cms_pkey_is_ri_type_supported(EVP_PKEY *pk, int ri_type)
 
     return (supportedRiType == ri_type);
 }
+
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_wrap_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                     const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+    EVP_CIPHER *fetched_kekcipher;
+    const char *kekcipher_name;
+    int keylen;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+        cms_ctx = ri->d.kari->cms_ctx;
+        ctx = ri->d.kari->ctx;
+    } else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        cms_ctx = ri->d.ori->d.kemri->cms_ctx;
+        ctx = ri->d.ori->d.kemri->ctx;
+    } else {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENTINFO_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
+    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
+    if (kekcipher != NULL) {
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+            return 0;
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (cipher == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cipher);
+    if (keylen <= 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_GET_WRAP_CIPHER) != 0) {
+        ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)(NULL, EVP_CTRL_GET_WRAP_CIPHER,
+                                               0, &kekcipher);
+        if (ret <= 0)
+            return 0;
+
+        if (kekcipher != NULL) {
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+                return 0;
+            kekcipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_get0_name(kekcipher);
+            goto enc;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
+     * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
+        kekcipher_name = SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap;
+    else
+#endif
+    if (keylen <= 16)
+        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes128_wrap;
+    else if (keylen <= 24)
+        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes192_wrap;
+    else
+        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes256_wrap;
+enc:
+    fetched_kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(cms_ctx),
+                                         kekcipher_name,
+                                         ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(cms_ctx));
+    if (fetched_kekcipher == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, fetched_kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    EVP_CIPHER_free(fetched_kekcipher);
+    return ret;
+}

crypto/cms/cms_err.c

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_reasons[] = {
      "not a signed receipt"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA), "not encrypted data"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_KEK), "not kek"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_KEM), "not kem"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT), "not key agreement"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT), "not key transport"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI), "not pwri"},
@@ -140,6 +141,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM),
      "unknown digest algorithm"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID), "unknown id"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_KDF_ALGORITHM),
+     "unknown kdf algorithm"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM),
      "unsupported compression algorithm"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),
@@ -148,6 +151,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMS_str_reasons[] = {
      "unsupported content type"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE),
      "unsupported encryption type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KDF_ALGORITHM),
+     "unsupported kdf algorithm"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM),
      "unsupported kek algorithm"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),

crypto/cms/cms_kari.c

@@ -7,12 +7,6 @@
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-/*
- * Low level key APIs (DH etc) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
- * internal use.
- */
-#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -349,7 +343,7 @@ int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,  X509 *recip,
     ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
     if (ri->d.kari == NULL)
         return 0;
-    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+    ri->encoded_type = ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
 
     kari = ri->d.kari;
     kari->version = 3;
@@ -412,67 +406,6 @@ int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,  X509 *recip,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
-                         const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
-{
-    const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx = kari->cms_ctx;
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
-    const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
-    EVP_CIPHER *fetched_kekcipher;
-    const char *kekcipher_name;
-    int keylen;
-    int ret;
-
-    /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
-    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ctx);
-    if (kekcipher != NULL) {
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
-            return 0;
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (cipher == NULL)
-        return 0;
-    keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(cipher);
-    if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_GET_WRAP_CIPHER) != 0) {
-        ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)(NULL, EVP_CTRL_GET_WRAP_CIPHER,
-                                               0, &kekcipher);
-        if (ret <= 0)
-             return 0;
-
-        if (kekcipher != NULL) {
-             if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
-                 return 0;
-             kekcipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_get0_name(kekcipher);
-             goto enc;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
-     * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
-     */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-    if (EVP_CIPHER_get_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
-        kekcipher_name = SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap;
-    else
-#endif
-    if (keylen <= 16)
-        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes128_wrap;
-    else if (keylen <= 24)
-        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes192_wrap;
-    else
-        kekcipher_name = SN_id_aes256_wrap;
-enc:
-    fetched_kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(cms_ctx),
-                                         kekcipher_name,
-                                         ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(cms_ctx));
-    if (fetched_kekcipher == NULL)
-        return 0;
-    ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, fetched_kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-    EVP_CIPHER_free(fetched_kekcipher);
-    return ret;
-}
-
 /* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
 
 int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
@@ -492,7 +425,7 @@ int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
     reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
     ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
     /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
-    if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
+    if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_wrap_init(ri, ec->cipher))
         return 0;
     /*
      * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key

crypto/cms/cms_kem.c

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/decoder.h>
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "cms_local.h"
+
+static int kem_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    uint32_t *kekLength;
+    X509_ALGOR *wrap;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx;
+    uint32_t cipher_length;
+    char name[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+    EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher = NULL;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_alg(ri, &kekLength, &wrap))
+        goto err;
+
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (pctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(ri);
+    if (kekctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    OBJ_obj2txt(name, sizeof(name), wrap->algorithm, 0);
+    kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(pctx->libctx, name, pctx->propquery);
+    if (kekcipher == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, wrap->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    cipher_length = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(kekctx);
+    if (cipher_length != *kekLength) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    rv = 1;
+err:
+    EVP_CIPHER_free(kekcipher);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+static int kem_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    uint32_t *kekLength;
+    X509_ALGOR *wrap;
+    X509_ALGOR *kdf;
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+    int security_bits;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_obj = NULL;
+    unsigned char kemri_x509_algor[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
+    OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+    X509_ALGOR *x509_algor = NULL;
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx;
+    int wrap_nid;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_alg(ri, &kekLength, &wrap))
+        goto err;
+
+    kdf = CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(ri);
+    if (kdf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+    if (pctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+    if (pkey == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    security_bits = EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey);
+    if (security_bits == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_obj, NULL, NULL, kdf);
+    if (kdf_obj == NULL || OBJ_obj2nid(kdf_obj) == NID_undef) {
+        /*
+         * If the KDF OID hasn't already been set, then query the provider
+         * for a default KDF.
+         */
+        params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CMS_KEMRI_KDF_ALGORITHM,
+                                                      kemri_x509_algor, sizeof(kemri_x509_algor));
+        params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_get_params(pkey, params))
+            goto err;
+        if (OSSL_PARAM_modified(&params[0])) {
+            const unsigned char *p = kemri_x509_algor;
+
+            x509_algor = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, (long)params[0].return_size);
+            if (x509_algor == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (!X509_ALGOR_copy(kdf, x509_algor))
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(kdf, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_HKDF_SHA256), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL))
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Get wrap NID */
+    kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(ri);
+    if (kekctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    *kekLength = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(kekctx);
+    wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_type(kekctx);
+
+    /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(wrap->algorithm);
+    ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap->parameter);
+    wrap->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+    wrap->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+    if (wrap->parameter == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(kekctx, wrap->parameter) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+    if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap->parameter) == NID_undef) {
+        ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap->parameter);
+        wrap->parameter = NULL;
+    }
+
+    rv = 1;
+err:
+    X509_ALGOR_free(x509_algor);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ossl_cms_kem_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt)
+{
+    assert(decrypt == 0 || decrypt == 1);
+
+    if (decrypt == 1)
+        return kem_cms_decrypt(ri);
+
+    if (decrypt == 0)
+        return kem_cms_encrypt(ri);
+
+    ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+    return 0;
+}

crypto/cms/cms_kemri.c

@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "cms_local.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+
+/* KEM Recipient Info (KEMRI) routines */
+
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                          uint32_t **pkekLength,
+                                          X509_ALGOR **pwrap)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (pkekLength)
+        *pkekLength = &ri->d.ori->d.kemri->kekLength;
+    if (pwrap)
+        *pwrap = ri->d.ori->d.kemri->wrap;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
+{
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return -2;
+    }
+    return ossl_cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(ri->d.ori->d.kemri->rid, cert);
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
+
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kemri->pctx);
+    kemri->pctx = NULL;
+
+    if (pk != NULL) {
+        pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kemri->cms_ctx), pk,
+                                          ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kemri->cms_ctx));
+        if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(pctx, NULL) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        kemri->pctx = pctx;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+err:
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Initialise a kemri based on passed certificate and key */
+
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+                                      EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, unsigned int flags,
+                                      const CMS_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CMS_OtherRecipientInfo *ori;
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+    int idtype;
+    X509_PUBKEY *x_pubkey;
+    X509_ALGOR *x_alg;
+
+    ri->d.ori = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo);
+    if (ri->d.ori == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ri->encoded_type = CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER;
+    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM;
+
+    ori = ri->d.ori;
+    ori->oriType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_ori_kem);
+    if (ori->oriType == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ori->d.kemri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo);
+    if (ori->d.kemri == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    kemri = ori->d.kemri;
+    kemri->version = 0;
+    kemri->cms_ctx = ctx;
+
+    /*
+     * Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the same
+     * structure.
+     */
+
+    idtype = (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) ? CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER : CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+    if (!ossl_cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(kemri->rid, recip, idtype, ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    x_pubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(recip);
+    if (x_pubkey == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, NULL, NULL, &x_alg, x_pubkey))
+        return 0;
+    if (!X509_ALGOR_copy(kemri->kem, x_alg))
+        return 0;
+
+    kemri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(ctx),
+                                             recipPubKey,
+                                             ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(ctx));
+    if (kemri->pctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(kemri->pctx, NULL) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
+        return ri->d.ori->d.kemri->ctx;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+X509_ALGOR *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM)
+        return ri->d.ori->d.kemri->kdf;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    const unsigned char *ukm,
+                                    int ukmLength)
+{
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ukm == NULL && ukmLength != 0) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
+
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(kemri->ukm);
+    kemri->ukm = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+    if (kemri->ukm == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(kemri->ukm, ukm, ukmLength);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static EVP_KDF_CTX *create_kdf_ctx(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri)
+{
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *kdf_oid;
+    int ptype;
+    char kdf_alg[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
+    EVP_KDF *kdf = NULL;
+    EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * KDFs with algorithm identifier parameters are not supported yet. To
+     * support this, EVP_KDF_CTX_set_algor_params from
+     * `doc/designs/passing-algorithmidentifier-parameters.md` needs to be
+     * implemented.
+     */
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&kdf_oid, &ptype, NULL, kemri->kdf);
+    if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && ptype != V_ASN1_NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KDF_ALGORITHM);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (OBJ_obj2txt(kdf_alg, sizeof(kdf_alg), kdf_oid, 1) < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(ossl_cms_ctx_get0_libctx(kemri->cms_ctx), kdf_alg,
+                        ossl_cms_ctx_get0_propq(kemri->cms_ctx));
+    if (kdf == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+err:
+    EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+    return kctx;
+}
+
+static int kdf_derive(unsigned char *kek, size_t keklen,
+                      const unsigned char *ss, size_t sslen,
+                      CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri)
+{
+    EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL;
+    OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+    unsigned char *infoder = NULL;
+    int infolen = 0;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    infolen = CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo_encode(&infoder, kemri->wrap, kemri->ukm,
+                                               kemri->kekLength);
+    if (infolen <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    kctx = create_kdf_ctx(kemri);
+    if (kctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
+                                                  (unsigned char *)ss, sslen);
+    params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
+                                                  (char *)infoder, infolen);
+    params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+    if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, kek, keklen, params) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    rv = 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(infoder);
+    EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
+ * or the encrypted CEK.
+ */
+
+static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+                          const unsigned char *ss, size_t sslen,
+                          const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+                          CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri, int enc)
+{
+    /* Key encryption key */
+    unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+    size_t keklen = kemri->kekLength;
+    unsigned char *out = NULL;
+    int outlen = 0;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (keklen > sizeof(kek)) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!kdf_derive(kek, keklen, ss, sslen, kemri))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Set KEK in context */
+    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kemri->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
+        goto err;
+    /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kemri->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, (int)inlen))
+        goto err;
+    out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+    if (out == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kemri->ctx, out, &outlen, in, (int)inlen))
+        goto err;
+    *pout = out;
+    out = NULL;
+    *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
+
+    rv = 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(out);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kemri->ctx);
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kemri->pctx);
+    kemri->pctx = NULL;
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Encrypt content key in KEM recipient info */
+
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                         CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    unsigned char *kem_ct = NULL;
+    size_t kem_ct_len;
+    unsigned char *kem_secret = NULL;
+    size_t kem_secret_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *enckey;
+    size_t enckeylen;
+    int rv = 0;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
+
+    ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
+    /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
+    if (!ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_wrap_init(ri, ec->cipher))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
+    if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(kemri->pctx, NULL, &kem_ct_len, NULL, &kem_secret_len) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    kem_ct = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_ct_len);
+    kem_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_secret_len);
+    if (kem_ct == NULL || kem_secret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(kemri->pctx, kem_ct, &kem_ct_len, kem_secret, &kem_secret_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(kemri->kemct, kem_ct, (int)kem_ct_len);
+    kem_ct = NULL;
+
+    if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, kem_secret, kem_secret_len, ec->key, ec->keylen,
+                        kemri, 1))
+        goto err;
+    ASN1_STRING_set0(kemri->encryptedKey, enckey, (int)enckeylen);
+
+    rv = 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_free(kem_ct);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(kem_secret, kem_secret_len);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_decrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                         CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+    CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+    const unsigned char *kem_ct = NULL;
+    size_t kem_ct_len;
+    unsigned char *kem_secret = NULL;
+    size_t kem_secret_len = 0;
+    unsigned char *enckey = NULL;
+    size_t enckeylen;
+    unsigned char *cek = NULL;
+    size_t ceklen;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NOT_KEM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    kemri = ri->d.ori->d.kemri;
+
+    ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
+
+    if (kemri->pctx == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
+    if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+        goto err;
+
+    kem_ct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(kemri->kemct);
+    kem_ct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(kemri->kemct);
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(kemri->pctx, NULL, &kem_secret_len, kem_ct, kem_ct_len) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+    kem_secret = OPENSSL_malloc(kem_secret_len);
+    if (kem_secret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(kemri->pctx, kem_secret, &kem_secret_len, kem_ct, kem_ct_len) <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
+    enckeylen = kemri->encryptedKey->length;
+    enckey = kemri->encryptedKey->data;
+    if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, kem_secret, kem_secret_len, enckey, enckeylen, kemri, 0))
+        goto err;
+    ec = ossl_cms_get0_env_enc_content(cms);
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+    ec->key = cek;
+    ec->keylen = ceklen;
+
+    ret = 1;
+err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(kem_secret, kem_secret_len);
+    return ret;
+}

crypto/cms/cms_local.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2008-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2008-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ typedef struct CMS_KEKIdentifier_st CMS_KEKIdentifier;
 typedef struct CMS_KEKRecipientInfo_st CMS_KEKRecipientInfo;
 typedef struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo;
 typedef struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st CMS_OtherRecipientInfo;
+typedef struct CMS_KEMRecipientInfo_st CMS_KEMRecipientInfo;
 typedef struct CMS_ReceiptsFrom_st CMS_ReceiptsFrom;
 typedef struct CMS_CTX_st CMS_CTX;
 
@@ -142,7 +143,11 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st {
 };
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st {
-    int type;
+    /*
+     * Type which the RecipientInfo is encoded with. OtherRecipientInfo
+     * encompasses different types, specified by 'type' below.
+     */
+    int encoded_type;
     union {
         CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri;
         CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
@@ -150,6 +155,8 @@ struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st {
         CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
         CMS_OtherRecipientInfo *ori;
     } d;
+    /* internal type, including ORI types */
+    int type;
 };
 
 typedef CMS_SignerIdentifier CMS_RecipientIdentifier;
@@ -245,7 +252,29 @@ struct CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo_st {
 
 struct CMS_OtherRecipientInfo_st {
     ASN1_OBJECT *oriType;
-    ASN1_TYPE *oriValue;
+    union {
+        /* NID_id_smime_ori_kem */
+        CMS_KEMRecipientInfo *kemri;
+        /* anything else */
+        ASN1_TYPE *other;
+    } d;
+};
+
+struct CMS_KEMRecipientInfo_st {
+    int32_t version;
+    CMS_RecipientIdentifier *rid;
+    X509_ALGOR *kem;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *kemct;
+    X509_ALGOR *kdf;
+    uint32_t kekLength;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm;
+    X509_ALGOR *wrap;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *encryptedKey;
+    /* Public key context associated with current operation */
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+    /* Cipher context for CEK wrapping */
+    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+    const CMS_CTX *cms_ctx;
 };
 
 struct CMS_DigestedData_st {
@@ -460,6 +489,7 @@ int ossl_cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk);
 int ossl_cms_pkey_is_ri_type_supported(EVP_PKEY *pk, int ri_type);
 
 void ossl_cms_RecipientInfos_set_cmsctx(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_wrap_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
 
 /* KARI routines */
 int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
@@ -470,6 +500,20 @@ int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
 int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
                                         CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
 
+/* KEMRI routines */
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                          uint32_t **pkekLength,
+                                          X509_ALGOR **pwrap);
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
+                                      EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, unsigned int flags,
+                                      const CMS_CTX *ctx);
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                         CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_kemri_decrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+                                         CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int CMS_CMSORIforKEMOtherInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *wrap,
+                                     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen);
+
 /* PWRI routines */
 int ossl_cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
                                       CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int en_de);
@@ -486,6 +530,7 @@ int ossl_cms_dh_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
 int ossl_cms_ecdh_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
 int ossl_cms_rsa_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
 int ossl_cms_rsa_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si, int verify);
+int ossl_cms_kem_envelope(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int decrypt);
 
 int ossl_cms_get1_certs_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) **certs);
 int ossl_cms_get1_crls_ex(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls);
@@ -496,10 +541,12 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EncryptedData)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_EnvelopedData)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_AuthEnvelopedData)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KEMRecipientInfo)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute)
+DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OtherRecipientInfo)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_Receipt)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)

crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
-    ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
+    ri->encoded_type = ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
 
     pwri = ri->d.pwri;
     pwri->cms_ctx = cms_ctx;

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -750,6 +750,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk,
                 return 1;
             if (r < 0)
                 return 0;
+        } else if (ri_type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM) {
+            if (cert == NULL || !CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp(ri, cert)) {
+                CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
+                r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
+                CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
+                if (cert != NULL || r > 0)
+                    return r;
+            }
         }
         /* If we have a cert, try matching RecipientInfo, else try them all */
         else if (cert == NULL || !CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(ri, cert)) {

crypto/dh/dh_backend.c

@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ int ossl_dh_key_fromdata(DH *dh, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
     if (!DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key))
         goto err;
 
