8.6 KiB
Functions for explicitly fetched PKEY algorithms
Quick background
There are several proposed designs that end up revolving around the same basic need, explicitly fetched signature algorithms. The following method type is affected by this document:
EVP_SIGNATURE
Public API - Add variants of EVP_PKEY_CTX
functionality
Through OTC discussions, it's been determined that the most suitable APIs to
touch are the of EVP_PKEY_
functions.
Specifically, EVP_PKEY_sign()
, EVP_PKEY_verify()
, EVP_PKEY_verify_recover()
and related functions.
They can be extended to accept an explicitly fetched algorithm of the right
type, and to be able to incrementally process indefinite length data streams
when the fetched algorithm permits it (for example, RSA-SHA256).
It must be made clear that the added functionality cannot be used to compose
an algorithm from different parts. For example, it's not possible to specify
a EVP_SIGNATURE
"RSA" and combine it with a parameter that specifies the
hash "SHA256" to get the "RSA-SHA256" functionality. For an EVP_SIGNATURE
"RSA", the input is still expected to be a digest, or some other input that's
limited to the modulus size of the RSA pkey.
Making things less confusing with distinct function names
Until now, EVP_PKEY_sign()
and friends were only expected to act on the
pre-computed digest of a message (under the condition that proper flags
and signature md are specified using functions like
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding()
and EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md()
),
or to act as "primitive" 1 functions (under the condition that proper
flags are specified, like RSA_NO_PADDING
for RSA signatures).
This design proposes an extension to also allow full (not pre-hashed) messages to be passed, in a streaming style through an update and a final function.
Discussions have revealed that it is potentially confusing to conflate the
current functionality with streaming style functionality into the same name,
so this design separates those out with specific init / update / final
functions for that purpose. For oneshot functionality, EVP_PKEY_sign()
and EVP_PKEY_verify()
remain supported.
Making it possible to verify with an early signature
Some more recent verification algorithms need to obtain the signature before processing the data. This is particularly important for streaming modes of operation. This design proposes a mechanism to accommodate these algorithms and modes of operation.
New public API - API Reference
For limited input size / oneshot signing with EVP_SIGNATURE
int EVP_PKEY_sign_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
For signing a stream with EVP_SIGNATURE
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_sign_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen);
#define EVP_PKEY_sign_message(ctx,sig,siglen,tbs,tbslen) \
EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx,sig,siglen,tbs,tbslen)
For limited input size / oneshot verification with EVP_SIGNATURE
int EVP_PKEY_verify_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
For verifying a stream with EVP_SIGNATURE
/* Initializers */
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
/* Signature setter */
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
size_t sigsize);
/* Update and final */
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *in,
size_t inlen);
int EVP_PKEY_verify_message_final(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
#define EVP_PKEY_verify_message(ctx,sig,siglen,tbs,tbslen) \
EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx,sig,siglen,tbs,tbslen)
For verify_recover with EVP_SIGNATURE
Preliminary feedback suggests that a streaming interface is uninteresting for verify_recover, so we only specify a new init function.
/* Initializers */
int EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init_ex2(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
EVP_SIGNATURE *algo,
const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
Requirements on the providers
Because it's not immediately obvious from a composite algorithm name what key type ("RSA", "EC", ...) it requires / supports, at least in code, allowing the use of an explicitly fetched implementation of a composite algorithm requires that providers cooperate by declaring what key type is required / supported by each algorithm.
For non-composite operation algorithms (like "RSA"), this is not necessary, see the fallback strategies below.
This is to be implemented through an added provider function that would work
like keymgmt's query_operation_name
function, but would return a NULL
terminated array of key type name instead:
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_QUERY_KEY_TYPE 26
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(const char **, signature_query_key_type, (void))
Furthermore, the distinction of intent, i.e. whether the input is expected to be a pre-hashed digest or the original message, must be passed on to the provider. Because we already distinguish that with function names in the public API, we use the same mapping in the provider interface.
The already existing signature_sign
and signature_verify
remain as they
are, and can be combined with message init calls.
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_INIT 27
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_UPDATE 28
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_MESSAGE_FINAL 29
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_init,
(void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_update,
(void *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_sign_message_final,
(void *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize))
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_INIT 30
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_UPDATE 31
# define OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_MESSAGE_FINAL 32
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_init,
(void *ctx, void *provkey, const OSSL_PARAM params[]))
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_update,
(void *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen))
/*
* signature_verify_message_final requires that the signature to be verified
* against is specified via an OSSL_PARAM.
*/
OSSL_CORE_MAKE_FUNC(int, signature_verify_message_final, (void *ctx))
Fallback strategies
Because existing providers haven't been updated to respond to the key type
query, some fallback strategies will be needed for the init calls that take
an explicitly fetched EVP_SIGNATURE
argument (they can at least be used
for pre-hashed digest operations). To find out if the EVP_PKEY
key type
is possible to use with the explicitly fetched algorithm, the following
fallback strategies may be used.
- Check if the fetched operation name matches the key type (keymgmt name)
of the
EVP_PKEY
that's involved in the operation. For example, this is useful when someone fetched theEVP_SIGNATURE
"RSA". This requires very little modification, as this is already done with the initializer functions that fetch the algorithm implicitly. - Check if the fetched algorithm name matches the name returned by the
keymgmt's
query_operation_name
function. For example, this is useful when someone fetched theEVP_SIGNATURE
"ECDSA", for which the key type to use is "EC". This requires very little modification, as this is already done with the initializer functions that fetch the algorithm implicitly.
If none of these strategies work out, the operation initialization should fail.