mirror of https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
				
				
				
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
			285 lines
		
	
	
		
			9.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			285 lines
		
	
	
		
			9.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
| /*
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|  *  Copyright 2024-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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|  *
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|  *  Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
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|  *  this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
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|  *  in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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|  *  https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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|  */
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| 
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| /*
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|  * NB: Changes to this file should also be reflected in
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|  * doc/man7/ossl-guide-tls-server-block.pod
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <string.h>
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| 
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| /* Include the appropriate header file for SOCK_STREAM */
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| #ifdef _WIN32 /* Windows */
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| # include <stdarg.h>
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| # include <winsock2.h>
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| #else /* Linux/Unix */
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| # include <err.h>
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| # include <sys/socket.h>
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| # include <sys/select.h>
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| #endif
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| 
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| #include <openssl/bio.h>
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| #include <openssl/ssl.h>
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| #include <openssl/err.h>
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| 
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| static const char cache_id[] = "OpenSSL Demo Server";
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| 
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| #ifdef _WIN32
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| static const char *progname;
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| 
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| static void vwarnx(const char *fmt, va_list ap)
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| {
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|     if (progname != NULL)
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|         fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", progname);
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|     vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
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|     putc('\n', stderr);
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| }
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| 
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| static void errx(int status, const char *fmt, ...)
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| {
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|     va_list ap;
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|     va_start(ap, fmt);
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|     vwarnx(fmt, ap);
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|     va_end(ap);
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|     exit(status);
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| }
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| 
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| static void warnx(const char *fmt, ...)
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| {
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|     va_list ap;
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|     va_start(ap, fmt);
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|     vwarnx(fmt, ap);
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|     va_end(ap);
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| }
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| #endif
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| 
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| /* Minimal TLS echo server. */
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| int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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| {
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|     int res = EXIT_FAILURE;
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|     long opts;
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|     const char *hostport;
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|     SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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|     BIO *acceptor_bio;
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| 
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| #ifdef _WIN32
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|     progname = argv[0];
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| #endif
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| 
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|     if (argc != 2)
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|         errx(res, "Usage: %s [host:]port", argv[0]);
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|     hostport = argv[1];
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * An SSL_CTX holds shared configuration information for multiple
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|      * subsequent per-client SSL connections.
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|      */
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|     ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
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|     if (ctx == NULL) {
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Failed to create server SSL_CTX");
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|     }
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * TLS versions older than TLS 1.2 are deprecated by IETF and SHOULD
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|      * be avoided if possible.
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|      */
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|     if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
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|         SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Failed to set the minimum TLS protocol version");
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|     }
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| 
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| #if 0
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|     /*
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|      * In applications (e.g. SMTP) where most clients are performing
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|      * unauthenticated opportunistic TLS it may make sense to set the security
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|      * level to 0, allowing weaker encryption parameters, which are still
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|      * stronger than a potential cleartext fallback.
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|      *
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|      * The default security level is 2 (as of OpenSSL 3.2), which is roughly
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|      * equivalent to that of 112 bit symmetric keys, or 2048-bit RSA or
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|      * finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys.  Notably, non-zero security levels no
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|      * longer allow the use of SHA-1 in certificate signatures, key exchange
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|      * or in the TLS 1.[01] PRF (so TLS 1.0 and 1.1 require security level 0).
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_set_security_level(ctx, 0);
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| #endif
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Tolerate clients hanging up without a TLS "shutdown".  Appropriate in all
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|      * application protocols which perform their own message "framing", and
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|      * don't rely on TLS to defend against "truncation" attacks.
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|      */
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|     opts = SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Block potential CPU-exhaustion attacks by clients that request frequent
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|      * renegotiation.  This is of course only effective if there are existing
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|      * limits on initial full TLS handshake or connection rates.
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|      */
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|     opts |= SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Most servers elect to use their own cipher or group preference rather
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|      * than that of the client.
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|      */
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|     opts |= SSL_OP_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
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| 
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|     /* Apply the selection options */
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|     SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, opts);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Load the server's certificate *chain* file (PEM format), which includes
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|      * not only the leaf (end-entity) server certificate, but also any
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|      * intermediate issuer-CA certificates.  The leaf certificate must be the
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|      * first certificate in the file.
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|      *
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|      * In advanced use-cases this can be called multiple times, once per public