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+    if (pub_key != NULL && priv_key != NULL)
+        if (ossl_dh_check_pairwise(dh) == 0)
+            return 0;
+#endif
+
     return 1;
 
  err:

crypto/err/openssl.txt

@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ CMS_R_NEED_ONE_SIGNER:164:need one signer
 CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT:165:not a signed receipt
 CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA:122:not encrypted data
 CMS_R_NOT_KEK:123:not kek
+CMS_R_NOT_KEM:197:not kem
 CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT:181:not key agreement
 CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT:124:not key transport
 CMS_R_NOT_PWRI:177:not pwri
@@ -394,11 +395,13 @@ CMS_R_UNABLE_TO_FINALIZE_CONTEXT:147:unable to finalize context
 CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:148:unknown cipher
 CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM:149:unknown digest algorithm
 CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID:150:unknown id
+CMS_R_UNKNOWN_KDF_ALGORITHM:198:unknown kdf algorithm
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM:151:unsupported compression algorithm
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:194:\
 	unsupported content encryption algorithm
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE:152:unsupported content type
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE:192:unsupported encryption type
+CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KDF_ALGORITHM:199:unsupported kdf algorithm
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM:153:unsupported kek algorithm
 CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:179:\
 	unsupported key encryption algorithm

crypto/evp/asymcipher.c

@@ -261,10 +261,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 
     cipher = ctx->op.ciph.cipher;
     desc = cipher->description != NULL ? cipher->description : "";
+    ERR_set_mark();
     ret = cipher->encrypt(ctx->op.ciph.algctx, out, outlen, (out == NULL ? 0 : *outlen), in, inlen);
-    if (ret <= 0)
+    if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_ASYM_CIPHER_FAILURE,
                        "%s encrypt:%s", cipher->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     return ret;
 
  legacy:
@@ -309,10 +311,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 
     cipher = ctx->op.ciph.cipher;
     desc = cipher->description != NULL ? cipher->description : "";
+    ERR_set_mark();
     ret = cipher->decrypt(ctx->op.ciph.algctx, out, outlen, (out == NULL ? 0 : *outlen), in, inlen);
-    if (ret <= 0)
+    if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_ASYM_CIPHER_FAILURE,
                        "%s decrypt:%s", cipher->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
 
     return ret;
 

crypto/evp/keymgmt_meth.c

@@ -460,10 +460,12 @@ void *evp_keymgmt_gen(const EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt, void *genctx,
         return NULL;
     }
 
+    ERR_set_mark();
     ret = keymgmt->gen(genctx, cb, cbarg);
-    if (ret == NULL)
+    if (ret == NULL && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_KEYMGMT_FAILURE,
                        "%s key generation:%s", keymgmt->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     return ret;
 }
 

crypto/evp/m_sigver.c

@@ -426,14 +426,20 @@ int EVP_DigestSignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
         return 0;
     }
 
+    ERR_set_mark();
     ret = signature->digest_sign_update(pctx->op.sig.algctx, data, dsize);
-    if (ret <= 0)
+    if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                        "%s digest_sign_update:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     return ret;
 
  legacy:
     if (pctx != NULL) {
+        if (pctx->pmeth == NULL) {
+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
         /* do_sigver_init() checked that |digest_custom| is non-NULL */
         if (pctx->flag_call_digest_custom
             && !ctx->pctx->pmeth->digest_custom(ctx->pctx, ctx))
@@ -470,10 +476,12 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t dsize)
         return 0;
     }
 
+    ERR_set_mark();
     ret = signature->digest_verify_update(pctx->op.sig.algctx, data, dsize);
-    if (ret <= 0)
+    if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                        "%s digest_verify_update:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     return ret;
 
  legacy:
@@ -523,11 +531,13 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
             pctx = dctx;
     }
 
+    ERR_set_mark();
     r = signature->digest_sign_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx, sigret, siglen,
                                      sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen);
-    if (!r)
+    if (!r && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                        "%s digest_sign_final:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     if (dctx == NULL && sigret != NULL)
         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
     else
@@ -634,11 +644,13 @@ int EVP_DigestSign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen,
 
             if (sigret != NULL)
                 ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+            ERR_set_mark();
             ret = signature->digest_sign(pctx->op.sig.algctx, sigret, siglen,
                                          sigret == NULL ? 0 : *siglen, tbs, tbslen);
-            if (ret <= 0)
+            if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
                 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                                "%s digest_sign:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+            ERR_clear_last_mark();
             return ret;
         }
     } else {
@@ -689,10 +701,12 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
             pctx = dctx;
     }
 
+    ERR_set_mark();
     r = signature->digest_verify_final(pctx->op.sig.algctx, sig, siglen);
-    if (!r)
+    if (!r && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
         ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                        "%s digest_verify_final:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+    ERR_clear_last_mark();
     if (dctx == NULL)
         ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
     else
@@ -765,10 +779,12 @@ int EVP_DigestVerify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sigret,
             int ret;
 
             ctx->flags |= EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_FINALISED;
+            ERR_set_mark();
             ret = signature->digest_verify(pctx->op.sig.algctx, sigret, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
-            if (ret <= 0)
+            if (ret <= 0 && ERR_count_to_mark() == 0)
                 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PROVIDER_SIGNATURE_FAILURE,
                                "%s digest_verify:%s", signature->type_name, desc);
+            ERR_clear_last_mark();
             return ret;
         }
     } else {

crypto/evp/p_lib.c

@@ -1024,12 +1024,19 @@ DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 
 int EVP_PKEY_get_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 {
+    if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT) {
+        const char *name = EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_name(pkey->keymgmt);
+        int type = evp_pkey_name2type(name);
+        if (type != NID_undef)
+            return type;
+    }
+
     return pkey->type;
 }
 
 int EVP_PKEY_get_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 {
-    return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
+    return EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey));
 }
 
 /*

crypto/objects/obj_dat.c

@@ -37,13 +37,16 @@ struct added_obj_st {
     ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
 };
 
+static unsigned long added_obj_hash(const ADDED_OBJ *ca);
+static int added_obj_cmp(const ADDED_OBJ *ca, const ADDED_OBJ *cb);
+
 static LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ) *added = NULL;
 static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *ossl_obj_lock = NULL;
 #ifdef TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING
 static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *ossl_obj_nid_lock = NULL;
 #endif
 
-static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_obj_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ossl_obj_api_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
 
 static ossl_inline void objs_free_locks(void)
 {
@@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ static ossl_inline void objs_free_locks(void)
 #endif
 }
 
-DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(obj_lock_initialise)
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(obj_api_initialise)
 {
     ossl_obj_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
     if (ossl_obj_lock == NULL)
@@ -68,40 +71,41 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(obj_lock_initialise)
         return 0;
     }
 #endif
+    added = lh_ADDED_OBJ_new(added_obj_hash, added_obj_cmp);
+    if (added == NULL) {
+        objs_free_locks();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     return 1;
 }
 
-static ossl_inline int ossl_init_added_lock(void)
+static ossl_inline int ossl_init_added_api(void)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOLOAD_CONFIG
     /* Make sure we've loaded config before checking for any "added" objects */
     OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
 #endif
-    return RUN_ONCE(&ossl_obj_lock_init, obj_lock_initialise);
+    return RUN_ONCE(&ossl_obj_api_init, obj_api_initialise);
 }
 
-static ossl_inline int ossl_obj_write_lock(int lock)
+static ossl_inline int ossl_obj_write_lock(void)
 {
-    if (!lock)
-        return 1;
-    if (!ossl_init_added_lock())
+    if (!ossl_init_added_api())
         return 0;
     return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ossl_obj_lock);
 }
 
-static ossl_inline int ossl_obj_read_lock(int lock)
+static ossl_inline int ossl_obj_read_lock(void)
 {
-    if (!lock)
-        return 1;
-    if (!ossl_init_added_lock())
+    if (!ossl_init_added_api())
         return 0;
     return CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ossl_obj_lock);
 }
 
-static ossl_inline void ossl_obj_unlock(int lock)
+static ossl_inline void ossl_obj_unlock(void)
 {
-    if (lock)
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ossl_obj_lock);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ossl_obj_lock);
 }
 
 static int sn_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b)
@@ -221,112 +225,22 @@ void ossl_obj_cleanup_int(void)
     objs_free_locks();
 }
 
-/*
- * Requires that the ossl_obj_lock be held
- * if TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING defined
- */
-static int obj_new_nid_unlocked(int num)
+int OBJ_new_nid(int num)
 {
     static TSAN_QUALIFIER int new_nid = NUM_NID;
 #ifdef TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING
     int i;
 
+    ossl_obj_write_lock();
     i = new_nid;
     new_nid += num;
-
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
     return i;
 #else
     return tsan_add(&new_nid, num);
 #endif
 }
 
-int OBJ_new_nid(int num)
-{
-#ifdef TSAN_REQUIRES_LOCKING
-    int i;
-
-    if (!ossl_obj_write_lock(1)) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_WRITE_LOCK);
-        return NID_undef;
-    }
-
-    i = obj_new_nid_unlocked(num);
-
-    ossl_obj_unlock(1);
-
-    return i;
-#else
-    return obj_new_nid_unlocked(num);
-#endif
-}
-
-static int ossl_obj_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lock)
-{
-    ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
-    ADDED_OBJ *ao[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, *aop[4];
-    int i;
-
-    if ((o = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL)
-        return NID_undef;
-    if ((ao[ADDED_NID] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL
-            || (o->length != 0
-                && obj->data != NULL
-                && (ao[ADDED_DATA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
-            || (o->sn != NULL
-                && (ao[ADDED_SNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
-            || (o->ln != NULL
-                && (ao[ADDED_LNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL))
-        goto err2;
-
-    if (!ossl_obj_write_lock(lock)) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_WRITE_LOCK);
-        goto err2;
-    }
-    if (added == NULL) {
-        added = lh_ADDED_OBJ_new(added_obj_hash, added_obj_cmp);
-        if (added == NULL) {
-            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) {
-        if (ao[i] != NULL) {
-            ao[i]->type = i;
-            ao[i]->obj = o;
-            aop[i] = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, ao[i]);
-            if (aop[i] != NULL)
-                aop[i]->type = -1;
-            (void)lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(added, ao[i]);
-            if (lh_ADDED_OBJ_error(added)) {
-                if (aop[i] != NULL)
-                    aop[i]->type = i;
-                while (i-- > ADDED_DATA) {
-                    lh_ADDED_OBJ_delete(added, ao[i]);
-                    if (aop[i] != NULL)
-                        aop[i]->type = i;
-                }
-                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    o->flags &=
-        ~(ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
-          ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA);
-
-    ossl_obj_unlock(lock);
-    return o->nid;
-
- err:
-    ossl_obj_unlock(lock);
- err2:
-    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++)
-        OPENSSL_free(ao[i]);
-    ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
-    return NID_undef;
-}
-
 ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n)
 {
     ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp = NULL;
@@ -339,13 +253,12 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n)
     ad.type = ADDED_NID;
     ad.obj = &ob;
     ob.nid = n;
-    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock(1)) {
+    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock()) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_READ_LOCK);
         return NULL;
     }
-    if (added != NULL)
-        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
-    ossl_obj_unlock(1);
+    adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
     if (adp != NULL)
         return adp->obj;
 
@@ -383,7 +296,7 @@ static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp)
 
 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj);
 
-static int ossl_obj_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const int lock)
+static int ossl_obj_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
 {
     int nid = NID_undef;
     const unsigned int *op;
@@ -399,18 +312,16 @@ static int ossl_obj_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const int lock)
     op = OBJ_bsearch_obj(&a, obj_objs, NUM_OBJ);
     if (op != NULL)
         return nid_objs[*op].nid;
-    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock(lock)) {
+    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock()) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_READ_LOCK);
         return NID_undef;
     }
-    if (added != NULL) {
-        ad.type = ADDED_DATA;
-        ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* casting away const is harmless here */
-        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
-        if (adp != NULL)
-            nid = adp->obj->nid;
-    }
-    ossl_obj_unlock(lock);
+    ad.type = ADDED_DATA;
+    ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* casting away const is harmless here */
+    adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+    if (adp != NULL)
+        nid = adp->obj->nid;
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
     return nid;
 }
 
@@ -645,18 +556,16 @@ int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s)
     op = OBJ_bsearch_ln(&oo, ln_objs, NUM_LN);
     if (op != NULL)
         return nid_objs[*op].nid;
-    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock(1)) {
+    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock()) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_READ_LOCK);
         return NID_undef;
     }
-    if (added != NULL) {
-        ad.type = ADDED_LNAME;
-        ad.obj = &o;
-        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
-        if (adp != NULL)
-            nid = adp->obj->nid;
-    }
-    ossl_obj_unlock(1);
+    ad.type = ADDED_LNAME;
+    ad.obj = &o;
+    adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+    if (adp != NULL)
+        nid = adp->obj->nid;
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
     return nid;
 }
 
@@ -672,18 +581,16 @@ int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s)
     op = OBJ_bsearch_sn(&oo, sn_objs, NUM_SN);
     if (op != NULL)
         return nid_objs[*op].nid;
-    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock(1)) {
+    if (!ossl_obj_read_lock()) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_READ_LOCK);
         return NID_undef;
     }
-    if (added != NULL) {
-        ad.type = ADDED_SNAME;
-        ad.obj = &o;
-        adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
-        if (adp != NULL)
-            nid = adp->obj->nid;
-    }
-    ossl_obj_unlock(1);
+    ad.type = ADDED_SNAME;
+    ad.obj = &o;
+    adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad);
+    if (adp != NULL)
+        nid = adp->obj->nid;
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
     return nid;
 }
 
@@ -808,20 +715,14 @@ int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln)
         }
     }
 
-    if (!ossl_obj_write_lock(1)) {
-        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_WRITE_LOCK);
-        ASN1_OBJECT_free(tmpoid);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
     /* If NID is not NID_undef then object already exists */
     if (oid != NULL
-        && ossl_obj_obj2nid(tmpoid, 0) != NID_undef) {
+        && ossl_obj_obj2nid(tmpoid) != NID_undef) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    tmpoid->nid = obj_new_nid_unlocked(1);
+    tmpoid->nid = OBJ_new_nid(1);
 
     if (tmpoid->nid == NID_undef)
         goto err;
@@ -829,13 +730,14 @@ int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln)
     tmpoid->sn = (char *)sn;
     tmpoid->ln = (char *)ln;
 
-    ok = ossl_obj_add_object(tmpoid, 0);
+    if (OBJ_add_object(tmpoid) != NID_undef)
+        ok = 1;
+
 
     tmpoid->sn = NULL;
     tmpoid->ln = NULL;
 
  err:
-    ossl_obj_unlock(1);
     ASN1_OBJECT_free(tmpoid);
     return ok;
 }
@@ -856,10 +758,65 @@ const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
 
 int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
 {
-    return ossl_obj_add_object(obj, 1);
+    ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
+    ADDED_OBJ *ao[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, *aop[4];
+    int i;
+
+    if ((o = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL)
+        return NID_undef;
+    if ((ao[ADDED_NID] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL
+            || (o->length != 0
+                && obj->data != NULL
+                && (ao[ADDED_DATA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+            || (o->sn != NULL
+                && (ao[ADDED_SNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL)
+            || (o->ln != NULL
+                && (ao[ADDED_LNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL))
+        goto err2;
+
+    if (!ossl_obj_write_lock()) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_WRITE_LOCK);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) {
+        if (ao[i] != NULL) {
+            ao[i]->type = i;
+            ao[i]->obj = o;
+            aop[i] = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, ao[i]);
+            if (aop[i] != NULL)
+                aop[i]->type = -1;
+            (void)lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(added, ao[i]);
+            if (lh_ADDED_OBJ_error(added)) {
+                if (aop[i] != NULL)
+                    aop[i]->type = i;
+                while (i-- > ADDED_DATA) {
+                    lh_ADDED_OBJ_delete(added, ao[i]);
+                    if (aop[i] != NULL)
+                        aop[i]->type = i;
+                }
+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OBJ, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    o->flags &=
+        ~(ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS |
+          ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA);
+
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
+    return o->nid;
+
+ err:
+    ossl_obj_unlock();
+ err2:
+    for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++)
+        OPENSSL_free(ao[i]);
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+    return NID_undef;
 }
 
 int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
 {
-    return ossl_obj_obj2nid(a, 1);
+    return ossl_obj_obj2nid(a);
 }

crypto/objects/obj_dat.h

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 /* Serialized OID's */
-static const unsigned char so[9550] = {
+static const unsigned char so[9571] = {
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,                 /* [    0] OBJ_rsadsi */
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,            /* [    6] OBJ_pkcs */
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x02,       /* [   13] OBJ_md2 */
@@ -1351,9 +1351,11 @@ static const unsigned char so[9550] = {
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x1C,  /* [ 9516] OBJ_HKDF_SHA256 */
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x1D,  /* [ 9527] OBJ_HKDF_SHA384 */
     0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x1E,  /* [ 9538] OBJ_HKDF_SHA512 */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x0D,  /* [ 9549] OBJ_id_smime_ori */
+    0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x0D,0x03,  /* [ 9559] OBJ_id_smime_ori_kem */
 };
 
-#define NUM_NID 1499
+#define NUM_NID 1501
 static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {
     {"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef},
     {"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]},
@@ -2854,9 +2856,11 @@ static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = {
     {"id-alg-hkdf-with-sha256", "HKDF-SHA256", NID_HKDF_SHA256, 11, &so[9516]},
     {"id-alg-hkdf-with-sha384", "HKDF-SHA384", NID_HKDF_SHA384, 11, &so[9527]},
     {"id-alg-hkdf-with-sha512", "HKDF-SHA512", NID_HKDF_SHA512, 11, &so[9538]},
+    {"id-smime-ori", "id-smime-ori", NID_id_smime_ori, 10, &so[9549]},
+    {"id-smime-ori-kem", "id-smime-ori-kem", NID_id_smime_ori_kem, 11, &so[9559]},
 };
 
