mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
				
				
				
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
			351 lines
		
	
	
		
			9.0 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			351 lines
		
	
	
		
			9.0 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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|  *
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|  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
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|  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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|  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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|  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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|  */
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| 
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| /* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
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| 
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| #include <stdio.h>
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| #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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| #include <openssl/bn.h>
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| #include <openssl/sha.h>
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| #include "dsa_locl.h"
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| #include <openssl/asn1.h>
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| 
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| static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
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| static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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|                                     BIGNUM **rp);
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| static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
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|                           BIGNUM **rp, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen);
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| static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
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|                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
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| static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
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| static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa);
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| 
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| static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
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|     "OpenSSL DSA method",
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|     dsa_do_sign,
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|     dsa_sign_setup_no_digest,
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|     dsa_do_verify,
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|     NULL,                       /* dsa_mod_exp, */
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|     NULL,                       /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */
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|     dsa_init,
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|     dsa_finish,
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|     DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
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|     NULL,
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|     NULL,
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|     NULL
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| };
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| 
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| static const DSA_METHOD *default_DSA_method = &openssl_dsa_meth;
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| 
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| void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth)
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| {
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|     default_DSA_method = meth;
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| }
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| 
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| const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void)
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| {
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|     return default_DSA_method;
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| }
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| 
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| const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
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| {
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|     return &openssl_dsa_meth;
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| }
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| 
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| static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
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| {
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|     BIGNUM *kinv = NULL;
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|     BIGNUM *m;
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|     BIGNUM *xr;
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|     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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|     int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
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|     DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
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|     int rv = 0;
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| 
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|     m = BN_new();
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|     xr = BN_new();
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|     if (m == NULL || xr == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
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|         reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     ret = DSA_SIG_new();
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|     if (ret == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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|     ret->r = BN_new();
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|     ret->s = BN_new();
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|     if (ret->r == NULL || ret->s == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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|     if (ctx == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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|  redo:
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|     if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
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|         /*
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|          * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
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|          * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
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|          * 4.2
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|          */
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|         dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
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|     if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
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|     if (!BN_mod_mul(xr, dsa->priv_key, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;               /* s = xr */
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|     if (!BN_add(ret->s, xr, m))
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|         goto err;               /* s = m + xr */
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|     if (BN_cmp(ret->s, dsa->q) > 0)
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|         if (!BN_sub(ret->s, ret->s, dsa->q))
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|             goto err;
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|     if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
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|      * unlikely.
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|      */
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|     if (BN_is_zero(ret->r) || BN_is_zero(ret->s))
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|         goto redo;
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| 
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|     rv = 1;
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| 
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|  err:
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|     if (rv == 0) {
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
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|         DSA_SIG_free(ret);
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|         ret = NULL;
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|     }
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|     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     BN_clear_free(m);
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|     BN_clear_free(xr);
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|     BN_clear_free(kinv);
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|     return ret;
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| }
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| 
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| static int dsa_sign_setup_no_digest(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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|                                     BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
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| {
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|     return dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx_in, kinvp, rp, NULL, 0);
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| }
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| 
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| static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
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|                           BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
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|                           const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
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| {
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|     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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|     BIGNUM *k, *kinv = NULL, *r = *rp;
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|     int ret = 0;
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| 
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|     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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|         return 0;
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|     }
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| 
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|     k = BN_new();
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|     if (k == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     if (ctx_in == NULL) {
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|         if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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|             goto err;
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|     } else
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|         ctx = ctx_in;
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| 
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|     /* Get random k */
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|     do {
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|         if (dgst != NULL) {
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|             /*
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|              * We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random).
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|              * This protects the private key from a weak PRNG.
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|              */
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|             if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
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|                                        dlen, ctx))
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|                 goto err;
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|         } else if (!BN_rand_range(k, dsa->q))
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|             goto err;
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|     } while (BN_is_zero(k));
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| 
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|     BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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| 
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|     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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|         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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|                                     dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
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|             goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
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|      * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
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|      * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
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|      * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
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|      */
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| 
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|     if (!BN_add(k, k, dsa->q))
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|         goto err;
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|     if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
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|         if (!BN_add(k, k, dsa->q))
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|             goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
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|             if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
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|                                        dsa->method_mont_p))
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|                 goto err;
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|     } else {
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|             if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
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|                 goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /* Compute  part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
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|     if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
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|     *kinvp = kinv;
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|     kinv = NULL;
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|     ret = 1;
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|  err:
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|     if (!ret)
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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|     if (ctx != ctx_in)
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|         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     BN_clear_free(k);
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|     return ret;
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| }
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| 
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| static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
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|                          DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa)
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| {
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|     BN_CTX *ctx;
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|     BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *t1;
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|     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
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|     const BIGNUM *r, *s;
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|     int ret = -1, i;
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|     if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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|         return -1;
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|     }
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| 
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|     i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
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|     /* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
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|     if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
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|         return -1;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
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|         return -1;
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|     }
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|     u1 = BN_new();
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|     u2 = BN_new();
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|     t1 = BN_new();
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|     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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|     if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || t1 == NULL || ctx == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
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| 
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|     if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) ||
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|         BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
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|         ret = 0;
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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|     if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) ||
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|         BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
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|         ret = 0;
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|         goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2
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|      */
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|     if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /* save M in u1 */
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|     if (dgst_len > (i >> 3))
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|         /*
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|          * if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
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|          * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
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|          * 4.2
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|          */
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|         dgst_len = (i >> 3);
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|     if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, u1) == NULL)
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /* u1 = M * w mod q */
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|     if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /* u2 = r * w mod q */
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|     if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
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|         mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
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|                                       dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx);
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|         if (!mont)
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|             goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
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|         if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
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|                                     dsa->p, ctx, mont))
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|             goto err;
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|     } else {
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|         if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx,
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|                               mont))
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|             goto err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* let u1 = u1 mod q */
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|     if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx))
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|         goto err;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R.
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|      */
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|     ret = (BN_ucmp(u1, r) == 0);
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| 
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|  err:
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|     if (ret < 0)
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|         DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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|     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     BN_free(u1);
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|     BN_free(u2);
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|     BN_free(t1);
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|     return (ret);
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| }
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| 
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| static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
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| {
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|     dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
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|     return (1);
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| }
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| 
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| static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa)
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| {
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|     BN_MONT_CTX_free(dsa->method_mont_p);
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|     return (1);
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| }
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