Merge branch '5.2.x'
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commit
1984cfe9d7
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@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ public class ReactiveAdapterRegistry {
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/**
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* {@code BlockHoundIntegration} for spring-core classes.
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* <p>Whitelists the following:
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* <p>Explicitly allow the following:
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* <ul>
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* <li>Reading class info via {@link LocalVariableTableParameterNameDiscoverer}.
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* <li>Locking within {@link ConcurrentReferenceHashMap}.
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@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ public class ContentNegotiationManagerFactoryBean
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* {@code ResourceHttpRequestHandler}.
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* <li>Determine the media type of views rendered with
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* {@code ContentNegotiatingViewResolver}.
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* <li>Whitelist extensions for RFD attack detection (check the Spring
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* <li>List safe extensions for RFD attack detection (check the Spring
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* Framework reference docs for details).
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* </ul>
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* @param mediaTypes media type mappings
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@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ public class ContentNegotiationConfigurer {
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* Add a mapping from a key, extracted from a path extension or a query
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* parameter, to a MediaType. This is required in order for the parameter
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* strategy to work. Any extensions explicitly registered here are also
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* whitelisted for the purpose of Reflected File Download attack detection
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* (see Spring Framework reference documentation for more details on RFD
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* attack protection).
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* treated as safe for the purpose of Reflected File Download attack
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* detection (see Spring Framework reference documentation for more details
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* on RFD attack protection).
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* <p>The path extension strategy will also try to use
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* {@link ServletContext#getMimeType} and {@link MediaTypeFactory} to resolve path
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* extensions. To change this behavior see the {@link #useRegisteredExtensionsOnly} property.
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@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ public abstract class AbstractMessageConverterMethodProcessor extends AbstractMe
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implements HandlerMethodReturnValueHandler {
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/* Extensions associated with the built-in message converters */
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private static final Set<String> WHITELISTED_EXTENSIONS = new HashSet<>(Arrays.asList(
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private static final Set<String> SAFE_EXTENSIONS = new HashSet<>(Arrays.asList(
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"txt", "text", "yml", "properties", "csv",
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"json", "xml", "atom", "rss",
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"png", "jpe", "jpeg", "jpg", "gif", "wbmp", "bmp"));
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private static final Set<String> WHITELISTED_MEDIA_BASE_TYPES = new HashSet<>(
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private static final Set<String> SAFE_MEDIA_BASE_TYPES = new HashSet<>(
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Arrays.asList("audio", "image", "video"));
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private static final List<MediaType> ALL_APPLICATION_MEDIA_TYPES =
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@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ public abstract class AbstractMessageConverterMethodProcessor extends AbstractMe
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this.contentNegotiationManager = (manager != null ? manager : new ContentNegotiationManager());
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this.safeExtensions.addAll(this.contentNegotiationManager.getAllFileExtensions());
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this.safeExtensions.addAll(WHITELISTED_EXTENSIONS);
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this.safeExtensions.addAll(SAFE_EXTENSIONS);
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}
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@ -406,8 +406,8 @@ public abstract class AbstractMessageConverterMethodProcessor extends AbstractMe
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}
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/**
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* Check if the path has a file extension and whether the extension is
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* either {@link #WHITELISTED_EXTENSIONS whitelisted} or explicitly
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* Check if the path has a file extension and whether the extension is either
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* on the list of {@link #SAFE_EXTENSIONS safe extensions} or explicitly
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* {@link ContentNegotiationManager#getAllFileExtensions() registered}.
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* If not, and the status is in the 2xx range, a 'Content-Disposition'
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* header with a safe attachment file name ("f.txt") is added to prevent
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@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ public abstract class AbstractMessageConverterMethodProcessor extends AbstractMe
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}
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private boolean safeMediaType(MediaType mediaType) {
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return (WHITELISTED_MEDIA_BASE_TYPES.contains(mediaType.getType()) ||
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return (SAFE_MEDIA_BASE_TYPES.contains(mediaType.getType()) ||
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mediaType.getSubtype().endsWith("+xml"));
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}
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@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ public class RequestResponseBodyMethodProcessorTests {
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Collections.singletonList(new StringHttpMessageConverter()),
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factory.getObject());
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.json", "whitelisted extension");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.json", "safe extension");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.pdf", "registered extension");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, true, "/hello.dataless", "unknown extension");
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@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ public class RequestResponseBodyMethodProcessorTests {
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.json;a=b", "path param shouldn't cause issue");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, true, "/hello.json;a=b;setup.dataless", "unknown ext in path params");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, true, "/hello.dataless;a=b;setup.json", "unknown ext in filename");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.json;a=b;setup.json", "whitelisted extensions");
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assertContentDisposition(processor, false, "/hello.json;a=b;setup.json", "safe extensions");
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// encoded dot
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assertContentDisposition(processor, true, "/hello%2Edataless;a=b;setup.json", "encoded dot in filename");
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@ -1725,11 +1725,11 @@ lower the risk but are not sufficient to prevent RFD attacks.
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To prevent RFD attacks, prior to rendering the response body, Spring MVC adds a
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`Content-Disposition:inline;filename=f.txt` header to suggest a fixed and safe download
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file. This is done only if the URL path contains a file extension that is neither whitelisted
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nor explicitly registered for content negotiation. However, it can potentially have
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side effects when URLs are typed directly into a browser.
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file. This is done only if the URL path contains a file extension that is neither
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allowed as safe nor explicitly registered for content negotiation. However, it can
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potentially have side effects when URLs are typed directly into a browser.
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Many common path extensions are whitelisted by default. Applications with custom
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Many common path extensions are allowed as safe by default. Applications with custom
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`HttpMessageConverter` implementations can explicitly register file extensions for content
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negotiation to avoid having a `Content-Disposition` header added for those extensions.
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See <<mvc-config-content-negotiation>>.
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