-#define NUM_SN 1490
+#define NUM_SN 1492
 static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
      364,    /* "AD_DVCS" */
      419,    /* "AES-128-CBC" */
@@ -3744,6 +3748,8 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
      201,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */
      199,    /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */
      198,    /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */
+    1499,    /* "id-smime-ori" */
+    1500,    /* "id-smime-ori-kem" */
      194,    /* "id-smime-spq" */
      250,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */
      249,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */
@@ -4350,7 +4356,7 @@ static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = {
     1289,    /* "zstd" */
 };
 
-#define NUM_LN 1490
+#define NUM_LN 1492
 static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
      363,    /* "AD Time Stamping" */
      405,    /* "ANSI X9.62" */
@@ -5367,6 +5373,8 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
      201,    /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */
      199,    /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */
      198,    /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */
+    1499,    /* "id-smime-ori" */
+    1500,    /* "id-smime-ori-kem" */
      194,    /* "id-smime-spq" */
      250,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */
      249,    /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */
@@ -5844,7 +5852,7 @@ static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = {
      125,    /* "zlib compression" */
 };
 
-#define NUM_OBJ 1347
+#define NUM_OBJ 1349
 static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
        0,    /* OBJ_undef                        0 */
      181,    /* OBJ_iso                          1 */
@@ -7051,6 +7059,7 @@ static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
      193,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cd                  1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 */
      194,    /* OBJ_id_smime_spq                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 */
      195,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 */
+    1499,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ori                 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 13 */
      158,    /* OBJ_x509Certificate              1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 1 */
      159,    /* OBJ_sdsiCertificate              1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 2 */
      160,    /* OBJ_x509Crl                      1 2 840 113549 1 9 23 1 */
@@ -7169,6 +7178,7 @@ static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = {
      254,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 4 */
      255,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 5 */
      256,    /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 6 */
+    1500,    /* OBJ_id_smime_ori_kem             1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 13 3 */
      150,    /* OBJ_keyBag                       1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 1 */
      151,    /* OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag          1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 2 */
      152,    /* OBJ_certBag                      1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 3 */

crypto/objects/obj_mac.num

@@ -1496,3 +1496,5 @@ aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha512_etm		1495
 HKDF_SHA256		1496
 HKDF_SHA384		1497
 HKDF_SHA512		1498
+id_smime_ori		1499
+id_smime_ori_kem		1500

crypto/objects/objects.txt

@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ SMIME 3			: id-smime-alg
 SMIME 4			: id-smime-cd
 SMIME 5			: id-smime-spq
 SMIME 6			: id-smime-cti
+SMIME 13		: id-smime-ori
 
 # S/MIME Modules
 id-smime-mod 1		: id-smime-mod-cms
@@ -355,6 +356,9 @@ id-smime-cti 4		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender
 id-smime-cti 5		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval
 id-smime-cti 6		: id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation
 
+# S/MIME OtherRecipientInfo Type Identifier
+id-smime-ori 3		: id-smime-ori-kem
+
 pkcs9 20		:			: friendlyName
 pkcs9 21		:			: localKeyID
 !Alias ms-corp 1 3 6 1 4 1 311

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c

@@ -375,7 +375,9 @@ int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
                          V_ASN1_NULL, NULL))
         return 0;
 
-    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC") || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DSA"))
+    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC")
+            || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "DSA")
+            || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "SM2"))
         return pkcs7_ecdsa_or_dsa_sign_verify_setup(p7i, 0);
     if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
         return pkcs7_rsa_sign_verify_setup(p7i, 0);

crypto/provider_core.c

@@ -2419,6 +2419,11 @@ static int core_pop_error_to_mark(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle)
     return ERR_pop_to_mark();
 }
 
+static int core_count_to_mark(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle)
+{
+    return ERR_count_to_mark();
+}
+
 static void core_indicator_get_callback(OPENSSL_CORE_CTX *libctx,
                                         OSSL_INDICATOR_CALLBACK **cb)
 {
@@ -2600,6 +2605,7 @@ static const OSSL_DISPATCH core_dispatch_[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_CORE_CLEAR_LAST_ERROR_MARK,
       (void (*)(void))core_clear_last_error_mark },
     { OSSL_FUNC_CORE_POP_ERROR_TO_MARK, (void (*)(void))core_pop_error_to_mark },
+    { OSSL_FUNC_CORE_COUNT_TO_MARK, (void (*)(void))core_count_to_mark },
     { OSSL_FUNC_BIO_NEW_FILE, (void (*)(void))ossl_core_bio_new_file },
     { OSSL_FUNC_BIO_NEW_MEMBUF, (void (*)(void))ossl_core_bio_new_mem_buf },
     { OSSL_FUNC_BIO_READ_EX, (void (*)(void))ossl_core_bio_read_ex },

crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c

@@ -220,6 +220,10 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *sm2_sig_gen(const EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *e)
     BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_ec_key_get_libctx(key);
 
+    if (dA == NULL) {
+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SM2, SM2_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+        goto done;
+    }
     kG = EC_POINT_new(group);
     if (kG == NULL) {
         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SM2, ERR_R_EC_LIB);

crypto/store/store_lib.c

@@ -428,12 +428,6 @@ OSSL_STORE_INFO *OSSL_STORE_load(OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     if (ctx->loader != NULL)
         OSSL_TRACE(STORE, "Loading next object\n");
 
-    if (ctx->cached_info != NULL
-        && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_num(ctx->cached_info) == 0) {
-        sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(ctx->cached_info);
-        ctx->cached_info = NULL;
-    }
-
     if (ctx->cached_info != NULL) {
         v = sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_shift(ctx->cached_info);
     } else {
@@ -556,14 +550,23 @@ int OSSL_STORE_error(OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 int OSSL_STORE_eof(OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    int ret = 1;
+    int ret = 0;
 
-    if (ctx->fetched_loader != NULL)
-        ret = ctx->loader->p_eof(ctx->loader_ctx);
+    if (ctx->cached_info != NULL
+        && sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_num(ctx->cached_info) == 0) {
+        sk_OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(ctx->cached_info);
+        ctx->cached_info = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->cached_info == NULL) {
+        ret = 1;
+        if (ctx->fetched_loader != NULL)
+            ret = ctx->loader->p_eof(ctx->loader_ctx);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
-    if (ctx->fetched_loader == NULL)
-        ret = ctx->loader->eof(ctx->loader_ctx);
+        if (ctx->fetched_loader == NULL)
+            ret = ctx->loader->eof(ctx->loader_ctx);
 #endif
+    }
     return ret != 0;
 }
 

crypto/x509/x509_txt.c

@@ -174,6 +174,16 @@ const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n)
         return "OCSP verification failed";
     case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
         return "OCSP unknown cert";
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID:
+        return "OCSP response(s) invalid";
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+        return "OCSP response signature verification failure";
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NOT_YET_VALID:
+        return "OCSP response not yet valid (contains a date in the future)";
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_HAS_EXPIRED:
+        return "OCSP response has expired";
+    case X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE:
+        return "no OCSP response available for certificate";
     case X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
         return "Cannot find certificate signature algorithm";
     case X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH:

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/dane.h"
@@ -55,7 +56,10 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int check_cert_ocsp_resp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#endif
+static int check_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
 static int check_cert_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
@@ -184,6 +188,24 @@ static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
     return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+/*
+ * Inform the verify callback of an error, OCSP-specific variant.
+ * It is called also on OCSP response errors, if the
+ * X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK or X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL flag
+ * is set.
+ * Here, the error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify
+ * the error number.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
+ */
+static int verify_cb_ocsp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
+{
+    ctx->error = err;
+    return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb(). */
 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
@@ -225,7 +247,6 @@ static int verify_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     return !!ctx->verify_cb(ctx->error == X509_V_OK, ctx);
 }
 
-
 /*-
  * Returns -1 on internal error.
  * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error in ctx->verify_cb().
@@ -1037,28 +1058,209 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
     int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
+    int crl_check_enabled =
+        (ctx->param->flags &
+         (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)) != 0;
+    int crl_check_all_enabled =
+        (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0;
+    int ocsp_check_enabled =
+        (ctx->param->flags &
+         (X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL)) != 0;
+    int ocsp_check_all_enabled =
+        (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL) != 0;
 
-    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0)
+    if (!crl_check_enabled && !ocsp_check_enabled)
         return 1;
-    if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) {
-        last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-    } else {
-        /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
-        if (ctx->parent != NULL)
-            return 1;
-        last = 0;
+
+    if (ocsp_check_enabled) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        /*
+         * certificate status checking with OCSP
+         */
+        if (ocsp_check_all_enabled)
+            last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+        else if (!crl_check_all_enabled && ctx->parent != NULL)
+            return 1; /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+
+        for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+
+            /* skip if cert is apparently self-signed */
+            if (ctx->current_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+                continue;
+
+            /* the issuer certificate is the next in the chain */
+            ctx->current_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i + 1);
+
+            ok = check_cert_ocsp_resp(ctx);
+
+            /*
+             * In the case the certificate status is REVOKED, the verification
+             * can stop here.
+             */
+            if (ok == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED) {
+                return verify_cb_ocsp(ctx, ctx->error != 0
+                                      ? ctx->error
+                                      : X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED);
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * In the case the certificate status is GOOD, continue with the next
+             * certificate.
+             */
+            if (ok == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
+                continue;
+
+            /*
+             * As stated in RFC 6961 section 2.2:
+             * If OCSP is not enabled or the client receives a "ocsp_response_list"
+             * that does not contain a response for one or more of the certificates
+             * in the completed certificate chain, the client SHOULD attempt to
+             * validate the certificate using an alternative retrieval method,
+             * such as downloading the relevant CRL;
+             */
+            if (crl_check_all_enabled || (crl_check_enabled && i == 0)) {
+                ok = check_cert_crl(ctx);
+                if (!ok)
+                    return ok;
+            } else {
+                ok = verify_cb_ocsp(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED);
+                if (!ok)
+                    return ok;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
     }
-    for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
-        ctx->error_depth = i;
-        ok = check_cert(ctx);
-        if (!ok)
-            return ok;
+
+    if (crl_check_enabled && !ocsp_check_all_enabled) {
+        /* certificate status check with CRLs */
+        if (crl_check_all_enabled) {
+            last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+        } else {
+            /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
+            if (ctx->parent != NULL)
+                return 1;
+            last = 0;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * in the case that OCSP is only enabled for the server certificate
+         * and CRL for the complete chain, the rest of the chain has to be
+         * checked here
+         */
+        if (ocsp_check_enabled && crl_check_all_enabled)
+            i = 1;
+        else
+            i = 0;
+        for (; i <= last; i++) {
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ok = check_cert_crl(ctx);
+            if (!ok)
+                return ok;
+        }
     }
+
     return 1;
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static int check_cert_ocsp_resp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int cert_status, crl_reason;
+    int i;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *sr = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *sr_cert_id = NULL;
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
+    EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cert_id = NULL;
+    int ret = V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN;
+    int num;
+
+    num = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(ctx->ocsp_resp);
+
+    if (num < 0 || num <= ctx->error_depth)
+        return X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE;
+
+    if ((resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(ctx->ocsp_resp, ctx->error_depth)) == NULL
+        || (bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)) == NULL
+        || (num = OCSP_resp_count(bs)) < 1)
+        return X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE;
+
+    if (OCSP_response_status(resp) != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+        OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+        ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (OCSP_basic_verify(bs, ctx->chain, ctx->store, OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) <= 0) {
+        ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    /* find the right single response in the OCSP response */
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+        sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, i);
+
+        /* determine the md algorithm which was used to create cert id */
+        sr_cert_id = (OCSP_CERTID *)OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(sr);
+        OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, NULL, sr_cert_id);
+        if (cert_id_md_oid != NULL)
+            cert_id_md = (EVP_MD *)EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid);
+        else
+            cert_id_md = NULL;
+
+        /* search the stack for the requested OCSP response */
+        cert_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, ctx->current_cert, ctx->current_issuer);
+        if (cert_id == NULL) {
+            ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID;
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!OCSP_id_cmp(cert_id, sr_cert_id))
+            break;
+
+        OCSP_CERTID_free(cert_id);
+        cert_id = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_id == NULL) {
+        ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (OCSP_resp_find_status(bs, cert_id, &cert_status, &crl_reason, &rev,
+                              &thisupd, &nextupd) <= 0) {
+        ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_status == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD) {
+        /*
+         * Note:
+         * A OCSP stapling result will be accepted up to 5 minutes
+         * after it expired!
+         */
+        if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L))
+            ret = X509_V_ERR_OCSP_HAS_EXPIRED;
+        else
+            ret = V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD;
+    } else {
+        ret = cert_status;
+    }
+
+end:
+    OCSP_CERTID_free(cert_id);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
     X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
     int ok = 0;
@@ -1070,6 +1272,9 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
     ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 
+    /* skip if cert is apparently self-signed */
+    if (ctx->current_cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+        return 1;
     if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0)
         return 1;
 
@@ -1645,7 +1850,7 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 
     sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
 
- done:
+done:
     /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
     if (crl != NULL) {
         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
@@ -2374,6 +2579,13 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
     ctx->crls = sk;
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk)
+{
+    ctx->ocsp_resp = sk;
+}
+#endif
+
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
 {
     /*
@@ -2490,7 +2702,6 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 }
 
-
 int X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
 {
     if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
@@ -2531,6 +2742,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
     ctx->rpk = NULL;
     /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
     memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
+    ctx->ocsp_resp = NULL;
 
     /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
     if (store != NULL)
@@ -2690,7 +2902,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_reasons(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                                         unsigned int current_reasons)
 {
-   ctx->current_reasons = current_reasons;
+    ctx->current_reasons = current_reasons;
 }
 
 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
@@ -2767,7 +2979,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                                 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn get_crl)
 {
-   ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+    ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
 }
 
 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn

crypto/x509/x_crl.c

@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
 static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
 {
     int idp_only = 0;
+    int ret = 0;
 
     /* Set various flags according to IDP */
     crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
@@ -320,7 +321,17 @@ static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
         crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
     }
 
-    return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+    ret = DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+
+    /*
+     * RFC5280 specifies that if onlyContainsUserCerts, onlyContainsCACerts,
+     * indirectCRL, and OnlyContainsAttributeCerts are all FALSE, there must
+     * be either a distributionPoint field or an onlySomeReasons field present.
+     */
+    if (crl->idp_flags == IDP_PRESENT && idp->distpoint == NULL)
+        crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
+
+    return ret;
 }
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = {

doc/man1/openssl-cms.pod.in

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ Encryption options:
 [B<-aes256-wrap>]
 [B<-des3-wrap>]
 [B<-debug_decrypt>]
+[B<-recip_kdf> I<kdf>]
+[B<-recip_ukm> I<ukm>]
 
 Signing options:
 
@@ -450,6 +452,19 @@ Depending on the OpenSSL build options used, B<-des3-wrap> may not be supported.
 This option sets the B<CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT> flag. This option should be used
 with caution: see the notes section below.
 
+=item B<-recip_kdf>
+
+This option sets the KDF used to generate the key encryption key in the
+B<KEMRecipientInfo> type. Any KDF that takes B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY> and
+B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO> parameters and is otherwise fully defined by its name or
+OID can be used, for example B<HKDF-SHA256>.
+
+=item B<-recip_ukm>
+
+This option sets the B<KEMRecipientInfo> type's optional user keying material (UKM)
+in hexadecimal form. The UKM will be encoded, along with other information, into the
+B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO> parameter of the B<KEMRecipientInfo> type's KDF.
+
 =back
 
 =head2 Signing options
@@ -937,6 +952,8 @@ The B<-engine> option was deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0.
 
 The B<-digest> option was added in OpenSSL 3.2.
 
+The B<-recip_kdf> and B<-recip_ukm> options were added in OpenSSL 3.6.
+
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
 Copyright 2008-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

doc/man1/openssl-rehash.pod.in

@@ -133,6 +133,13 @@ By default, this command only lists each directory as it is processed.
 The path to an executable to use to generate hashes and
 fingerprints (see above).
 
+=item B<PATH>
+
+List of paths, separated by colons (or semicolons, on Windows platforms),
+where the B<openssl> executable is searched in case the path to the hash
+generating executable is not provided in the B<OPENSSL> environment variable
+or it is not usable (that is, does not exist or is not executable).
+
 =item B<SSL_CERT_DIR>
 
 Colon separated list of directories to operate on.

doc/man1/openssl-s_client.pod.in

@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
 [B<-sess_in> I<filename>]
 [B<-serverinfo> I<types>]
 [B<-status>]
+[B<-ocsp_check_leaf>]
+[B<-ocsp_check_all>]
 [B<-alpn> I<protocols>]
 [B<-nextprotoneg> I<protocols>]
 [B<-ct>]
@@ -671,6 +673,24 @@ file.
 Sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling). The server
 response (if any) is printed out.
 
+=item B<-ocsp_check_leaf>
+
+Require performing server (end-entity) certificate status checking, where any
+OCSP response provided in the TLS handshake (by so-called "OCSP stapling") is tried
+first.
+If no valid and conclusive OCSP response can be found, CRL-based checking
+is attempted as fallback if enabled, otherwise the status check fails.
+
+This implies B<-status>.
+
+=item B<-ocsp_check_all>
+
+As the option before, but require performing certificate status checking also
+for the issuer chain of the server certificate (i.e., intermediate CA certificates,
+excluding the trust anchor).
+
+This implies the B<-status> and B<-ocsp_check_leaf>.
+
 =item B<-alpn> I<protocols>, B<-nextprotoneg> I<protocols>
 
 These flags enable the Enable the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation
@@ -1023,6 +1043,11 @@ B<-no_tx_cert_comp>,
 and B<-tfo>
 options were added in OpenSSL 3.2.
 
+The
+<-ocsp_check_leaf>
+and B<-ocsp_check_all>
+options were added in OpenSSL 3.6.
+
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
 Copyright 2000-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

doc/man1/openssl-s_server.pod.in

@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_server>
 [B<-no_ign_eof>]
 [B<-no_ems>]
 [B<-status>]
+[B<-status_all>]
 [B<-status_verbose>]
 [B<-status_timeout> I<int>]
 [B<-proxy> I<[http[s]://][userinfo@]host[:port][/path][?query][#fragment]>]
@@ -487,7 +488,15 @@ Disable Extended master secret negotiation.
 