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|      * key algorithm for which the server has a corresponding certificate.
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|      * However, the corresponding private key (see below) must be loaded first,
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|      * *before* moving on to the next chain file.
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|      *
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|      * The requisite files "chain.pem" and "pkey.pem" can be generated by running
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|      * "make chain" in this directory.  If the server will be executed from some
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|      * other directory, move or copy the files there.
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|      */
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|     if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, "chain.pem") <= 0) {
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|         SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Failed to load the server certificate chain file");
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|     }
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Load the corresponding private key, this also checks that the private
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|      * key matches the just loaded end-entity certificate.  It does not check
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|      * whether the certificate chain is valid, the certificates could be
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|      * expired, or may otherwise fail to form a chain that a client can validate.
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|      */
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|     if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "pkey.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
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|         SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Error loading the server private key file, "
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|                   "possible key/cert mismatch???");
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|     }
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Servers that want to enable session resumption must specify a cache id
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|      * byte array, that identifies the server application, and reduces the
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|      * chance of inappropriate cache sharing.
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)cache_id, sizeof(cache_id));
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|     SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * How many client TLS sessions to cache.  The default is
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|      * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (20k in recent OpenSSL versions),
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|      * which may be too small or too large.
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1024);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Sessions older than this are considered a cache miss even if still in
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|      * the cache.  The default is two hours.  Busy servers whose clients make
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|      * many connections in a short burst may want a shorter timeout, on lightly
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|      * loaded servers with sporadic connections from any given client, a longer
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|      * time may be appropriate.
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, 3600);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Clients rarely employ certificate-based authentication, and so we don't
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|      * require "mutual" TLS authentication (indeed there's no way to know
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|      * whether or how the client authenticated the server, so the term "mutual"
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|      * is potentially misleading).
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|      *
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|      * Since we're not soliciting or processing client certificates, we don't
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|      * need to configure a trusted-certificate store, so no call to
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|      * SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths() is needed.  The server's own
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|      * certificate chain is assumed valid.
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Create a listener socket wrapped in a BIO.
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|      * The first call to BIO_do_accept() initialises the socket
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|      */
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|     acceptor_bio = BIO_new_accept(hostport);
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|     if (acceptor_bio == NULL) {
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|         SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Error creating acceptor bio");
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|     }
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| 
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|     BIO_set_bind_mode(acceptor_bio, BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR);
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|     if (BIO_do_accept(acceptor_bio) <= 0) {
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|         SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|         ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|         errx(res, "Error setting up acceptor socket");
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* Wait for incoming connection */
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|     for (;;) {
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|         BIO *client_bio;
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|         SSL *ssl;
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|         unsigned char buf[8192];
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|         size_t nread;
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|         size_t nwritten;
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|         size_t total = 0;
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| 
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|         /* Pristine error stack for each new connection */
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|         ERR_clear_error();
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| 
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|         /* Wait for the next client to connect */
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|         if (BIO_do_accept(acceptor_bio) <= 0) {
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|             /* Client went away before we accepted the connection */
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|             continue;
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|         }
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| 
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|         /* Pop the client connection from the BIO chain */
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|         client_bio = BIO_pop(acceptor_bio);
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|         fprintf(stderr, "New client connection accepted\n");
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| 
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|         /* Associate a new SSL handle with the new connection */
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|         if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
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|             ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|             warnx("Error creating SSL handle for new connection");
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|             BIO_free(client_bio);
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|             continue;
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|         }
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|         SSL_set_bio(ssl, client_bio, client_bio);
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| 
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|         /* Attempt an SSL handshake with the client */
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|         if (SSL_accept(ssl) <= 0) {
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|             ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
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|             warnx("Error performing SSL handshake with client");
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|             SSL_free(ssl);
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|             continue;
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|         }
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| 
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|         while (SSL_read_ex(ssl, buf, sizeof(buf), &nread) > 0) {
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|             if (SSL_write_ex(ssl, buf, nread, &nwritten) > 0 &&
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|                 nwritten == nread) {
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|                 total += nwritten;
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|                 continue;
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|             }
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|             warnx("Error echoing client input");
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|             break;
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|         }
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|         fprintf(stderr, "Client connection closed, %zu bytes sent\n", total);
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|         SSL_free(ssl);
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|     }
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Unreachable placeholder cleanup code, the above loop runs forever.
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|      */
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|     SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
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|     return EXIT_SUCCESS;
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| }
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