 =item B<-status>
 
-Enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling).
+Enables certificate status request support (aka OCSP stapling):
+an OCSP response is provided for the leaf (server) certificate
+if requested by the client side.
+
+=item B<-status_all>
+
+Like before, but for TLS v1.3 and beyond, status responses for all
+certificates in the chain (except the trust anchor) are provided
+if requested by the client side.
 
 =item B<-status_verbose>
 
@@ -530,6 +539,8 @@ Any given query component is handled as part of the path component.
 
 Overrides any OCSP responder URLs from the certificate and always provides the
 OCSP Response stored in the file. The file must be in DER format.
+This option may be used multiple times to specify OCSP responses for all
+certificates in the server certificate chain.
 
 =item B<-ssl_config> I<val>
 
@@ -925,6 +936,8 @@ B<-no_tx_cert_comp>,
 and B<-tfo>
 options were added in OpenSSL 3.2.
 
+The B<-status_all> option was added in OpenSSL 3.6.
+
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
 Copyright 2000-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

doc/man1/openssl-s_time.pod.in

@@ -134,6 +134,18 @@ See L<openssl(1)/TLS Version Options>.
 
 =back
 
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<SSL_CIPHER>
+
+If the B<-cipher> option is not specified, the contents of this environment
+variable are used to modify the TLSv1.2 and below cipher list sent
+by the client the same way the aforementioned option does.
+
+=back
+
 =head1 NOTES
 
 This command can be used to measure the performance of an SSL connection.

doc/man3/CMS_add1_recipient_cert.pod

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ The originator-related fields are relevant only in case when the keyAgreement
 method of providing of the shared key is in use.
 
 CMS_add1_recipient_cert() adds recipient B<recip> to CMS_ContentInfo enveloped
-data structure B<cms> as a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
+data structure B<cms> as a KeyTransRecipientInfo or KEMRecipientInfo structure,
+or as a KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure with an ephemeral key.
 
 CMS_add0_recipient_key() adds symmetric key B<key> of length B<keylen> using
 wrapping algorithm B<nid>, identifier B<id> of length B<idlen> and optional

doc/man3/CMS_encrypt.pod

@@ -78,10 +78,12 @@ BIO_new_CMS().
 
 The recipients specified in B<certs> use a CMS KeyTransRecipientInfo info
 structure. KEKRecipientInfo is also supported using the flag B<CMS_PARTIAL>
-and CMS_add0_recipient_key().
+and CMS_add0_recipient_key(). KEMRecipientInfo is also supported using the
+flag B<CMS_PARTIAL> and CMS_add1_recipient().
 
 The parameter B<certs> may be NULL if B<CMS_PARTIAL> is set and recipients
-added later using CMS_add1_recipient_cert() or CMS_add0_recipient_key().
+are added later using CMS_add1_recipient() or CMS_add1_recipient_cert() with
+CMS_add0_recipient_key().
 
 CMS_encrypt() is similar to CMS_encrypt_ex() but uses default values
 of NULL for the library context I<libctx> and the property query I<propq>.
@@ -104,7 +106,7 @@ The B<CMS_STREAM> flag was first supported in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
 
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
-Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2008-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 
 Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

doc/man3/CMS_get0_RecipientInfos.pod

@@ -6,9 +6,12 @@ CMS_get0_RecipientInfos, CMS_RecipientInfo_type,
 CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id, CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp,
 CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey, CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id,
 CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer,
-CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey, CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx,
 CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp, CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key,
-CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt, CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp, CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx, CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm, CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt,
+CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
 - CMS envelopedData RecipientInfo routines
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -27,6 +30,7 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt, CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
                                                EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *peer);
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg,
                                      ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid,
                                      ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate,
@@ -36,6 +40,13 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt, CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
                                     const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen);
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+ X509_ALGOR *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                     const unsigned char *ukm,
+                                     int ukmLength);
 
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
  int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
@@ -47,7 +58,8 @@ structures associated with a CMS EnvelopedData structure.
 
 CMS_RecipientInfo_type() returns the type of CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>.
 It will currently return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS, CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE,
-CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK, CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS, or CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER.
+CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK, CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS, CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM, or
+CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER.
 
 CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id() retrieves the certificate recipient
 identifier associated with a specific CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which
@@ -69,6 +81,10 @@ must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE.
 CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey() associates the private key B<pkey> with the
 CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE.
 
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx() returns the EVP_CIPHER_CTX for the key
+encryption key, allowing the caller to specify the key wrap cipher.  The
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE.
+
 CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id() retrieves the key information from the
 CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK.  Any
 of the remaining parameters can be NULL if the application is not interested in
@@ -88,6 +104,27 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() associates the symmetric key B<key> of length
 B<keylen> with the CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type
 CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK.
 
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp() compares the certificate B<cert> against the
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM.
+It returns zero if the comparison is successful and non zero if not.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey() associates the private key B<pkey> with the
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri>, which must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx() returns the EVP_CIPHER_CTX for the key
+encryption key, allowing the caller to specify the key wrap cipher.  The
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg() returns the X509_ALGOR for the
+RecipientInfo's KDF, allowing the caller to specify the KDF algorithm.  The
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM. If the
+caller doesn't specify a KDF algorithm, B<HKDF-SHA256> will be used.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm() sets the RecipientInfo's optional user
+keying material (UKM).  The UKM is encoded, along with other information, into
+the B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO> parameter of the RecipientInfo's KDF. The
+CMS_RecipientInfo structure B<ri> must be of type CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM.
+
 CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() attempts to decrypt CMS_RecipientInfo structure
 B<ri> in structure B<cms>. A key must have been associated with the structure
 first.
@@ -125,12 +162,20 @@ CMS_get0_RecipientInfos() returns all CMS_RecipientInfo structures, or NULL if
 an error occurs.
 
 CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(),
-CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key() and
-CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs.
-CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurs.
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(), CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(),
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(), CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(),
+CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt() and CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt() return 1 for
+success or 0 if an error occurs.
 
-CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp() and CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_cmp() return 0
-for a successful comparison and non zero otherwise.
+CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(), CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp() and
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_cmp() return 0 for a successful comparison and non zero
+otherwise.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx() and CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx return
+the RecipientInfo's EVP_CIPHER_CTX or NULL if an error occurred.
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg() returns the RecipientInfo's KDF's
+X509_ALGOR or NULL if an error occurred.
 
 Any error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
 
@@ -143,9 +188,13 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<CMS_decrypt(3)>
 B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer> and B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey>
 were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
 
+B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp>, B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey>,
+B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx>, B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg>
+and B<CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm> were added in OpenSSL 3.6.
+
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
-Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2008-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 
 Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy

doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts,
 CRYPTO_set_mem_debug, CRYPTO_mem_ctrl,
 CRYPTO_mem_leaks, CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp, CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb,
 OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES,
-OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD
+OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD,
+OPENSSL_MALLOC_SEED
 - Memory allocation functions
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD
 
  env OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES=... <application>
  env OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD=... <application>
+ env OPENSSL_MALLOC_SEED=... <application>
 
 The following functions have been deprecated since OpenSSL 3.0, and can be
 hidden entirely by defining B<OPENSSL_API_COMPAT> with a suitable version value,
@@ -155,9 +157,9 @@ with CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(), it's recommended to swap them all out
 at once.
 
 If the library is built with the C<crypto-mdebug> option, then one
-function, CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts(), and two additional environment
-variables, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES> and B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD>,
-are available.
+function, CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts(), and three additional environment
+variables, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES>, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD>,
+and B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_SEED>, are available.
 
 The function CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts() fills in the number of times
 each of CRYPTO_malloc(), CRYPTO_realloc(), and CRYPTO_free() have been
@@ -167,12 +169,14 @@ respectively.  If a pointer is NULL, then the corresponding count is not stored.
 The variable
 B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES> controls how often allocations should fail.
 It is a set of fields separated by semicolons, which each field is a count
-(defaulting to zero) and an optional atsign and percentage (defaulting
-to 100).  If the count is zero, then it lasts forever.  For example,
-C<100;@25> or C<100@0;0@25> means the first 100 allocations pass, then all
-other allocations (until the program exits or crashes) have a 25% chance of
-failing. The length of the value of B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES> must be 256 or
-fewer characters.
+(defaulting to zero) and an optional atsign and percentage (interpreted
+as a floating point number that is rounded up to two decimal digits
+of precision, defaulting to 100).  If the count is zero, then it lasts forever.
+For example, C<100;@0.258> or C<100@0;0@0.258> means the first 100 allocations
+pass, then all other allocations (until the program exits or crashes) have
+a 0.26% chance of failing, with random(3) used as a source of randomness.
+The length of the value of B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES> must be 256 or fewer
+characters.
 
 If the variable B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD> is parsed as a positive integer, then
 it is taken as an open file descriptor. This is used in conjunction with
@@ -188,6 +192,10 @@ work on all platforms):
   export OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD
   ...app invocation... 3>/tmp/log$$
 
+If the environment variable B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_SEED> is set, its value
+is interpreted as an integer using atoi(3) and supplied to the srandom(3)
+call for the random number generator initialisation.
+
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
 OPENSSL_malloc_init(), OPENSSL_free(), OPENSSL_clear_free()

doc/man3/PKCS12_gen_mac.pod

@@ -67,6 +67,28 @@ given passphrase. See L<passphrase-encoding(7)> for more information.
 
 All functions returning an integer return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred.
 
+=head1 ENVIRONMENT
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12>
+
+=for comment
+https://tc26.ru/standarts/metodicheskie-rekomendatsii/transportnyy-klyuchevoy-konteyner.html section 5.1
+https://tc26.ru/standard/rs/%D0%A0%2050.1.112-2016.pdf section 5
+https://meganorm.ru/mega_doc/norm/prikaz/25/r_1323565_1_041-2022_rekomendatsii_po_standartizatsii.html section 7.1
+
+If this environment variable is set, MAC generation that utilises
+GOST R 34.11-94 or GOST 34.11-2012 hashing algorithms is performed the usual
+way and not in accordance with the specification provided in the methodical
+recommendation MP 26.2.002-2012 (or in its later versions, standartisation
+recommendation P 50.1.112-2016 or P 1323565.1.041-2022)
+of Technical Committee 26, that specifies that the key used for MAC
+generation should be the last 32 bytes of the 96-byte sequence generated
+by L<PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(3)> and not the whole sequence.
+
+=back
+
 =head1 CONFORMING TO
 
 IETF RFC 7292 (L<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292>)

doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb.pod

@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type,
 SSL_set_tlsext_status_type,
 SSL_get_tlsext_status_type,
 SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
-SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp
+SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp,
+SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex,
+SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex
 - OCSP Certificate Status Request functions
 
 =head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -33,9 +35,12 @@ SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp
  long SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char **resp);
  long SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, unsigned char *resp, int len);
 
+ long SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(ssl, STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) **resp);
+ long SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(ssl, STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *resp);
+
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-A client application may request that a server send back an OCSP status response
+A client application may request that a server send back OCSP status response(s)
 (also known as OCSP stapling). To do so the client should call the
 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() function prior to the creation of any SSL
 objects. Alternatively an application can call the SSL_set_tlsext_status_type()
@@ -45,9 +50,13 @@ should be passed in the B<type> argument. Calling
 SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() will return the type B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>
 previously set via SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() or -1 if not set.
 
+For TLS versions before 1.3 only a single OCSP status response is sent back
+by the server. TLS 1.3 specifies that the server can send OCSP status responses
+for the whole chain (OCSP multi-stapling).
+
 The client should additionally provide a callback function to decide what to do
 with the returned OCSP response by calling SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(). The
-callback function should determine whether the returned OCSP response is
+callback function should determine whether the returned OCSP response(s) are
 acceptable or not. The callback will be passed as an argument the value
 previously set via a call to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(). Note that the
 callback will not be called in the event of a handshake where session resumption
@@ -63,22 +72,48 @@ side SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() can be used to determine whether the client
 requested OCSP stapling. If the client requested it then this function will
 return B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp>, or -1 otherwise.
 
-The response returned by the server can be obtained via a call to
-SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). The value B<*resp> will be updated to point
-to the OCSP response data and the return value will be the length of that data.
-Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from this data via a
-call to the d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() function. If the server has not provided any
-response data then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
+A single response returned by the server (TLS < 1.3) can be obtained via a call
+to SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). The value B<*resp> will be updated to
+point to the OCSP response data and the return value will be the length of that
+data. Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from this data
+via a call to the d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE() function. If the server has not provided
+any response data then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
 SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() will be -1.
 
+A server application must also call the SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() function
+if it wants to be able to provide clients with (single) OCSP response for the
+server certificate. Typically the server callback would obtain the server
+certificate that is being sent back to the client via a call to
+SSL_get_certificate(); retrieve the related OCSP response to be sent back; and
+then set that response data by calling SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). A
+pointer to the response data should be provided in the B<resp> argument, and
+the length of that data should be in the B<len> argument.
+
+In the case of multi-stapling the responses to be returned by the server can be
+obtained via a call to SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(). The value B<*resp>
+will be updated to point to the OCSP response stack and the return value will
+be the number of responses on the stack.
+The OCSP responses on the stack are expected to be in the same order as the
+certificates in the chain. If no OCSP response is available for a certificate
+in the chain, a NULL element in the stack will represent this.
+Typically a callback would obtain an OCSP_RESPONSE object from the stack via a
+call to sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop. If the server has not provided any response data
+then B<*resp> will be NULL and the return value from
+SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex() will be -1.
+
 A server application must also call the SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb() function
 if it wants to be able to provide clients with OCSP Certificate Status
-responses. Typically the server callback would obtain the server certificate
-that is being sent back to the client via a call to SSL_get_certificate();
-obtain the OCSP response to be sent back; and then set that response data by
-calling SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(). A pointer to the response data should
-be provided in the B<resp> argument, and the length of that data should be in
-the B<len> argument.
+responses, where TLS 1.3 allows for multi-stapling, i.e., providing responses
+for all certificates in the chain of the server certificate (excluding the root
+CA certificate).
+The certificates sent back to the client and for which OCSP response(s)
+should be acquired could be obtained via call to SSL_get_certificate() resp.
+SSL_get0_chain_certs(). OCSP response(s) then set by calling
+SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(). A stack of OCSP responses should be
+provided in the B<resp> argument.
+The OCSP responses on the stack are expected to be in the same order as the
+certificate in the chain. If no OCSP response is available for a certificate in
+the chain, a NULL element in the stack will represent this.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
@@ -93,8 +128,9 @@ returned) or SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL (meaning that a fatal error has
 occurred).
 
 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(), SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(),
-SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() and
+SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(),
 SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() return 0 on error or 1 on success.
+SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex() will return always 1.
 
 SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type() returns the value previously set by
 SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), or -1 if not set.
@@ -102,6 +138,9 @@ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(), or -1 if not set.
 SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp() returns the length of the OCSP response data
 or -1 if there is no OCSP response data.
 
+SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex() returns the number of the OCSP responses
+on the stack or -1 if there is no OCSP response data.
+
 SSL_get_tlsext_status_type() returns B<TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp> on the client
 side if SSL_set_tlsext_status_type() was previously called, or on the server
 side if the client requested OCSP stapling. Otherwise -1 is returned.
@@ -115,6 +154,9 @@ L<ssl(7)>
 The SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(), SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_type()
 and SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
 
+The SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex() and SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex()
+macros were added in OpenSSL 3.6.
+
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 
 Copyright 2015-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_get_error.pod

@@ -440,6 +440,32 @@ Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP verification failed.
 Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the certificate is not
 recognized by the OCSP responder.
 
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID: OCSP response(s) invalid>
+
+Returned by the verify callback to indicate that one or more OCSP
+responses are invalid.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: OCSP response signature failure>
+
+Returned by the verify callback to indicate OCSP response signature
+verification failed.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NOT_YET_VALID: OCSP response not yet valid>
+OCSP response not yet valid (contains a date in the future)>
+
+Returned by the verify callback to indicate that OCSP response has a
+I<thisUpdate> date in the future.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_HAS_EXPIRED: OCSP response has expired>
+
+Returned by the verify callback to indicate that the OCSP response has expired.
+
+=item B<X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE:
+no OCSP response available for certificate>
+
+Returned by the verify callback to indicate that no OCSP response is available
+for the certificate.
+
 =item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM:
 unsupported signature algorithm>
 

doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_get0_rpk,
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_default,
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify,
 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn,
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp,
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose,
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust,
 X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit
  typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
  void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify);
 
+ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk);
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose);
  int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust);
  int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
@@ -217,6 +219,12 @@ validate extended key usage information in certificates will need to define a
 custom "purpose" (see below) or supply a nondefault verification callback
 (L<X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(3)>).
 
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp() sets the OCSP response(s) for the verification
+of a certificate chain or for including in the TLS handshake, when the client
+requests OCSP stapling. The stack of OCSP responses I<sk> is not copied but
+just stored to the context.
+I<ctx> holds a pointer to the stack, so the stack must outlive the I<ctx>.
+
 X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() sets the purpose for the target certificate being
 verified in the I<ctx>. Built-in available values for the I<purpose> argument
 are B<X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT>, B<X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER>,
@@ -314,6 +322,7 @@ The X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
 The X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
 The X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(), X509_STORE_CTX_get0_rpk(), and
 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_rpk() functions were added in OpenSSL 3.2.
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp() function was added in OpenSSL 3.6.
 
 There is no need to call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() explicitly since OpenSSL 3.0.
 

doc/man7/openssl-env.pod

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ openssl-env - OpenSSL environment variables
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-The OpenSSL libraries use environment variables to override the
-compiled-in default paths for various data.
-To avoid security risks, the environment is usually not consulted when
-the executable is set-user-ID or set-group-ID.
+The OpenSSL libraries and commands use environment variables to override
+compiled-in defaults for various aspects of their behaviour.
+To avoid security risks, the environment is not consulted
+for security-sensitive environment variables when the executable
+is set-user-ID or set-group-ID.
 
 =over 4
 
@@ -18,39 +19,85 @@ the executable is set-user-ID or set-group-ID.
 Specifies the path to a certificate transparency log list.
 See L<CTLOG_STORE_new(3)>.
 
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
+=item B<HOME>, B<SYSTEMROOT>, B<USERPROFILE>
+
+Path which L<RAND_file_name(3)> uses as a directory for the random seed file
+name when the B<RANDFILE> environment variable is not set.
+B<HOME> is the only variable that is considered on Unix-like systems;
+B<USERPROFILE> and B<SYSTEMROOT> are used as fallbacks on Windows platforms.
+
+B<HOME> variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
+=item B<HTTPS_PROXY>, B<HTTP_PROXY>, B<NO_PROXY>, B<https_proxy>, B<http_proxy>, B<no_proxy>
+
+Specify a proxy hostname.
+See L<OSSL_HTTP_parse_url(3)>.
+
+These variables are considered security-sensitive environment variables.
+
+=item B<LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12>
+
+Affects the way MAC is generated in PKCS#12 containers for GOST algorithms.
+See L<PKCS12_gen_mac(3)>.
+
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL>
 
 Specifies the path to the B<openssl> executable. Used by
 the B<rehash> script (see L<openssl-rehash(1)/Script Configuration>)
 and by the B<CA.pl> script (see L<CA.pl(1)/NOTES>
 
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_CONF>, B<OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE>
 
 Specifies the path to a configuration file and the directory for
 included files.
 See L<config(5)>.
 
+These variables are considered security-sensitive environment variables.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_CONFIG>
 
 Specifies a configuration option and filename for the B<req> and B<ca>
 commands invoked by the B<CA.pl> script.
 See L<CA.pl(1)>.
 
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
+=item B<OPENSSL_DEBUG_DECC_INIT>
+
+On VMS only:  if this variable is set, enables verbose output of parsing
+of C<DECC$*> logical names, that contain C RTL features, during library
+initialisation (C<LIB$INITIALIZE>).  If the value of the variable is more
+than 1, outputs information about every processed feature.
+
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_ENGINES>
 
 Specifies the directory from which dynamic engines are loaded.
 See L<openssl-engine(1)>.
 
-=item B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD>, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES>
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
+=item B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES>, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_FD>, B<OPENSSL_MALLOC_SEED>
 
 If built with debugging, this allows memory allocation to fail.
 See L<OPENSSL_malloc(3)>.
 
+These variables are not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_MODULES>
 
 Specifies the directory from which cryptographic providers are loaded.
 Equivalently, the generic B<-provider-path> command-line option may be used.
 
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_SEC_MEM>
 
 Initializes the secure memory at the beginning of the application which makes
@@ -59,12 +106,24 @@ indicates the B<size> parameter in bytes. The value can be expressed in
 binary, octal, decimal and hexadecimal. For formatting see B<strtol(3)>.
 For further restrictions see L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(3)>.
 
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_SEC_MEM_MINSIZE>
 
 An optional variable used with B<OPENSSL_SEC_MEM>. The value indicates
 B<minsize> parameter in bytes. The same formatting applies as above.
 Default is 0. For more info see L<CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(3)>.
 
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
+=item B<OPENSSL_TEST_LIBCTX>
+
+This test-only environment variable, that is recognised by the L<openssl(1)>
+command, when is set to "1", leads to creation of a nondefault library context
+by the command, for which the B<-config> option then takes effect.
+
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_TRACE>
 
 By default the OpenSSL trace feature is disabled statically.
@@ -75,58 +134,14 @@ Unless OpenSSL tracing support is generally disabled,
 enable trace output of specific parts of OpenSSL libraries, by name.
 This output usually makes sense only if you know OpenSSL internals well.
 
-The value of this environment varialble is a comma-separated list of names,
+The value of this environment variable is a comma-separated list of names,
 with the following available:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item B<TRACE>
+=item B<ALL>
 
-Traces the OpenSSL trace API itself.
-
-=item B<INIT>
-
-Traces OpenSSL library initialization and cleanup.
-
-=item B<TLS>
-
-Traces the TLS/SSL protocol.
-
-=item B<TLS_CIPHER>
-
-Traces the ciphers used by the TLS/SSL protocol.
-
-=item B<CONF>
-
-Show details about provider and engine configuration.
-
-=item B<ENGINE_TABLE>
-
-The function that is used by RSA, DSA (etc) code to select registered
-ENGINEs, cache defaults and functional references (etc), will generate
-debugging summaries.
-
-=item B<ENGINE_REF_COUNT>
-
-Reference counts in the ENGINE structure will be monitored with a line
-of generated for each change.
-
-=item B<PKCS5V2>
-
-Traces PKCS#5 v2 key generation.
-
-=item B<PKCS12_KEYGEN>
-
-Traces PKCS#12 key generation.
-
-=item B<PKCS12_DECRYPT>
-
-Traces PKCS#12 decryption.
-
-=item B<X509V3_POLICY>
-
-Generates the complete policy tree at various points during X.509 v3
-policy evaluation.
+Traces everything.
 
 =item B<BN_CTX>
 
@@ -136,9 +151,9 @@ Traces BIGNUM context operations.
 
 Traces CMP client and server activity.
 
-=item B<STORE>
+=item B<CONF>
 
-Traces STORE operations.
+Show details about provider and engine configuration.
 
 =item B<DECODER>
 
@@ -148,16 +163,81 @@ Traces decoder operations.
 
 Traces encoder operations.
 
-=item B<REF_COUNT>
+=item B<ENGINE_REF_COUNT>
 
-Traces decrementing certain ASN.1 structure references.
+Reference counts in the ENGINE structure will be monitored with a line
+of generated for each change.
+
+=item B<ENGINE_TABLE>
+
+The function that is used by RSA, DSA (etc) code to select registered
+ENGINEs, cache defaults and functional references (etc), will generate
+debugging summaries.
 
 =item B<HTTP>
 
 Traces the HTTP client and server, such as messages being sent and received.
 
+=item B<INIT>
+
+Traces OpenSSL library initialization and cleanup.
+
+=item B<PKCS12_DECRYPT>
+
+Traces PKCS#12 decryption.
+
+=item B<PKCS12_KEYGEN>
+
+Traces PKCS#12 key generation.
+
+=item B<PKCS5V2>
+
+Traces PKCS#5 v2 key generation.
+
+=item B<PROVIDER>
+
+Traces various operations that are performed on OpenSSL providers during their
+handling by the library (see L<provider(7)>), such as initialisation, tear down,
+parameter and capability retrieval, self-test, and so on.
+
+=item B<QUERY>
+
+Traces operation related to addition, removal, and fetching of methods
+in the so-called method store, that holds pointers to functions provided
+by various providers.
+
+=item B<REF_COUNT>
+
+Traces reference count changes in various structures,
+including C<BIO>, C<DH>, C<DSA>, C<EC_KEY>, C<ECX_KEY>,
+C<EVP_PKEY>, C<EVP_SKEY>, C<RSA>, C<SSL>, C<SSL_CTX>, C<SSL_SESSION>,
+C<X509_CRL>, C<X509_STORE>, C<X509>, and some others.
+
+=item B<STORE>
+
+Traces STORE operations.
+
+=item B<TLS>
+
+Traces the TLS/SSL protocol.
+
+=item B<TLS_CIPHER>
+
+Traces the ciphers used by the TLS/SSL protocol.
+
+=item B<TRACE>
+
+Traces the OpenSSL trace API itself.
+
+=item B<X509V3_POLICY>
+
+Generates the complete policy tree at various points during X.509 v3
+policy evaluation.
+
 =back
 
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =item B<OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8>
 
 If set, then L<UI_OpenSSL(3)> returns UTF-8 encoded strings, rather than
@@ -166,41 +246,35 @@ the L<openssl(1)> program also transcodes the command-line parameters
 from the current code page to UTF-8.
 This environment variable is only checked on Microsoft Windows platforms.
 
+=item B<OPENSSL_armcap>, B<OPENSSL_ia32cap>, B<OPENSSL_ppccap>, B<OPENSSL_riscvcap>, B<OPENSSL_s390xcap>, B<OPENSSL_sparcv9cap>
+
+OpenSSL supports a number of different algorithm implementations for
+various machines and, by default, it determines which to use based on the
+processor capabilities and run time feature enquiry.  These environment
+variables can be used to exert more control over this selection process.
+See L<OPENSSL_ia32cap(3)>, L<OPENSSL_riscvcap(3)>, and L<OPENSSL_s390xcap(3)>.
+
+These variables are not considered security-sensitive.
+
+=item B<OSSL_QFILTER>
+
+Used to set a QUIC qlog filter specification. See L<openssl-qlog(7)>.
+
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
+=item B<QLOGDIR>
+
+Specifies a QUIC qlog output directory. See L<openssl-qlog(7)>.
+
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
 =item B<RANDFILE>
 
 The state file for the random number generator.
 This should not be needed in normal use.
 See L<RAND_load_file(3)>.
 
-=item B<SSL_CERT_DIR>, B<SSL_CERT_FILE>
-
-Specify the default directory or file containing CA certificates.
-See L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
-
-=item B<TSGET>
-
-Additional arguments for the L<tsget(1)> command.
-
-=item B<OPENSSL_ia32cap>, B<OPENSSL_sparcv9cap>, B<OPENSSL_ppccap>, B<OPENSSL_armcap>, B<OPENSSL_s390xcap>, B<OPENSSL_riscvcap>
-
-OpenSSL supports a number of different algorithm implementations for
-various machines and, by default, it determines which to use based on the
-processor capabilities and run time feature enquiry.  These environment
-variables can be used to exert more control over this selection process.
-See L<OPENSSL_ia32cap(3)>, L<OPENSSL_s390xcap(3)> and L<OPENSSL_riscvcap(3)>.
-
-=item B<NO_PROXY>, B<HTTPS_PROXY>, B<HTTP_PROXY>
-
-Specify a proxy hostname.
-See L<OSSL_HTTP_parse_url(3)>.
-
-=item B<QLOGDIR>
-
-Specifies a QUIC qlog output directory. See L<openssl-qlog(7)>.
-
-=item B<OSSL_QFILTER>
-
-Used to set a QUIC qlog filter specification. See L<openssl-qlog(7)>.
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
 
 =item B<SSLKEYLOGFILE>
 
@@ -214,6 +288,49 @@ the exchanged keys during an SSL session, it allows any available party with
 read access to the file to decrypt application traffic sent over that session.
 Use of this feature should be restricted to test and debug environments only.
 
+This variable is considered a security-sensitive environment variable.
+
+=item B<SSL_CERT_DIR>, B<SSL_CERT_FILE>
+
+Specify the default directory or file containing CA certificates.
+See L<SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3)>.
+
+These variables are considered security-sensitive environment variables,
+except in L<openssl-rehash(1)>, where B<SSL_CERT_DIR> is not considered
+security-sensitive.
+
+=item B<SSL_CIPHER>
+
+Used by L<openssl-s_time(1)> in case B<-cipher> option (that allows modifying
+TLSv1.2 and below cipher list sent by the client) is not provided,
+for specification of the aforementioned ciphers.
+
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
+=item B<TSGET>
+
+Additional arguments for the L<tsget(1)> command.
+
+This variable is not considered security-sensitive.
+
+=back
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+This section contains environment variables that are no longer considered
+by the OpenSSL libraries and commands.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX>
+
+This environment variable, existed in OpenSSL versions from 1.1.1 up to 3.5,
+allowed specification of a prefix prepended to each line sent to the I<stdout>
+by L<openssl(1)>, used by the test harness to avoid commingling the command
+under test output with the output for the TAP consumer.
+
+This variable was not considered security-sensitive.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 COPYRIGHT

doc/man7/provider-base.pod

@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ provider):
  core_new_error                 OSSL_FUNC_CORE_NEW_ERROR
  core_set_error_debug           OSSL_FUNC_CORE_SET_ERROR_DEBUG
  core_vset_error                OSSL_FUNC_CORE_VSET_ERROR
+ core_set_error_mark            OSSL_FUNC_CORE_SET_ERROR_MARK
+ core_clear_last_error_mark     OSSL_FUNC_CORE_CLEAR_LAST_ERROR_MARK
+ core_pop_error_to_mark         OSSL_FUNC_CORE_POP_ERROR_TO_MARK
+ core_count_to_mark             OSSL_FUNC_CORE_COUNT_TO_MARK
  core_obj_add_sigid             OSSL_FUNC_CORE_OBJ_ADD_SIGID
  core_obj_create                OSSL_FUNC_CORE_OBJ_CREATE
  CRYPTO_malloc                  OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_MALLOC
@@ -270,6 +274,33 @@ error occurred or was reported.
 
 This corresponds to the OpenSSL function L<ERR_vset_error(3)>.
 
+=item core_set_error_mark()
+
+sets a mark on the current topmost error record if there is one.
+
+This corresponds to the OpenSSL function L<ERR_set_mark(3)>.
+
+=item core_clear_last_error_mark()
+
+removes the last mark added if there is one.
+
+This corresponds to the OpenSSL function L<ERR_clear_last_mark(3)>.
+
+=item core_pop_error_to_mark()
+
+pops the top of the error stack until a mark is found. The mark is then removed.
+If there is no mark, the whole stack is removed.
+
+This corresponds to the OpenSSL function L<ERR_pop_to_mark(3)>.
+
+=item core_count_to_mark()
+
+returns the number of entries on the error stack above the most recently
+marked entry, not including that entry. If there is no mark in the error stack,
+the number of entries in the error stack is returned.
+
+This corresponds to the OpenSSL function L<ERR_count_to_mark(3)>.
+
 =back
 
 The core_obj_create() function registers a new OID and associated short name

doc/man7/provider-keymgmt.pod

@@ -442,6 +442,30 @@ its argument I<mdname>.  This signifies that no digest has to be specified
 with the corresponding signature operation, but may be specified as an
 option.
 
+=item "ri-type" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CMS_RI_TYPE>) <integer>
+
+The value should be the CMS RecipientInfo type for the given key, for example
+B<CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM> or B<CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE>.
+The value that can be given through this parameter is found in
+F<< <openssl/cms.h> >>, with the macros having names starting with
+C<CMS_RECIPINFO_>.
+
+CMS will query this parameter first to determine the RecipientInfo type.  If
+this parameter is not filled in, CMS will check for known key types and map
+them to the appropriate RecipientInfo type. Otherwise, CMS will default to
+using B<CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS>.
+
+=item "kemri-kdf-alg" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CMS_KEMRI_KDF_ALGORITHM>) <UTF8 string>
+
+The value should be the DER-encoded X509_ALGOR for the default KDF for this key
+if it supports the KEMRecipientInfo (B<CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM>) type.
+
+Any KDF that takes B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY> and B<OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO> parameters
+and is otherwise fully defined by its OID can be used, for example B<HKDF-SHA256>.
+
+If B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_CMS_KEMRI_KDF_ALGORITHM> is not implemented, B<HKDF-SHA256>
+will be used as the default KDF.
+
 =back
 
 The OpenSSL FIPS provider also supports the following parameters:

fuzz/dtlsserver.c

@@ -590,10 +590,7 @@ int FuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
     SSL *server;
     BIO *in;
     BIO *out;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)                     \
-    || (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0))
     BIO *bio_buf;
-#endif
     SSL_CTX *ctx;
     int ret;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0

fuzz/oids.txt

@@ -1347,3 +1347,5 @@ OBJ_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256f_WITH_SHAKE256="\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x03\x2E"
 OBJ_HKDF_SHA256="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1C"
 OBJ_HKDF_SHA384="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1D"
 OBJ_HKDF_SHA512="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x03\x1E"
+OBJ_id_smime_ori="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x0D"
+OBJ_id_smime_ori_kem="\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x09\x10\x0D\x03"

include/crypto/x509.h

@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st {      /* X509_STORE_CTX */
     STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted;
     /* set of CRLs passed in */
     STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *ocsp_resp;
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
     /* Other info for use with get_issuer() */
     void *other_ctx;

include/internal/quic_ackm.h

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ OSSL_ACKM *ossl_ackm_new(OSSL_TIME (*now)(void *arg),
                          void *now_arg,
                          OSSL_STATM *statm,
                          const OSSL_CC_METHOD *cc_method,
-                         OSSL_CC_DATA *cc_data);
+                         OSSL_CC_DATA *cc_data, int is_server);
 void ossl_ackm_free(OSSL_ACKM *ackm);
 
 void ossl_ackm_set_loss_detection_deadline_callback(OSSL_ACKM *ackm,

include/openssl/cms.h.in

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_ContentInfo_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK               2
 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS              3
 # define CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER             4
+# define CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM               5
 
 /* S/MIME related flags */
 
@@ -401,6 +402,14 @@ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg,
                           ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen);
 
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk);
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+X509_ALGOR *CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_get0_kdf_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kemri_set_ukm(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+                                    const unsigned char *ukm,
+                                    int ukmLength);
+
 /* Backward compatibility for spelling errors. */
 # define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITM CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
 # define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECPIENTINFO_TYPE \

include/openssl/cmserr.h

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_A_SIGNED_RECEIPT                       165
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED_DATA                         122
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_KEK                                    123
+#  define CMS_R_NOT_KEM                                    197
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT                          181
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT                          124
 #  define CMS_R_NOT_PWRI                                   177
@@ -106,10 +107,12 @@
 #  define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER                             148
 #  define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM                   149
 #  define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_ID                                 150
+#  define CMS_R_UNKNOWN_KDF_ALGORITHM                      198
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM          151
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM   194
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE                   152
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE                192
+#  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KDF_ALGORITHM                  199
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM                  153
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM       179
 #  define CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE                   193

include/openssl/core_dispatch.h

@@ -253,6 +253,10 @@ OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, provider_up_ref,
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, provider_free,
                     (const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *prov, int deactivate))
 
+/* Additional error functions provided by the core */
+# define OSSL_FUNC_CORE_COUNT_TO_MARK          120
+OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, core_count_to_mark, (const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *prov))
+
 /* Functions provided by the provider to the Core, reserved numbers 1024-1535 */
 # define OSSL_FUNC_PROVIDER_TEARDOWN           1024
 OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(void, provider_teardown, (void *provctx))

include/openssl/obj_mac.h

@@ -778,6 +778,10 @@
 #define NID_id_smime_cti                195
 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti                OBJ_SMIME,6L
 
+#define SN_id_smime_ori         "id-smime-ori"
+#define NID_id_smime_ori                1499
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ori                OBJ_SMIME,13L
+
 #define SN_id_smime_mod_cms             "id-smime-mod-cms"
 #define NID_id_smime_mod_cms            196
 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms            OBJ_id_smime_mod,1L
@@ -1113,6 +1117,10 @@
 #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation            256
 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation            OBJ_id_smime_cti,6L
 
+#define SN_id_smime_ori_kem             "id-smime-ori-kem"
+#define NID_id_smime_ori_kem            1500
+#define OBJ_id_smime_ori_kem            OBJ_id_smime_ori,3L
+
 #define LN_friendlyName         "friendlyName"
 #define NID_friendlyName                156
 #define OBJ_friendlyName                OBJ_pkcs9,20L

include/openssl/pem.h

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY "EC PRIVATE KEY"
 # define PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS   "PARAMETERS"
 # define PEM_STRING_CMS          "CMS"
+# define PEM_STRING_SM2PRIVATEKEY "SM2 PRIVATE KEY"
 # define PEM_STRING_SM2PARAMETERS "SM2 PARAMETERS"
 # define PEM_STRING_ACERT        "ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE"
 

include/openssl/ssl.h.in

@@ -1342,6 +1342,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 # define SSL_CTRL_GET0_IMPLEMENTED_GROUPS        139
 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_SIGNATURE_NAME             140
 # define SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NAME        141
+# define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX        142
+# define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX        143
 # define SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST                      1
 # define SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT                       2
 # define SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER                     3

include/openssl/tls1.h

@@ -325,6 +325,12 @@ __owur int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
 # define SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(ssl, arg, arglen) \
         SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP,arglen,arg)
 
+# define SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(ssl, arg) \
+    SSL_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX, 0, arg)
+
+# define SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(ssl, arg) \
+    SSL_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX, 0, arg)
+
 # define SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, cb) \
         SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB,\
                 (void (*)(void))cb)

include/openssl/x509_vfy.h.in

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ use OpenSSL::stackhash qw(generate_stack_macros);
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE)
+
 /*-
 SSL_CTX -> X509_STORE
                 -> X509_LOOKUP
@@ -316,6 +318,14 @@ X509_LOOKUP_ctrl_ex((x), X509_L_ADD_STORE, (name), 0, NULL,           \
 # define X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS               94
 # define X509_V_ERR_RPK_UNTRUSTED                        95
 
+/* additional OCSP status errors */
+# define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_RESP_INVALID                    96
+# define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_SIGNATURE_FAILURE               97
+# define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NOT_YET_VALID                   98
+# define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_HAS_EXPIRED                     99
+# define X509_V_ERR_OCSP_NO_RESPONSE                    100
+# define X509_V_ERR_CRL_VERIFY_FAILED                   101
+
 /* Certificate verify flags */
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
 #  define X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK             0x0   /* Deprecated */
@@ -367,6 +377,11 @@ X509_LOOKUP_ctrl_ex((x), X509_L_ADD_STORE, (name), 0, NULL,           \
 /* Do not check certificate/CRL validity against current time */
 # define X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME               0x200000
 
+/* Verify OCSP stapling response for server certificate */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK 0x400000
+/* Verify OCSP stapling responses for whole chain */
+# define X509_V_FLAG_OCSP_RESP_CHECK_ALL 0x800000
+
 # define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT                    0x1
 # define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE                  0x2
 # define X509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS                0x4
@@ -675,6 +690,9 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *target);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_rpk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *target);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *c, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk);
+# endif
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose);
 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust);
 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,

providers/common/der/HKDF.asn1

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-- Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+--
+-- Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+-- this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+-- in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+-- https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
+-- -------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Taken from https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8619/
+
+id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 }
+id-alg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime  3 }
+
+id-alg-hkdf-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg 28 }
+id-alg-hkdf-with-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg 29 }
+id-alg-hkdf-with-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-alg 30 }

providers/common/der/build.info

@@ -127,9 +127,20 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{'slh-dsa'} -}]
   DEPEND[$DER_SLH_DSA_H]=oids_to_c.pm SLH_DSA.asn1
 ENDIF
 
+#----- HKDF
+$DER_HKDF_H=$INCDIR/der_hkdf.h
+$DER_HKDF_GEN=der_hkdf_gen.c
+
+GENERATE[$DER_HKDF_GEN]=der_hkdf_gen.c.in
+DEPEND[$DER_HKDF_GEN]=oids_to_c.pm HKDF.asn1
+
+DEPEND[${DER_HKDF_GEN/.c/.o}]=$DER_HKDF_H
+GENERATE[$DER_HKDF_H]=$INCDIR/der_hkdf.h.in
+DEPEND[$DER_HKDF_H]=oids_to_c.pm HKDF.asn1
+
 #----- Conclusion
 
-$COMMON= $DER_RSA_COMMON $DER_DIGESTS_GEN $DER_WRAP_GEN
+$COMMON= $DER_RSA_COMMON $DER_DIGESTS_GEN $DER_WRAP_GEN $DER_HKDF_GEN
 
 IF[{- !$disabled{dsa} -}]
   $COMMON = $COMMON $DER_DSA_GEN $DER_DSA_AUX

providers/common/der/der_hkdf_gen.c.in

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * {- join("\n * ", @autowarntext) -}
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "prov/der_hkdf.h"
+
+/* Well known OIDs precompiled */
+{-
+    $OUT = oids_to_c::process_leaves('providers/common/der/HKDF.asn1',
+                                     { dir => $config{sourcedir},
+                                       filter => \&oids_to_c::filter_to_C });
+-}

providers/common/include/prov/der_hkdf.h.in

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * {- join("\n * ", @autowarntext) -}
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/der.h"
+
+/* Well known OIDs precompiled */
+{-
+    $OUT = oids_to_c::process_leaves('providers/common/der/HKDF.asn1',
+                                     { dir => $config{sourcedir},
+                                       filter => \&oids_to_c::filter_to_H });
+-}

providers/fips/fipsprov.c

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_mark_fn *c_set_error_mark;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_clear_last_error_mark_fn *c_clear_last_error_mark;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark_fn *c_pop_error_to_mark;
+static OSSL_FUNC_core_count_to_mark_fn *c_count_to_mark;
 static OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_malloc_fn *c_CRYPTO_malloc;
 static OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_zalloc_fn *c_CRYPTO_zalloc;
 static OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_free_fn *c_CRYPTO_free;
@@ -834,6 +835,9 @@ int OSSL_provider_init_int(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
         case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_POP_ERROR_TO_MARK:
             set_func(c_pop_error_to_mark, OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark(in));
             break;
+        case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_COUNT_TO_MARK:
+            set_func(c_count_to_mark, OSSL_FUNC_core_count_to_mark(in));
+            break;
         case OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_MALLOC:
             set_func(c_CRYPTO_malloc, OSSL_FUNC_CRYPTO_malloc(in));
             break;
@@ -1072,6 +1076,11 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
     return c_pop_error_to_mark(NULL);
 }
 
+int ERR_count_to_mark(void)
+{
+    return c_count_to_mark != NULL ? c_count_to_mark(NULL) : 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * This must take a library context, since it's called from the depths
  * of crypto/initthread.c code, where it's (correctly) assumed that the

providers/fips/self_test_data.inc

@@ -1027,38 +1027,39 @@ static const unsigned char dh_priv[] = {
     0x40, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xe6
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_pub[] = {
-    0x95, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x29, 0xe5, 0x71, 0x04,
-    0x92, 0xb9, 0x18, 0x31, 0x7b, 0x72, 0xa3, 0x69,
-    0x36, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x1a, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0x59,
-    0x16, 0x99, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x6d, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0x9b,
-    0xdd, 0x6d, 0x5a, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x98, 0x89, 0x0c,
-    0x62, 0xb3, 0x76, 0x52, 0xd3, 0x6e, 0x71, 0x21,
-    0x11, 0xe6, 0x8a, 0x73, 0x55, 0x37, 0x25, 0x06,
-    0x99, 0xef, 0xe3, 0x30, 0x53, 0x73, 0x91, 0xfb,
-    0xc2, 0xc5, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x5a, 0xc3, 0xe5, 0xb2,
-    0x33, 0x86, 0xc3, 0xee, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xc0,
-    0x99, 0xd7, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x02, 0x68, 0x7e, 0x83,
-    0x96, 0x42, 0x48, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x90,
-    0x8e, 0x8f, 0xb3, 0x31, 0x93, 0x15, 0xf6, 0xd2,
-    0x60, 0x6d, 0x7f, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x2c, 0xc6, 0xe7,
-    0xc5, 0x84, 0x3a, 0xfb, 0x22, 0x51, 0x9c, 0xf0,
-    0xf0, 0xf9, 0xd3, 0xa0, 0xa4, 0xe8, 0xc8, 0x88,
-    0x99, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe7, 0x36, 0x43, 0x51, 0xfb,
-    0x6a, 0x36, 0x3e, 0xe7, 0x17, 0xe5, 0x44, 0x5a,
-    0xda, 0xb4, 0xc9, 0x31, 0xa6, 0x48, 0x39, 0x97,
-    0xb8, 0x7d, 0xad, 0x83, 0x67, 0x7e, 0x4d, 0x1d,
-    0x3a, 0x77, 0x75, 0xe0, 0xf6, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0xdf,
-    0x73, 0xc7, 0xad, 0x80, 0x1e, 0x66, 0x5a, 0x0e,
-    0x5a, 0x79, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x03, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x9f,
-    0xa1, 0x82, 0xef, 0xc8, 0xa0, 0x4f, 0x5e, 0x4d,
-    0xb9, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x86, 0x37, 0xf9, 0x5d, 0xb1,
-    0x64, 0x36, 0xbd, 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xfc, 0x09, 0x6c,
-    0x4f, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xbe, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x47,
-    0x9a, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x77, 0x26, 0x3e,
-    0x07, 0xd9, 0x95, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0xbf, 0x3f,
-    0x0a, 0xe3, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0x89, 0xc9,
-    0x9e, 0x3e, 0xa1, 0x21, 0x73, 0x43, 0xdd, 0x8c,
-    0x65, 0x81, 0xac, 0xc4, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x91, 0xd3
+    0x00, 0x8f, 0x81, 0x67, 0x68, 0xce, 0x97, 0x99,
+    0x7e, 0x11, 0x5c, 0xad, 0x5b, 0xe1, 0x0c, 0xd4,
+    0x15, 0x44, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x47, 0xe7, 0x06, 0x27,
+    0x5e, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x5c, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0x35, 0x05,
+    0xfd, 0x3c, 0x8f, 0x35, 0x85, 0x1b, 0x82, 0xdd,
+    0x49, 0xc9, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x3a, 0x5f, 0x33, 0xdc,
+    0x8f, 0x5e, 0x32, 0x76, 0xe1, 0x52, 0x1b, 0x88,
+    0x85, 0xda, 0xa9, 0x1d, 0x5f, 0x1c, 0x05, 0x3a,
+    0xd4, 0x8d, 0xbb, 0xe7, 0x46, 0x46, 0x1e, 0x29,
+    0x4b, 0x5a, 0x02, 0x88, 0x46, 0x94, 0xd0, 0x68,
+    0x7d, 0xb2, 0x9f, 0x3a, 0x3d, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe5,
+    0xa7, 0xbe, 0x6c, 0x7e, 0x24, 0x35, 0x25, 0x14,
+    0xf3, 0x45, 0x08, 0x90, 0xfc, 0x55, 0x2e, 0xa8,
+    0xb8, 0xb1, 0x89, 0x15, 0x94, 0x51, 0x44, 0xa9,
+    0x9f, 0x68, 0xcb, 0x90, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0xae, 0x02,
+    0x37, 0x26, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x90, 0x95, 0x7e,
+    0x1d, 0xac, 0x0c, 0x91, 0x97, 0x83, 0x24, 0x83,
+    0xb9, 0xa1, 0x40, 0x72, 0xac, 0xf0, 0x55, 0x32,
+    0x18, 0xab, 0xb8, 0x90, 0xda, 0x13, 0x4a, 0xc8,
+    0x4b, 0x7c, 0x18, 0xbc, 0x33, 0xbf, 0x99, 0x85,
+    0x39, 0x3e, 0xc6, 0x95, 0x9b, 0x48, 0x8e, 0xbe,
+    0x46, 0x59, 0x48, 0x41, 0x0d, 0x37, 0x25, 0x94,
+    0xbe, 0x8d, 0xf5, 0x81, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xdc, 0xeb,
+    0x98, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0x44, 0x61, 0x6f, 0xa3, 0xef,
+    0x7b, 0xfe, 0xbb, 0xc2, 0x8e, 0x46, 0x63, 0xbc,
+    0x52, 0x65, 0xf9, 0xf8, 0x85, 0x41, 0xdf, 0x82,
+    0x4a, 0x10, 0x2a, 0xe3, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x84,
+    0xa6, 0x6f, 0x4e, 0x8e, 0x96, 0x1e, 0x04, 0xf7,
+    0x57, 0x39, 0xca, 0x58, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x5a, 0xf1,
+    0xf5, 0x69, 0xc2, 0xb1, 0x5c, 0x0a, 0xce, 0xbe,
+    0x38, 0x01, 0xb5, 0x3f, 0x07, 0x8a, 0x72, 0x90,
+    0x10, 0xac, 0x51, 0x3a, 0x96, 0x43, 0xdf, 0x6f,
+    0xea
 };
 static const unsigned char dh_peer_pub[] = {
     0x1f, 0xc1, 0xda, 0x34, 0x1d, 0x1a, 0x84, 0x6a,

providers/implementations/encode_decode/decode_pem2der.c

@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ static int pem2der_decode(void *vctx, OSSL_CORE_BIO *cin, int selection,
         { PEM_STRING_DSAPARAMS, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "DSA", "type-specific" },
         { PEM_STRING_ECPRIVATEKEY, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "EC", "type-specific" },
         { PEM_STRING_ECPARAMETERS, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "EC", "type-specific" },
+        { PEM_STRING_SM2PRIVATEKEY, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "SM2", "type-specific" },
         { PEM_STRING_SM2PARAMETERS, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "SM2", "type-specific" },
         { PEM_STRING_RSA, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "RSA", "type-specific" },
         { PEM_STRING_RSA_PUBLIC, OSSL_OBJECT_PKEY, "RSA", "type-specific" },

providers/implementations/keymgmt/build.info

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{'ml-kem'} -}]
     SOURCE[$TLS_ML_KEM_HYBRID_GOAL]=mlx_kmgmt.c
   ENDIF
   SOURCE[$ML_KEM_GOAL]=ml_kem_kmgmt.c
+  DEPEND[ml_kem_kmgmt.o]=../../common/include/prov/der_hkdf.h
 ENDIF
 
 SOURCE[$RSA_GOAL]=rsa_kmgmt.c

providers/implementations/keymgmt/ml_kem_kmgmt.c.in

@@ -19,9 +19,13 @@ use OpenSSL::paramnames qw(produce_param_decoder);
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include "crypto/ml_kem.h"
 #include "internal/fips.h"
 #include "internal/param_build_set.h"
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+#include "prov/der_hkdf.h"
+#include "prov/der_wrap.h"
 #include "prov/implementations.h"
 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
@@ -494,7 +498,9 @@ static int ml_kem_import(void *vkey, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
                           ['PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY',           'privkey',   'octet_string'],
                           ['PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY',            'pubkey',    'octet_string'],
                           ['PKEY_PARAM_ENCODED_PUBLIC_KEY', 'encpubkey', 'octet_string'],
-                         )); -}
+                          ['PKEY_PARAM_CMS_RI_TYPE',        'ri_type',   'int'],
+                          ['PKEY_PARAM_CMS_KEMRI_KDF_ALGORITHM', 'kemri_kdf_alg', 'octet_string'],
+                          )); -}
 
 static const OSSL_PARAM *ml_kem_gettable_params(void *provctx)
 {
@@ -612,6 +618,36 @@ static int ml_kem_get_params(void *vkey, OSSL_PARAM params[])
                                   &ossl_ml_kem_encode_seed))
             return 0;
     }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+    if (p.ri_type != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p.ri_type, CMS_RECIPINFO_KEM))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p.kemri_kdf_alg != NULL) {
+        uint8_t aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
+        int ret;
+        size_t aid_len = 0;
+        WPACKET pkt;
+        uint8_t *aid = NULL;
+
+        ret = WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, aid_buf, sizeof(aid_buf));
+        ret &= ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(&pkt, -1)
+            && ossl_DER_w_precompiled(&pkt, -1, ossl_der_oid_id_alg_hkdf_with_sha256,
+                                      sizeof(ossl_der_oid_id_alg_hkdf_with_sha256))
+            && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(&pkt, -1);
+        if (ret && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+            WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &aid_len);
+            aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
+        }
+        WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+        if (!ret)
+            return 0;
+        if (aid != NULL && aid_len != 0 &&
+            !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p.kemri_kdf_alg, aid, aid_len))
+            return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
     return 1;
 }
 

providers/legacyprov.c

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_core_vset_error_fn *c_vset_error;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_set_error_mark_fn *c_set_error_mark;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_clear_last_error_mark_fn *c_clear_last_error_mark;
 static OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark_fn *c_pop_error_to_mark;
+static OSSL_FUNC_core_count_to_mark_fn *c_count_to_mark;
 #endif
 
 /* Parameters we provide to the core */
@@ -234,6 +235,9 @@ int OSSL_provider_init(const OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
         case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_POP_ERROR_TO_MARK:
             set_func(c_pop_error_to_mark, OSSL_FUNC_core_pop_error_to_mark(tmp));
             break;
+        case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_COUNT_TO_MARK:
+            set_func(c_count_to_mark, OSSL_FUNC_core_count_to_mark(in));
+            break;
         }
     }
 #endif
@@ -301,4 +305,9 @@ int ERR_pop_to_mark(void)
 {
     return c_pop_error_to_mark(NULL);
 }
+
+int ERR_count_to_mark(void)
+{
+    return c_count_to_mark != NULL ? c_count_to_mark(NULL) : 0;
+}
 #endif

ssl/quic/quic_ackm.c

@@ -536,6 +536,9 @@ struct ossl_ackm_st {
     /* Set to 1 when the handshake is confirmed. */
     char            handshake_confirmed;
 
+    /* Set to 1 when attached to server channel */
+    char            is_server;
+
     /* Set to 1 when the peer has completed address validation. */
     char            peer_completed_addr_validation;
 
@@ -855,7 +858,13 @@ static OSSL_TIME ackm_get_pto_time_and_space(OSSL_ACKM *ackm, int *space)
     }
 
     for (i = QUIC_PN_SPACE_INITIAL; i < QUIC_PN_SPACE_NUM; ++i) {
-        if (ackm->ack_eliciting_bytes_in_flight[i] == 0)
+        /*
+         * RFC 9002 section 6.2.2.1 keep probe timeout armed until
+         * handshake is confirmed (client sees HANDSHAKE_DONE message
+         * from server).
+         */
+        if (ackm->ack_eliciting_bytes_in_flight[i] == 0 &&
+            (ackm->handshake_confirmed == 1 || ackm->is_server == 1))
             continue;
 
         if (i == QUIC_PN_SPACE_APP) {
@@ -875,10 +884,18 @@ static OSSL_TIME ackm_get_pto_time_and_space(OSSL_ACKM *ackm, int *space)
             }
         }
 
-        t = ossl_time_add(ackm->time_of_last_ack_eliciting_pkt[i], duration);
-        if (ossl_time_compare(t, pto_timeout) < 0) {
-            pto_timeout = t;
-            pto_space   = i;
+        /*
+         * Only re-arm timer if stack has sent at least one ACK eliciting frame.
+         * If stack has sent no ACK eliciting frame at given encryption level then
+         * particular timer is zero and we must not attempt to set it. Timer keeps
+         * time since epoch (Jan 1 1970) and we must not set timer to past.
+         */
+        if (!ossl_time_is_zero(ackm->time_of_last_ack_eliciting_pkt[i])) {
+            t = ossl_time_add(ackm->time_of_last_ack_eliciting_pkt[i], duration);
+            if (ossl_time_compare(t, pto_timeout) < 0) {
+                pto_timeout = t;
+                pto_space   = i;
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -1021,7 +1038,8 @@ OSSL_ACKM *ossl_ackm_new(OSSL_TIME (*now)(void *arg),
                          void *now_arg,
                          OSSL_STATM *statm,
                          const OSSL_CC_METHOD *cc_method,
-                         OSSL_CC_DATA *cc_data)
+                         OSSL_CC_DATA *cc_data,
+                         int is_server)
 {
     OSSL_ACKM *ackm;
     int i;
@@ -1045,6 +1063,7 @@ OSSL_ACKM *ossl_ackm_new(OSSL_TIME (*now)(void *arg),
     ackm->statm     = statm;
     ackm->cc_method = cc_method;
     ackm->cc_data   = cc_data;
+    ackm->is_server = (char)is_server;
 
     ackm->rx_max_ack_delay = ossl_ms2time(QUIC_DEFAULT_MAX_ACK_DELAY);
     ackm->tx_max_ack_delay = DEFAULT_TX_MAX_ACK_DELAY;

ssl/quic/quic_channel.c

@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ static int ch_init(QUIC_CHANNEL *ch)
         goto err;
 
     if ((ch->ackm = ossl_ackm_new(get_time, ch, &ch->statm,
-                                  ch->cc_method, ch->cc_data)) == NULL)
+                                  ch->cc_method, ch->cc_data,
+                                  ch->is_server)) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (!ossl_quic_stream_map_init(&ch->qsm, get_stream_limit, ch,

ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 
 #define TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS       OSSL_NELEM(tls13_ciphers)
 #define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS        OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers)
@@ -3534,6 +3535,10 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    unsigned char *p = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+#endif
 
     if (sc == NULL)
         return ret;
@@ -3666,16 +3671,79 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         break;
 
     case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
-        *(unsigned char **)parg = sc->ext.ocsp.resp;
-        if (sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0
-                || sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len > LONG_MAX)
-            return -1;
-        return (long)sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len;
+        *(unsigned char **)parg = NULL;
+        ret = -1;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, 0);
+
+        if (resp != NULL) {
+            int resp_len = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &p);
+
+            if (resp_len > 0) {
+                OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp);
+                *(unsigned char **)parg = sc->ext.ocsp.resp = p;
+                sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len = (size_t)resp_len;
+                ret = resp_len;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
 
     case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP:
-        OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp);
-        sc->ext.ocsp.resp = parg;
-        sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len = larg;
+        ret = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        /*
+         * cleanup single values, which might be set somewhere else
+         * we only use the extended values
+         */
+        if (sc->ext.ocsp.resp != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp);
+            sc->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
+            sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+        }
+
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+        sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL;
+
+        if (parg != NULL) {
+            sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_reserve(NULL, 1);
+            if (sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex == NULL)
+                return 0;
+
+            p = parg;
+            resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, larg);
+            if (resp != NULL)
+                sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, resp);
+        }
+#endif
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) **)parg = sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex;
+        ret = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex);
+#else
+        *(unsigned char **)parg = NULL;
+        ret = -1;
+#endif
+        break;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP_EX:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        /*
+         * cleanup single values, which might be set somewhere else
+         * we only use the extended values
+         */
+        if (sc->ext.ocsp.resp != NULL) {
+            OPENSSL_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp);
+            sc->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
+            sc->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+        }
+
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+        sc->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = (STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *)parg;
+#endif
         ret = 1;
         break;
 

ssl/ssl_cert.c

@@ -433,6 +433,9 @@ static int ssl_verify_internal(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, EVP_PKEY *
     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
     SSL_CTX *sctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    SSL *ssl;
+#endif
 
     /* Something must be passed in */
     if ((sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) && rpk == NULL)
@@ -486,6 +489,26 @@ static int ssl_verify_internal(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, EVP_PKEY *
     if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
 
+    /*
+     * Set OCSP Responses for verification:
+     * This function is called in the SERVER_CERTIFICATE message, in TLS 1.2
+     * the OCSP responses are sent in the CERT_STATUS message after that.
+     * Therefore the verification code currently only works in TLS 1.3.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+    /*
+     * TODO(DTLS-1.3): in future DTLS should also be considered
+     */
+    if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && SSL_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        /* ignore status_request_v2 if TLS version < 1.3 */
+        int status = SSL_get_tlsext_status_type(ssl);
+
+        if (status == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+            X509_STORE_CTX_set_ocsp_resp(ctx, s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex);
+    }
+#endif
+
     /*
      * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
      * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
@@ -555,7 +578,7 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
 }
 
 static void set0_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
-                        STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+                         STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
 {
     sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
     *ca_list = name_list;

ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ SSL *ossl_ssl_connection_new_int(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *user_ssl,
     s->ext.ocsp.exts = NULL;
     s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
     s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL;
 
     if (!SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx))
         goto err;
@@ -1497,14 +1498,20 @@ void ossl_ssl_connection_free(SSL *ssl)
     OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tuples);
     OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
     sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+
     sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+    sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
     SCT_LIST_free(s->scts);
     OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
 #endif
-    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
     OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn);
     OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
     if (s->clienthello != NULL)
@@ -6428,41 +6435,59 @@ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
 {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
     int scts_extracted = 0;
-    const unsigned char *p;
     OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
     OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
     STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL;
-    int i;
+    int ret;
+    int i, j;
 
-    if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL || s->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0)
+    if (s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    p = s->ext.ocsp.resp;
-    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, (int)s->ext.ocsp.resp_len);
-    if (rsp == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
-    if (br == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) {
-        OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
-
-        if (single == NULL)
-            continue;
-
-        scts =
-            OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL);
-        scts_extracted =
-            ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE);
-        if (scts_extracted < 0)
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex); j++) {
+        rsp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, j);
+        if (rsp == NULL)
             goto err;
+
+        br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+        if (br == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) {
+            OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
+
+            if (single == NULL)
+                continue;
+
+            scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single,
+                                                NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL);
+
+            OCSP_SINGLERESP_free(single);
+
+            if (scts == NULL)  {
+                scts_extracted = -1;
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            ret = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts,
+                               SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE);
+
+            SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+
+            if (ret < 0) {
+                scts_extracted = -1;
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            scts_extracted += ret;
+        }
+
+        OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+        /* to assure that is not freed twice */
+        br = NULL;
     }
  err:
-    SCT_LIST_free(scts);
     OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
-    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
     return scts_extracted;
 # else
     /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */

ssl/ssl_local.h

@@ -1639,6 +1639,7 @@ struct ssl_connection_st {
             /* OCSP response received or to be sent */
             unsigned char *resp;
             size_t resp_len;
+            STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *resp_ex;
         } ocsp;
 
         /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */
@@ -2594,6 +2595,7 @@ void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg);
 
 __owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
 __owur int ssl_verify_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *rpk);
+__owur int ssl_verify_ocsp(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
 __owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags);
 __owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain,
                                    int ref);

ssl/statem/extensions.c

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
 #include "../ssl_local.h"
 #include "statem_local.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 
 static int final_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
 static int init_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context);
@@ -1148,6 +1149,9 @@ static int init_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned int context)
         OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
         s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
         s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+        s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = NULL;
     }
 
     return 1;

ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c

@@ -1510,14 +1510,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
     }
 
     if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
-        /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
-         * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
-         */
-        if (chainidx != 0)
-            return 1;
-
         /* SSLfatal() already called */
-        return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
+        return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, chainidx, pkt);
     }
 
     /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */

ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c

@@ -1751,9 +1751,6 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
     if (!s->ext.status_expected)
         return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 
-    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
-        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
-
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
             || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1765,9 +1762,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
      * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
      * separate message
      */
-    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
-       /* SSLfatal() already called */
-       return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+    if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
+        && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, chainidx, pkt)) {
+        /* SSLfatal() already called */
+        return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
     }
     if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
 #include "internal/comp.h"
 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 
 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                              PACKET *pkt);
@@ -2900,40 +2901,77 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
  * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
  * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
  */
-int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
+int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t chainidx, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    size_t resplen;
     unsigned int type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    size_t resplen;
+    unsigned char *respder;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+#endif
 
     if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
         || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
-        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
-    if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
-        s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
-    if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-        return 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp);
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
+    s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
+
+    if (s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex == NULL)
+        s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_null();
+
+    /*
+     * TODO(DTLS-1.3): in future DTLS should also be considered
+     */
+    if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+        sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, OCSP_RESPONSE_free);
+        s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_null();
     }
 
+    if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+        if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (resplen > 0) {
+            respder = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
+
+            if (respder == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, respder, resplen)) {
+                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                OPENSSL_free(respder);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            p = respder;
+            resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, (long)resplen);
+            OPENSSL_free(respder);
+            if (resp == NULL) {
+                SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
+                         SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_insert(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, resp, (int)chainidx);
+        }
+    }
+
+#endif
     return 1;
 }
 
-
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
+    if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, 0, pkt)) {
         /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
     }

ssl/statem/statem_local.h

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                           PACKET *pkt);
 __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                          PACKET *pkt);
-__owur int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt);
+__owur int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t chainidx, PACKET *pkt);
 __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                   PACKET *pkt);
 __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ __owur int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION *s, X509 **px509,
 __owur CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                          WPACKET *pkt);
 __owur int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s);
-__owur int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+__owur int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t chainidx, WPACKET *pkt);
 __owur CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
                                                  WPACKET *pkt);
 __owur MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,

ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
 #include "internal/comp.h"
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 
 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE       8
 
@@ -2193,8 +2194,11 @@ static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
                 break;
                 /* status request response should be sent */
             case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-                if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+                if (s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex != NULL
+                        && sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex) > 0)
                     s->ext.status_expected = 1;
+#endif
                 break;
                 /* something bad happened */
             case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -2298,6 +2302,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
 
     if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
         int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
+
         if (rv == 0) {
             /* SSLfatal() was already called */
             goto err;
@@ -4327,21 +4332,149 @@ CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt
  * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
  * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
  */
-int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t chainidx, WPACKET *pkt)
 {
-    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
-            || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
-                                       s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
+    unsigned char *respder = NULL;
+    int resplen = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    int i = 0, num = 0;
+    unsigned int len;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain_certs = NULL;
+    SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *bs = NULL;
+    OCSP_SINGLERESP *sr = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+    OCSP_CERTID *sr_cert_id = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
+    const EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
+    ASN1_INTEGER *respSerial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *respIssuerNameHash;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING *certIssuerNameHash;
+    const X509_NAME *certIssuerName;
+    unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    const ASN1_INTEGER *certSerial;
+#endif
+
+    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
     }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    /*
+     * In TLSv1.3 the caller gives the index of the certificate for which the
+     * status message should be created.
+     * Prior to TLSv1.3 the chain index is 0 and the body should contain only
+     * the status of the server certificate itself.
+     */
+    SSL_get0_chain_certs(ssl, &chain_certs);
+
+    /*
+     * if the certificate chain was built, get the status message for the
+     * requested certificate specified by chainidx  SSL_get0_chain_certs
+     * contains certificate chain except the server cert
+     *
+     * if chainidx = 0 the server certificate is requested
+     * if chainidx > 0 an intermediate certificate is requested
+     */
+    if (chain_certs != NULL && (int)chainidx <= sk_X509_num(chain_certs) && chainidx > 0)
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain_certs, (int)chainidx - 1);
+    else
+        x = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* for a selfsigned certificate there will be no OCSP response */
+    if (X509_self_signed(x, 0))
+        return 1;
+
+    if ((resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(s->ext.ocsp.resp_ex, (int)chainidx)) != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * check if its the right response in the case it is a successful response
+         * as not every time the issuer certificate is available the check just
+         * uses the issuer name and the serial number from the current certificate
+         */
+        if (OCSP_response_status(resp) == OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
+            /*
+             * set a mark for the error queue her to be able to ignore errors
+             * happening because of test cases
+             */
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            if (((bs = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp)) != NULL)
+                && ((sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, 0)) != NULL)) {
+                /* use the first single response to get the algorithm used */
+                cid = (OCSP_CERTID *)OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(sr);
+
+                OCSP_id_get0_info(&respIssuerNameHash, &cert_id_md_oid, NULL, &respSerial, cid);
+                if (cert_id_md_oid != NULL)
+                    cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cert_id_md_oid);
+                else
+                    cert_id_md = EVP_sha1();
+
+                /* get serial number and issuer name hash of the certificate from the chain */
+                certSerial = X509_get0_serialNumber(x);
+                certIssuerName = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+                certIssuerNameHash = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+                if (!X509_NAME_digest(certIssuerName, cert_id_md, md, &len) ||
+                    !(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(certIssuerNameHash, md, len))) {
+                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(certIssuerNameHash);
+                    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+                    ERR_clear_last_mark();
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                num = OCSP_resp_count(bs);
+                for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+                    sr = OCSP_resp_get0(bs, i);
+
+                    /* determine the md algorithm which was used to create cert id */
+                    sr_cert_id = (OCSP_CERTID *)OCSP_SINGLERESP_get0_id(sr);
+
+                    OCSP_id_get0_info(&respIssuerNameHash, NULL, NULL, &respSerial, sr_cert_id);
+
+                    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(certSerial, respSerial) &&
+                        !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(certIssuerNameHash, respIssuerNameHash))
+                        break;
+                }
+
+                ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(certIssuerNameHash);
+                OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bs);
+
+                /*
+                 * if we did not find the right single response in the OCSP response we
+                 * construct an empty message
+                 */
+                if (i == num)
+                    resp = NULL;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * in a test case a response without a basic response is used the error set
+             * could be ignored here
+             */
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (resp != NULL)
+        resplen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &respder);
+#endif
+
+    if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, respder, resplen)) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        OPENSSL_free(respder);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(respder);
     return 1;
 }
 
 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
 {
-    if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
+    if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, 0, pkt)) {
         /* SSLfatal() already called */
         return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
     }

test/crltest.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #include "internal/nelem.h"
 #include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -17,7 +18,16 @@
 
 #include "testutil.h"
 
+/*
+ * We cannot use old certificates for new tests because the private key
+ * associated with them is no longer available. Therefore, we add kCRLTestLeaf,
+ * kCRLTestLeaf2 and PARAM_TIME2, as well as pass the verification time to the
+ * verify function as a parameter. Certificates and CRL from
+ * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/27506 are used.
+ */
+
 #define PARAM_TIME 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */
+#define PARAM_TIME2 1753284700 /* July 23th, 2025 */
 
 static const char *kCRLTestRoot[] = {
     "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n",
@@ -70,6 +80,61 @@ static const char *kCRLTestLeaf[] = {
     NULL
 };
 
+static const char *kCRLTestRoot2[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    "MIID4zCCAsugAwIBAgIUGTcyNat9hTOo8nnGdzF7MTzL9WAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n",
+    "BQAweTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcM\n",
+    "DVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xEzARBgNVBAoMCk15IENvbXBhbnkxEzARBgNVBAMMCk15\n",
+    "IFJvb3QgQ0ExEzARBgNVBAsMCk15IFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMjUwMzAzMDcxNDA0WhcN\n",
+    "MzUwMzAxMDcxNDA0WjB5MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5p\n",
+    "YTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNU2FuIEZyYW5jaXNjbzETMBEGA1UECgwKTXkgQ29tcGFueTET\n",
+    "MBEGA1UEAwwKTXkgUm9vdCBDQTETMBEGA1UECwwKTXkgUm9vdCBDQTCCASIwDQYJ\n",
+    "KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAN6jjwkmV+pse430MQfyaWv+JtAd2r6K\n",
+    "qzEquBcoofzuf/yvdEhQPjK3bcotgfEcFq3QMo1MJ7vqRHEIu0hJ+5ZnEQtIRcrg\n",
+    "Vm7/EoVCBpDc9BDtW40TDp69z9kaKyyKYy6rxmSKgJydGBeGGMwBxgTK/o0xAriC\n",
+    "C3lLXHT8G8YMamKUpToPL5iCRX+GJPnnizB2ODvpQGMWkbp9+1xEc4dD7Db2wfUb\n",
+    "gatDYUoGndQKWD49UhURavQZeLpDxlz93YutRRkZTWc4IB7WebiEb39BDjSP3QYm\n",
+    "2h+rZYyjp3Gxy8pBNTPzE9Dk4yjiqS7o3WGvi/S6zKTLDvWl9t6pMOMCAwEAAaNj\n",
+    "MGEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFNdhiR+Tlot2VBbp5XfcfLdlG4AkMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIB\n",
+    "hjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTXYYkfk5aLdlQW6eV33Hy3ZRuAJDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTAD\n",
+    "AQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCvwutY0WMcKoqulifnYfhxGLtXSSvD2GET\n",
+    "uNRv+S1KI5JKcAdfvnbNDpUwlujMDIpe3ewmv9i6kcitpHwZXdVAw6KWagJ0kDSt\n",
+    "jbArJxuuuFmSFDS7kj8x7FZok5quAWDSSg+ubV2tCVxmDuTs1WXJXD3l9g+3J9GU\n",
+    "kyeFMKqwRp8w22vm9ilgXrzeesAmmAg/pEb56ljTPeaONQxVe7KJhv2q8J17sML8\n",
+    "BE7TdVx7UFQbO/t9XqdT5O9eF8JUx4Vn4QSr+jdjJ/ns4T3/IC9dJq9k7tjD48iA\n",
+    "TNc+7x+uj8P39VA96HpjujVakj8/qn5SQMPJgDds+MSXrX+6JBWm\n",
+    "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
+static const char *kCRLTestLeaf2[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    "MIIECjCCAvKgAwIBAgIUPxuMqMtuN1j3XZVRVrNmaTCIP04wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n",
+    "BQAweTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcM\n",
+    "DVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xEzARBgNVBAoMCk15IENvbXBhbnkxEzARBgNVBAMMCk15\n",
+    "IFJvb3QgQ0ExEzARBgNVBAsMCk15IFJvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMjUwNDE3MTAxNjQ5WhcN\n",
+    "MjYwNDE3MTAxNjQ5WjBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwJDTjEQMA4GA1UECAwHQmVpamluZzEQ\n",
+    "MA4GA1UEBwwHQmVpamluZzEYMBYGA1UECgwPTXkgT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uMRswGQYD\n",
+    "VQQDDBJNeSBJbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0EwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAw\n",
+    "ggEKAoIBAQDIxRxZQokflDaLYoD21HT2U4EshqtKpSf9zPS5unBMCfnQkU4IJjBF\n",
+    "3qQmfgz5ZOpZv3x0w48fDjiysk0eOVCFAo+uixEjMeuln6Wj3taetch2Sk0YNm5J\n",
+    "SJCNF2olHZXn5R8ngEmho2j1wbwNnpcccZyRNzUSjR9oAgObkP3O7fyQKJRxwNU0\n",
+    "sN7mfoyEOczKtUaYbqi2gPx6OOqNLjXlLmfZ8PJagKCN/oYkGU5PoRNXp65Znhu6\n",
+    "s8FuSmvTodu8Qhs9Uizo+SycaBXn5Fbqt32S+9vPfhH9FfELDfQIaBp+iQAxcKPX\n",
+    "tUglXEjiEVrbNf722PuWIWN9EIBolULVAgMBAAGjgZowgZcwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgw\n",
+    "BgEB/wIBATAxBgNVHR8EKjAoMCagJKAihiBodHRwOi8vbG9jYWxob3N0OjgwMDAv\n",
+    "Y2FfY3JsLmRlcjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUh40vFgoopz5GUggPEEk2+bKgbwQwHwYDVR0j\n",
+    "BBgwFoAU12GJH5OWi3ZUFunld9x8t2UbgCQwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgGGMA0GCSqG\n",
+    "SIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDANfJuTgo0vRaMPYqOeW8R4jLHdVazdGLeQQ/85vXr/Gl1\n",
+    "aL40tLp4yZbThxuxTzPzfY1OGkG69YQ/8Vo0gCEi5KjBMYPKmZISKy1MwROQ1Jfp\n",
+    "HkmyZk1TfuzG/4fN/bun2gjpDYcihf4xA4NhSVzQyvqm1N6VkTgK+bEWTOGzqw66\n",
+    "6IYPN6oVDmLbwU1EvV3rggB7HUJCJP4qW9DbAQRAijUurPUGoU2vEbrSyYkfQXCf\n",
+    "p4ouOTMl6O7bJ110SKzxbCfWqom+iAwHlU2tOPVmOp1CLDCClMRNHIFMDGAoBomH\n",
+    "s01wD+IcIi9OkQEbqVb/XDKes8fqzQgTtSM9C9Ot\n",
+    "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
 static const char *kBasicCRL[] = {
     "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
     "MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE\n",
@@ -124,6 +189,24 @@ static const char *kBadIssuerCRL[] = {
     NULL
 };
 
+static const char *kEmptyIdpCRL[] = {
+    "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----\n",
+    "MIICOTCCASECAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAweTELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNV\n",
+    "BAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xEzARBgNVBAoM\n",
+    "Ck15IENvbXBhbnkxEzARBgNVBAMMCk15IFJvb3QgQ0ExEzARBgNVBAsMCk15IFJv\n",
+    "b3QgQ0EXDTI1MDEwMTAwMDAwMFoXDTI1MTIwMTAwMDAwMFowJzAlAhQcgAIu+B8k\n",
+    "Be6WphLcth/grHAeXhcNMjUwNDE3MTAxNjUxWqBLMEkwGAYDVR0UBBECDxnP/97a\n",
+    "dO3y9qRGDM7hQDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTXYYkfk5aLdlQW6eV33Hy3ZRuAJDAMBgNV\n",
+    "HRwBAf8EAjAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAf+mtlDi9IftsYwTcxYYKxE203\n",
+    "+prttFB00om29jjtkGYRxcs3vZQRTvera21YFn3mrS/lxvhBq6GMx0I61AQ48Pr4\n",
+    "63bDvZgf+/P6T2+MLgLds23o3TOfy2SBSdnFEcN0bFUgF5U0bFpQqlQWx+FYhrAf\n",
+    "ZX3RAhURiKKfGKGeVOVKS0u+x666FoDQ7pbhbHM3+jnuzdtv8RQMkj1AZMw0FMl8\n",
+    "m2dFQhZqT9WdJqZAc8ldc6V3a0rUeOV8BUPACf1k4B0CKhn4draIqltZkWgl3cmU\n",
+    "SX2V/a51lS12orfNYSEx+vtJ9gpx4LDxyOnai18vueVyljrXuQSrcYuxS2Cd\n",
+    "-----END X509 CRL-----\n",
+    NULL
+};
+
 /*
  * This is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point
  * extension.
@@ -189,6 +272,8 @@ static const char **unknown_critical_crls[] = {
 
 static X509 *test_root = NULL;
 static X509 *test_leaf = NULL;
+static X509 *test_root2 = NULL;
+static X509 *test_leaf2 = NULL;
 
 /*
  * Glue an array of strings together.  Return a BIO and put the string
@@ -251,7 +336,7 @@ static X509 *X509_from_strings(const char **pem)
  * Returns a value from X509_V_ERR_xxx or X509_V_OK.
  */
 static int verify(X509 *leaf, X509 *root, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
-                  unsigned long flags)
+                  unsigned long flags, time_t verification_time)
 {
     X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
     X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
@@ -276,8 +361,8 @@ static int verify(X509 *leaf, X509 *root, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
         goto err;
     X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, roots);
     X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls);
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, PARAM_TIME);
-    if (!TEST_long_eq((long)X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(param), PARAM_TIME))
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(param, verification_time);
+    if (!TEST_long_eq((long)X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(param), (long)verification_time))
         goto err;
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, 16);
     if (flags)
@@ -342,10 +427,10 @@ static int test_basic_crl(void)
         && TEST_ptr(revoked_crl)
         && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root,
                               make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, NULL),
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK), X509_V_OK)
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME), X509_V_OK)
         && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root,
                               make_CRL_stack(basic_crl, revoked_crl),
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK), X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME), X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
     if (r) {
         X509_CRL_get0_signature(basic_crl, NULL, &alg);
         tbsalg = X509_CRL_get0_tbs_sigalg(basic_crl);
@@ -362,7 +447,7 @@ static int test_basic_crl(void)
 static int test_no_crl(void)
 {
     return TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root, NULL,
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK),
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME),
                        X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
 }
 
@@ -374,12 +459,26 @@ static int test_bad_issuer_crl(void)
     r = TEST_ptr(bad_issuer_crl)
         && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root,
                               make_CRL_stack(bad_issuer_crl, NULL),
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK),
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME),
                        X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
     X509_CRL_free(bad_issuer_crl);
     return r;
 }
 
+static int test_crl_empty_idp(void)
+{
+    X509_CRL *empty_idp_crl = CRL_from_strings(kEmptyIdpCRL);
+    int r;
+
+    r = TEST_ptr(empty_idp_crl)
+        && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf2, test_root2,
+                              make_CRL_stack(empty_idp_crl, NULL),
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME2),
+                       X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
+    X509_CRL_free(empty_idp_crl);
+    return r;
+}
+
 static int test_known_critical_crl(void)
 {
     X509_CRL *known_critical_crl = CRL_from_strings(kKnownCriticalCRL);
@@ -388,7 +487,7 @@ static int test_known_critical_crl(void)
     r = TEST_ptr(known_critical_crl)
         && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root,
                               make_CRL_stack(known_critical_crl, NULL),
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK), X509_V_OK);
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME), X509_V_OK);
     X509_CRL_free(known_critical_crl);
     return r;
 }
@@ -401,7 +500,7 @@ static int test_unknown_critical_crl(int n)
     r = TEST_ptr(unknown_critical_crl)
         && TEST_int_eq(verify(test_leaf, test_root,
                               make_CRL_stack(unknown_critical_crl, NULL),
-                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK),
+                              X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, PARAM_TIME),
                        X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION);
     X509_CRL_free(unknown_critical_crl);
     return r;
@@ -421,7 +520,7 @@ static int test_reuse_crl(int idx)
     if (idx & 1) {
         if (!TEST_true(X509_CRL_up_ref(reused_crl)))
             goto err;
-	addref_crl = reused_crl;
+        addref_crl = reused_crl;
     }
 
     idx >>= 1;
@@ -464,12 +563,15 @@ static int test_reuse_crl(int idx)
 int setup_tests(void)
 {
     if (!TEST_ptr(test_root = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestRoot))
-        || !TEST_ptr(test_leaf = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestLeaf)))
+        || !TEST_ptr(test_leaf = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestLeaf))
+        || !TEST_ptr(test_root2 = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestRoot2))
+        || !TEST_ptr(test_leaf2 = X509_from_strings(kCRLTestLeaf2)))
         return 0;
 
     ADD_TEST(test_no_crl);
     ADD_TEST(test_basic_crl);
     ADD_TEST(test_bad_issuer_crl);
+    ADD_TEST(test_crl_empty_idp);
     ADD_TEST(test_known_critical_crl);
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_unknown_critical_crl, OSSL_NELEM(unknown_critical_crls));
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_reuse_crl, 6);
@@ -480,4 +582,6 @@ void cleanup_tests(void)
 {
     X509_free(test_root);
     X509_free(test_leaf);
+    X509_free(test_root2);
+    X509_free(test_leaf2);
 }

test/generate_buildtest.pl

@@ -23,9 +23,19 @@ print <<"_____";
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
 # include <stdio.h>
 #endif
+_____
+
+if (${name_uc} eq "RSA") {
+    print("#include <openssl/rsa.h>");
+}
+else {
+    print <<"_____";
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_${name_uc}
 # include <openssl/$name.h>
 #endif
+_____
+}
+print <<"_____";
 
 int main(void)
 {

test/helpers/handshake.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 
 #include "../../ssl/ssl_local.h"
 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
@@ -265,47 +266,100 @@ static int client_hello_nov12_cb(SSL *s, int *al, void *arg)
     return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS;
 }
 
-static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val = 0xff;
-static unsigned char dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val = 0xfe;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+static OCSP_RESPONSE *dummy_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+static STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *dummy_sk_resp = NULL;
 
 static int server_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 {
-    unsigned char *resp;
+    unsigned char *respder = NULL;
+    int resplen = 0;
+
+    resplen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(arg, &respder);
 
-    resp = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
-    if (resp == NULL)
-        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
     /*
      * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response
      */
-    *resp = *(unsigned char *)arg;
-    if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, resp, 1)) {
-        OPENSSL_free(resp);
+    if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, respder, resplen)) {
+        OPENSSL_free(respder);
         return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
     }
 
+    OPENSSL_free(respder);
+
+    return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int server_ocsp_cb_ext(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * For the purposes of testing we just send back a dummy OCSP response
+     */
+    sk_resp = (STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *)arg;
+    if (!SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, sk_resp))
+        return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+
     return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static int client_ocsp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 {
-    const unsigned char *resp;
-    int len;
+    const unsigned char *resp, *p;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
+    int len, status;
 
     len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &resp);
-    if (len != 1 || *resp != dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val)
-        return 0;
 
-    return 1;
+    p = resp;
+    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
+
+    status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
+
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+    SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, NULL, 0);
+
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+    return status == OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL;
 }
 
-static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+static int client_ocsp_cb_ext(SSL *s, void *arg)
+{
+    int len, status;
+    STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPONSE) *sk_resp = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
+
+    SSL_get0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, &sk_resp);
+
+    if (sk_resp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    len = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_num(sk_resp);
+
+    if (len != 1)
+        return 0;
+
+    rsp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_value(sk_resp, 0);
+
+    status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
+
+    SSL_set0_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp_ex(s, NULL);
+
+    return status == OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
     X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
     return 0;
 }
 
 static int n_retries = 0;
-static int verify_retry_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+static int verify_retry_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
     int idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
     SSL *ssl;
 
@@ -320,7 +374,8 @@ static int verify_retry_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
     return SSL_set_retry_verify(ssl);
 }
 
-static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
+{
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -566,13 +621,67 @@ static int configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
     }
 
     if (extra->server.cert_status != SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE) {
+
         SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_type(client_ctx, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
-        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
         SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(client_ctx, NULL);
-        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
-        SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx,
-            ((extra->server.cert_status == SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE)
-            ? &dummy_ocsp_resp_good_val : &dummy_ocsp_resp_bad_val));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+        switch (extra->server.cert_status) {
+        case SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE:
+
+            dummy_ocsp_resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, NULL);
+
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE:
+
+            dummy_ocsp_resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, NULL);
+
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE_EXT:
+
+            dummy_sk_resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_null();
+            dummy_ocsp_resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, NULL);
+            sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(dummy_sk_resp, dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb_ext);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb_ext);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, dummy_sk_resp);
+
+            break;
+
+        case SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE_EXT:
+
+            dummy_sk_resp = sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_new_null();
+            dummy_ocsp_resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_INTERNALERROR, NULL);
+            sk_OCSP_RESPONSE_push(dummy_sk_resp, dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb_ext);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb_ext);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, dummy_sk_resp);
+
+            break;
+
+        default:
+
+            dummy_ocsp_resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, NULL);
+
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(client_ctx, client_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(server_ctx, server_ocsp_cb);
+            SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(server_ctx, &dummy_ocsp_resp);
+
+            break;
+        }
+#endif
     }
 
     /*

test/helpers/ssl_test_ctx.c

@@ -460,7 +460,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, enable_server_sctp_label_bug)
 static const test_enum ssl_certstatus[] = {
     {"None", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE},
     {"GoodResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE},
-    {"BadResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE}
+    {"BadResponse", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE},
+    {"GoodResponseExt", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE_EXT},
+    {"BadResponseExt", SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE_EXT}
 };
 
 __owur static int parse_certstatus(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF *server_conf,

test/helpers/ssl_test_ctx.h

@@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef enum {
     SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_NONE = 0, /* Default */
     SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE,
-    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE,
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_GOOD_RESPONSE_EXT,
+    SSL_TEST_CERT_STATUS_BAD_RESPONSE_EXT
 } ssl_cert_status_t;
 
 /*

test/quic_ackm_test.c

@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int helper_init(struct helper *h, size_t num_pkts)
 
     /* Initialise ACK manager. */
     h->ackm = ossl_ackm_new(fake_now, NULL, &h->statm,
-                            &ossl_cc_dummy_method, h->ccdata);
+                            &ossl_cc_dummy_method, h->ccdata,
+                            /* is_server */0);
     if (!TEST_ptr(h->ackm))
         goto err;
 

test/quic_fifd_test.c

@@ -329,7 +329,8 @@ static int test_fifd(int idx)
         || !TEST_ptr(info.ackm = ossl_ackm_new(fake_now, NULL,
                                                &info.statm,
                                                &ossl_cc_dummy_method,
-                                               info.ccdata))
+                                               info.ccdata,
+                                               /* is_server */0))
         || !TEST_true(ossl_ackm_on_handshake_confirmed(info.ackm))
         || !TEST_ptr(info.cfq = ossl_quic_cfq_new())
         || !TEST_ptr(info.txpim = ossl_quic_txpim_new())

test/quic_txp_test.c

@@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ static int helper_init(struct helper *h)
     if (!TEST_ptr(h->args.ackm = ossl_ackm_new(fake_now, NULL,
                                                &h->statm,
                                                h->cc_method,
-                                               h->cc_data)))
+                                               h->cc_data,
+                                               /* is_server */0)))
         goto err;
 
     if (!TEST_true(ossl_quic_stream_map_init(&h->qsm, NULL, NULL,

test/recipes/15-test_ec.t

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ setup("test_ec");
 
 plan skip_all => 'EC is not supported in this build' if disabled('ec');
 
-plan tests => 15;
+plan tests => 16;
 
 my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
 
@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@ subtest 'EC conversions -- private key' => sub {
     tconversion( -type => 'ec', -prefix => 'ec-priv',
                  -in => srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem") );
 };
+
+SKIP: {
+    skip "SM2 is not supported by this OpenSSL build", 1
+        if disabled("sm2");
+    subtest 'EC conversions -- private key' => sub {
+        tconversion( -type => 'ec', -prefix => 'sm2-priv',
+                     -in => srctop_file("test","testec-sm2.pem") );
+    };
+}
+
 subtest 'EC conversions -- private key PKCS#8' => sub {
     tconversion( -type => 'ec', -prefix => 'ec-pkcs8',
                  -in => srctop_file("test","testec-p256.pem"),